The Romanian and the battle of Odessa
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The Romanian and the battle of Odessa
I was reading on Victor site that the Romanian people didn't want the Romanian Army to go beyond the borders of Romania. Even High officers and politicians were against it. On july 27 1941, Hitler met with Antonescu and requested Romanian troops to take part in in the battle to take the port of Odessa.
Did the sentiment of the population changed during the course of the war, when the Axis forces had huge sucsess on the Eastern front?
Did the sentiment of the population changed during the course of the war, when the Axis forces had huge sucsess on the Eastern front?
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Re: The Romanian and the battle of Odessa
"High officers and politicians" had been against Germany all the time from 1933 onwards, and even more after 1940. Apparently, considering Hitler's diplomatic efforts from 1933 to 1939, the Germans desired far more an alliance with Romania, than did our "upper classes" desire an alliance with anyoneBenoit Douville wrote:I was reading on Victor site that the Romanian people didn't want the Romanian Army to go beyond the borders of Romania. Even High officers and politicians were against it. On july 27 1941, Hitler met with Antonescu and requested Romanian troops to take part in in the battle to take the port of Odessa.

The idea of not go beyond the borders of Romania(borders from before 1940, because the present-day border of Romania is on the Prut River and will remain there supposedly forever

A quote from Victor's site:
Emphase is mine."[...] I assume, in compliance with Your Excellency's desire, the security, order and safety of the territory between the Dniestr and the Dniper. It remains that the northern boundaries of this territory to be settled. As I have informed Mr. Minister von Killinger as well, I would not have the power, on account of the lack of means and proper officials, to assume the responsibility of administration and economic exploitation of the territory, but only between the Dniestr and the Bug, because the whole territory of Romania, and especially Bassarabia, needs total administrative and economical reconstruction and organization."
Answer of Ion Antonescu, on 17 August 1941, to the letter sent by Adolf Hitler on 14 August
So Hitler had asked Marshal Antonescu to occupy a territory, and Antonescu refused

~Ovidius
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The debate here was about the sentiment of the population, not about if it was the right thing to do. The population wasn’t too keen on the war beyond the 1940 borders. Many thought that the army should be preserved for the next conflict with Hungary. However, these did not take into account the fact that a war is over only when it is won. And that means to go after your enemy and finish him (just like the Soviets did). The stop at the Dniester idea was not a realistic one.
In fact life in Romania during 1941-43 didn't really look like the one of a country in war.
Here is a note by Constantin Radulescu Motru (a Romanian professor of sociology) made on 14 August 1943:
At all the people I met in Craiova I noticed in their attitude an almost angel-like peace. With all the pessimistic news which go around, looks like Romania is not threatened by any danger. Could this be a sign of confidence or of recklessness? In the train with which I returned from Butoiesti, the people were only talking about parties, weddings, baths etc.
Food was not a problem, at least not the basics, unlike in some other countries in Europe. In a report of George Kennan, the US ambassador at Moscow to the State Department, he gives several factors which determined the Soviet attitude towards Romania.
Among these was:
The resent and jealousy for the relative prosperity the Russians saw in Nazi occupied Romania; a prosperity which offended them, because it contradicts their propaganda about the misery of the people in occupied Europe; a provocation at their idea that the living standards in the defeated countries should not be superior to the one in the Soviet Union.
In fact life in Romania during 1941-43 didn't really look like the one of a country in war.
Here is a note by Constantin Radulescu Motru (a Romanian professor of sociology) made on 14 August 1943:
At all the people I met in Craiova I noticed in their attitude an almost angel-like peace. With all the pessimistic news which go around, looks like Romania is not threatened by any danger. Could this be a sign of confidence or of recklessness? In the train with which I returned from Butoiesti, the people were only talking about parties, weddings, baths etc.
Food was not a problem, at least not the basics, unlike in some other countries in Europe. In a report of George Kennan, the US ambassador at Moscow to the State Department, he gives several factors which determined the Soviet attitude towards Romania.
Among these was:
The resent and jealousy for the relative prosperity the Russians saw in Nazi occupied Romania; a prosperity which offended them, because it contradicts their propaganda about the misery of the people in occupied Europe; a provocation at their idea that the living standards in the defeated countries should not be superior to the one in the Soviet Union.
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At least not until August 1, 1943,...Victor wrote:In fact life in Romania during 1941-43 didn't really look like the one of a country in war.
Here is a note by Constantin Radulescu Motru (a Romanian professor of sociology) made on 14 August 1943:
At all the people I met in Craiova I noticed in their attitude an almost angel-like peace. With all the pessimistic news which go around, looks like Romania is not threatened by any danger. Could this be a sign of confidence or of recklessness? In the train with which I returned from Butoiesti, the people were only talking about parties, weddings, baths etc.

"Occupied"? This is not quite in line with the facts, but we have to say so... otherwise some annoying persons will begin to ask why did the Romanian government organized certain "operations", if not from "orders of the military occupant".....Victor wrote:Food was not a problem, at least not the basics, unlike in some other countries in Europe. In a report of George Kennan, the US ambassador at Moscow to the State Department, he gives several factors which determined the Soviet attitude towards Romania.
Among these was:
The resent and jealousy for the relative prosperity the Russians saw in Nazi occupied Romania; a prosperity which offended them, because it contradicts their propaganda about the misery of the people in occupied Europe; a provocation at their idea that the living standards in the defeated countries should not be superior to the one in the Soviet Union.

~Ovidius
PS If my "occupation theory" above seems unclear, take a look here: http://www.thirdreichforum.com/phpBB2/v ... php?t=2093
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For Romania, it was a duty to fight beyond the Nistru... You cannot be victorious without defeating an entire army... So you MUST march on. It would mean cowardise and opportunism to have let the Germans fought alone the bolshevik menace - after thousands of German soldiers had died for the liberation of Bessarabia. Antonescu was a sincere person, not a coward conspirator as Maniu, Bratianu, the king or the communist foreigners. The act of 23rd August was a disaster, maybe one of the darkest days of Romania's history... - More than 170,000 soldiers lost and some 150,000 captured by the "friendly" Reds... The 6th German army, who was rebuild, was once again destroyed, and this time, far more terrible than Stalingrad!
As for Odesa, the Romanians lost some 70,000 and the Sovuets some 80,000. This "disaster" was caused mainly by the commanders's obsolete tactics. The Romanian Army didn't have modern field guns or mortars ( Obsolete field guns of 75 mm and 60mm mortars). The Soviets had many machine guns, and the Romanians were forced to take them by assault like in the Russian-Romanian-Turkish war of 1877-1878...
This "defeat" awakened the Romanian commanders to modern warfare.

As for Odesa, the Romanians lost some 70,000 and the Sovuets some 80,000. This "disaster" was caused mainly by the commanders's obsolete tactics. The Romanian Army didn't have modern field guns or mortars ( Obsolete field guns of 75 mm and 60mm mortars). The Soviets had many machine guns, and the Romanians were forced to take them by assault like in the Russian-Romanian-Turkish war of 1877-1878...
This "defeat" awakened the Romanian commanders to modern warfare.

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Both Maniu and Bratianu had expressed their opinions frankly to Antonescu. I do not see in what way they were cowards. As for the King, he just did what Antonescu preserved him for.Maresal-06 wrote: Antonescu was a sincere person, not a coward conspirator as Maniu, Bratianu, the king or the communist foreigners.
In fact "only" about 110,000 were taken after 24 August. The casualties between 20-23 August numbered 77,177 men (8,305 dead, 24,989 wounded and 43,883 missing). But keep in mind that without 23 August there would be a smaller Romania right know. You also have the benefit of hindsight. Remember that in 1944, the king and the others did not know that Romania had already been given to the Soviet Union by the western Allies. They still hoped that the West would not abandon them. In that case the Allies would surely not deal with a dictator (Antonescu), but with the leaders of the democratic parties.Maresal-06 wrote: The act of 23rd August was a disaster, maybe one of the darkest days of Romania's history... - More than 170,000 soldiers lost and some 150,000 captured by the "friendly" Reds...
Nope, the Romanians had 98,156 casualties (18,730 dead, 67,955 wounded and 11,471 missing).Maresal-06 wrote: As for Odesa, the Romanians lost some 70,000 and the Sovuets some 80,000.
The Red Army and ChF had 41,268 casualties (16,578 dead and missing, 24,690 wounded).
The large Romanian casualties can be explained through the fact that the city had been heavily fortified: 250 km of AT ditches, trenches and bunkers, 45 km of barb wire and over 40,000 mines. Also the sea lanes were open, because the Romanian Royal Navy's size did not permit it to engage the ChF and the airforce already had its hands full. The poor tactical initiative of many of the officers also contributed to this and frontal assaults were common. The Romanian pioneers were not trained according to the assault pioneer concept of the Wehrmacht and were not as effective. The lack of a dedicated assault aircraft to support the infantry was another drawback (just look at Sevastopol).
The battle was a disaster for the Romanian public opinion. This is why Antonescu gave the order not to publish anymore the casualties.
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Antonescu was very furious when he heard about the casualties ant the weakness of the operations... He shouted on an aged reserve officer riding on a cart while his men marched: "IF YOU CAN'T CARRY YOUR DUTIES BECAUSE YOU ARE TOO OLD AND SOFT, YOU HAD BEST SHOOT YOURSELF"...Victor wrote:Both Maniu and Bratianu had expressed their opinions frankly to Antonescu. I do not see in what way they were cowards. As for the King, he just did what Antonescu preserved him for.Maresal-06 wrote: Antonescu was a sincere person, not a coward conspirator as Maniu, Bratianu, the king or the communist foreigners.
By 1943-1944, Maniu was conspirating against the legal government; he was secretely receiving messages from the "allies" and transmitting them to the king and other dissidents of Antonescu. Even if Maniu wasn't informed about 23rd August, he indirectly participated to treason. Same thing for Bratianu... But don't worry, they all paid with their lives... IN PRISON. That's what happening when you are pacting with the devil. The king was treacherous because the armistice terms of Mrs.Kollontay (Soviet ambassador in Stockholm/Sweden) to the chief of the state, marshal Antonescu. And not to the king. Antonescu was ready to discuss with Hitler, about an intelligent armistice who could save the two parties from heavy losses. And on 23rd August, Antonescu planned to go on the Moldavian front. The plan was that the Soviet Offensive Iasi-Chisinau be stopped on the fortified line Focsani-Namoloasa, were Antonescu moved some 88mm anti-aircraft guns from Ploiesti, and "transformed" them in AT guns, to face the heavier Soviet armour. The Germans did the same with a part of their guns... And by this time, our "lovely" allies were bombing savagely civilian towns as Craiova, Turnu-Severin etc...
Maresal-06 wrote: The act of 23rd August was a disaster, maybe one of the darkest days of Romania's history... - More than 170,000 soldiers lost and some 150,000 captured by the "friendly" Reds...
In fact "only" about 110,000 were taken after 24 August. The casualties between 20-23 August numbered 77,177 men (8,305 dead, 24,989 wounded and 43,883 missing). But keep in mind that without 23 August there would be a smaller Romania right know. You also have the benefit of hindsight. Remember that in 1944, the king and the others did not know that Romania had already been given to the Soviet Union by the western Allies. They still hoped that the West would not abandon them. In that case the Allies would surely not deal with a dictator (Antonescu), but with the leaders of the democratic parties.
The number varies very much. When I say "More than 170,000 soldiers lost" I also mention the Germans. As for the 150,000 captured, your 110,000 is SOVIET PROPAGANDA. There was NO "only". There was just "TOO MUCH"! Let me say that in Axworthy's book "Third Axis, Fourth Ally", he talks about a number of 150,000. In another book, "Armata Romana in al doilea razboi mondial 1941-1945 by Alesandru Dutu, Florica Dobre and Leonida Loghin, Editura Enciclopedica - Bucuresti 1999, at the "DEZARMAREA DIVIZIILOR ROMANE PE FRONTUL DIN MOLDOVA DE CATRE SOVIETICI DUPA 23 AUGUST 1944, the Romanian commission for the armistice declared the number of 160,000. After the personal declaration of a saylor taken prisoner by the Soviets, there were thousands of cattle wagons full of Romanian and German prisoners taking the route of Siberia, from the Moldavian front.
Nope, the Romanians had 98,156 casualties (18,730 dead, 67,955 wounded and 11,471 missing).Maresal-06 wrote: As for Odesa, the Romanians lost some 70,000 and the Soviets some 80,000.
The Red Army and ChF had 41,268 casualties (16,578 dead and missing, 24,690 wounded).
The large Romanian casualties can be explained through the fact that the city had been heavily fortified: 250 km of AT ditches, trenches and bunkers, 45 km of barb wire and over 40,000 mines. Also the sea lanes were open, because the Romanian Royal Navy's size did not permit it to engage the ChF and the airforce already had its hands full. The poor tactical initiative of many of the officers also contributed to this and frontal assaults were common. The Romanian pioneers were not trained according to the assault pioneer concept of the Wehrmacht and were not as effective. The lack of a dedicated assault aircraft to support the infantry was another drawback (just look at Sevastopol).
"Including local manpower, the total Soviet commitment may have exceeded 120,000 men, on whom about 60,000 casualties were inflicted. It seems probable that the VARIOUS SOVIET RETURNS OF 16,578 OR 12,565 DEAD AND MISSING AND 24,690 OR 22,424 WOUDER ARE LIKELY TO BE TOO LIGHT" -> THIRD AXIS, FOURTH ALLY by Mark Axworthy, Cornel Scafes and Cristian Craciunoiu. page 58.
I also apologize, because my first statistics were wrong. But what I want to say is, that, for the total number of Romanian losses, we must expect just much higher Soviet ones. My great-uncle was on the Eastern Front, in a mortar company and after his stories, you can say: FOR EACH AXIS SOLDIER, 5-10 SOVIETS! It wasn't the case at Odesa for sure, but, the Soviets had equal, or maybe higher losses...
The battle was a disaster for the Romanian public opinion. This is why Antonescu gave the order not to publish anymore the casualties.