Best fighting allies
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Hi Andy,
Unfortuntely I would have to disagree about the level of support the Japanese provided the Germans indirectly, as mentioned before, the Asia-Pacific theatre's of war were secondary to the European theatre. In Geofferey Perret's biography of Douglas MacArthur, 'Old Soldiers Never Die', he highlights the dangerous situation the Pacific Allied forces were in:
"On paper he(MacArthur) commanded 480,000 soldiers, but in reality, most of his troops were Australian draftees"*
"The AMF(Australian Military Forces) was a half trained, poorly led, badly equipped militia that, under Australian law could not serve beyond the boundaries of Australia"
Thus the SWPA command was hardly poaching from German Fronts to gain troops in the battle against the Japanese. The war against the Japanese was considered such a low priority that out of total aircraft production, one third went to the British and Soviets under lend-lease, much of the rest went to the eighth and ninth air forces to aid them in the battle for air superiority over Europe. SWPA was even denied just 10% of the total, as being too high for the asia-pacific theatre of operations, it took a special approach by George Kenney to Roosevelt for any extra planes to be reassigned.
The case of naval forces assigned to SWPA, and of landing craft, is even more miserly:
"The U.S Seventh Fleet attached to SWPA consisted of three obsolescent cruisers, one American, the other two Australian"^
The landing flotilla was even more abysmal, considering that the European and African theatres receieved total and unquestioned priority:
"The Seventh Amphib(to service the Pacific region) was not going to boast anything more than four obsolescent destroyers converted to troop transport, six LSTs and roughly thirty landing craft"^
So it is clear that until the final days of the land campaign in Europe, the forces in the Asia-Pacific region were the bare minimum, indeed, the U.S state department, the joint chiefs of staff and Roosevelt perceived the objective in Asia-Pacific as a holding campaign, a stalemate, until the Germans had been defeated(it took charismatic generals such as MacArthur to lift the lethargy). Thus when significant forces had been diverted to fight the Japanese, it was too late to be of any assistance for the Germans, they had since been defeated.
*shortened version
^ From Geoffery Perret's 'Old Soldiers Never Die'
Cheers
Julian
Unfortuntely I would have to disagree about the level of support the Japanese provided the Germans indirectly, as mentioned before, the Asia-Pacific theatre's of war were secondary to the European theatre. In Geofferey Perret's biography of Douglas MacArthur, 'Old Soldiers Never Die', he highlights the dangerous situation the Pacific Allied forces were in:
"On paper he(MacArthur) commanded 480,000 soldiers, but in reality, most of his troops were Australian draftees"*
"The AMF(Australian Military Forces) was a half trained, poorly led, badly equipped militia that, under Australian law could not serve beyond the boundaries of Australia"
Thus the SWPA command was hardly poaching from German Fronts to gain troops in the battle against the Japanese. The war against the Japanese was considered such a low priority that out of total aircraft production, one third went to the British and Soviets under lend-lease, much of the rest went to the eighth and ninth air forces to aid them in the battle for air superiority over Europe. SWPA was even denied just 10% of the total, as being too high for the asia-pacific theatre of operations, it took a special approach by George Kenney to Roosevelt for any extra planes to be reassigned.
The case of naval forces assigned to SWPA, and of landing craft, is even more miserly:
"The U.S Seventh Fleet attached to SWPA consisted of three obsolescent cruisers, one American, the other two Australian"^
The landing flotilla was even more abysmal, considering that the European and African theatres receieved total and unquestioned priority:
"The Seventh Amphib(to service the Pacific region) was not going to boast anything more than four obsolescent destroyers converted to troop transport, six LSTs and roughly thirty landing craft"^
So it is clear that until the final days of the land campaign in Europe, the forces in the Asia-Pacific region were the bare minimum, indeed, the U.S state department, the joint chiefs of staff and Roosevelt perceived the objective in Asia-Pacific as a holding campaign, a stalemate, until the Germans had been defeated(it took charismatic generals such as MacArthur to lift the lethargy). Thus when significant forces had been diverted to fight the Japanese, it was too late to be of any assistance for the Germans, they had since been defeated.
*shortened version
^ From Geoffery Perret's 'Old Soldiers Never Die'
Cheers
Julian
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I would seriously dispute alot of that info Julian. The period your talking there would be at the very begining of America's entry into the pacific. 480,000 Australian home gaurd troops? ha ha!! you gotta be kidding me.
You see, Japan was rolling down every Island after Pearl Harbour and was held up once they reached New Guini by home troops (some other Aussie here can give the figures to the amount of them). The so called allied navy consisting of those ships were being rolled like 10 pins also.
It wasnt until Australia pulled out all troops out of Nth Africa against English wishes and sent to releave home troops, as well as cover from American planes that a true hold up of the Japanes began.
Although the Jap soldier may have been brave etc, I would dispute alot of methods as to the way of their supply lines went. Starvation of themselves beleiving that they were of a supior race was absolute laughter and extreme brutalilty shown to anyone as well as canabalism of other troops makes me vile to the point of I dont ever want to hear about them. Any itiotic troops can stand to the death like they did but I'd rather be Italian anyday

You see, Japan was rolling down every Island after Pearl Harbour and was held up once they reached New Guini by home troops (some other Aussie here can give the figures to the amount of them). The so called allied navy consisting of those ships were being rolled like 10 pins also.
It wasnt until Australia pulled out all troops out of Nth Africa against English wishes and sent to releave home troops, as well as cover from American planes that a true hold up of the Japanes began.
Although the Jap soldier may have been brave etc, I would dispute alot of methods as to the way of their supply lines went. Starvation of themselves beleiving that they were of a supior race was absolute laughter and extreme brutalilty shown to anyone as well as canabalism of other troops makes me vile to the point of I dont ever want to hear about them. Any itiotic troops can stand to the death like they did but I'd rather be Italian anyday


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Elsewhere in the Pacific the Japanese advance had been equally dramatic, reaching Lae and Salamaua in New Guinea by 8 March 1942. Following a Japanese landing in the Phillipines on 10 December 1941, Bataan surrendered on 9 April 1942 and Corregidor a month later. Fortunately the US Navy, supported by ships of the RAN, turned back a Japanese convoy headed for Port Moresby at the Battle of the Coral Sea on 5-8 May. After a further naval defeat at Midway on 4-6 June, the Japanese attempted an overland attack against Port Moresby.109
In December 1941 Australia's seven militia divisions were mobilised and, early in January 1942, Australia agreed to redeploy the 1st Australian Corps (6th and 7th Divisions ) from the Middle East to the Far East. At about the same time the Port Moresby garrison was strengthened by two militia battalions and other units. The destination of 1st Australian Corps was changed to Australia following the fall of Singapore.110
Now that sounds a bit better, the later number of troops would have consisted of both American and as mentioned 1st army cops of Australia who had been fighting in the African theatre.
In December 1941 Australia's seven militia divisions were mobilised and, early in January 1942, Australia agreed to redeploy the 1st Australian Corps (6th and 7th Divisions ) from the Middle East to the Far East. At about the same time the Port Moresby garrison was strengthened by two militia battalions and other units. The destination of 1st Australian Corps was changed to Australia following the fall of Singapore.110
Now that sounds a bit better, the later number of troops would have consisted of both American and as mentioned 1st army cops of Australia who had been fighting in the African theatre.
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Hi Napoli,
I think the history of the of the Japanese offensives is sufficiently well known and a recital is a tad out of place for this topic. I think you will find these estimates of manpower and Naval forces assigned to SWPA(as opposed to the navy) correct. The divisions you are referring to, are the Australian Imperial Forces, this included five first-clas infantry divisions, two of which, at the timw were serving in the middle east, MacArthur's American divisions with combat experience were the 32nd and the 41st. So given the 480,000 soldiers, MacArthur had the equivalent of sixteeen divisions, out of that were the 3 AIF divisions, with two American, leaving 10 divisions made up, or to be made up out of AMF manpower, sad bu true. As a result the extensive AMF troops, Curtin amended the rule that forbad them to fight outside Australia
Cheers
Julian
I think the history of the of the Japanese offensives is sufficiently well known and a recital is a tad out of place for this topic. I think you will find these estimates of manpower and Naval forces assigned to SWPA(as opposed to the navy) correct. The divisions you are referring to, are the Australian Imperial Forces, this included five first-clas infantry divisions, two of which, at the timw were serving in the middle east, MacArthur's American divisions with combat experience were the 32nd and the 41st. So given the 480,000 soldiers, MacArthur had the equivalent of sixteeen divisions, out of that were the 3 AIF divisions, with two American, leaving 10 divisions made up, or to be made up out of AMF manpower, sad bu true. As a result the extensive AMF troops, Curtin amended the rule that forbad them to fight outside Australia
Cheers
Julian
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Julian wrote:On paper he(MacArthur) commanded 480,000 soldiers, but in reality, most of his troops were Australian draftees"*
Out of 16 divisions, only 7 were home gaurd, that was my only real point to be made, sorry about the hassle Julian.
How did you come to the conclusion of 10 home gaurd divisions as my info was from the Australian army files?
Were abouts you from if you dont mind me asking?
Out of 16 divisions, only 7 were home gaurd, that was my only real point to be made, sorry about the hassle Julian.

How did you come to the conclusion of 10 home gaurd divisions as my info was from the Australian army files?
Were abouts you from if you dont mind me asking?
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Hi Napoli,
I guess the main point was, the lack of support SWPA and the Asia-Pacific theatres received in general from the JCS and CCS, for the bulk of the war years the Pacifc was considered a backwater, receiving the 'left overs' after arms and equipment had been distributed to the European Fronts and the Soviets. I think it was a pretty amazing performance, that the Australian and American forces there(in New Guineau) were able to achieve so much with so little. A lot of MacArthur's biographies(American Ceasar, Old Soldiers Never Die), describe the disillusionment the Genearl felt upon arriving in Australia to see the paucity of resources there to fight the Japanese. By the way I'm from Melbourne, Australia
Cheers
Julian
I guess the main point was, the lack of support SWPA and the Asia-Pacific theatres received in general from the JCS and CCS, for the bulk of the war years the Pacifc was considered a backwater, receiving the 'left overs' after arms and equipment had been distributed to the European Fronts and the Soviets. I think it was a pretty amazing performance, that the Australian and American forces there(in New Guineau) were able to achieve so much with so little. A lot of MacArthur's biographies(American Ceasar, Old Soldiers Never Die), describe the disillusionment the Genearl felt upon arriving in Australia to see the paucity of resources there to fight the Japanese. By the way I'm from Melbourne, Australia
Cheers
Julian
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Hi Napoli & Julian
Both of you back up your relative arguements with stats that I cant prove or disprove into how the drive into the Pacific effected each side, but surely any percentage be it averaged out or not was aiding the Germans by just not being available to the forces fighting the Germans?. I could be wrong on this point but as I mentioned earlier wasn't the lack of landing craft within the European sphere caused by the high percentage of them being sent to the Pacific, thus delaying allied amphib op's in Europe-surely that was beneficial to the Germans!
Andy from the Shire
Both of you back up your relative arguements with stats that I cant prove or disprove into how the drive into the Pacific effected each side, but surely any percentage be it averaged out or not was aiding the Germans by just not being available to the forces fighting the Germans?. I could be wrong on this point but as I mentioned earlier wasn't the lack of landing craft within the European sphere caused by the high percentage of them being sent to the Pacific, thus delaying allied amphib op's in Europe-surely that was beneficial to the Germans!

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julian's Statistics and Japan Military Effort
Julian,
Even if you are correct with you statistics (which seem to only primarily focus on the opening year of the campaign in the Pacific), what other Axis power (besides Germany) had such a percentage of the US economy and manpower dedicated to its destruction from 1941-1945? The Italians and Romanians together never had the same amounts of US airpower and naval power set aside and dedicated toward their destruction, even simultaneously, as were set aside for the destruction of the Japanese Empire. Japan alone had more US power dedicated against it from May 1945 until September 1945, then Italy did throughout the entire conflict. When you look at the total effort in the Pacific from 1942 until September 1943, the US had greater assets set aside to combat Japan then was deployed against Italy or Romania. Meanwhile, Germany had to send units throughout Europe to bolster many of their allies, like Finland, and it has been argued often in the past that many of them were a drain to the Third Reich (like Italy) and not an asset, but this cannot be argued about Japan. At no time during the entire conflict did the Third Reich send any units into the Pacific, which they couldn’t have done anyways, because the Japanese fought the conflict almost single-handedly. So in economic and military terms Japan drew off more US power then any other Axis nation that could have been used against Germany. By far, the Japanese Empire was the best-allied nation Germany had simply by its existence in political, economic and in military terms.
James
Even if you are correct with you statistics (which seem to only primarily focus on the opening year of the campaign in the Pacific), what other Axis power (besides Germany) had such a percentage of the US economy and manpower dedicated to its destruction from 1941-1945? The Italians and Romanians together never had the same amounts of US airpower and naval power set aside and dedicated toward their destruction, even simultaneously, as were set aside for the destruction of the Japanese Empire. Japan alone had more US power dedicated against it from May 1945 until September 1945, then Italy did throughout the entire conflict. When you look at the total effort in the Pacific from 1942 until September 1943, the US had greater assets set aside to combat Japan then was deployed against Italy or Romania. Meanwhile, Germany had to send units throughout Europe to bolster many of their allies, like Finland, and it has been argued often in the past that many of them were a drain to the Third Reich (like Italy) and not an asset, but this cannot be argued about Japan. At no time during the entire conflict did the Third Reich send any units into the Pacific, which they couldn’t have done anyways, because the Japanese fought the conflict almost single-handedly. So in economic and military terms Japan drew off more US power then any other Axis nation that could have been used against Germany. By far, the Japanese Empire was the best-allied nation Germany had simply by its existence in political, economic and in military terms.
James
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Hi guys,
In a way Germany was already in the Pacific theatre before the Pearl Harbour attack.
U-boats where even patroling and mine laying in both gulfs of Sth Australia, An attack confirmed on Cape Jaffa. Many patroling both West and East coasts of Australia in general and also the threat of German raider ships which probably the most famous being the sinking of HMAS Sydney by the raider Korman (which subsequently also sank). So in a way there was direct; and indirect support to Japan in that way as stopping shipping from Australia to England was the main priority. Although it may not seem much, just the threat would have been enough to slow things down to a point.
The terain in New Guinea would have helped the Australians like it did in Vietnam to the Vietcong in the fact that it was close range heavy hand to hand sometime jungle fighting which would have suited the larger Australians as well as knowing the next stop being Australia made the situation more desperate as heavy bombing had started on Darwin already. Had the terrain been a desert, the outcome most probably would have been different.
Jlees, I agree but the thought of no America in the Euro theatre would have been a better compromise than Germany joining Japans war on America. England being swept aside in Nth Africa and sent back home and all concentrations put on Russia would almost have been the end of their campains, but who knows?
In a way Germany was already in the Pacific theatre before the Pearl Harbour attack.
U-boats where even patroling and mine laying in both gulfs of Sth Australia, An attack confirmed on Cape Jaffa. Many patroling both West and East coasts of Australia in general and also the threat of German raider ships which probably the most famous being the sinking of HMAS Sydney by the raider Korman (which subsequently also sank). So in a way there was direct; and indirect support to Japan in that way as stopping shipping from Australia to England was the main priority. Although it may not seem much, just the threat would have been enough to slow things down to a point.
The terain in New Guinea would have helped the Australians like it did in Vietnam to the Vietcong in the fact that it was close range heavy hand to hand sometime jungle fighting which would have suited the larger Australians as well as knowing the next stop being Australia made the situation more desperate as heavy bombing had started on Darwin already. Had the terrain been a desert, the outcome most probably would have been different.
Jlees, I agree but the thought of no America in the Euro theatre would have been a better compromise than Germany joining Japans war on America. England being swept aside in Nth Africa and sent back home and all concentrations put on Russia would almost have been the end of their campains, but who knows?

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Japan
Napoli,
I agree with you 100% it would have been better for Germany if all the US forces were sent against Japan. There is no question on this point, but the issue was who was the best nation fighting on Germany's side and that still has to be Japan for all the stated reasons.
James
I agree with you 100% it would have been better for Germany if all the US forces were sent against Japan. There is no question on this point, but the issue was who was the best nation fighting on Germany's side and that still has to be Japan for all the stated reasons.
James
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The supporters of the bizarre theory that Japan was Germany's best ally, slip blissfully into several blatant misconceptions over what actually constitutes the term 'best ally'. The main argument seems to be, 'the U.S was Germany's most potent foe, therefore, since Japan was fighting the U.S, Japan is the best ally', an ss argument, simplistic and spurious. Strategically and tactically, Japan and Germany were fighting different wars, a world apart, the much vaunted Tripartite Pact not worth the paper it was written on(witness the vacillation of Italy during the battle of France). Japan and Germany conflicted in their objectives on the one issue that would prove vitally important, the war against the Soviet Union, the Germans as time progressed desperately needed Japan to open a second front against the Soviets and tie down the Soviet forces in the far-east, the Japanese were logistically incapable and unwilling to open a front against the Soviets. Instead the Japanese brought the entry into the war of the Americans, Guderian was critical of the declaring of war against the Americans, as he put it, there was much latitude to be obtained out of the status quo(the undeclared war against the Americans) without embarking upon a declared war. Compared to the Soviets, until 1944, the German allocation of forces against the Americans was negligible, so the Japanese, unwilling to support the Germans against their greatest adversary, the Soviets, instead brought a fresh combatant to the table. The Japanese may rightly claim that 'the Germans are our greatest allies' the JCS dictum of 'Europe first' greatly reduced the U.S forces confronting the Imperial Army, however the benefits were all one way, Germany ended up confronting both the Soviet Union and the U.S, unaided in battle with the former, and confronting the bulk of the latter's forces. This is not a debate as to whom 'could' have made the best ally(because of Japan's military strength, infrastructure etc), but who actually did, and Germany's war was largely a European, East-European affair, with the non -European power(the U.S) only making a decisive entrance in 1944. The reason for the American lethargy was not due to lack of landing craft, but the decline of the U.S military post WW1, the U.S military at the start of WW2 was incredibly deficient, as noted by MacArthur and Marshall.
Cheers
Julian
P.S I'm prepared to put up with a lot, but Napoli, that was just not called for, all I can say is, the Crows and Carey(traitor!!) deserve each other
Cheers
Julian
P.S I'm prepared to put up with a lot, but Napoli, that was just not called for, all I can say is, the Crows and Carey(traitor!!) deserve each other

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Back to Japan Again
There is no "blatant misconceptions over what actually constitutes the term 'best ally,” Japan was Germany's best and in fact main ally throughout the entire conflict. It is immaterial where they were on the maps, if many of the US and British units could have been sent against the Germans and were not because they were fighting the Japs, then it helped Germany. No other Axis power drew off more allied troops away from Germany and took them on single-handedly then any other Axis nation then Japan. While Germany had to send troops, equipment and financial support to assist other Axis powers (like Italy, Romania and Finland), they sent basically nothing to Japan throughout the entire conflict. Just think what the British forces could had done with the 100,000 man Singapore Garrison in North Africa in 1941 or 1942, instead of having them sit POW camps constructing Japanese railroads. There was also large number of Commonwealth troops in India and Burma during the war that could have enlarged the British 8th Army in size. This is even overlooking the supplies sent to the Pacific to support these troops that could have been used by the 8th Army too. Or how decisive US airpower really could have been if many of their air assets were not deployed in the Pacific, but sent (100%) just against Germany in 1944/45. Or, maybe having all the landing craft in the Atlantic instead of a large percentage in the Pacific. How affective could the Allies have been in the Atlantic against the U-Boats with both American and British fleets in that body of water instead of divided throughout the globe because they were also fighting the Japanese? The US would have also been able to deploy all six US Marine Divisions in Europe if there was no Japanese enemy too. Just think what an amphibious multiplier the Allies would have had with six Marine Divisions and other Allied troops in the Atlantic instead of the Pacific. No, I think there maybe a need to develop a better understanding of what actually constitutes an ally among everyone here and Japan nicely fits into the picture as the best. But it the interest of fair play, we'll limit the discussion to just Axis allies in Europe as Julian suggested.
James
James
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Ho hum
Hi JLees,
I have no objection to allies being found from all the corners of the globe, should evidence be adduced in their favor, however the mish-mash confronting me in your post is hardly likely to adduce anything, except the ability of the written word to outrun the thoughts behind it. I'm thouroughly impressed, it was obviously quite an effort in self-control to avoid responding to any of my points, 'the ignore and reply' tactic, but let me see if I can make sense of your spaghetti like reply.
Now when you say, 'drew off so many troops' whose troops does this refer to? did the British leave the desert campaign in mid-battle? I think the vagueness of this reply speaks for itself. When you refer to Commonwealth troops in India and Burma, are you referring to the permanent garrisions, from the Indian Army, mainly native troops, whose existence was to counter threats other than the off chance the Japanese might invade. Given then that garrisons would have to exist in these regions, would you have figures on the forces to be withdrawn, or will these just remain 'troops' as in lots of 'troops', stacks of 'troops' etc.
Of course, expert as you are in 'troop' dispositions, you would realize that the lack of landing craft depended upon the lack of landing craft, not the over-utilisation of such craft in the pacific. As I have pointed out repeatedly, the European theatre took priority in equipment, men and supplies as per JCS(joint Chiefs of Staff) resolutions. Your comments upon Naval dispositions ignores of course that the British Navy was the dominant naval force in the European theatre and that the Uboat threat had resided by 1942-1943, and while the allied airforces might have benefited from the addition of a few hundreds more planes(though it is hard to see where the aircraft carrier would have proved overly useful), the early entry of Japan by bringing the other superpower, U.S, to join the Soviet Union in pounding on the gates of Germany, was certainly no great benefit.
The U.S may not have joined the war if not for Japan, the Japanese attack allowed Roosevelt to finally circumvent congress and push America into the second world war, previous to Pearl Harbour, congress and indeed the American public was not supportive of U.S entry into a European war. So the Japanese provided one superpower foe for Germany and refused to help with the other, but as Jlees, with his usual succinct analysis, puts it, the Japanese very kindly decided to help with the country they already attacked, Germany should be eternally grateful
Cheers
Julian
I have no objection to allies being found from all the corners of the globe, should evidence be adduced in their favor, however the mish-mash confronting me in your post is hardly likely to adduce anything, except the ability of the written word to outrun the thoughts behind it. I'm thouroughly impressed, it was obviously quite an effort in self-control to avoid responding to any of my points, 'the ignore and reply' tactic, but let me see if I can make sense of your spaghetti like reply.
Now when you say, 'drew off so many troops' whose troops does this refer to? did the British leave the desert campaign in mid-battle? I think the vagueness of this reply speaks for itself. When you refer to Commonwealth troops in India and Burma, are you referring to the permanent garrisions, from the Indian Army, mainly native troops, whose existence was to counter threats other than the off chance the Japanese might invade. Given then that garrisons would have to exist in these regions, would you have figures on the forces to be withdrawn, or will these just remain 'troops' as in lots of 'troops', stacks of 'troops' etc.
Of course, expert as you are in 'troop' dispositions, you would realize that the lack of landing craft depended upon the lack of landing craft, not the over-utilisation of such craft in the pacific. As I have pointed out repeatedly, the European theatre took priority in equipment, men and supplies as per JCS(joint Chiefs of Staff) resolutions. Your comments upon Naval dispositions ignores of course that the British Navy was the dominant naval force in the European theatre and that the Uboat threat had resided by 1942-1943, and while the allied airforces might have benefited from the addition of a few hundreds more planes(though it is hard to see where the aircraft carrier would have proved overly useful), the early entry of Japan by bringing the other superpower, U.S, to join the Soviet Union in pounding on the gates of Germany, was certainly no great benefit.
The U.S may not have joined the war if not for Japan, the Japanese attack allowed Roosevelt to finally circumvent congress and push America into the second world war, previous to Pearl Harbour, congress and indeed the American public was not supportive of U.S entry into a European war. So the Japanese provided one superpower foe for Germany and refused to help with the other, but as Jlees, with his usual succinct analysis, puts it, the Japanese very kindly decided to help with the country they already attacked, Germany should be eternally grateful
Cheers
Julian