Paris Under the Nazis: Happy Days?

[Boby]

Hello all

In the website of "Ullstein bild", there are 27 pages of color pictures (658 in all) of Paris under German occupation. The pictures were taken by André Zucca.

Paris unter deutscher Besatzung - Farbfotografien
http://www.ullsteinbild.de/

Best Regards
Boby,

[David Thompson]

A cool link! Thanks, Boby.

[Patzinak]

The essential point being made by the person who started this thread was that the German occupation of France was relatively humane.

Oh. Is that what "Paris Under the Nazis: Happy Days?" meant? Well, not so long ago, the vet told my friend her cat had to be euthanised. He administered to the animal a pain killer, a sedative, and then a lethal injection. The cat died in my friend's arms -- painlessly, for all I could tell. That was "relatively humane" -- and I can absolutely positively guarantee that it wasn't "happy days", or "happy hours", or "happy minutes", or happy any blinking thing at all.

My messages on this thread have addressed the question of whether the German occupation authorities inflicted great suffering on the French people […] My view is that they did not […]

And you have provided a welter of evidence in support -- or have you?

The standard of living of most of the French population was lower during the war than it had been up to 1940, but that outcome was due primarily to general wartime conditions […]

So, then, it wasn't happy -- whatever the reasons?

[…] the war and the French defeat had led to widespread unemployment in France, caused by a fall in economic activity. […]

Which, naturally, the French populace blamed on the German occupation. Hence their not experiencing "happy days". Right?!

[…] French workers in Germany were paid higher wages than in France,

How much higher? According to Aly, "wages [for forced laborers] were 15 to 40% lower than those for German workers" (p156). But that's not all -- in "the case of agriculture, Berlin kept wages [for foreign labourers] artificially low, creating […] an indirect subsidy for [German] farmers to the tune of at least 3.5 billion marks" (p162).

and provided a benefit to the French economy through their remittances to their relatives at home. […]

They did?

In the first six months after the French capitulation […] more than half a billion reichsmarks owed to families of French workers 'employed' in Germany were confiscated by the treasury and paid out in francs from the occupation budget. […]

And let's not forget that the Germans manipulated the exchange rate specifically to plunder France. But that's not all, because, in practice, "the Reich appropriated 60 to 70 percent of the wages" paid by Daimler-Benz and Krupp to foreign workers (p162).

rather like the movement of Mexican labour to the United States […]

Have you done research in this field, or have you had any personal experience with it? Alternatively, can you provide references and data to support such a comparison? If not, I suggest leaving Mexican labour in the US to those interested in the subject, and let's stick to nos moutons.

Initially, the movement of French labour to Germany was voluntary […], but by late 1943 French workers had become very reluctant […] mainly because work in German factories had become very hazardous […]

Data and specific supporting evidence, please. The author you yourself invoked does not support such a view; in the paper I quoted in the previous post, Milward, citing German military sources, ascribes it to "the hostility aroused by German economic policy [in occupied France], especially by the increasing brutality of the labour 'actions'" (p343).

That is why Germany resorted to the draft, which however it could not impose unilaterally on France, but only introduce with the agreement of the French Government. […]

See the quote from Milward in my previous message, which shows clearly that Sauckel (with Hitler's approval) imposed unilaterally and without any consultation with the French the quota he wanted; he merely announced it to the French (who, naturally enough, protested bitterly, but to no avail). According to Milward, the whole debate on producing in France vs forced French labour was a German dispute:

The dispute between Sauckel and Speer has tended to be understood as a dispute about spheres of authority […]. But […] it was a dispute of deep principles over the nature of the National Socialist revolution. The victor was Sauckel because in the last resort Hitler remained faithful to the fascist revolution. […]

IOW, it was a dispute involving two different perspectives on the Großraumwirtschaft, but in which the French had no input. Theirs not to reason why, theirs but…

[…] Milward in his book (of which the article quoted by Patzinak is largely an abstract) […]

It is? You amaze me, Holmes. I was under the impression that it was an essay on an aspect which is touched upon in the book, but would have fitted ill there. Please tell me more.

[…] One of the most important points […]

Fascinating, no doubt, but not germane to "Happy Days" in Paris under the Nazi heel. Encore une fois, restons à nos moutons, SVP!

--Patzinak

[michael mills]

Patzinak posted this quote from Aly:

Aly, p157, wrote:
In the first six months after the French capitulation […] more than half a billion reichsmarks owed to families of French workers 'employed' in Germany were confiscated by the treasury and paid out in francs from the occupation budget. […]

and made this comment of his own:

And let's not forget that the Germans manipulated the exchange rate specifically to plunder France.

Aly has been criticised for his misunderstanding of economic data and processes, and it may be that Patzinak has been led astray by placing too much trust in Aly's faulty comprehension of the mechanics of international monetary transfers.

The process described above is simply a normal process whereby a value accrued in one country and denominated in that country's currency is transferred to another country and converted into the currency of that country.

In the above case, French workers in Germany had earned wages denominated in Reichsmarks, and wanted to send part of those wages back to their families in France. The firms owing the wages to the French workers withhold the part of them to be remitted, and pay that part in Reichsmarks to the German Treasury. The German Treasury, through its agents in France, pays to the families of the workers, from its reserves of francs, an amount in francs equivalent to the amount in Reichsmarks withheld from the workers' wages and paid to it by the firms employing the workers. It is hardly a case of "confiscation".

Here is the process expressed in a simple formula that I hope will be comprehensible to simple pastoral nomads such as Pechenegs:

• A German firm owes an amount of Reichsmarks to the family of one of its French workers, for the labour services of that worker.
• The French Government owes an amount of francs to the German Treasury incurred under obligations agreed to in the armistice of June 1940.
• The German firm pays the Reichsmark amount to the German Treasury.
• An agent of the German Treasury in France directs the French Government to pay to the worker's family a sum of francs equivalent to the Reichsmark amount paid to the German Treasury, and to debit that sum from the amount of francs owed by the French Government.
• The French Government pays the sum in francs to the worker's family.

The comment made by Patzinak about the devaluation of the French currency imposed by Germany shows an ignorance of the effects of movements in currencies relative to each other. The devaluation of a nation's currency, whether artificial or caused by market forces, increases the purchasing power within the economy of that nation of the holders of currencies against which that devaluation takes place; ie a given amount in Reichsmarks can buy more in France than it could prior to the devaluation.

It has been stated that the devaluation of the franc resulted in an exchage rate of 5 Pfennig to the franc, or 20 francs to the Reichsmark. That means that a sum of half a billion Reichsmark owed to the families of French workers in Germany had the purchasing power of 10 billion francs in France. Accordingly, the families of the workers received a far greater purchasing power in France than they would have received prior to the devaluation, a net benefit to them.

[JonS]

That is a typically rosy view of things, which is to be expected.

It convieniently ignores the purchasing power of Germans in France, be it occupation troops, or businessmen looking for assets.

German money moving from Germany to Franch could by much more 'stuff' than it could in Germany due to the forced, artificial devaluation. Thus, anyone with German money could plunder the French economy. This was deliberate. This was policy. This was not good for France.

[JonS]

Accordingly, the families of the workers received a far greater purchasing power in France than they would have received prior to the devaluation, a net benefit to them.

Why, then, was there a distinct lack of Frenchmen flocking to Germany to make out like robber barons?

[lebel]

Don't forget that according to Armistice agreements , France had to pay for " German Occupation charges " about 450 millions of francs DAILY .
as a comparision 1FF 1940 = 0.4 USD 2007 ( In 1939 a brand new Citroen Traction Avant was worth 27000 FF )
............and with that money , and the rate 1 RM : 20 FF , you understand how germans could plunder France !!

[Patzinak]

Patzinak posted this quote from Aly:

[…] more than half a billion reichsmarks owed to families of French workers 'employed' in Germany were confiscated by the treasury and paid out in francs from the occupation budget. […]

[…] Aly has been criticised for his misunderstanding of economic data and processes […]

(1) The quote from Aly presented data, not Aly's "misunderstanding" of it. Therefore, any criticism of Aly's "misunderstanding" is irrelevant to the point.

(2) In a paper highly critical of "Hitlers Volkstaat" (of which "Hitler's Beneficiaries…" is the English-language version), Tooze wrote that Aly's "brilliantly lucid account of the importance of Reichskreditkassenscheine, the German currency of occupation, in rigging the terms of trade in Germany’s favour is a gift to teachers of economic history everywhere". So much for "misunderstanding of economic data". However, a discussion of Aly's book has no place here. OTOH, if you have references to show that Aly's figure -- the >RM0.5 billion -- is wrong, then, by all means, do please share them with us. As for the "confiscated", if you don't like that word, then how about replacing it with, "the currency control regulations that prevented [foreign] workers from personally taking savings home and required that they use the slow and complicated [Reich treasury] remittance channels" (Rhoades, p562)? Takes a little longer to write, but, as long as you're happy…

The process described above is simply a normal process […]

Thank you. You have provided a brilliant demonstration of three points.

(1) That, in school, one of us has skipped a few lessons in Economics.

(2) That -- with deep apologies for taking a somewhat personal tack -- you probably do not have friends in, and have not travelled to, eastern Europe and/or the former USSR. Otherwise, irrespective of theoretical grounding in Economics, you'd have had a practical grounding in the mechanics and meaning of remittances, currency transfers, and forced vs market currency exchange rates.

(3) That high-flying speculation is entertaining, but, without the benefit of supporting evidence and actual details (such as purchasing power or inflation), not particularly illuminating.

[…] The comment made by Patzinak about the devaluation of the French currency imposed by Germany shows an ignorance of the effects of movements in currencies relative to each other. […]

I humbly apologise for my ignorance; possibly I was misled by the actual, rather than imaginary, details of how German control of the exchange rate worked:

[…] the exchange rate between the franc and the mark, which had been set to benefit German buyers, was selectively manipulated: the official rate was one reichsmark to 20 francs, which represented a 25 percent devaluation of the prewar French currency, but for outstanding German accounts receivable, the prewar exchange rate was used. […]

Of course, if you have a scholarly study of the mechanism and impact of remittances of French workers in the Third Reich (a matter which, IIRC, Milward does not adequately cover), then I should be most interested to find out about it. Without meaning any disrespect whatever, I am somewhat less interested in your speculations and conjectures, fascinating though they may be.

At any rate, as it appears that all we have left to argue about is merely my dismal ignorance (which I freely confess), we do seem to have gained something.

First, we seem to have dropped the somewhat curious -- and, naturally, unsupported -- notion that, "the German occupation […] was always only a military occupation, never a political one".

Second, we also seem to have disposed of the notion that, for the French peasant, German occupation was a "happy time"; as for the French economy, see also http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 2#p1211742.

Third, we finally seem to have set to rest the notion that "Paris Under the Nazis" meant "Happy Days" for France.

All in all, not too shabby a result for our efforts, IMHO -- but then, simple pastoral nomads are notorious for being easily pleased…

Sources:

• Aly, G (2007) Hitler's Beneficiaries : Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi Welfare State. 1st US ed, New York: Metropolitan Books. ISBN 0805079262.
  
  Rhoades, RE (1978) Foreign Labor and German Industrial Capitalism 1871–1978: The Evolution of a Migratory System. Am Ethnol 5(3): 553–73.

--Patzinak

[michael mills]

First, we seem to have dropped the somewhat curious -- and, naturally, unsupported -- notion that, "the German occupation […] was always only a military occupation, never a political one".

Absolutely not, we have not dropped that "notion", or to be more precise, we are not ignoring that historical fact.

The whole of France remained under the political and administrative control of the French Government, which was temporarily seated at Vichy, having moved there before the French surrender. The prefectural administration throughout France, both in the occupied zone and the unoccupied zone, took its orders from the ministers of the French Government in Vichy, not from German military administrators. Wherever German officials in the occupied zone made requests of French officials, the latter did not comply unless they received instructions to do so.

An example is provided by the actions of the late Maurice Papon, who during the war was a sub-prefect in the Bordeaux area with responsibility for Jewish affairs. When he received a request from German police officials to provide Jews from Bordeaux for extraordinary rendition, he first applied to the French police chief in Paris, Jean Leguay, for instructions. When the latter, as representative of the French Government, gave approval, Papon complied with the German request.

The occupation agreed to under the terms of the armistice was a military one, in that it allowed German forces to be stationed in parts of France for the purpose of pursuing the war with Britain. To that end, all military infrastructure in the occupied zone was handed over to the German forces for their use, and all French military forces withdrew into the unoccupied zone. The only police powers that the German occupiers had in the occupied zone were those necessary for the security of the German armed forces, ie the German military police could pursue and arrest residents of France who carried out illegal acts against the German forces, but could not arrest French civilians for other reasons, except with the permission of the French Government.

The German occupation of parts of France, and after 1942 of the whole of the country, was therefore different from the post-war Allied occupation of Germany, where the German state had been abolished and its sovereign power transferred to the military administrations set up by the Allied occupiers. Such was never the case in France.

[Patzinak]

First, we seem to have dropped the somewhat curious -- and, naturally, unsupported -- notion that, "the German occupation […] was always only a military occupation, never a political one".

Absolutely not, we have not dropped that "notion", or to be more precise, we are not ignoring that historical fact. […]

Oh? In that case (and with a strong feeling of déjà vu), I respectfully suggest that you start a new thread, perhaps titled, "Character of the German Military Occupation in France", in which you can do what you have been asked -- but haven't done so far --, ie, explain whether you refer to the ensemble of German authorities, including SS and Abetz, or just to the MBF, provide supporting sources, and provide an explanation for German involvement in such purely political matters as the release of Laval and Déat or the formation of RNP, and discuss such matters as the applicability of Vichy legislation without German approval, control of French press, etc.

I'm looking forward to pertinent quotes from Paxton, Burrin, Jackson -- and, no doubt, others, with which, I'm sure, you're far more familiar than I am.

--Patzinak

[michael mills]

I have now had a chance to consult again the book by Milward "The New Order and the French Economy", and have found the following passages as the source of some of the points made by me in earlier posts.

1. Remittances by French workers in Germany:

Page274:

The sums transferred by French workers in Germany back to France seem to have been greater than those transferred from Germany by any other ethnic group. The only similarly large number of workers of the same nationality were the Russians, and since they were women, and less skilled and more discriminated against, their earnings were much lower. In 1943 at least 277,046,200 Reichsmarks were sent back to France. For the first six months of 1944 the total amount was almost as great.

2. Wages paid to French workers by German employers:

Page 134:

Wages paid to French workers on German construction projects, as, for example, the West Wall, in which construction was particularly active in 1943, were much above the level of permitted wages in France, and this was one of the most potent sources of black-market operations.

(The phrase "permitted wages" is a reference to the wage controls introduced by the french Government to estrain inflationary pressures).

Page 162: (From a passage dealing with Sauckel's negotiations with French Government officials in Paris on 23 November 1943)

Secondly, he insisted that there should be no pay increase in France but that the level of wages there should be brought back to the 1939 level. Wage increases narrowed the vital differential which induced foreign workers to work in the Reich.

On another matter, it is apparent from the quibbling by Patzinak that the meaining of "politocal occupation" is not entirely clear. A political occupation is one where the sovereign power of a state over all or part of its territory is extiguinshed, and that power is exercised by foreign forces occupying that territory. An example of such a political occupation over the whole territory of a formerly soveriegn state would be the Allied occupation of post-war Germany, where the Military Government set up by the Allied occupiers had all the powers and carried out all the functions of the government of a sovereign state.

Such was clearly not the case in France from 1940 to 1944. The sovereign power of the French state was not extinguished on any part of its territory, except de facto in Alsace-Lorraine. The French Government located temporarily at Vichy exercised all the powers of the sovereign French state throughout its territory. It had agreed to allow German forces to be stationed on part of its territory for the purpose of pursuing the war with Britain, and had granted those forces certain rights on that part of its territory, including the right of self-defence against illegal attacks by French residents. Any actions that the German Government wished to have carried out on French territory, other than those related to the pursuit of the war against Britain permitted under the Armistice Agreement, had to be requested from and assented to by the french Government, as for example the arrest and detention of Jews for the purpose of extraordinary rendition.

Of course, the German Government did not hesitate to use its superior position of strength to lean on the French Government, so as to persuade it to do what the German Government wanted. But that is a normal phenomenon of relations between sovereign states, even today. Sometimes the French Government assented to German demands, sometimes it resisted, as for example when it initially refused to allow Jews with French citizenship to be arrested.

[David Thompson]

Michael -- You wrote:

On another matter, it is apparent from the quibbling by Patzinak that the meaining of "politocal occupation" is not entirely clear.

This is the first and only time the term "political occupation" has come up in this 7-page thread. How is it relevant to the topic?

You also wrote:

The sovereign power of the French state was not extinguished on any part of its territory, except de facto in Alsace-Lorraine. The French Government located temporarily at Vichy exercised all the powers of the sovereign French state throughout its territory. It had agreed to allow German forces to be stationed on part of its territory for the purpose of pursuing the war with Britain, and had granted those forces certain rights on that part of its territory, including the right of self-defence against illegal attacks by French residents.

The armistice, available online at:

FRANCO-GERMAN ARMISTICE, JUNE 25, 1940
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1940/400625a.html

reads somewhat differently, suggests more of a surrender than a grant, and restricts the power of the French government to the unoccupied portion of France:

ARTICLE III. In the occupied parts of France the German Reich exercises all rights of an occupying power. The French Government obligates itself to support with every means the regulations resulting from the exercise of these rights and to carry them out with the aid of French administration.

All French authorities and officials of the occupied territory, therefore, are to be promptly informed by the French Government to comply with the regulations of the German military commanders and to cooperate with them in a correct manner. . . . .

The French Government is permitted to select the seat of its government in unoccupied territory, or, if it wishes, to move to Paris. In this case, the German Government guarantees the French Government and its central authorities every necessary alleviation so that they will be in a position to conduct the administration of unoccupied territory from Paris.

The "rights of an occupying power" are defined in the Annex to the 1907 Hague IV Convention, beginning at Article 42. The theory of sovereignty we see there is "The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant . . . ." (Article 43).

1907 Hague IV Convention
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague04.htm

Of course, all of France was occupied by the German armed forces after November 1942, which didn't leave much sovereignty to the Vichy government.

[David Thompson]

Here's a little more data on the Nazi occupation rip-off of France, from the stats presented at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0#p1212230

A. The currency scam, overcharging, bullion seizures and illegal fines

1. occupation costs overcharge = 4.561 billion marks; total = 830 RM per capita (men, women, and children)

2. the one-way clearing system = pegged ratio at 1:20; real ratio 1:10 = 50% discount

3. outright seizures and levies of gold, bank notes, and foreign currency = 257 kg of gold, 6.899 million francs, 55 million francs in silver

4. the imposition of collective fines = 413,636,550 francs (includes 1 million franc fine against Jews)

[More on this when I convert these figures to current values].

B. In-kind rip-offs (not including black market purchases)

1. Agricultural Products

This is a brief summary of the percentage of official German levies on agriculture in relation to the total French production:

Wheat, 13 %;
oats, 75 %;
hay and straw, 80 %;
meat, 21 %;
poultry, 35 %;
eggs, 60 %;
butter, 20 %;
preserved fish, 30 %;
champagne, 56 %;
wood for industrial uses, 50 %;
forest fuels, 50 %;
alcohol, 25 %.

2. Raw materials

The percentage of levies of raw materials in relation to French production:

Coal, 29 %;
electric power, 22 %;
petroleum and motor fuel, 80 %;
iron ore, 74 %;
steel products, crude and half finished, 51 %;
copper, 75 %;
lead, 43 %;
zinc, 38 %;
tin, 67 %;
nickel, 64 %;
mercury, 50 %;
platinum, 76 %;
bauxite, 40 %;
aluminum, 75 %;
magnesium, 100 %;
sulphur carbonate, 80 %;
industrial soap, 67 %;
vegetable oil, 40 %;
carbosol, 100 %;
rubber, 38 %;
paper and cardboard, 16 %;
wool, 59 %;
cotton, 53 %;
flax, 65 %;
leather, 67 %;
cement, 55 %;
lime, 20 %;
acetone, 21 %.

3. Manufactured Goods

Levies on manufactured goods:

Automobile construction, 70 %;
electrical and radio construction, 45 %;
industrial precision parts, 100 %;
heavy castings, 100 %;
foundries, 46 %;
chemical industries, 34 %;
rubber industry, 60 %;
paint and varnish, 60 %;
perfume, 33 %;
wool industry, 28 %;
cotton weaving, 15 %;
flax and cotton weaving, 12 %;
industrial hides, 20 %;
buildings and public works, 75 %;
wood work and furniture, 50 %;
lime and cement, 68 %;
naval construction, 79 %;
aeronautic construction, 90 %.

C. The result:

1.

From autumn 1940 to February 1944 the cost of living increased 166 percent in France, while in Germany it increased only 7 percent.

2.

In the occupied countries, in France particularly, many persons died solely because of undernourishment and because of lack of heat. It was estimated that people require from 3,000 to 3,500 calories a day and heavy laborers about 4,000. From the beginning of the rationing in September 1940 only 1,800 calories per day per person were distributed. Successively the ration decreased to 1,700 calories in 1942, then to 1,500, and finally fell to 1,220 and 900 calories a day for adults and to 1,380 and 1300 for heavy laborers; old persons were given only 850 calories a day. But the true situation was still worse than the ration theoretically allotted through ration cards; in fact, frequently a certain number of coupons were not honored.

The Germans could not fail to recognize the disastrous situation as far as public health was concerned, since they themselves estimated in the course of the war of 1914-1918 that the distribution of 1,700 calories a day was a "regime of slow starvation, leading to death."

What aggravated the situation still more was the quality of the rations which were distributed. Bread was of the poorest quality; milk, when there was any, was skimmed to the point where the fat content amounted to only 3 percent. The small amount of meat given to the population was of bad quality. Fish had disappeared from the market. If we add to that an almost total lack of clothing, shoes, and fuel, and the fact that frequently neither schools nor hospitals were heated, one may easily understand what the physical condition of the population was.

Incurable sicknesses such as tuberculosis developed and will continue to extend their ravages for many years. The growth of children and adolescents is seriously impaired. The future of the race is a cause for the greatest concern. The results of economic spoliation will be felt for an indefinite period.

[michael mills]

The heading "B. In-kind rip-offs (not including black market purchases)" is somewhat misleading.

The percentages quoted as "levies" actually represent the proportions of French production of particular items that were exported to Germany (including items consumed by the German forces stationed in France). The producers of the items concerned were paid by the German importers.

It might be objected that the financing of the exports to Germany came for the most part from the occupation costs charged by Germany to the French Government, ie from taxes on and borrowings from the French population.

The German position taken at the armistice negotiations in relation to the level of occupation costs was that they were no higher than the cost that France would have incurred if it were still actively involved in hostilities and were maintaining armed forces in the field and were producing munitions and other supplies for those armed forces and their military operations.

Although one might quibble about the actual level of the costs charged (the French side calculated that, based on the average cost of maintaining one French soldier, the total amount of occupation costs would suffice to maintain an army of 18 million men in France) the principle was sound. The French Government had elected to go to war with Germany, which involved enormous public expenditure; now it had elected to stop fighting Germany, but it would continue to make that public expenditure, except that now the expenditure would maintain the German armed forces rather than the French.

The German rationale was that it was fighting a war on behalf of the whole of Europe, including France, against "Plutocracy and Bolshevism", and that nations that were not taking an active part in combat, such as France, should provide material support to Germany, which was doing the major part of the fighting. There were some in France who agreed with that view, including members of the French Government such as Jean Bichelonne. There were others who violently rejected that view. The majority of the French population probably wanted to get on with their lives as best they could.

Whatever one may think of the German rationale for requiring France to contribute to the German war effort, it is one commonly used by great powers. It is the rationale used today by the United States for demanding that other states contribute to its "War on Terror", the validity of which may be agreed with or disagreed with, just as the validity of the German "War against Plutocracy and Bolshevism" could be agreed with or disagreed with.

It was not simply the compulsory contribution made by France to the German war effort that caused living standards in France to fall compared with the pre-war situation. Phenomena such as a reduction in food supplies were just as much a result of the Allied blockade, which cut off imports of fuel and fertilisers and thereby contributed to a decline in French agricultural production.

[David Thompson]

Michael -- You wrote:

The German rationale was that it was fighting a war on behalf of the whole of Europe, including France, against "Plutocracy and Bolshevism", and that nations that were not taking an active part in combat, such as France, should provide material support to Germany, which was doing the major part of the fighting. There were some in France who agreed with that view, including members of the French Government such as Jean Bichelonne. There were others who violently rejected that view. The majority of the French population probably wanted to get on with their lives as best they could.

The problem with the German point of view here is that taking more from the occupied region than the legitimate garrison and administrative costs is a war crime. See the annex to the 1907 Hague IV Convention, at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague04.htm

Art. 48.
If, in the territory occupied, the occupant collects the taxes, dues, and tolls imposed for the benefit of the State, he shall do so, as far as is possible, in accordance with the rules of assessment and incidence in force, and shall in consequence be bound to defray the expenses of the administration of the occupied territory to the same extent as the legitimate Government was so bound.

Art. 49.
If, in addition to the taxes mentioned in the above article, the occupant levies other money contributions in the occupied territory, this shall only be for the needs of the army or of the administration of the territory in question.

Art. 50.
No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible.

Art. 51.
No contribution shall be collected except under a written order, and on the responsibility of a commander-in-chief.

The collection of the said contribution shall only be effected as far as possible in accordance with the rules of assessment and incidence of the taxes in force.

For every contribution a receipt shall be given to the contributors.

Art. 52.
Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation. They shall be in proportion to the resources of the country, and of such a nature as not to involve the inhabitants in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country.

Such requisitions and services shall only be demanded on the authority of the commander in the locality occupied.

Contributions in kind shall as far as possible be paid for in cash; if not, a receipt shall be given and the payment of the amount due shall be made as soon as possible.

Art. 53.
An army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds, and realizable securities which are strictly the property of the State, depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, and, generally, all movable property belonging to the State which may be used for military operations.

All appliances, whether on land, at sea, or in the air, adapted for the transmission of news, or for the transport of persons or things, exclusive of cases governed by naval law, depots of arms, and, generally, all kinds of munitions of war, may be seized, even if they belong to private individuals, but must be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made.

Your explanation of the German plundering actions in France is akin to asking a criminal why he committed crimes, and getting the answer: "Well, those were my needs."

You also wrote:

Whatever one may think of the German rationale for requiring France to contribute to the German war effort, it is one commonly used by great powers. It is the rationale used today by the United States for demanding that other states contribute to its "War on Terror", the validity of which may be agreed with or disagreed with, just as the validity of the German "War against Plutocracy and Bolshevism" could be agreed with or disagreed with.

If you have a 20th century example which you think is a war crime, as this German example is, don't hesitate to start a thread on it in the H&WC section.