I would like to point out that the officers of the battleship Bismarck had, at least, considered the possibility of using the Arado to shoot down or chase off the pursuing PBY Catalina on May 26, 1941. From an old post of mine, discussing a similar situation in this thread
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 49&start=0
The Bismarck's bridge team had debated about using the Arados to chase off the Catalina on 26 May, But Captain Lindemann nixed the idea. His reasoning was that the risks involved in recovering the aircraft in heavy seas were to great. As for defending against the Swordfish, there simply was not enough time to launch the aircraft. At the start of an attack, the Arado would have been stowed in the hanger, without fuel or ammunition. So you would have to unstow the Arado, fuel & arm it, place it on the catapult, warm up the engine, turn the ship so that the catapult is roughly facing the wind, and then launch. I doubt the Swordfish will obligingly wait to attack until all of that has been completed. You might argue that the Arado could have been kept fully fueled on the cat, but that defies logic. A fuelled aircraft is a major fire hazard and by having it out in the open where it could be easily damaged, by the heavy weather present during most of the Bismarck's voyage, greatly increases the risk of a BOOM!
As Dili has graciously pointed out the float plane could fly to several different fields to land. But, here is the downfall of the Italians, even though several fields were within flying distance little or no effort was made to provide them with air support or, apparently, reconnaissance. Possibly this was because the Italians believed that there was only one British battleship in the vicinity, not three and an aircraft carrier.
I think we can all agree that for every example of a multi-kill pilot, there is an equal rebuttal of a plane lost to a rear seat gunner.
Phylo,
I'm sorry if you took offense to my posting about the seaplane carriers seeing little action in the Philippines. I was clarifying, for other readers, that the Japanese seaplane tenders saw little action in the taking of the Philippines. As you have quoted from Combined Fleet, half a month of action, and, IIRC, only two of the tenders briefly participated there. My point was that they saw extensive action against the British and Dutch, which you have chosen not to quote. Neither did I as it would take up a few pages.
Twice now, have mentioned the "expense" of the seaplane tenders. If these ships had not been built, what would Japan have done with the savings? The answer for the Chitose and Chiyoda is nothing. When those ships were constructed, Japan was maxed, or nearly so, on all ship classes regulated by the Washington and London Naval treaties. Also, all four seaplane carriers were part another popular Japanese niche, the midget submarine. Both ships could carry 12 midget submarines along with their aircraft. But, then again, Japan also believed that the war would end quickly and that all they required was a strong offensive force to win the day. Neglecting the fact that one of equal defensive measure would be required to keep their new conquests. As you have said, these ships were overly specialized.
I'm surprised you did not mention the fact that the Nisshin was not completed until after the war began and the only action her aircraft participated in was at Midway.
Finland is not the Manchurian border.
