Why did Germany lose World War II?

[The_Enigma]

In a very cynical way, the best thing that could have happened to Europe.

[bf109 emil]

In a very cynical way, the best thing that could have happened to Europe.

Not to the residences whom occupied the top floor of some of these buildings, while their sons goose stepped blindly into combat without questioned the reason or viability of decisions being made at the head of the Reich.

[The_Enigma]

Again in a very cynical way - a sacrifice worth making - the complete and utter desctruction of the "old ways" and the forming of two superblocs that ensured war would never return on the same scale - i.e. the medivel period to 1945. It brought about the end of a millenia of death and destruction.

Now we just need to level Asia, the Americas, and Africa - and were done!

[RichTO90]

The simple fact is that the German military had been preparing, training, organising, and expanding at a greater rate than either French or British. The French military had a defensive doctrine, relied on half trained reservists, was incapable of offensive fighting and the British military needed time to expand.

6 years before, the Allies had much bigger defense budgets than the Germans, as result they accumulated a stocks of munitions, while Germany needed to make up for the difference. They managed to reduce the difference by 1940, but the Allies still had greater quantities of guns, tanks and aircraft.

Really? The Allies began mobilizing for war in 1934? Interesting...I suppose it is time to alert the media to this new evidence of how the Allies suckered poor Germany into starting a World War they were so ready to fight. Oh, wait, that's right, you don't have any evidence of that... :roll:

Is it just me or is "WTF" becoming the de regieur answer to everything that G-man eructs?

[RichTO90]

Some flaming here.

Um, no, sorry, but making blanket assertions regarding other persons ancestry and then unsupported declarations about what they believe, in the full knowledge that it will elicit a response, is called trolling, not flaming, flaming is an unprovoked and virulent response to an innocuous post by another...but then trolling's what YOU DID and flaming is not what anyone did in response to your provocation.

I expected nothing else. Rich was specially aggressive.

Poor you. Try posting something other than deliberate provocation, smearing of someone else's country or ancestry, or, at the least, something that doesn't qualify as pseudo-history unworthy of The Mythtry Channel.

[David Thompson]

Let's drop the personal remarks and get back on topic.

[Jon G.]

I haven't used Abelshauser's figures for calculating these numbers.

I didn't suggest that you did. I just take continued issue with your claims re German production efficiency - a claim which you first canvassed by making reference to Abelshauser's figures.

Claims about the 100% increase of efficiency between 1941 and 1944?

160% percent to be exact, but by your standards, 40% is just a small deviation.

Well, I don't see a problem about that. Could you point me to some criticism of it? I haven't read anything about it.

Then you haven't been paying attention. Just the first post of mine which I could think of http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 5#p1438915 there are many others.

Your continued stonewalling of evidence, arguments and data put before you to contest your outrageous and insane theories is very galling. You simply go on to launch the same theories, which have been showed to be wrong, in new posts, new threads and new forums.

I note your preference for using old secondary sources over more up-to-date analysis.

I do not know any other estimates of munitions production in terms of dollar value, so that they could be compared between countries.

That does not exactly elevate Goldsmith's findings, especially not when he states his guesstimate-based methodology, as quoted by me above.

I would surely like to have other estimates.

So would I. More to the point, though, I would refrain from making conclusions based on estimates.

...Goldsmith was an economic historian. Those types like to make estimates out of anything. 1) The usefulness of estimates is always above zero. 2) Though one should be able to interpret it correctly.

1) An estimate based on shaky or un-verifyable figures is worth just that, zero. 2) An estimate is an interpretation.

...
My estimate about the productivity of airframe and aero engine plans between 1941 and 1944:

1)


2) An 105.8% increase in productivity between mid 1941 and mid 1944 in airframe plans, and 3) 35.6% increase in productivity in aero engine plants between January 1942 and march 1944.

1) Your table is cropped to the right.

2+3) I am sure we can agree that this increase so cleverly computed by you is less than 160%. Or 200% for that matter.

3) It has also been pointed out to you before that a) part reason for the increase in aeroengine output relative to man-hours was a corresponding cut-down of spare parts production, and b) in any case, the Germans were building the same fighter types - the Bf-109, the Me-110, the Ju-88 [and the FW-190 was just entering production] in 1944 as they were in 1941. You may ponder why the Germans continued to churn out Bf-109s well after this fighter had been surpassed by newer Allied types.

...

Economies of scale: a concept pionereed in American industry and well known to all WW2 combatants.

The main factor was not the existence of economies of scale. It was the process of learning that takes place with time, as time passes, the people involved learn how to optimize production. Since the armament industries were much smaller before the war, this sector was a new economy during the war, and hence productivity increased as time passed.

...which, incidentally, translates into economies of scale, that is, the higher the output, the lower the individual unit cost; you can't calculate economies of scale without including the time factor.

I've suggested you read Tooze before. I hope you get round to doing it sometime.

I am sorry?

So am I.

*From Raymond W. Goldsmith The Power of Victory: Munitions Output in World War II, Military Affairs, vol. 10, no. 1 (Spring 1946), pp 72n

It may be an unknown concept to you, but historians - and by extension participants in historical debates - provide precise references for their claims. That way you can check and cross-check their claims for yourself. But what would an Economics student know about that.

Well, this is quite an informal discussion on the Internet. But if the rules are to make reference to specific pages for any point data, I will follow them.

Yes, please do.

[Meyer]

in any case, the Germans were building the same fighter types - the Bf-109, the Me-110, the Ju-88 [and the FW-190 was just entering production] in 1944 as they were in 1941

Pretty much like everybody else
.

You may ponder why the Germans continued to churn out Bf-109s well after this fighter had been surpassed by newer Allied types..

That does not make sense, since the Germans could only choose beetwen their own fighters. Anyway, the answer is really simple: they didn't have anything better. And IMHO the 109 was not clearly surpassed as a fighter in 1944-45, which of course was not good enough for the LW cause.

[Jon G.]

in any case, the Germans were building the same fighter types - the Bf-109, the Me-110, the Ju-88 [and the FW-190 was just entering production] in 1944 as they were in 1941

Pretty much like everybody else

Also pretty much irrelevant, since the point was to show how 1944 German productivity apparently increased relative to 1941 German productivity.

You may ponder why the Germans continued to churn out Bf-109s well after this fighter had been surpassed by newer Allied types..

That does not make sense, since the Germans could only choose beetwen their own fighters. Anyway, the answer is really simple: they didn't have anything better. And IMHO the 109 was not clearly surpassed as a fighter in 1944-45, which of course was not good enough for the LW cause.

I don't think I've suggested that the Germans were capable of building anything but their own aircraft?

The Me-262 was delayed; the Luftwaffe stuck with old Ju-88s and Me-110s for their night fighters rather than the superior He-219 and so on.

[David Thompson]

An assortment of off-topic posts were deleted pursuant to the thread warning at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9#p1501579 - DT.

[Guaporense]

I haven't used Abelshauser's figures for calculating these numbers.

I didn't suggest that you did. I just take continued issue with your claims re German production efficiency - a claim which you first canvassed by making reference to Abelshauser's figures.

Claims about the 100% increase of efficiency between 1941 and 1944?

160% percent to be exact, but by your standards, 40% is just a small deviation.

From 75.9% to 160% is a 110% increase in productivity.

Well, I don't see a problem about that. Could you point me to some criticism of it? I haven't read anything about it.

Then you haven't been paying attention. Just the first post of mine which I could think of http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 5#p1438915 there are many others.

Oh, I read that.

Well, you didn't exactly make a point there. You just showed your prejudices about the dynamics of productivity change while pointed out to some authors that in your opinion, showed that these statistics are wrong.

I will deconstruct that post.

Your continued stonewalling of evidence, arguments and data put before you to contest your outrageous and insane theories is very galling. You simply go on to launch the same theories, which have been showed to be wrong, in new posts, new threads and new forums.

I have read the objections to my "theories", I have changed my opinion on these subjects by quite a large extend. You can just read what I posted 10 months ago and now and see how my ideas evolved.

I will may not change my ideas in the direction that you wish as well.

And this "showed to be wrong" is quite a large extrapolation in your part.

I note your preference for using old secondary sources over more up-to-date analysis.

I do not know any other estimates of munitions production in terms of dollar value, so that they could be compared between countries.

That does not exactly elevate Goldsmith's findings, especially not when he states his guesstimate-based methodology, as quoted by me above.

His estimates have many problems. But I don't have better ones.

I would surely like to have other estimates.

So would I. More to the point, though, I would refrain from making conclusions based on estimates.

I may trust imperfect estimates with greater confidence than you do.

...
My estimate about the productivity of airframe and aero engine plans between 1941 and 1944:

1)


2) An 105.8% increase in productivity between mid 1941 and mid 1944 in airframe plans, and 3) 35.6% increase in productivity in aero engine plants between January 1942 and march 1944.

1) Your table is cropped to the right.

You can open it by pasting it's link on your navigator.

2+3) I am sure we can agree that this increase so cleverly computed by you is less than 160%. Or 200% for that matter.

The airframe productivity increased by 105.8% between mid 1941 and mid 1944, while overall productivity increased by 110% in the same time frame.

3) It has also been pointed out to you before that a) part reason for the increase in aeroengine output relative to man-hours was a corresponding cut-down of spare parts production, and b) in any case, the Germans were building the same fighter types - the Bf-109, the Me-110, the Ju-88 [and the FW-190 was just entering production] in 1944 as they were in 1941. You may ponder why the Germans continued to churn out Bf-109s well after this fighter had been surpassed by newer Allied types.

The Allies continued to produce obsolete types by 1944-45 as well. If you define the Bf-109 as obsolete, 2/3 of the American fighters produced during WW2 were obsolete.

...which, incidentally, translates into economies of scale, that is, the higher the output, the lower the individual unit cost; you can't calculate economies of scale without including the time factor.

The concept of economies of scale is actually based on a type of misunderstanding of the concept of optimal scale. When production occurs below optimal scale, the increase in scale of production will lower unit costs. When production occurs above optimal scale, the decrease in scale of production will lower unit costs.

Optimal scale is determined by a variety of factors, mostly by technology. However, since optimal scale is not know apriori, it is common for plants to vary the scale of operations as they grope into the unknown and discover the shape of the unit cost curve.

Since it is cheaper to make a small plant than a large plant, it is usual for plants to start out as below optimal scale and they tend to expand production. This process of discovery of the shape of the unit cost curve occurs with the passage of time.

[Guaporense]

In a more recent thread, he posted questionable figures for German vs. Soviet fighter losses, paired with extraordinary extrapolations for the periods where he did not have data: viewtopic.php?p=1433972#p1433972 (Yes, I know I've drawn attention to this thread before. This is just to describe the tendency)

Well, my thesis was that the Germans lost air superiority over the continent because they lacked the pilots and the fuel to use the added fighter production, not because they lacked fighter production.

Single engine fighter losses, total and damaged:

1943 - 10.661
1944 - 16.150

source: http://wwiiarchives.net/servlet/document/112/26/0

Single engine fighter production:

1943 - 9.626
1944 - 25.860

source: http://wwiiarchives.net/servlet/document/150/215/0

Aircraft fuel production, thousands of metric tons:

1943 - 1.917
1944 - 1.117

source: http://wwiiarchives.net/servlet/document/113/122/0

Average number of hours of training for fighter pilots:

mid 1942 - 240 hours
mid 1943 - 200 hours
early 1944 - 160 hours
late 1944 - 110 hours

source: http://wwiiarchives.net/servlet/document/112/30/0

Clearly, fuel production should have been several times higher in 1944 to be enough for the effective utilization of the added fighter supply. For the direct use of the fighters and to train fighter pilots.

The potential for the exertion of air power given by the increased fighter production couldn't be harnessed due to lack of fuel and trained pilots. The fundamental cause was the lack of oil reserves in Europe, with clearly bounded fuel production to low levels, impossibilitating decent training of fighter pilots and good fuel supply for a large air force capable of challenging allied air power.

In this particular thread, Guaporense has, amongst many other things, posted some highly questionable figures for increase in armaments worker productivity (upthread)
viewtopic.php?p=1437357#p1437357

...restating Overy's point (via Abelshauser) that per worker productivity in the German armaments sector went from a low of 75.9% (with 1939 representing 100) in 1941 to a 'lower bound' figure of no less than 160% per worker output in 1944.

Barring the advent of major, major new technology between 1941 and 1944, that is flatly impossible within normal economic parameters as far as I know. Especially when we consider that the normal trend for all warring nations was a drop in per-worker productivity - a tendency which BTW was very pronounced for German coal production.

Well, let's start with the data:

Output per head in German Industry, 1939-1944
year -------------- 1939 ---- 1940 ---- 1941 ---- 1942 ---- 1943 ---- 1944
Primary Industry - 100 ---- 104.1 ---- 114.6 --- 113.5 --- 108.7 --- 87.6
Arms Industry ---- 100 ---- 87.6 ----- 75.9 ----- 99.6 ---- 131.6 --- 160.0
Consumer Industry 100 ---- 115.9 ---- 133.3 --- 121.1 --- 124.7 --- 132.3

source: Overy, R., War and Economy in the Third Reich, page 367

The productivity in the primary industry stagnated, while in the arms industry it increased greatly from 1941 onwards and in the consumer industry we had a small increase.

The productivity of the coal industry didn't increase while the armaments production increased greatly. Why? Simple, the coal industry was old, and had already matured. The opportunities for fast learning were exhausted.

While the production of munitions was a new sector of the German economy, that sprang from the war. In this new sector millions of workers were suddenly allocated. The industry wasn't very organized and the workers didn't have much experience.

With the passing of the years, the industry matured and productivity increased. As the managers and workers learned to manage and work in this new industry. The modest fall in productivity between 1939 and 1941 was probably caused by the fact that millions of workers and a large part of industry were allocated to war production in this period, the workers were inexperienced and between 1941 and 1944 the proportion of the workforce working for the armed forces didn't increase at the same fast rate, and the conversion to a war economy was already completed, enabling the existing workforce to learn and expand their productivity.

The proportion of the industrial workforce working on orders for the armed forces in Germany:
1939 -- 1940 -- 1941 -- 1942 -- 1943
21.9% - 50.2% - 54.5% - 56.1% - 61%

The increase in productivity in the armaments sector occurred not only in Germany but in all countries that fought in WW2. In the US productivity increased greatly between 1940 and 1944, the time it took to make a B-17 airframe decreased from 55.000 hours to 17.000 hours. The cost of production of a T-34 also declined greatly, from ca 250.000 rubles in 1941 to nearly half of that number by 1944.

It so happens that Tooze (on pp 437-440) takes serious issue with Overy's figures for the early war slump in productivity, in part because Overy apparently simply compares number of workers in war industries, on one side, to overall armaments output, on the other side, hence disregarding the investment in infrastructure and plant and also disregarding that any addition of new workers to the armaments industry will not become immediately apparent until the corresponding supply of raw materials has caught up - a point which Abelshauser (p 155) is also making, BTW.

I wouldn't say that Tooze takes issue with the low productivity of the armaments industry in 1941 but with the idea entertained by writers that the German industry was inefficient during the first years of the war and that inefficiency prevented them from producing what they could.

Tooze explains that the low level of production in 1941 relative to 1944 was natural in view of the situation of the industry. I also think that we must consider the effects of learning that Tooze doesn't appear to focus on.

[bf109 emil]

Tooze explains that the low level of production in 1941 relative to 1944 was natural in view of the situation of the industry. I also think that we must consider the effects of learning that Tooze doesn't appear to focus on.

which would be what? Tooze reported the facts, if you can provide what he doesn't focus upon with sources, facts and viable information, i would appreciate it.

as all we have are the facts and the facts to work with, in trying to be historically accurate...something does Tooze shows relates accurately in his findings...

[woden]

Na i think Germany learned the industrial potential of Britain later with the flattening of Cologne, Hamburg, Vienna, Nuremberg, Ruhr dams, Berlin was a nice city by early 1945 a symbol of the reich power, lovely remains of Dresden, the sinking of countless submarines, ending the 1 and only sortie of the Bismarck, tirpitz turning turtle, punting the AK out of Afirca...na i think Nazi Germany painted a portrait that they defeated an industrious and equal foe being Great Britain by allowing a meagre token force of fighting men (BEF) as having done something spectacular...but perhaps a short while later and with the industrial potential of the United Kingdom playing possum we are now able to look directly as superior German industrial potential first hand.

I find your glorifying of Britain amusing as Britain's Industrial potential was nowhere near Germany's. If the Americans didn't come to rescue Britain (again), then let's see how things play out...

[The_Enigma]

I find your glorifying of Britain amusing as Britain's Industrial potential was nowhere near Germany's. If the Americans didn't come to rescue Britain (again), then let's see how things play out...

When was the first time? Other than the American government and bankers letting loans get taken out and essentily funding our war effort, when were we "rescued" in the First World War? Maybe if the Americans had ceased to send exports to the Germans sooner in effect helping the British blockade, the war may have ended sooner (was there not some limited funding/loans as well)?

Of course during the Second World War FDR mentioned something along the lines of the security of the USA rested on the British Empire not falling to the Germans - in effect the possiblity of the Germans gaining bases in the Carriebean and the fleet (along with the French) falling into German hands and giving the Germans a fleet capable of outnumbering and defeating the Atlantic Fleet and thus giving rise to the possiblity of invasion - the Battle of Britain, prior to the yanks screwing us out of our entire gold reserve and prior to any aid, secured the survival of the nation along with the politicians making the decision not to give in and to attack the French fleet does not support your notion of the US "rescuing" the UK for a second time.

So :roll: