Comparative air force performance & a/c production

[The_Enigma]

they failed to utilize their production. That was because of lack of pilots and lack of fuel to fly the aircraft.

And the allied bomber raids in 1944 had about 1-2 thousand combat aircraft. While the Germans only managed to attack these raids with small groups of fighters is strange. Considering that Ger made nearly 30,000 figters in 1944, if they managed to use all this production, they should have much larger number of operational fighters.

Forgive me all those who have greater patience than I do...

WTF DO YOU IMAGINE WAS THE CAUSE OF THAT FAILURE?

Did they fail to plant enough pilot trees?

Yes, they really, really shoulda oughta had a much larger number...

Surreal...

Pilot trees are very rare in that part of the world tbh!

[Guaporense]

they failed to utilize their production. That was because of lack of pilots and lack of fuel to fly the aircraft.

And the allied bomber raids in 1944 had about 1-2 thousand combat aircraft. While the Germans only managed to attack these raids with small groups of fighters is strange. Considering that Ger made nearly 30,000 figters in 1944, if they managed to use all this production, they should have much larger number of operational fighters.

Forgive me all those who have greater patience than I do...

WTF DO YOU IMAGINE WAS THE CAUSE OF THAT FAILURE?

Did they fail to plant enough pilot trees?

Yes, they really, really shoulda oughta had a much larger number...

Surreal...

Coordination failure.

Apparently, the Luftwaffe didn't have the structure to train a very large number of pilots. And failed to anticipate the increase in fighter production in 1943 and 1944. Second to Strategy for Defeat, in 1942 the Germans trained 1,662 fighter pilots, in 1943, 3,276 fighter pilots, and I guess, around 4,000 in 1944.

Considering that in 1943, the Germans lost 5178 fighters (all causes) and 2970 pilots (KIA, WIA and MIA). While they produced about 12,000 fighters. The ideal numbers of pilots trained would have been about 6,000 in 1943 and 15,000 in 1944. So they could use all fighters that they made.

[The_Enigma]

That would lead to me ask, and am being serious this time, my run up fighter production if they couldnt keep pace with training new pilots - given that some of the discrepencey would come from new production replacing lost planes but not lost pilots etc

[Guaporense]

That would lead to me ask, and am being serious this time, my run up fighter production if they couldnt keep pace with training new pilots - given that some of the discrepencey would come from new production replacing lost planes but not lost pilots etc

Well. They increased the number of pilots trained, until they had fuel to train them, but at a smaller rate of increase than the production of fighters. But, since they lost about 2 fighters for every pilot, to use all their production, they would have to train 1 pilot for every 2 planes, and they never managed to do that.

[The_Enigma]

.... because .....

Why increase production of they cant match it with training? It seems confusing to me.

[Jon G.]

...Germany apparently had air superiority over the eastern front even in 1944. And airsuperiority is a good measure of material superiority.

Not necessarily, and no, they didn't. Meaning that the Luftwaffe could usually seize air superiority where and when it wanted on the EF until about 1943, but at the price of diluting air strength in other sectors. See for example how German air strength on the Don front steadily increased in late 1942/early 1943, at the cost of surrendering air superiority on other sections of the front.

For the Kursk offensive, the Luftwaffe found that they were not strong enough to maintain air superiority over both pincers of the attack at the same time, and the Kuban bridgehead was abandoned chiefly due to the loss of air superiority. So whether the Luftwaffe had air superiority over the Eastern Front in 1944 can definitely be contested.

...So, it is not pretty irrelevant. The fact that Ger lost only about 25% of fighters produced in 1944, the year were Germany lost the control of her airspace, means that they failed to utilize their production. That was because of lack of pilots and lack of fuel to fly the aircraft...

Your numbers have been well and fully challenged already on this thread, but you're right that German aircraft production (overwhelmingly of figthers) increased massively in 1944 - we've covered this before, BTW http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 8#p1414788 - that was mainly due to the foundations laid down by Milch several years earlier, plus the efforts of the Jägerstab.

The backside of the increased output, impressive as it was, was that German aircraft factories were mainly churning out stock types - lots of FW-190s, which perform poorly at the altitudes where Allied bombers usually operated, and lots of Bf-109s, which had vicious landing characteristics which increasingly inexperienced German pilots could not handle. For example, Sperrle discovered in July 1944 that his pilots (in Luftflotte 3, based in the West) only had an average of 8 to 30 days operational experience.

See if you can get hold of the old HMSO publication The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force 1933 to 1945, even though it's old it puts many more recent Luftwaffe monographs to shame.

[RichTO90]

Rich, your US 13,289 number includes only combat losses or includes all types of losses?

Combat losses. Total losses all cause overseas were 20,394 in 1944. Accidents were 5,187. The other 1,918 "losses" were aircraft retired to 2nd Line, which meant they were "no longer considered operational due to such factors as age and obsolescence".

It always helps to compare apples to apples and oranges to oranges when possible.

[The_Enigma]

Is it then possible the large numbers of Soviet losses also include planes that had been retired?

[Guaporense]

Rich, your US 13,289 number includes only combat losses or includes all types of losses?

Combat losses. Total losses all cause overseas were 20,394 in 1944. Accidents were 5,187. The other 1,918 "losses" were aircraft retired to 2nd Line, which meant they were "no longer considered operational due to such factors as age and obsolescence".

It always helps to compare apples to apples and oranges to oranges when possible.

Well them, these losses refers only to combat aircraft? Them, the orange to orange comparison apparently must be made with the accidents plus combat losses, 18,476 for the americans and the 6,209 for the germans in the first half of 1944 (annualized to 12,418).

[Guaporense]

For the Kursk offensive, the Luftwaffe found that they were not strong enough to maintain air superiority over both pincers of the attack at the same time, and the Kuban bridgehead was abandoned chiefly due to the loss of air superiority. So whether the Luftwaffe had air superiority over the Eastern Front in 1944 can definitely be contested.

Apparently, their losses are consistent with airsuperiority in 1944. From the losses figures in that site that I refered in my first post about fighters, it was safer for German combat aircraft to fly over Russia in 1944 than it was for Allied combat aircraft over Normandy in 1944.

The backside of the increased output, impressive as it was, was that German aircraft factories were mainly churning out stock types - lots of FW-190s, which perform poorly at the altitudes where Allied bombers usually operated, and lots of Bf-109s, which had vicious landing characteristics which increasingly inexperienced German pilots could not handle. For example, Sperrle discovered in July 1944 that his pilots (in Luftflotte 3, based in the West) only had an average of 8 to 30 days operational experience.

Well, them, my point is only that they didn't utilize their increased production, even in 1943. This is evident in the small number of pilots trained, the small losses suffered and small numbers of aircraft in the engagements.

Anybody here disagrees with my claim that the germans didn't use the fighters that they could make, and hence, lost air superiority because they failed to utilize the equipment that they produced and not that they couldn't produce the equipment needed?

In 1944 the germans acted as if fighter production was about 7,000 to 8,000, instead of 29,000. The increase in fighter aircraft production in 1944 was completely useless. And even the increase in 1943 from 1942 was quite useless as well.

And your claim that german aircraft produced in 1944 were crap is irrelevant to my argument.

[RichTO90]

Well them, these losses refers only to combat aircraft? Them, the orange to orange comparison apparently must be made with the accidents plus combat losses, 18,476 for the americans and the 6,209 for the germans in the first half of 1944 (annualized to 12,418).

Are you truly that thick?

US Combat Losses All Theaters 1944 = 13,289
German Combat Losses All Theaters 1944 = 12,631
Soviet Combat Losses All Theaters 1944 = 9,456 or 9,500

What part of that very simple formula do you fail to comprehend?

If you like I can compute the German LOSSES DUE TO ENEMY ACTION AND ACCIDENTS if you like, WHICH THEN MAY BE COMPARED TO THE US FIGURE OF 18,476...

Again, apologies to the moderators and the other posters, but this just doesn't seem to be getting through...

Surreal...

[The_Enigma]

Out of interest and sorry Rich if you have already posted them and i have missed them, am glancing through the topic while clock watching in work ; do you have a breakdown for the US losses split between the Germans and Japanses?

I always thought it was amazing that in a space of six months a few thousand planes were lost during the Battles of France and Britain ... a couple of years later and their in the tens of thousands! Seems somewhat unbelieable.

[Guaporense]

Rich, do you have german combat only losses for combat aircraft in 1943 and 1942 as well? Because I strongly suspect that the 12,600 number is for combat and accidental losses. If it is only from combat, then it refers to total losses and damaged aircraft.

Your fighter losses figure is 9,407, while my source says that fighter losses due to combat in the first half of 1944 were only, 2,855. If your figure is correct that implies that fighter losses in the second half of 1944 were 6,552. That's why I suspect that your figure is not comparing apples to apples.

[Guaporense]

Out of interest and sorry Rich if you have already posted them and i have missed them, am glancing through the topic while clock watching in work ; do you have a breakdown for the US losses split between the Germans and Japanses?

I always thought it was amazing that in a space of six months a few thousand planes were lost during the Battles of France and Britain ... a couple of years later and their in the tens of thousands! Seems somewhat unbelieable.

German fighter losses were heavier in 1940 compared to production than in 1944.

In 8 months of 1940, the germans lost 1,100 fighters (annualize to 1,650) for annual production of 3,100 (losses corresponded to 53,2% of production). While in the first 6 months of 1944, the germans lost 4,200 fighters (annualized to 8,400), for annual production of 29,000 (28,9%).

Source:

[bf109 emil]

Well, them, my point is only that they didn't utilize their increased production, even in 1943. This is evident in the small number of pilots trained, the small losses suffered and small numbers of aircraft in the engagements.

I don't think Germany ever had a lack of recruits to be trained, but rather a flawed system that saw the best pilots from training being placed or sent to fly bombers rather then fighter aircraft IIRC

Anybody here disagrees with my claim that the germans didn't use the fighters that they could make, and hence, lost air superiority because they failed to utilize the equipment that they produced and not that they couldn't produce the equipment needed?

on which front? as I don't think Germany had air superiority over any front on the west or in North Africa beginning from Aug. 1940 on...they had at time air supremacy at times but never IMHO air superiority.

Unsure of what is meant that Germany didn't use the fighters they could make! I believe they did, but with the increase in losses, etc. pilots often where rushed through training either because of attrition or because logistics (Later being fuel) forced them to become combat pilots against an enemy (mainly western Allied) whom had more hours training and likewise had more candidates from which resulted in only the top % becoming combat pilots and a vast majority being washed out per say and sent to other roles within their respected air-force

In 1944 the germans acted as if fighter production was about 7,000 to 8,000, instead of 29,000.

again unsure what this means as the majority of Luftwaffe pilots coming into flying in 1944 had far less experience did pilots whom flew back in 1940 already having years of experience...

In all essence I kinda compare this to the Heers fighting ability perhaps in 1944/45 was not up to the same standard, as the cream of the army being done in at Stalingrad, Tunisia, etc. forced Germany to lower it's standards (age/ability) to remain fighting somewhat along the same lines as the Luftwaffe did simultaneously which forced the over all combat ability of Luftwaffe fliers to drop below that whom they continued facing...

Guaporense I kinda know what you are saying as the war grew on, Germany had better planes and an increase in number, but so did the ability of the Allies in number and logistics now have an upper hand in combating them and upon a winning note. In a comparison of sorts, Germany in 1943-45 had a better tank (panther/Tiger) then they did in 1939-1942 and produced this armor in higher numbers, are we to assume Germany never used this increase in armor and acted like production was still similar to earlier times? NO, but the result of increase in later years came against a foe whom likewise also increased it's size, but upon a greater % or scale.