Comparative air force performance & a/c production

[Guaporense]

No Emil, you didn't understand: German equipment losses in 1943 and 1944 (specially fighters) didn't increase in proportion with the increase in production. That implies that their didn't make full use if their increased production.

This is corroborated by the number of aircraft used in operations and by the lack of increase in aircraft streght. In may 1940, the Germans had 1,370 fighters. In september 1944, they had 1,610 fighters. But production in september 1944 was 3,300 fighters while in 1940, monthly production was around 250. I mean, were these extra fighters produced went?

Apparently, the luftwaffe didn't have the capacity to operate a very large number of aircraft at the same time. And hence, to absorb the increased german production. So this increase was useless and didn't have any impact on the war.

Also, in 1940, Britain made 4,000 fighters, Germany made 3,100. In 1944, Germany made 29,000 fighters and Britain made 10,000. But in 1940, Germany had airsuperiority over most of Europe and the RAF could only manage to not get completely destroyed, in 1944 RAF had air supremacy over most of Europe, while the Luftwaffe was trying to offer some resistance to the bombers.

[RichTO90]

Rich, do you have german combat only losses for combat aircraft in 1943 and 1942 as well?

Yes.

Because I strongly suspect that the 12,600 number is for combat and accidental losses. If it is only from combat, then it refers to total losses and damaged aircraft.

And I strongly suspect you are talking through your hat.

Your fighter losses figure is 9,407, while my source says that fighter losses due to combat in the first half of 1944 were only, 2,855. If your figure is correct that implies that fighter losses in the second half of 1944 were 6,552. That's why I suspect that your figure is not comparing apples to apples.

And using incomplete and suspect data to support your case. Or do you believe that Luftwaffe losses in the second half of 1944 WERE THE SAME OR LESS than they were in the first half? Surreal...

1 July to 31 December in the West Luftwaffe losses were tabulated as 7,957 dead and missing, (1,280 non-operational losses), 3,260 wounded and injured (687 non-operational), 10,362 aircraft destroyed (1,698 in accidents) and 6,787 damaged (2,919 in accidents). Training units lost 1,314 dead and 672 injured, 2,052 aircraft destroyed and 1,986 damaged. (RAF Air Staff Post-Hostilities Studies, Book 21: "Luftwaffe Activity I" (IWM AHB 6, Tin 192, frame 1071-85) as referenced by Hooton, Eagle in Flames, 1997.

Surreal... I miss the good old days when weird shit like this required hallucinogens instead of the Internet...just goes to prove that

"There's a statistical theory that if you give a million monkeys typewriters and set them to work for an infinite period of time, they'd eventually come up with the complete works of Shakespeare. Thanks to the Internet, we now know this isn't true." Robert Wilensky

[bf109 emil]

No Emil, you didn't understand: German equipment losses in 1943 and 1944 (specially fighters) didn't increase in proportion with the increase in production.

Your right as Germany increased her ability to make aircraft at this time or era, she never had the amount of adequately trained pilots, thus Germany was now sending up a poorly trained Luftwaffe to combat a better trained Allied airforce...


We also have to be aware that from around May 1944 onwards huge numbers of Luftwaffe aircraft where destroyed by Allied pilots on the ground. etc.

That implies that their didn't make full use if their increased production.

Unsure what this means...but I agree as I think Germany, had they been apt to use this increase they would have, although the determining factor being they never used this increase not because they never wanted to, but because they couldn't, either through pilot losses, inadequate supply of fuel, numerous losses to air-craft while at fields or grounded and by sheer ability or superior logistics of there foe.

[Meyer]

Since fighters only made up about 13% of all aircraft in the eastern front in 1944 (400 out of 3000 (1)).

(1) http://www.lesbutler.ip3.co.uk/jg26/thtrlosses.htm

I don't see those numbers in Don Caldwell's page. And they are wrong, according to http://sturmvogel.orbat.com/LWOB.html#Jagdwaffe
I counted 541 fighters "on hand" for a total of 2355 aircraft in the "East" (including Norway, Finland and the Balkans). That would represent a 23%, and I did not include any night fighters or the Focke-Wulfs of the SG units...

[Jon G.]

...So whether the Luftwaffe had air superiority over the Eastern Front in 1944 can definitely be contested.

Apparently, their losses are consistent with airsuperiority in 1944.

You can't deduce who had air superiority simply by comparing losses - achieving and maintaining air superiority is costly. See f. e. Luftwaffe losses over Western Europe in May-June 1940, and at any rate your original claim of 26,000 VVS losses has by now been reduced to 9,500 losses in 1944.

For that matter, you'll probably also find that the Soviets lost more men on the ground than the Germans did - which evidently does not tell us who won the war in the East.

From the losses figures in that site that I refered in my first post about fighters, it was safer for German combat aircraft to fly over Russia in 1944 than it was for Allied combat aircraft over Normandy in 1944.

I would be interested if you could post Allied air combat losses over Normandy in 1944 and hold them against LW losses in the same geographical and temporal timeframe.

Well, them, my point is only that they didn't utilize their increased production, even in 1943. This is evident in the small number of pilots trained, the small losses suffered and small numbers of aircraft in the engagements.

Increased production didn't come out of the blue, as I've been trying to explain; it took the overhaul of German aircraft production by Milch, after Udet had blown his brains out, to set the foundations of increased fighter production, and in the view of German high command the Luftwaffe didn't need more fighters in 1942. It took changing fortunes of war to alter that priority.

Anybody here disagrees with my claim that the germans didn't use the fighters that they could make, and hence, lost air superiority because they failed to utilize the equipment that they produced and not that they couldn't produce the equipment needed?

You are turning things upside down here. The Germans built more and more fighters as a response to losing air superiority. If things had been going better on the battlefronts, odds are that Milch's production scheme would not have gotten priority. In the event, despite managing a dramatic increase in fighter production, it was still dwarfed by Allied aircraft output.

In 1944 the germans acted as if fighter production was about 7,000 to 8,000, instead of 29,000. The increase in fighter aircraft production in 1944 was completely useless. And even the increase in 1943 from 1942 was quite useless as well.

And your claim that german aircraft produced in 1944 were crap is irrelevant to my argument.

Not quite crap - just basically the same types which Milch had envisioned building from 1942 on - Bf-109s, Me-110s, Ju-88s and, a bit later, also FW-190s, at the expense of everything else, including pilot training.

[RichTO90]

(1) http://www.lesbutler.ip3.co.uk/jg26/thtrlosses.htm

Note the total given for losses in 1944, East and West, are 12,174. But then we don't know how inclusive the figures are whereas I can give the units my figures are derived for.

This is becoming more and more just another pointless tail-chasing exercise...

Surreal...

[Meyer]

(1) http://www.lesbutler.ip3.co.uk/jg26/thtrlosses.htm

Note the total given for losses in 1944, East and West, are 12,174. But then we don't know how inclusive the figures are whereas I can give the units my figures are derived for.

This is becoming more and more just another pointless tail-chasing exercise...

Surreal...

They apparently include damaged aircraft...

Two categories of aircraft are shown: "day fighters", which includes single-engine and twin-engine day fighters, and "total a/c", which includes all combat types. The table covers only the period Sept 43-Oct 44; Groehler's data for the rest of the war are either incompatible or incomplete. This is the period during which the Luftwaffe lost the air war, according to Western historians, and excludes the late-war period, when the fuel shortage took full effect and grounded much of the Luftwaffe. Unfortunately, Groehler obtained his "losses" by combining operational and non-operational "total losses" and "damaged" - a very strange thing to do, unless this helped him prove his thesis. According to other data in the original article, the "losses" in this table are about twice the "operational losses", but there are not enough data in the latter category to tabulate. There are other peculiarities - Groehler put the Balkans in the west, and we had to follow suit - but we take what we can get. Assuming that all his loss numbers are off by roughly the same proportion, conclusions based on comparisons should be valid, but to emphasize Groehler's dubious practice we'll put quotes around his "losses".

[Guaporense]

...So whether the Luftwaffe had air superiority over the Eastern Front in 1944 can definitely be contested.

Apparently, their losses are consistent with airsuperiority in 1944.

You can't deduce who had air superiority simply by comparing losses - achieving and maintaining air superiority is costly.

That depends. But I agree that low losses doest implies air superiority. However, it proves that the Red Air Force wasn't capable of deafeating the Luftwaffe.

See f. e. Luftwaffe losses over Western Europe in May-June 1940, and at any rate your original claim of 26,000 VVS losses has by now been reduced to 9,500 losses in 1944.

WS?

My claim refered to losses due to combat and accidents. The 9.5 thousand figure refers to only combat losses. Art said that the figure of losses of all causes was 24.8 thousand.

For that matter, you'll probably also find that the Soviets lost more men on the ground than the Germans did - which evidently does not tell us who won the war in the East.

They could "produce" more men. They couldn't produce more combat aircraft (35,600 german to 33,000 soviet production in 1944).

From the losses figures in that site that I refered in my first post about fighters, it was safer for German combat aircraft to fly over Russia in 1944 than it was for Allied combat aircraft over Normandy in 1944.

I would be interested if you could post Allied air combat losses over Normandy in 1944 and hold them against LW losses in the same geographical and temporal timeframe.

I don't have that sort of data. However, wikipedia puts allied losses of 4,101 planes versus german losses of 2,127 planes.

Overall, I though that combat aircraft losses in 1944 looked like this:

Consisting of total losses of combat aircraft to accident and combat.

Western front
Allied losses - 20,000
German losses - 9,500

Eastern front
Soviet losses - 24,800
German losses - 2,500

However, I have doubts that the 12,000 german loss statistic refers to combat and accidental losses or only total losses. But I am not entirely convinced yet.

Increased production didn't come out of the blue, as I've been trying to explain; it took the overhaul of German aircraft production by Milch, after Udet had blown his brains out, to set the foundations of increased fighter production, and in the view of German high command the Luftwaffe didn't need more fighters in 1942. It took changing fortunes of war to alter that priority.

True. But my point is that this increase of production was useless, because luftwaffe total losses could be replaced by 1942 levels of fighter production! Hence, the luftwaffe failed to utilize the increased material means at its disposal.

You are turning things upside down here. The Germans built more and more fighters as a response to losing air superiority. If things had been going better on the battlefronts, odds are that Milch's production scheme would not have gotten priority. In the event, despite managing a dramatic increase in fighter production, it was still dwarfed by Allied aircraft output.

The difference between allied and german fighter output in 1944 was not very large. US+Britain made about 48,000 fighters, Ger made 29,000 (and the rate reached 40,000 in september). Since 85-90% of german fighter ouput was allocated to the western front, I can consider the german output versus allied output at 26,000. Also, the US was fighting japan, and they allocated a significant portion of their fighter output agaist them, perhaps 20% of western allied output, leaving 38,000 allied fighters versus 26,000 german fighters.

However, when the luftwaffe engaged the allies in 1944, they had a dozens of fighters versus hundreds of fighters protecting the 1 thousand bomber fleet. The numerical discrepancy was much larger than the discrepancy of production. With implies that the luftwaffe was not able to utilize the new fighters produced.

[The_Enigma]

VVS (two Vs, now a W) is the Soviet Red Air force

[The_Enigma]

In regards to Normandy air force casualties:

Major Ellis notes that 163,403 allied sorties were flown between 6-30 June; his info is a little confusing so am not to sure if he is suggesting the 1,508 planes lost was the complete total. He states these losses are from Bomber Command and 8th Air force however his sortie table includes 2TAF, ADGB, Costal Command, and 9th AF.

In comparion between these dates the Luftwaffe flew 13,829 sorties for the loss of 808 aircraft.

So doing the simpolistic maths thats 108 sorties per downed allied plane and 17 sorties per downed German. Ala more dangerous for the latter. Although i do think that the simplistic figures dont show the real picture nor is the Allied losses bob on.

Edit: Found the info on the whole campaign that i was looking for:

480,317 sorties flown by the various Allied air forces (2TAF, ADGB, Bomber Command, Costal Command, 8AF and 9AF) for the loss of 4,101 aircraft between 6 June and 31 August (i.e. 117 sorties for every plane downed).

Cant find the similar Luftwaffe info yet.

[Guaporense]

Rich, do you have german combat only losses for combat aircraft in 1943 and 1942 as well?

Yes.

Are they equal to the losses that I posted on that picture?

Your fighter losses figure is 9,407, while my source says that fighter losses due to combat in the first half of 1944 were only, 2,855. If your figure is correct that implies that fighter losses in the second half of 1944 were 6,552. That's why I suspect that your figure is not comparing apples to apples.

And using incomplete and suspect data to support your case. Or do you believe that Luftwaffe losses in the second half of 1944 WERE THE SAME OR LESS than they were in the first half? Surreal...

1 July to 31 December in the West Luftwaffe losses were tabulated as 7,957 dead and missing, (1,280 non-operational losses), 3,260 wounded and injured (687 non-operational), 10,362 aircraft destroyed (1,698 in accidents) and 6,787 damaged (2,919 in accidents). Training units lost 1,314 dead and 672 injured, 2,052 aircraft destroyed and 1,986 damaged. (RAF Air Staff Post-Hostilities Studies, Book 21: "Luftwaffe Activity I" (IWM AHB 6, Tin 192, frame 1071-85) as referenced by Hooton, Eagle in Flames, 1997.

That gives losses of 10,362 aircraft, including 1,700 to accidents. But not of combat aircraft to combat.

However, this source: (http://www.lesbutler.ip3.co.uk/jg26/thtrlosses.htm) gives the following day fighter losses:

Jan-May 1944 -- 6487
Jun-Oct 1944 --- 7477

It probably includes partial and total losses to accident and combat. A small increase (15%) between the first 5 months of 1944 and the next 5 moths of 1944.

Strategy for defeat gives: 4,080 fighter losses due to accident and combat in the first half of 1944. If losses increased by 15% in the second half of 1944, we get: 8,728 fighter losses, for accident and combat in 1944. You gave 9,407 fighter losses. So, I think this number refers to accident and combat losses.

[RichTO90]

Overall, I though that combat aircraft losses in 1944 looked like this:

Consisting of total losses of combat aircraft to accident and combat.

Western front
Allied losses - 20,000

USAAF losses (combat and accident) in theaters versus Germany during 1944 were 13,868. Another 807 were 2nd Line losses. USAAF losses on combat missions in theaters versus Germany during 1944 were 11,618. Of those, 2,465 were to other causes (accident and unknown). Losses to enemy action included 4,063 to enemy aircraft and 5,190 to flak.

German losses - 9,500

Eastern front
Soviet losses - 24,800
German losses - 2,500

However, I have doubts that the 12,000 german loss statistic refers to combat and accidental losses or only total losses. But I am not entirely convinced yet.

Why? Do you have trouble translating the German terms?

[ljadw]

No Emil, you didn't understand: German equipment losses in 1943 and 1944 (specially fighters) didn't increase in proportion with the increase in production. That implies that their didn't make full use if their increased production.

This is corroborated by the number of aircraft used in operations and by the lack of increase in aircraft streght. In may 1940, the Germans had 1,370 fighters. In september 1944, they had 1,610 fighters. But production in september 1944 was 3,300 fighters while in 1940, monthly production was around 250. I mean, were these extra fighters produced went?

Apparently, the luftwaffe didn't have the capacity to operate a very large number of aircraft at the same time. And hence, to absorb the increased german production. So this increase was useless and didn't have any impact on the war.

Also, in 1940, Britain made 4,000 fighters, Germany made 3,100. In 1944, Germany made 29,000 fighters and Britain made 10,000. But in 1940, Germany had airsuperiority over most of Europe and the RAF could only manage to not get completely destroyed, in 1944 RAF had air supremacy over most of Europe, while the Luftwaffe was trying to offer some resistance to the bombers.

Guaporense:German fighter production in 1940 was 2746,in 1944 25285 (or maybe you are counting ground-attack aircraft as fighters ?)Source :The Luftwaffe War Diaries (C.Bekker)Appendix XIII

[The_Enigma]

Ellis notes in regards to the Normandy air force losses: "If the total number of sorties is taken into account, it is calculated that on average some 36 men and 9 aircraft were lost for every 1000 sorties flown by the RAF, and that the USAF lost some 34 men and 8 aircraft for every 1000 sorties flown."(Ellis, Victory in the West, p. 488)

I still cant find the German figures, i dont think there is similar info in this book but on the whole it doesnt seem that dangerous for the Allied air crew.

[RichTO90]

Strategy for defeat gives: 4,080 fighter losses due to accident and combat in the first half of 1944. If losses increased by 15% in the second half of 1944, we get: 8,728 fighter losses, for accident and combat in 1944. You gave 9,407 fighter losses. So, I think this number refers to accident and combat losses.

Why do you insist on trying to compute losses for months where you have no data on months were you have data? Why do you think losses "increased by 15% in the second half of 1944"? Why not 5%? Or 25%?

Surreal...