But, now look at the relative strenghts of opposing strategic bombing operations:
We can see a vast allied increase between 1943 and 1944, while german strength doesn't increase. That's because of lack of pilots, particularly in 1944. Second to the American Strategic Bombing survey:
"Enemy opposition to the bomber raids had grown very little numerically in the last nine months. The number of bombers in US task forces had multiplied by four in the same period, and fighter escort numbers also had become four times as great (Figure 4). For example, in the fall of 1943, 300 bombers and 200 escort fighters had been opposed by 200 or more enemy fighters. In May 1944 comparative figures show 1,000 bombers with 900 escort fighters opposed by some 300 enemy interceptors."
Why German fighter strength didn't increase, since production nearly tripled between 1943 and 1944? Well:
"The enemy situation is confirmed in an interview with Lieutenant General Karl Koller, Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe, who stated that In addition to the lack of suitable fighter aircraft, the Luftwaffe was handicapped by lack of petroleum and of well-trained pilots. When General Seller became Chief of the Air Staff in 1943 he found that the total aviation gasoline alloted to pilot training was 10,000 tone a month. By February 1944, he had increased this allotment to 50,000 tons. Thereafter, the progressive difficulties in production caused by air attack made it necessary to curtail training and finally to cease training altogether. (Reference Note 6)"
If they allocated 50,000 tons of fuel to training one year earlier... They literally failed to plant pilot trees!
50,000 tons of fuel is not that much, german oil supplies were 800,000-900,000 tons per month before may 1944, german aircraft fuel production was 200,000 tons per month before the bombings.
German single engine fighter production:
January 1944 1,316
February 1944 1,016
March 1944 1,377
April 1944 1,696
May 1944 1,907
Juno 1944 2,177
July 1944 2,687
August 1944 2,779
September 1944 3,031
October 1944 2,735
November 1944 2,776
December 1944 2,424
Note that production reach turning tide levels only in may, by that time however, fuel production colapsed and they couldn't train the pilots to use the aircraft nor actually use them.
Compare the trends of force strength between the USAF and the german interceptors:
German strength peaked in mid 1944, when aircraft fuel reserves were ending.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz