Tito's Partisans prepared to collaborate with the Axis?

[Westminster]

[Split from "Chetnik volunteers at Waffen SS side (info-pictures?)"]

1) People's Liberation Army (partisans/communists); fought against Axis forces; shortly allies with DM's chetniks, soon afterwards fought against them and the old regime (monarchy); at one point they were also prepared to collaborate with Germans and fight against the Allies (which supported DM's chetniks at the time and it was expected that they'll land in Yug.), but this never happened
2) Yugoslav Army in Fatherland (Draza Mihailovic's chetniks/monarchists); fought against partisans (as mentioned above, they were allies for a short period) and against the Axis forces; later often collaborated with Axis to fight against partisans (but at the same time they also saved Allied pilots, which landed in Yug.); note: even when collaborating with Axis, they still supported their King in exile (who was in England at the time, with W. Churchill); note 2: I'm skipping Chetniks of other regions of ex-Yugoslavia in this text

While the second point can be argued, with the inevitable conclusion that DM forces were predominantly in the business of switching sides in order to save their skin and stay in whatever form of power, your first point where "at one point they [Tito's Partisans] were also prepared to collaborate with Germans and fight against the Allie" goes to nothing short of absurdity.

Can you please, for my and the world's amusement, show one shred of evidence of any kind of collaboration, plan of collaboration, even a single photo linking Tito's forces to the Axis. Please do not amuse us with the mention of the March negotiations, which only went to the extent of prisoner exchange and a possible ceasefire. Please, elaborate on this new-age Chetnik propaganda.

Having an interest in guerrilla movements in general, I am aware of the new history revisionists in the Balkans. They come from all backgrounds, be it Bosnian, Croatian or in this case Serbian. The quote above is one such example. The ultimate aim, in my view, of these fabrications is to justify the latest horrors in their region, promote the notion of "century old conflicts", and erase all trace of unity amongst these people (who 50 years earlier knew better than to divide and slaughter each-other needlessly).

[Marcus]

I have split your post off into a new thread to keep the discussions on topic.

/Marcus

[DrG]

Italian intelligence kept a close eye on German-Partizan negotiations in March 1943. They discovered that Tito's Partizans were offering not only an exchange of prisoners, but also a cease-fire with the Germans and, unless attacked, the Ustashas, aimed at the destruction of Chetniks (given the absence of German operations against Partizans until early May 1943, it seems that a local agreement was really reached). Decrypts of Chetnik radio messages were instead the only source available to Italian intelligence of the information about the Partizans' offer of an alliance with the Germans in case of British landing in the Balkans.

[G. Trifkovic]

Hi DrG,

do you happen to know if those decrypts are available in the NARA T-821 Series, and if yes, on which rolls?

Thanks in advance,

G.

[Westminster]

Italian intelligence kept a close eye on German-Partizan negotiations in March 1943. They discovered that Tito's Partizans were offering not only an exchange of prisoners, but also a cease-fire with the Germans and, unless attacked, the Ustashas, aimed at the destruction of Chetniks (given the absence of German operations against Partizans until early May 1943, it seems that a local agreement was really reached). Decrypts of Chetnik radio messages were instead the only source available to Italian intelligence of the information about the Partizans' offer of an alliance with the Germans in case of British landing in the Balkans.

While I appreciate the above, again, where is a shred of evidence of any kind of collaboration? A ceasefire is not, and has never been deemed as collaboration by anyone. Ceasefires occur in every war, and are strictly NOT viewed as collaboration. Collaboration involves pre-planed action involving two separate forces to reach a common goal. Tito's partisans were never involved in any collaboration with any troops what so ever (other than Draza Mihailovic's troops who ultimately ratted them out at the beginning of the war). Draza Mihailovic's chetniks, on the other hand, were consistently involved in collaboration with both Ustashas as well as Italians, and at a local level with the Germans. They were also intentionally passive in allowing German troop supplies through their railway territory. Lets not forget the genocide, of course.

Also, decrypts of Chetnik radio messages cannot attest to any king of pre-planned collaboration. In my experience, to be honest, I (or any of my colleagues) have never heard of such messages. I would love for you to provide references for these in any case (regardless of their lack of credibility).

I just cannot get my self to believe that this "Chicago" based propaganda is still trickling to the people of the Balkans and viewed as based in fact. Their "hearsay" evidence is disturbing in the sense that they are attempting to distort history at a time when there is little motive to support any kind of brotherhood and unity amongst these people (which the Partisans promoted). The Yugoslav Partisan struggle is as heroic as it is fascinating. To have Chetnik proponents, whose predecessors were in many instances nothing short of genocidal maniacs, distort history while there is no demand for the real truth is really disturbing. There are far-right documentaries out there that brand them as freedom fighters whose ultimate aim was to fight "the communists", as if all Partisans were part of the CPY. Shocking, and when I come across these kinds of fabrication I have to comment.

[G. Trifkovic]

Westminster,

I suggest we continue discussing this subject in an academic manner, without using sweeping generalizations or pamphleteer language. It can bring nothing constructive and only lead to flame wars, a thing this forum is not for.

Let us therefore begin with the facts. As already said, there is no documentary evidence that the talks resulted in a truce. I've reached that conclusion during my research, and so did Klaus Schmider, a historian with no love for either Chetnik or Partisan cause (Schmider, Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien, p. 252). The only concession the Partisans actually made in this context is a temporary halt to the sabotage on the Zagreb-Belgrade railway line.

(given the absence of German operations against Partizans until early May 1943, it seems that a local agreement was really reached).

This is an often repeated and- flawed- argument. The fact that the Germans stopped on the Neretva River in mid-March 1943 and didn't pursue the Partisans into Eastern Herzegovina had more to do with logistics and politics than with the talks they had with the Partisans.

For starters, Italians were wary of German encroachment of their rights in the Independent State of Croatia. They were forced to swallow the German incursion into Western Herzegovina in February-March and occupation of the all-important bauxite area around Mostar, but were not prepared to make further concessions.

Already on 2 March 1943, the Italian VI Corps contacted the German 718th Division and asked for a guarantee "that the German troops would not cross the line running from Konjic to Rama." The division responded that it already had the order "not to cross south of that line." (NAW, T-315, Roll 2271, 000283, 980).

The Commander of German Troops in Croatia reported in the summary report for the first two weeks of March, that the operation "Weiss" was concluded and that "the pursuit of the enemy south and east of Neretva is not possible because of political obligations made to the Italians" ( NAW, T-314, Roll 554,000368).

The Germans did , however, cross the Neretva on several places in order to ensure the Partisans stayed on the run. There was several sharp rear-guard actions, like the one around the village of Bijela (south of Konjic) on 20-21 March 1943, where the Germans lost one tank to Partisan fire (NAW, T315, Roll 2271,000840-2).

The Italians could not do much about it in the Konjic area, since they had no troops there. To the south, however, the situation was different. On 17 March 1943, at Grabovica, the Italians "would not allow us [the 369th Infantry Division] to cross the river and advance from there to Gornja Grabovica" (NAW, T315, Roll 2154,000431).

One often forgets that Wehrmacht troops were in action since 20 January 1943 and badly needed rest by mid-March. This is especially true for the 717th Infantry Division which had to fight non-stop for almost two months (other divisions got a ten-day rest in February between the first and the second phase of Operation "Weiss"). The division was totally exhausted by the time it reached Neretva. The 718th was in a little better shape, but it had only one regiment-sized battle group at hand for any incursions to the east of the river. These units also suffered casualties in the especially bitter battle for Konjic in February-March. The strongest division, the 7th SS was tasked with securing the bauxite area, a task by far on the top of German priorities at that time. 369th was a totally green formation, and could not be expected to pursuit the Partisans on its own. If we add that the major reorganization of German divisions of the 700-series was scheduled to begin in April, then there is really no need to look for conspiracy in the decision to make a halt on the Neretva.

So much for now. Cheers,

G.

[DrG]

A Chetnik radio intercept (dated 11 May 1943) about the agreement between Partizans and Germans regarding a cease-fire and Partizan support in the event of a British landing is quoted in Oddone Talpo, "Dalmazia, una cronaca per la storia. 1943-1944", USSME, 1994. The original documents are preserved in the historical archives of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministero degli Affari Esteri) and of the Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito. The Ufficio 'I' (Informazioni) of 'Supersloda' (Italian 2nd Army) had been decoding all the Chetnik radio messages with London since the end of 1942.
On 25 May 1943 the SIE (intelligece of the Regio Esercito) sent a memo to the highest officers of the Italian Army regarding the relations between the Germans and Partizans, in which the contacts for exchange of prisoners are confirmed (also the Italian military mission in Zagreb had been contacted, although, it seems, very superficially and without development after the first contact), while the aforementioned agreements of non-aggression and collaboration were described as based only on decoded Chetnik radio messages.

According to Mario Dassovich ("Fronte jugoslavo 1943", Del Bianco, 2000), Nora Beloff, in her "Tito's Flawed Legacy" (quoted from its Italian edition "Tito fuori dalla leggenda"), quotes two documents, both dated 30 March 1943. In the first Tito, Rankovic' and Zujovic' ordered to Arso Jovanovic' to stop attacking the Germans, because Partizan's first aim was that of destroying Chetniks. In the second document (an order sent to the First Army Corps of Bosnia by Tito, through a messenger who travelled under the protection of the Germans, according to Dedijer) Tito orders to concentrate the attacks on the Chetniks of Central Bosnia and Krajia and to exploit the truce that had allowed Partizans "to divide the Germans from the Italians and Chetniks".

According to Stefano Fabei ("I cetnici nella seconda guerra mondiale", LEG, 2006), Walter Hagen (Wilhelm Höttl) wrote, in his "The Secret Front", 1953, that the Germans had intercepted a radio message from Stalin ordering Tito to collaborate with the Germans in case of Allied landing in the Balkans.

[G. Trifkovic]

Hi DrG,

On 25 May 1943 the SIE (intelligece of the Regio Esercito) sent a memo to the highest officers of the Italian Army regarding the relations between the Germans and Partizans, in which the contacts for exchange of prisoners are confirmed (also the Italian military mission in Zagreb had been contacted, although, it seems, very superficially and without development after the first contact), while the aforementioned agreements of non-aggression and collaboration were described as based only on decoded Chetnik radio messages.

Is this memo quoted as well in Talpo?

According to Mario Dassovich ("Fronte jugoslavo 1943", Del Bianco, 2000), Nora Beloff, in her "Tito's Flawed Legacy" (quoted from its Italian edition "Tito fuori dalla leggenda"), quotes two documents, both dated 30 March 1943. In the first Tito, Rankovic' and Zujovic' ordered to Arso Jovanovic' to stop attacking the Germans, because Partizan's first aim was that of destroying Chetniks. In the second document (an order sent to the First Army Corps of Bosnia by Tito, through a messenger who travelled under the protection of the Germans, according to Dedijer) Tito orders to concentrate the attacks on the Chetniks of Central Bosnia and Krajia and to exploit the truce that had allowed Partizans "to divide the Germans from the Italians and Chetniks".

The order to 1st Bosnian Corps was published in Zbornik/II/8/360-1, and Tito did order the attacks on Chetniks in Central Bosnia and Krajina, only the original document mentions "exploiting the contact made with the Germans in order to exchange prisoners" [Iskoristivši kontakt za razmjenu zarobljenika sa Nijemcima], rather than "exploiting the truce". Also, the couriers who were partly escorted by the Germans on their journey (Vladimir Velebit and Grujo Soknic) were headed for Slavonia and Eastern, not West Bosnia.

There was a similar order going to 6th East Bosnian Brigade, and I'll try to dig it out later.

Interestingly, it was the Chetniks who also informed the British about the "existence but not the subject" of the negotiations ; Col. Bailey sent the news to Cairo on 22 March 1943(Mark Wheeler, Britain and War for Yugoslavia 1940-1943, p. 226-7).

Cheers,

G.

[Westminster]

I'm confused as to the relevance of a cease-fire. Can you please state your stance on this issue before your elaboration. That is, is a cease-fire considered by individuals here as collaboration? I hope, whatever the stance, that you are aware it does not amount to collaboration in the eyes of any respectable historian, politician, or army.

Regardless, if part of the issue here is the Partisan attempt to secure a cease-fire, I would concede that this has been well documented. A detailed account of the March negotiations is also provided by Milovan Djilas, present at the negotiations, and while a dissident his works are generally accepted as accurate.

Lastly, I cannot emphasise enough the difference between actual collaboration and "intercepts of apparent offers". How can one be assured that an apparent radio intercept of a Partisan offer was in fact legitimate. Who is to say that Partisans, should they have proposed this, would actually go through with it? Many deals have been made and not followed through in order to gain the upper hand. One has to look at facts of deed, rather than propositions that may or may not be legitimate. In doing so, you will find endless accounts of direct collaboration on the part of the Chetniks, and not a single account of collaboration on the part of Partisans. The same applies to photographic evidence. I have not come across a single photo of a Partisan, of whatever rank, with German entourage unless captured or vice versa. They say a picture tells a thousand words. These photos tell millions.

I do not mean to be patronising, but an example would help explain my position.

If I borrow $10 from G. and state that I would return this money, I have not collaborated in any way.
If I return this money, I have collaborated.
If I do not return this money, I have NOT collaborated.

A Partisan proposition, if it ever existed, would not amount to even the first of the above steps. In this example, it would only prove that I intended to take $10 from G. - nothing further.

Collaboration can only be ascertained by action. Chetniks indulged in a considerable amount of such action, where as Partisans never did so.

The proposition that an apparent Partisan proposal to collaborate is deemed collaboration is quite clearly misguided. Their intent has not been confirmed. In fact, since the Germans never agreed to any such proposition, they quite clearly never trusted the Partisans - for good reason. They partly trusted the Chetniks, who were also trusted in full by other Axis forces.

[DrG]

Dear G. Trifkovic,
thank you for the clarifications about Nora Beloff's first document. Translations from Slavic to English and then to Italian didn't help much.
About the 25 May memo of the SIE, it's fully reproduced in Talpo's book, but I am unable to scan it. I can rewrite, word by word, the passage about the Chetnik intercepts regarding the agreements.

25 maggio 1943 - XXI
Stato Maggiore R. Esercito
Servizio Informazioni Esercito
(SIE)
Promemoria
Oggetto: Croazia - Contatti fra le autorità germaniche ed i partigiani
[...]
- Secondo intercettazioni del traffico r.t. cetnico i tedeschi avrebbero condotto trattative con i partigiani concluse con un accordo in base al quale i tedeschi non attaccherebbero i partigiani e questi si opporrebbero ad un eventuale sbarco degli anglo sassoni nella penisola balcanica.

Translation:

25 May 1943 - XXI [year of the Fascist Era]
[Italian] Royal Army General Staff
Army Intelligence Service
(SIE)
Memo
Object: Croatia - Contacts between German authorities and Partizans
[...]
- According to intercepts of Chetnik radio traffic the Germans would have made negotiations with Partizans concluded with an agreement according to which the Germans would not attack Partizans and the latter would not oppose an eventual Anglo-Saxon landing in the Balkanic peninsula.

Guido

[G. Trifkovic]

Hi Guido,

and thanks for the info. You don't have to scan it or transcribe it, it's sufficient for me to know where to find it. I'm bugging you for the sources, because I'll need them for my PhD.

I'm confused as to the relevance of a cease-fire.

The Chetniks, as we know, utilized (or tried to utilize) the tactic of "neutralizing" one side in order to concentrate on the other since the late 1941. If the Partisans and the Germans concluded a cease-fire on the Neretva which in turn enabled the former to concentrate on their civil war enemies, the Chetniks, then the Partisans did exactly what they accused the Chetniks of doing throughout the war.

Lastly, I cannot emphasise enough the difference between actual collaboration and "intercepts of apparent offers". How can one be assured that an apparent radio intercept of a Partisan offer was in fact legitimate. Who is to say that Partisans, should they have proposed this, would actually go through with it? Many deals have been made and not followed through in order to gain the upper hand.

The mere fact that they openly stated they wanted a cease-fire and that they would oppose the landings on the Adriatic was enough for their opponents to accuse of them of collaboration. Indeed, in my opinion, the Second Yugoslavia added to the strength of the rumors by constantly denying them and by pretending these talks never happened. They even filed a diplomatic protest (!) because of the publishing of Robert's book in 1973, in which the existence of talks was first mentioned (and erroneous conclusions first made).

As for the intercepted Chetnik messages: it is questionable whether Italians trusted to the word what they read , but they still could use these informations. They would have come in handy if the Germans asked them again to stop collaborating with the Chetniks and disarm them. If Germans accused them of this again, they could respond the former did the same with the Communists.

In fact, apart from general distrust of Tito, Ribbentrop named this as a reason why no accommodation with Tito, no matter how limited, can take place. The Germans feared the Italians would use it as a pretext to keep the Chetniks in their service. (ADAP/E/V/501-2).

Cheers,

G.

[Westminster]

The Chetniks, as we know, utilized (or tried to utilize) the tactic of "neutralizing" one side in order to concentrate on the other since the late 1941. If the Partisans and the Germans concluded a cease-fire on the Neretva which in turn enabled the former to concentrate on their civil war enemies, the Chetniks, then the Partisans did exactly what they accused the Chetniks of doing throughout the war.
...
The mere fact that they openly stated they wanted a cease-fire and that they would oppose the landings on the Adriatic was enough for their opponents to accuse of them of collaboration. Indeed, in my opinion, the Second Yugoslavia added to the strength of the rumors by constantly denying them and by pretending these talks never happened. They even filed a diplomatic protest (!) because of the publishing of Robert's book in 1973, in which the existence of talks was first mentioned (and erroneous conclusions first made).

In regards to the first paragraph, there is a clear distinction between a cease-fire and collaboration. In that respect, Partisans did not engage in treason (of the collective Yugoslav people). Chetniks, besides the cease-fire, actively worked towards the same objective as the Germans - fighting along side, contributing to German offensives, aiming to destroy an active anti-axis force. Moreover, I emphasise again, a proposal on the part of the Partisans is not an act of collaboration; it was likely a maneuver to buy time. History shows it didn't have effect. One can only consider actual acts of collaboration, facts... deeds, of which Chetniks committed aplenty. There is no evidence of such action by Partisans in military archives of any side involved in the conflict.

As far as the second paragraph, an apparent proposition to fight the Allies should they land on the Balkans is not based in fact. Can you please provide some evidence to support this? I am genuinely interested. Having said that, it would not change the fact that such a proposition never evolved to action and that it was likely a ploy to buy time. If such a proposition was really made, the Germans have dismissed it with good reason. After all, it would have been made by arguably the biggest and most effective resistance movement in Europe. Would you trust such an entity and aid it while it recoups and recovers, and hope it sticks to its side of the bargain?

Also, while the state's suppression of the March negotiations was not an ideal way to deal with public opinion, one can see why such a tactic was employed. This information can easily be taken out of context, misinterpreted, or embellished - especially by a very active exile (and brainwashed expat) community working hard to sabotage the newly formed government.

Browsing around these forums, the number of these Chicago brainwashed "prodigies" more than alarms me. Some of the stuff they are coming out with just cannot be taken seriously. I could not believe some of the posts dating back to 2005. They are relentless and ignore fact while pollute with fiction. While a misguided post here and there can be tolerated, when a "denial of service attack" occurs, forum moderators needs to act and steer the topic to the right direction. It can be difficult to read or follow when members persistently post irrelevant hearsay while ignoring or denying Axis or Ally documents. These contemporary Chetnik historians are also behind the rehabilitation of Dragoljub Mihailovic currently undergoing in Serbia. Should the revisionists get their way it will be a sad day not only for Serbia, but the whole region.

[Westminster]

According to intercepts of Chetnik radio traffic the Germans would have made negotiations with Partizans concluded with an agreement according to which the Germans would not attack Partizans and the latter would not oppose an eventual Anglo-Saxon landing in the Balkanic peninsula.

I may be asking for much, but is there any information as to who this message was addressed to? I would assume the Allies? While I'm jumping to conclusions, it could easily be construed as misinformation aiming to sever Ally - Partisan relations.

[DrG]

Hi Guido,
and thanks for the info. You don't have to scan it or transcribe it, it's sufficient for me to know where to find it. I'm bugging you for the sources, because I'll need them for my PhD.

Dear G. Trifkovic,
the archival cohordinates of the memo I quoted are: USSME, Busta 1262/A, Stato Maggiore Esercito, Servizio informazioni.
Best wishes for your thesis, I've just defended mine (in Finance, not History) last week (so, finally, my nickname in this forum will not be misunderstood! I didn't even think I would have got a Ph.D. when I choose "DrG", it meant another thing for me...).
Guido

[DrG]

I may be asking for much, but is there any information as to who this message was addressed to? I would assume the Allies? While I'm jumping to conclusions, it could easily be construed as misinformation aiming to sever Ally - Partisan relations.

The SIE was able to decrypt messages both from Mihailovic' to London and between different Chetnik units in Yugoslavia. The memo doesn't state from which messages it got its information, i.e. whether from inter-Chetnik or Chetnik-London ones.
Guido