Operation Sealion - Seriously considered or just a feint?

[john2]

Hitler was clearly adverse to invading Britain. In one of the books I have read Hitler is quoted as saying that invading Britain would only allow others to benefit. Namely Russia, Japan and the US. Hitler seems to be planning two wars which apparently are mutually exclusive. Operation Sea Lion to defeat Britain that year and an invasion of Russia - who's supposed purpose is to isolate Britain in 1941. However if Britain is to be defeated in 1940 then the main justification to attack Russia, helping to end the war with Britain, is eliminated. The only conclusion that can be reached is that Hitler was skeptical of Sea Lion, skeptical enough to assume that Britain would still be in the war the next year. However if Hitler was skeptical about Sea Lion it was not shown because, as people have pointed out, the preparations seemed real enough. A possible solution to the problem is this:

Hitler wished for Britain to simply surrender. When the British refused he felt he had no choice but to plan a military solution - Sea Lion. As the planning begun two problems arose - whether or not it was within German capabilities to carry out an invasion and the future intentions of Russia. Given these problems Hitler felt compelled to make long range plans as it seemed the prospects of carrying out an invasion would be difficult. These plans invovled invading Russia. In spite of this Hitler still hoped Britain could somehow be defeated that year. The goal of the air attacks was twofold - to put pressure on the British to give up and soften up the British in case it was decided an invasion could go ahead. Thus Hitler was keeping all his options open. He could try to force Britain into surrender that year through pressure or invasion and if that failed he had his plans to invade Russia the next year.

[Michael Emrys]

Hitler wished for Britain to simply surrender.

I'm not sure but what 'surrender' might be considered too strong a term. Hitler wanted Britain to come to terms with him. I may not have all the details, but I believe that broadly the terms were that Britain would make peace giving Hitler a free hand in continental Europe, as well as a return of its colonies in Africa. In return, GB would continue as an independent nation, retaining the rest of its empire and most of its navy, etc.

The rest of your argument I find very well reasoned. Thank you.

[john2]

I agree those would have been Hitler's terms. I still consider it a surrender of sorts because it entailed Britain's recognition of Germany's dominant position which could only mean that Britain would then be a secondary power dependant on Germany's goodwill.

[Benny C.]

I think that this is one of those topics that cannot be proven for definate one way or the other.
In my opinion Sealion was not seriously considered. I think it was a political bluff, and a bluff is no use unless it is prepared for as if it is not a bluff, hence the reason that lower level figures were never told that it would not be carried out because if they were their preparations would not be realistic. As I said in an earlier post Goebbels' wrote in his diary that the invasion is not planned but we must talk about it in our propaganda to confuse the enemy.AFAIK Goering never attended any of the conferences on Seelowe because he knew that it wouldn't happen. Von Runstedt said to Hitler that it was impossible to which Hitler said that he knew that and that on land he was a hero but on the sea a coward. Gunther Blumentrie (don't know the spelling) who I think was Von Runstedts Chief of Operations also said that it was a political ploy to try to get Britain to the table but that it must be prepared for as if real in order to convince the enemy that the invasion was serious. And with Hitler being completely pre-occupied with the planning for the invasion of the Soviet Union I can't see Sealion being anything more than a political bluff by military means. Hitler may have considered it at the beginning but I don't think it was long before he realised how difficult it would be any no longer seriously considered it.

Just my two cents,

Regards,
Benny C.

[fredleander]

Anyhow, if this was bluff - it worked in the sense that much resources were used to build up the island defense. Forces which could have been used elsewhere - in Africa or the Far East. In '41/'42 the Brits were just as afraid of an invasion as in '40. Churchill at this time writes about new German developments of LCT's capable of transporting 8-10 tanks - of which 150-200 should be available. Of course, this might be part of a German bluff.

[Grubendagger]

Britain didn't accept its role given to it by Hitler.
If there was something Hitler hated, it was when nations did not accept their roles. An invasion of Britain would be completely acceptable in his mind, and so would a "punishment". Poland were initially planned to be a friendly help-nation (by Hitler).
Poland didn't accept its role and Poland was then punished. Hitler was not only ready to invade England, but also ready to give the British the same treatment he gave the Poles. Hitler's army, however, was not ready.

[Billy]

I would have to agree more with those saying it was [at least until the chance of invasion in 1940 passed, i.e. early October] an ambitious and genuine intention that hinged first and foremost upon the Luftwaffe neutralizing the R.A.F. in the necessary amount of time, and failing that, "preparations" continued after as a feint. Something else to consider is why would the Army have gone to all the hassle to develop the Tauchpanzer variant of the PzKpfw III designed to help spearhead the Sea Lion landings if it was intended from the beginning as a feint? As it was the Tauchpanzer was only used in action in the crossing of the Southern Bug river in the U.S.S.R. since Sea Lion was cancelled, and even then that it was as an afterthought, as in "what do we do with these submersible tanks since we're not going to use them in Sea Lion?". Granted, Germany wasted plenty of other resources during the war on other research & development projects that didn't turn out to be worth the investment of time and effort, but since the Tauchpanzer idea was a direct result of what they felt was a genuine need for a submersible tank to help spearhead the invasion, it would seem to lend credence to Sea Lion being intended as a real operation that was hamstrung by their failure to neutralize the R.A.F. rather than originally intended as a feint.

[JonS]

... the Tauchpanzer idea was a direct result of what they felt was a genuine need for a submersible tank to help spearhead the invasion, it would seem to lend credence to Sea Lion being intended as a real operation that was hamstrung by their failure to neutralize the R.A.F. rather than originally intended as a feint.

Feints generally aren't very effective when everyone knows it's a feint.

[Billy]

I would agree that feints need to look real to be effective, that goes without saying, but why go to the specific effort of developing a real Tauchpanzer instead of just practicing landing panzers from barges in the conventional manner? Both would get armour ashore, and if they exclusively practiced the conventional landing of them it would achieve the same impression [feint-wise] on the British by showing they intend to put armour ashore, and would involve exactly zero research & development effort. Also, not only the Tauchpanzer development but the Sea Lion matter as a whole seems [to me] awfully involved and complicated to have been intended from the beginning purely as a feint. Feints must be realistic-looking, but are also most effective when they don't require your own side to expend more effort and resources than the compensatory enemy expediture/expected reward, or end up being more hassle than they're worth.

[Benny C.]

I would agree with Billy to a point.
As I said earlier I think Hitler considered it a real option at the beginning but I don't think it would have been long before he realised it was just too ambitious for the Wehrmacht at that time and then decided to carry on preparations in order to try and get the British "to the table".

Benny C.

[Graeme Sydney]

There was no plan, there was no feint. The whole of the German policy and strategy smacks of expediency and policy on the trot.

There had been German plans, rehearsals, visions, dreams and training for the battle for France for a hundred years but the Germans had never considered how they were going to neutralize Britain - and they didn't seem to join the dots as to the need to neutralise Britain (despite the BIG lesson of WW1). They always seemed to assume that Britain could be forced into a fait acomplait.

The Germans were surprised and overwhelmed at their own success. They arrived in front of Dunkirk without a plan of what to do next. Hitler wasn’t half hearted he was confused.

They drifted in to a two front war completely contrary to all experience and military advice for the past 100 years based on faulty military appreciation driven by hope and self belief (destiny).

If you want an example of faulty military appreciation driven by hope and self belief/ self delusion look at this.

“Britain's hope lies in Russia and the United States. If the hopes pinned on Russia are disappointed then America too will fall by the wayside, because elimination of Russia would tremendously increase Japan's power in the far east.” “...Germany will then be master of Europe and the Balkans.”...“If we start in May '41, we would have 5 months to finish the job. Tackling it this year would still have been the best, but unified action would have been impossible at this time.”

Hitler and the German officer corp completely and abjectly failed at the geo-political level.

Cheers, Graeme.

[fredleander]

If Hitler didn't want to invade UK, but staked on the Brits giving in to "military facts" - Sealion being intented as a positive bluff would certainly have surfaced in documents after the war.

[tonyh]

why would the Army have gone to all the hassle to develop the Tauchpanzer variant of the PzKpfw III

Because there's more than one body of water in the world that may need to be crossed and the pre-cursor of the Pan III Tauchpanzer goes back to before the war. The were plans for a water-fording Panzer II. The development of a water-fording panzer has nothing really to with Sealion.

Besides the Panzerwaffe only had about 220 Panzer III's (of which a mere fraction were in Tauchpanzer development) in the Summer of 1940 and no way of transporting them to the South of England without Royal Navy interference.

Tony