why didnt the blitzkieg strategy work on the british in south africa (or was it used at all by Afrika Corps?), and why didnt it work on russians during barbarossa?
since heinz guderian was involved in barbarrossa he should have applied his blitzkieg tactics as he did in his western campaign...
thx bruce
another question about blitzkieg....?
-
Benoit Douville
- Member
- Posts: 3184
- Joined: 11 Mar 2002, 02:13
- Location: Montréal
I know that the Blitzkrieg was pretty effective in the start of operation Barbarossa on june 22 1941. The Wehrmacht did conquer a lot of km very fast, in fact the campaign was going so well that Hilter told everybody that the War in Soviet Union was almost over and it will take about 6 weeks before the Soviet Union Collapse. It didn't work because of the winter and the fail to capture Moscow in december 1941. Now it was too late even with that big push that the Wehrmacht have in the summer of 1942.
Regards
Regards
Blitz
The Blitzkrieg was a form or warfare that depended on surprise, numerical supreriority, if this is not possible the concentrated superiority at a the point of attack.
Not only this but when the socalled blitz was unleashed on Poland it was against an army that was far behind times and had it's hands tied. The Polish wanted to call up there reservers weeks before the invasion but there allies who in negoitiations Germany did not want to offend them by having a allie preparing for war. The west forced the polish not to mobilize till it was far to late. At that there were many bloody battles for the new German Heer.
In the west the the Germans won by being better prepared, trained and equiped. Even considering that they were outnumbered against the allies in armor they still won due to training.
In both cases the a nations attacked were not a large in comparision to the areas in North Africa or Russia.
In North Africa, Rommel may well of won if he had been given half the supplies he asked for. When he was in a position to launch a small scale blitz it usually worked, but with anything if you use it to often others learn form it.
The Allies were better supplied then equipped, and to top it all off Torch. The Africa Korps was never supplied enough to win. That's an opinion of a officer who served Rommel. Hans von Luck.
In Russia the Germans overran as much and more land as they did in the west but they never expected the Russia's to be as adaptable as they were. When encircled they would fight to death or surrender enmasse. In 43 they were getting there act together to the point of taking control of the battlefield.
The Germans did not have the supplies, industrial capacity, or manpower to handle the Russians. The socalled house of cards was far from true. In 42 it was plain to many Germans that they would be lucky to get a draw on the eastren front.
Not only this but when the socalled blitz was unleashed on Poland it was against an army that was far behind times and had it's hands tied. The Polish wanted to call up there reservers weeks before the invasion but there allies who in negoitiations Germany did not want to offend them by having a allie preparing for war. The west forced the polish not to mobilize till it was far to late. At that there were many bloody battles for the new German Heer.
In the west the the Germans won by being better prepared, trained and equiped. Even considering that they were outnumbered against the allies in armor they still won due to training.
In both cases the a nations attacked were not a large in comparision to the areas in North Africa or Russia.
In North Africa, Rommel may well of won if he had been given half the supplies he asked for. When he was in a position to launch a small scale blitz it usually worked, but with anything if you use it to often others learn form it.
The Allies were better supplied then equipped, and to top it all off Torch. The Africa Korps was never supplied enough to win. That's an opinion of a officer who served Rommel. Hans von Luck.
In Russia the Germans overran as much and more land as they did in the west but they never expected the Russia's to be as adaptable as they were. When encircled they would fight to death or surrender enmasse. In 43 they were getting there act together to the point of taking control of the battlefield.
The Germans did not have the supplies, industrial capacity, or manpower to handle the Russians. The socalled house of cards was far from true. In 42 it was plain to many Germans that they would be lucky to get a draw on the eastren front.
Re: another question about blitzkieg....?
The blitzkrieg did work in South Africa, in 1976. The South African moved at about 500 kliks per day against the Soviet Empire, and were quickly on the outskirts of Luanda the capital of Angola, when the American Henry Kissinger got cold feet and forced them to stop.bruce wrote:why didnt the blitzkieg strategy work on the british in south africa (or was it used at all by Afrika Corps?), and why didnt it work on russians during barbarossa?
since heinz guderian was involved in barbarrossa he should have applied his blitzkieg tactics as he did in his western campaign...
thx bruce
re
>>why didnt the blitzkieg strategy work on the british in south africa<<
Theres one over riding reason. Numbers. From the outset the German's were in a position of numerical inferiority to the allies. Also air cover was firmly in the allies court. There was really only one fully operational Geshwader in the African theater, JG 27. There were elements of JG 53, 27 etc. But they were mostly drafted in and out of the area. In order for Blitzkrieg to work successfully, air cover must be provided in strength.
Bottom line is that for Blitzkrieg to work there must be the substantial numbers. Not necessarilly superior numbers to the enemy.
>>and why didnt it work on russians during barbarossa?<<
It did and to a staggering degree. In fact the Barbarossa campaign is a shinning example of Blitzkrieg in operation. All elements of the armed forces working in co operative synchronicity to achieve victory over a numerically superior foe. The wehrmacht advanced over 60 miles on the first day alone. The problem with Blitzkrieg is that an army can eaily out run its vital supply lines and also advance beyond its means.
Tony
Theres one over riding reason. Numbers. From the outset the German's were in a position of numerical inferiority to the allies. Also air cover was firmly in the allies court. There was really only one fully operational Geshwader in the African theater, JG 27. There were elements of JG 53, 27 etc. But they were mostly drafted in and out of the area. In order for Blitzkrieg to work successfully, air cover must be provided in strength.
Bottom line is that for Blitzkrieg to work there must be the substantial numbers. Not necessarilly superior numbers to the enemy.
>>and why didnt it work on russians during barbarossa?<<
It did and to a staggering degree. In fact the Barbarossa campaign is a shinning example of Blitzkrieg in operation. All elements of the armed forces working in co operative synchronicity to achieve victory over a numerically superior foe. The wehrmacht advanced over 60 miles on the first day alone. The problem with Blitzkrieg is that an army can eaily out run its vital supply lines and also advance beyond its means.
Tony
Since 'Blitzkrieg' is not a military doctrine but a journalist term, everybody interprets it as they want.
The tactics proposed by Guderain worked only up to 1942.
A good battle to prove this is The battle of Kursk on July 43.
The germans had 5 months (aproximately) to prepare their assault. They concentrated close to 80% of their armor in the attack. On the russian side, the defense was prepared thoroughly.
In the outcome the germans acknowledged defeat (after 16 days) by returning to starting point.
The russians suffered heavy losses (as did the germans) but were so far from defeat that they managed to mount their own offensive that was ultimately stopped only in berlin by a dictator putting a bullet in his brain.
:roll:
The tactics proposed by Guderain worked only up to 1942.
A good battle to prove this is The battle of Kursk on July 43.
The germans had 5 months (aproximately) to prepare their assault. They concentrated close to 80% of their armor in the attack. On the russian side, the defense was prepared thoroughly.
In the outcome the germans acknowledged defeat (after 16 days) by returning to starting point.
The russians suffered heavy losses (as did the germans) but were so far from defeat that they managed to mount their own offensive that was ultimately stopped only in berlin by a dictator putting a bullet in his brain.
:roll:
Very true. Thge only "Blitzkrieg" planned and fought as such was "Barbarossa" and it failed.avidan wrote:Since 'Blitzkrieg' is not a military doctrine but a journalist term, everybody interprets it as they want.
Note: Winning an agressive war in very short time isn't necessarily a "Blitzkrieg" per se.
-
Benoit Douville
- Member
- Posts: 3184
- Joined: 11 Mar 2002, 02:13
- Location: Montréal
Blitz
The Blitz was as pointed out only a term used to describe a form of attack.
In the Battle Kursk the High Command did not want to go through with this operation as they new the plans were know to the soviets. The soviets actually fire artillery shells containing leaflets with the date, time and locations of the attack to the german lines to taunt them.
Guderian and some other generals wanted to attack before Hitler had planned as they new the soviets were building up.
So the blitz was not stopped at Kursk.
Kursk was a planned attack against a prepared enemy and this was all in the plans for the operation.
In one of my IDF magazines they have an article stating the pros and cons of the blitz and wether it actually existed. They seem to form the opinion was a type of attack that was attempted in the first war but never carried through.
In the Battle Kursk the High Command did not want to go through with this operation as they new the plans were know to the soviets. The soviets actually fire artillery shells containing leaflets with the date, time and locations of the attack to the german lines to taunt them.
Guderian and some other generals wanted to attack before Hitler had planned as they new the soviets were building up.
So the blitz was not stopped at Kursk.
Kursk was a planned attack against a prepared enemy and this was all in the plans for the operation.
In one of my IDF magazines they have an article stating the pros and cons of the blitz and wether it actually existed. They seem to form the opinion was a type of attack that was attempted in the first war but never carried through.
AndyW wrote:Wrong. The "Blitzkrieg" (actually the first ever "planned" as such)against the SU ended after Smolensk/Kiev.Benoit Douville wrote:It ["Blitzkrieg"]didn't work because of the winter and the fail to capture Moscow in december 1941.
The tactics propsed by Guderian were the use of tanks to effect a breakthrough in the defensive line and exploit it with mobile forces. (as opposed to trying to brekthrough with Artillery preparations and Infantry assaults like the ones in WWI)
He proposed that a mass of concentrated tanks would be able to punch through (if the terrain conditions were right) the defense.
This is what the German High command tried to do in Kursk '43,
The result was that the German Panzer divisions were decimated and did not manage to breakthrough the russian defenses.
Hey dont take my word for it:
"The Panzer tactics that led to the great successes in The years 1939,1940 and 1941 must be viewed as outdated. Even if today it is still possible to breach an anti-tank defensive front through concentrated Panzer forces employed in several waves behind each other, we still must consider past experience that this always leads to significant losses..."
commander 17.Pz.Div 24.April.43 (Jentz- Panzerttuppen vol 2 pp.43)
This was 3 months before Kursk.
He proposed that a mass of concentrated tanks would be able to punch through (if the terrain conditions were right) the defense.
This is what the German High command tried to do in Kursk '43,
The result was that the German Panzer divisions were decimated and did not manage to breakthrough the russian defenses.
Hey dont take my word for it:
"The Panzer tactics that led to the great successes in The years 1939,1940 and 1941 must be viewed as outdated. Even if today it is still possible to breach an anti-tank defensive front through concentrated Panzer forces employed in several waves behind each other, we still must consider past experience that this always leads to significant losses..."
commander 17.Pz.Div 24.April.43 (Jentz- Panzerttuppen vol 2 pp.43)
This was 3 months before Kursk.