Why British and American Tank tactics were so bad

[Kunikov]

Perhaps the worst problem in the west though was a simple lack of infantry. Of some 100-odd infantry and fusilier battalions (not counting Panzergrenadier or Fallschirmjaeger) fully 25 percent were Ost-Truppen. Many of these collapsed quickly when the Allies attacked, often stranding their German "compatriots" in untenable positions. I sometimes wonder if the Germans would have been better served to keep those troops in the east, where if they would be certain of their fate if they deserted or were captured? The Germans could have simply traded them on a one-for-one basis for "elite" German infantry battalions to deploy in the west.

Actually their fates were not certain, if they did desert they simply might have been put on the front line with the rest of the Red Army. There are accounts of how Soviet 'spies' and partisans were able to convince whole units (companies or battalions) to switch sides and fight for the Red Army. This being the major reason why the Germans sent their 'eastern volunteers' to the West, where they promptly surrendered.

[Tony Williams]

Agreed - which reminds me another rather chilling viewpoint attributed to the German Army in 1944, which might help to account for their stubborn resistance despite obvious defeat. It went something like this:

"We might as well enjoy the war, because the peace is going to be terrible."

Tony Williams

[RichTO90]

I know. I was being facetious.

[RichTO90]

"We might as well enjoy the war, because the peace is going to be terrible."

To which one could reply that they reaped what they had sown.

[Caldric]

Hey if you want to talk about the horrible Western Allies? Name any other nation besides the US/UK/Canada who could put 132700 troops on a beach in 1 operation in 1 or 2 days? And in less then 1 month put 1 million troops and 177,000 vehicles in one battle front?? 57,000 of these vehicles and 325000 troops where put there in 1 week!

What wins wars? Few but excellent Panzers? Or the basics LOGISTICS.

I place my bet on logistics, any takers?

You can say Western allies were cowards or inept and poor equipment but no one person can say they were not very good at bringing the war to your front door.

Did they look like parade field troops of the Germans? No they did not. Did they kick the hell out of German forces in France? Well I will allow you to open your history books.

[Mark V.]

OK, point taken. But the main point was that unlike the other units discussed here, they did not spend half a year or several months in France absorbing large numbers of replacements, but arrived relatively fresh from action in the East.

As Andeas already wrote the two divisions didn't need 6 months of rest as the others to recuperate.

I was not actually aware that there was any "special training for the East". What may you be talking about here? Also, 21st PzD and 12th SS PzD did eventually fight in the East, and if they performed poorly this is news to me.

These divisions were formed as mobile units to counter possible invasion and as such weren't intended for action in the East. There training was focused on defeating para drops, swift attacks on enemy beachheads, building the Atlantikwall . As such they weren't prepared for the rough conditions (mud) in the East - you could find a similar example in 25.Pz.Div., see also Balck's comments on 9.SS-Pz.Div.

What is this based on? It is usually singled out as one of the most effective German units in Normandy.

This shouldn't be a surprise to you. The division never did (or could) justify big hopes at its creation and all the resources (human and equipment) invested in it. After the successful Tilly campaign the things just went for the worst.

[Qvist]

These divisions were formed as mobile units to counter possible invasion and as such weren't intended for action in the East. There training was focused on defeating para drops, swift attacks on enemy beachheads, building the Atlantikwall . As such they weren't prepared for the rough conditions (mud) in the East - you could find a similar example in 25.Pz.Div., see also Balck's comments on 9.SS-Pz.Div.

Mark, if you have any evidence that there existed a specifically EF-oriented training programme for Panzer Divisions, not to mention training activities geared towards coping with mud, that the new formations raised in the West were not given, I would appreciate if you would post it. Also, I'm curious how much a time a unit such as Panzer Lehr spent working on the atlantic wall, and considering that HJ had a core of officers from LAH and Pz Lehr ditto from Panzer training school, I would also be a bit surprised, to say the very least, if they chose to train their soldiers in a less demanding and beneficial way than was the case for units raised for the East. Probably, the activities you describe figured markedly for 21st PzD, which would not be surprising given the nature of the Division's deployment. But this would obviously have more to do with the fact that the divisions was deployed in the expected immediate area of landing than with the fact it was raised and intended for use in Western Europe. The distinction between units "intended for the East" and "Units intended for the West " as such is IMO a pointless one.

This shouldn't be a surprise to you. The division never did (or could) justify big hopes at its creation and all the resources (human and equipment) invested in it. After the successful Tilly campaign the things just went for the worst.

It's not a surprise that you think so as you have written it before, but you're still not giving any very good reasons. What you describe above can hardly be put down to Panzer Lehr's performance - and as far as THAT is concerned I have yet to see any particularly unfavourable comments, rather the opposite in fact.

cheers

[RichTO90]

Also, I'm curious how much a time a unit such as Panzer Lehr spent working on the atlantic wall, and considering that HJ had a core of officers from LAH and Pz Lehr ditto from Panzer training school, I would also be a bit surprised, to say the very least, if they chose to train their soldiers in a less demanding and beneficial way than was the case for units raised for the East. Probably, the activities you describe figured markedly for 21st PzD, which would not be surprising given the nature of the Division's deployment.

No Qvist, Mark is not corect. Personnel of the Panzer and Panzergrenadier formations in France were never detailed for Atlantik Wall work. If you check carefully my 7.-Armee OB posted at Feldgrau you may note that the positions for some infantry division companies is given as "working" at different places. The daily Meldungen for 7.-Armee as contained in the Anlagen to the Armee KTB are available for February-May and there are literally hndreds of references to the assignment of working parties and - although I have not examined any other month than May closely - I have yet to run into any case where these working parties are seconded from Panzer formations. Others have commented, including Spiedel IIRC, that the infantry divisions on the cost were all suffering from lack of training time because of Rommel's insistance that coastal defense works be given a priority.

BTW, the units designated as specialized anti-paratroop forces were 91.Inf.Div. and Fs.Jr.Regt.6 in the Cotentin and 77.Inf.Div. in Brittany. Both of these peninsulas were seen as likely candidates for a mass parachute operation. Also in the Cotentin IIRC both the z.Ers.u.Ausb.Abt.100 and Pz.Abt.206 were assigned as anti-paratroop forces, backing up the previously mentioned units. Of course, one could ask why with so many troops "specially" assigned to the task that the task was performed so poorly?

It's not a surprise that you think so as you have written it before, but you're still not giving any very good reasons. What you describe above can hardly be put down to Panzer Lehr's performance - and as far as THAT is concerned I have yet to see any particularly unfavourable comments, rather the opposite in fact.

cheers

12.SS-Pz.Div., Lehr and 2.PzDiv. were all designated as anti-invasion reserves with the task of acting as quick reaction forces designed to mass rapidly at the invasion site and counterattack so as to destroy it. It was recognized that to do so would entail some exposure of the troops to Allied air power and to the Allies strong artillery forces (including naval), thus the attempt to mechanize as many elements as possible in these divisions. Partly this appears to have developed from experience during HUSKY, AVALANCHE and SHINGLE, where the German forces were either able to counterattack immediately, but not in strong enough force, or were able to counterattack with nearly sufficient force, but too late to be strong enough. In Normandy the Allies were very worried about such an eventuality (it permeated their every action in June) and planned effectively to meet the threat - in this case the German armored counterattack never really got of the ground and it took too much time to assemble the forces despite their preparations and equuipment.

Of course one could also simply point out the ludicrousness of the idea that the Germans would develop multiple armored doctrines and training programs for different theaters of war (did Panzerdivision Norwegen have a special ski course? Would the order be "Panzer Schuss" instead of "Panzer Marsch!" one wonders? Was there a special ski attachment for the Panzer III? )

[Polynikes]

The M4 was a good tank when it came out, and remained at least the equal of the Pz.IV throughout the war. The problem was that the USA and UK never fielded a satisfactory heavy tank equivalent to the Panther or Tiger. OTOH if they had, such vehicles would have caused considerable difficulties, due to the much smaller number which could have been carried by shipping - a crucial factor to the Allies.

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and Discussion forum

Not sure I'd agree with you there Tony.

I think I'd take a Pz IV over a Sherman - though the 17lb armed variants were pretty potent.

The British and the Americans both produced heavy tanks - just not in large numbers. The main problem for the British was that they remained shackled to the idea that there were distinct tank roles and distinct tank types for these roles. Consequently we had the fast (when working) "cavalry" tanks that were under-armed AND under armoured and the slow "infantry" tanks that had heavier armour but also had weak armament.

The British were and still are IMO, still affected by their tank arm being staffed by their cavalrymen. Instead of persevering with their new tank arm (The Royal Tank Corps) it was disbanded and re-formed as the Royal Armoured Corps and made up mostly of cavalry regiments that had reluctantly converted to tanks.
The cavalry regiments should've been converted to armoured recce and the tank battalions formed by "tankies".

That way, there would've been a real armoured doctrine in the British army. The same mistake is threatening to repeat itself today with the cavalry trying to get their paws on the Longbow Apaches and form "air cavalry" regiments instead of attack helicopter regiments from the Army Air Corps.

Cheers from Rich

Cheers from Rich

[Polynikes]

Englander

Also in the battle of France the Germans discovered a mean tank killing weapon,namely the 88 flak cannon.

Actually the potential of the 88mm gun as an AT gun had been recognised some time before - that's why Rommel's 7th Pz Div had an issue of AP rounds for their 88mm guns. Their AA shells wouldn't have been much of a threat otherwise.

Cheers from Rich

[PanzerKing]

And the Sherman M4A4 was not a bad tank at all, better than the Pz IV with 100mm frontal armor, new engine, and a 76mm about equal to the L/48 75mm of the P IV. The problem was that there were not enough of them late in the war as most were the 75mm type.

[Qvist]

Rich TO90

Of course one could also simply point out the ludicrousness of the idea that the Germans would develop multiple armored doctrines and training programs for different theaters of war (did Panzerdivision Norwegen have a special ski course? Would the order be "Panzer Schuss" instead of "Panzer Marsch!" one wonders? Was there a special ski attachment for the Panzer III? )

As always (well, almost always at least ), I am happy to associate myself fully with your comments.

cheers

[Mark V.]

Is this a tag-team ?

Rich thanks for your constructive commentss - I really appreciate it.

No Qvist, Mark is not corect. Personnel of the Panzer and Panzergrenadier formations in France were never detailed for Atlantik Wall work. If you check carefully my 7.-Armee OB posted at Feldgrau you may note that the positions for some infantry division companies is given as "working" at different places. The daily Meldungen for 7.-Armee as contained in the Anlagen to the Armee KTB are available for February-May and there are literally hndreds of references to the assignment of working parties and - although I have not examined any other month than May closely - I have yet to run into any case where these working parties are seconded from Panzer formations. Others have commented, including Spiedel IIRC, that the infantry divisions on the cost were all suffering from lack of training time because of Rommel's insistance that coastal defense works be given a priority.

To settle the matter of Atlantik wall "works" - this was meant as the third option (after I was getting out of any better ones ...). Nevertheless I wouldn't have mentioned it if I wasn't sure this did happen. Now Rich, hopefully you won't give me such a sarcastic answer as Qvist in another thread - so here's my info.
From Fürbringer (9.SS-Pz.Div. - some examples)

"Einzelne Kompanien wurden auch weiterhin bei Stellungsbau an der Kanalküste eingesetzt. Am 21.Dezember griffen um 10,30 Uhr vier feindliche Flugzeuge eine Baustelle des I./20 bei Berthem an..."

"Die 4./20 war beim Stellungsbau beim Rodelinghem - Ardres, 17 Kilometer südostwärts Calais, eingesetzt und wurde am 22.Dezember von zwei Jägern angegriffen..."

"Als die 13./20 am 24.Dezember von ihrer Baustelle zur Unterkunft zurückkehrte, wurde ihr Transport mehrere Male angegriffen."

"Kaum waren Feiertage vorüber, ging es weiter mit Stellungsbau. So waren das I. und II. Bataillon, wie auch 13. und 16.Kompanie beider Panzergrenadier-Regimenter auf den Baustelle zu finden, durch die Flak ihrer 14.Kompanien gegen Luftangriffe einigermassen geschützt. Die Grenadiere konnten trotz schlechten Wetters - vielleicht gerade deswegen - im Stellungs- und Bunkerbau wertvolle Erfahrungen sammeln..."

12.SS-Pz.Div., Lehr and 2.PzDiv. were all designated as anti-invasion reserves with the task of acting as quick reaction forces designed to mass rapidly at the invasion site and counterattack so as to destroy it. It was recognized that to do so would entail some exposure of the troops to Allied air power and to the Allies strong artillery forces (including naval), thus the attempt to mechanize as many elements as possible in these divisions. Partly this appears to have developed from experience during HUSKY, AVALANCHE and SHINGLE, where the German forces were either able to counterattack immediately, but not in strong enough force, or were able to counterattack with nearly sufficient force, but too late to be strong enough. In Normandy the Allies were very worried about such an eventuality (it permeated their every action in June) and planned effectively to meet the threat - in this case the German armored counterattack never really got of the ground and it took too much time to assemble the forces despite their preparations and equuipment.

Sure the panzerdivisions had the same basic training but these divisions in the West additionaly began to specialize for the new enemy (how many divisions were practicing assaults on the bridgeheads and defeating paradrops). During Hohenstaufen's training exercise on 20 August 1943 von Veitinghoff (OB 15.Armee) said the following to the soldiers and officers of division: »Weiter führte der Generaloberst aus, dass der Gegner in absehbarer Zeit eine Landung beabsichtige, daher müsste sich die Ausbildung der Division nur auf dieses Ereignis hin spezialisiren...« (Fürbringer; the whole paragraph is at the end of the post) Next quote is from Hohenstaufen's sister division Frundsberg: »Sowohl die Gefechts- und Verbandsausbildung als auch die Ausbildung der Versorgungstruppen waren ausgerichtet auf einen Feind, dessen Luftüberlegenheit unbestitten war. Den Planspielen lagen aktuelle Feindlagen zugrunde: die Abwehr eines aus der Luft und von See her landenden Feindes.« (Klapdor). I'll skip the various training scenarios practised by the two divisions simulating the parachute attacks to detail (also getting to know the structure of British and US airborne divisions) since both divisions became known for it, (un)fortunately for the Germans after the Normandy campaign (Arnhem).
Gen.d.Pz.Tr. Balck (KG XXXXVIII.Pz.Korps) also mentiones the »supposed differences in training«: »Psycologisch war der Fehler gemacht worden, vermutlich von Himmler, dass dem SS-Korps gesagt war, ihr sollt Kriegserfahrungen sammeln, aber vermeidet unnütze Verluste. Eure Aufgabe liegt nicht im Osten sondern ist Abweisung der Invasion.« Though this could be looked also for a different prespective - was it wise to employ a division, with the above described training, on the Eastern front were this training wasn't needed - maybe some similarities with the employement of Gebirgsdivisions on the Eastern front.

did Panzerdivision Norwegen have a special ski course? Would the order be "Panzer Schuss" instead of "Panzer Marsch!" one wonders? Was there a special ski attachment for the Panzer III?

I guess they weren't prepared for the Eastern snow (the Nordic snow is much softer) .

Cheers
Mark

P.S.: be aware the ref doesn't allow two men from the same team in the ring at the same time .

**Weiter führte der Generaloberst aus, dass der gegner in absehbarer Zeit eine Landung beabsichtige, daher müsste sich die Ausbildung der Division nur auf dieses Ereignis hin spezialisiren. Er betonte weiterhin, dass die Luftüberlegenheit des Gegners zur guten Tarnung zwinge. Bei einem Einsatz würde der Gegner unter dem Schutz zweier Feuerglocken landen, eine gebildet von ihrer Luftwaffe, die andere von der weitreichenden Schiffsartillerie. Deshalb müsse auch das Durchschreiten von Artilleriefeuer gut geübt werden. Die nächste Phase wäre dann das Festsetzen in Orten. Um den Gegner hier wieder herauszuwerfen, muss die truppe im Ortskampf besonders gut geschult werden. Der Engländer - so Vietinghoff - ist in der Verteidigung gut und darf ja nicht unterschätzt werden, zudem versteht er es durch die vorhandenden Nebel in England in diesert Lage zu kämpfen

[Englander]

Englander

Also in the battle of France the Germans discovered a mean tank killing weapon,namely the 88 flak cannon.

Actually the potential of the 88mm gun as an AT gun had been recognised some time before - that's why Rommel's 7th Pz Div had an issue of AP rounds for their 88mm guns. Their AA shells wouldn't have been much of a threat otherwise.

Cheers from Rich

For sure in the early battles, the 88 flak gun were used to take out command post,bunkers,and used for artillery.
Am i right in saying the first tank kills for the 88 flak gun, was in the battle for Arras?.If so,why were they position in the rear?

In the Western campain in May 1940 the 88mm Flak was the only weapon that penetrated the heavy French and British tank armor. One famous but desperate action of the 88mm Flak took place on 21 May 1940, when 74 British heavy tanks drove through the German line of advance near Arras. The 37mm anti-tank guns of the German regiments prove inadequate to penetrate the armor of the the British tanks, and were overrun. Fortunately for the Germans, 105mm field artillery and 88mm dual-purpose guns were deployed well in the rear to provide indirect fire and anti-aircraft support. Although not positioned specifically as an anti-tank screen, the German gun crews were able to defeat the triumphant British tank columns who were driving in open country.

The point i'm trying to make is, why didn't Rommel use them as a spearhead like in the western desert?

[Andreas]

Englander - did you read my post? There was an AT Abteilung equipped with 88s at the start of the campaign. Whether the first tank kill was achieved at Arras or elsewhere (probably elsewhere during French counterattacks) is meaningless, if the gun had been designated an AT gun in specific units before. The Germans did not suddenly "discover" that the 88 could kill tanks. They knew it before the campaign, and had prepared for it to be used in that way by establishing units designated Panzerjaeger that were equipped with 88s.

I would also suggest that the quote you have in your post is inaccurate. There were other guns that could penetrate heavy enemy tanks, namely the 10cm K18, the 15,5cm sFH18 with the right ammo, and probably the 10,5cm lFH18 too.

I did not notice you were trying to make a point about use as spearheads, but if you want to do that, could that be because the countryside in Belgium and Northern France looks ever so slightly different from the desert? If indeed Rommel used them as spearheads in the desert.