For me it would have to be Tang Shengzhi who led the battle of nanjing.
He left the city in before it even fell to the Japanese, Once he left the Chinese soldiers were in disarray and the city became chaotic as all the soldiers were looking for a way out.
Ultimately he can blamed for many of the civilians and soldiers that were massacred once the city fell.
The worst?
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Philip Keane
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ChristopherPerrien
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Its intriguing that you haven't read the topic , Freydenhall is mentioned several times.Philip Keane wrote:I find it intriguing that no one has mentioned Major general Lloyd Fredenhall, Corp Commander US Army, one of his most notable achievements, Kasserine Pass, result sent back to the USA, promoted into a training position.
My personal choice for worst commander would be Courtney Hodges , he managed to feed at least a corps (5 divs(IIRC) into the shedder of the Hurtgen Forrest displaying a total lack of both tactical and strategic competence and was seemingly unaware of the whole fiasco.. And afterwards his 1st Army was so "cut-up", the battered units were hard put to slow down the Germans in the battle of the Bulge, although they did , it was certainly not due to Hodges.
And honestly , while I don't find much fault with Adm Kimmel for Pearl Harbor, I am dismayed about General Short with his idiotic "sabotage " measures of parking most aircraft at Pearl Harbor bunched together in the center of the airfields. Although they supposively had no gas or ammo in them , I have to wonder what kind of idiot would think bunched planes are safer against sabotage than planes, spaced out, sitting in their own protective revements(sp?) . Plus planes bunched together like that are hardly ready if a real war starts. Of course in his defence, he probably thought even losing one plane to one fool Japanese sabotuer with a molotov cocktail would have probably meant his job, typical "peacetime officer" thinking. Reminds me of that fool Marine Colonel who took the bullets away from the gate guards at the Beuruit US embassy compound,(A WAR ZONE) thinking they might "shoot someone".
Adm. Turner I would rate as the most detrimental to the Amercian war effort in the Pacific; his errors and druken irascability are legion in number. Starting with his total disruption of Allied intelligence activities in 1941 and befuddled ideas on Japanese intentions. Why we won at Guadacanal with him in charge was purely dumb-luck. And that was realized, I think, by Nimitz who later kept this drunk's hands off the wheel/tiller.
On the axis side I suppose I'd pick Adm. Kurita and von Wiechs(sp?)(Army group B).
Kurita made a mess of the battle of the Phillipine Sea, lied to his superior OZawa about the dispositons and the damage being inflicted on the US fleet by his land based air groups and then during the naval battle proceeded to turn tail and run in the IJNS Yamato, no less, facing only a few DD's and CVE's, when he could have smashed the beachhead.
Von Weichs should have protected his flanks better, than with using Romanian and Italian troops and his dispositions for all of his troops. For all that is said about Hitler running Stalingrad, Von Wiechs should have done what he thought was best and told his crazy boss whatever he wanted to hear. Failing that, he just should have resigned.
And let us not forget Goering , like Turner , it seems that hardcore junkies make lousy generals/admirals, no matter their drug of choice.
Chris
I would like to add General Toshizo Nishio to the list of worst General. In 1939 he was in charge of an Army of 100,000 which he led toward Changsa, neglecting not only his flanks but even his rear. The end result was the Chinese surrounded his force and destroyed it. The battle of Changsa was consider the biggest Chinese victory in WWII
Agree totally - add to that he ran screaming into the night when faced by a German attack, leaving his far more capable corps commanders to move troops into position (particularly on the shoulder, IIRC) that fatally delayed the German attack.ChristopherPerrien wrote:My personal choice for worst commander would be Courtney Hodges , he managed to feed at least a corps (5 divs(IIRC) into the shedder of the Hurtgen Forrest displaying a total lack of both tactical and strategic competence and was seemingly unaware of the whole fiasco.. And afterwards his 1st Army was so "cut-up", the battered units were hard put to slow down the Germans in the battle of the Bulge, although they did , it was certainly not due to Hodges.
I think the logic is similar to that of convoys. Disperse your aircraft/ships, and you need to guard each one. Concentrate them and the task of guarding becomes a lot easier.And honestly , while I don't find much fault with Adm Kimmel for Pearl Harbor, I am dismayed about General Short with his idiotic "sabotage " measures of parking most aircraft at Pearl Harbor bunched together in the center of the airfields. Although they supposively had no gas or ammo in them , I have to wonder what kind of idiot would think bunched planes are safer against sabotage than planes, spaced out, sitting in their own protective revements(sp?) . Plus planes bunched together like that are hardly ready if a real war starts. Of course in his defence, he probably thought even losing one plane to one fool Japanese sabotuer with a molotov cocktail would have probably meant his job, typical "peacetime officer" thinking.
[off topic]
Also, if the convoy does trip over a U-boat then the sheer number of targets will tend to swamp the U-boat's ability to engage. A U-boat may be able to engage all ten spaced out merchantmen over a ten hour window, but of ten merchantmen travelling in a convoy (and passing his posiiton within an hour or so) he may only be able to engage 2 or 3 (again like cars on a motorway being targetted by a cop with a speed laser). Finally, particularly valuable cargos/ships can be positioned wthin the convoy to minimise their particular risk. These are the same principles that herds of animals use, and they never have 'escort animals' to protect them.
For more on this, see here.
However, having said all that, I think you are correct with regard to the a/c on the ground at Hawaii - a risk assessment had been done, and it was felt that the greatest risk to the a/c was from malcontents already in Hawaii. Moving the a/c away from the perimeter, and grouping them together meant that a more effective defence against a ground based threat could be mounted. No one had really considered that the Japanese would be able to mount an air-strike against Hawaii. You can call that a failure of imagination, I suppose, but the point is that due dilligence was done to protect the a/c.
The more egregious failure - IMO - was in the Philipines, were exactly the same mistake was made, after they already knew what the actual threat profile was (ie, air, not ground). I suppose though, being generous, 6 hours(?) isn't that much time to communicate the information necessary to make the correct decisions re:a/c dispersal in the PIs, and have it implemented.
For more on this see here
[/off topic]
That is true, but convoys work even if they have NO escorts. The reason being that a steady stream of ships on a route means that there is nearly always a target for a U-boat on the route to engage (like for example cars on a motorway being targetted by a cop with a speed laser). However, when ships travel in a convoy most of the route is empty, and the blob of the convoy can be relatively easily maneauvred around known concentrations of U-boats.thejester wrote:I think the logic is similar to that of convoys. Disperse your aircraft/ships, and you need to guard each one. Concentrate them and the task of guarding becomes a lot easier.
Also, if the convoy does trip over a U-boat then the sheer number of targets will tend to swamp the U-boat's ability to engage. A U-boat may be able to engage all ten spaced out merchantmen over a ten hour window, but of ten merchantmen travelling in a convoy (and passing his posiiton within an hour or so) he may only be able to engage 2 or 3 (again like cars on a motorway being targetted by a cop with a speed laser). Finally, particularly valuable cargos/ships can be positioned wthin the convoy to minimise their particular risk. These are the same principles that herds of animals use, and they never have 'escort animals' to protect them.
For more on this, see here.
However, having said all that, I think you are correct with regard to the a/c on the ground at Hawaii - a risk assessment had been done, and it was felt that the greatest risk to the a/c was from malcontents already in Hawaii. Moving the a/c away from the perimeter, and grouping them together meant that a more effective defence against a ground based threat could be mounted. No one had really considered that the Japanese would be able to mount an air-strike against Hawaii. You can call that a failure of imagination, I suppose, but the point is that due dilligence was done to protect the a/c.
The more egregious failure - IMO - was in the Philipines, were exactly the same mistake was made, after they already knew what the actual threat profile was (ie, air, not ground). I suppose though, being generous, 6 hours(?) isn't that much time to communicate the information necessary to make the correct decisions re:a/c dispersal in the PIs, and have it implemented.
For more on this see here
[/off topic]
So obvious. Do you recall the crushing defeats he inflicted on the Soviets as commander of Army Group Vistula?Enkpitt wrote:Why was Himmler such a bad commander?
Anyway, my vote goes to Budenny, Mekhlis, Voroshilov, Bergonzola, Percival, Fredendall, Clark, Lucas, and, last but not least, Reichsmarschall Pompous Fat Ass Herman Goering himself.
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ChristopherPerrien
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I missed this.
Chris
Not even remotely true. This had been talked about since the 1920's by just about everyone concerned with the Pacific Theater, be they Army or Navy/USMC or Air Corps. And exercises were conducted by US forces many MANY times, since the 1920's simulating this very event with the USS Lexington and/or USS Sarotoga , being OPFOR-Japanese forces.. About the only people who seemed to have had a total mental block to this occuring was Gen. Short and FDR.No one had really considered that the Japanese would be able to mount an air-strike against Hawaii.
Chris
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Spitfire10001
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Delta Tank
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Jon S,
In fact if you read the beginning of the book up until the Japanese attack you will get a very good feel for preparations for defense of the Philippines.
Mike
This book explains exactly what happened to the Army Air Forces in the Philippines. Bad luck/ yesterday we were at peace and today we are war also contributed. http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... _5.htm#p79Jon S. wrote:The more egregious failure - IMO - was in the Philipines, were exactly the same mistake was made, after they already knew what the actual threat profile was (ie, air, not ground). I suppose though, being generous, 6 hours(?) isn't that much time to communicate the information necessary to make the correct decisions re:a/c dispersal in the PIs, and have it implemented.
In fact if you read the beginning of the book up until the Japanese attack you will get a very good feel for preparations for defense of the Philippines.
Mike
There were many bad commanders in WW2. Among them Gamelin, Fredenhall, Lucas, Goring, Busch, Freissner, Zhukov, Voroshilov, Percival, etc.
However, the absolute worst must be Italian generals Sebastiano Visconti Prasca and Ubaldo Soddu, who commanded the attack against Greece. Not only their leadership of the battle was disastrous, but they were both pompous characters, totally unfit for command. Visconti-Prasca described his plan of attack as being "as perfect as humanly possible", while Soddu had the habit of spending hours daily to compose movie soundtracks while his army was collapsing in face of the Greek counter-offensive.
However, the absolute worst must be Italian generals Sebastiano Visconti Prasca and Ubaldo Soddu, who commanded the attack against Greece. Not only their leadership of the battle was disastrous, but they were both pompous characters, totally unfit for command. Visconti-Prasca described his plan of attack as being "as perfect as humanly possible", while Soddu had the habit of spending hours daily to compose movie soundtracks while his army was collapsing in face of the Greek counter-offensive.
Re: The worst?
Concerning Pacific theatre I would vote following:
1. Chūichi Nagumo
For his poor performance at Midway battle during which Imperial Japanese Navy was crippled and never recovered again.
2. All japanese army officers responsible for counter attacks at Guadalcanal.
3. Isoroku Yamamoto and staff of Imperial Japanese Navy responsible for planing of Pearl Harbor
Since the choice of target was totally wrong when instead the destruction of infrastructure and supplies in order to push US to west coast attacked old useless battleships.
4. Victor Crutchley
For his performance at Battle of Savo Islands which looks more like sabotage and not professional effort.
1. Chūichi Nagumo
For his poor performance at Midway battle during which Imperial Japanese Navy was crippled and never recovered again.
2. All japanese army officers responsible for counter attacks at Guadalcanal.
3. Isoroku Yamamoto and staff of Imperial Japanese Navy responsible for planing of Pearl Harbor
Since the choice of target was totally wrong when instead the destruction of infrastructure and supplies in order to push US to west coast attacked old useless battleships.
4. Victor Crutchley
For his performance at Battle of Savo Islands which looks more like sabotage and not professional effort.