butgen wrote:ljadw wrote:LWD wrote:ljadw wrote:thus,more resources is always better than mastery of mobile warfare (which was not that important in the east),than a goodplan,than being tactically superior.
I disagree at least to some extent. What was important in the East was not only did the Soviets have more resources but their operational and strategic skills at least equalled and arguably surpassed that of the Germans in the latter parts of the war. This rendered German tactical superiority while still painful ultimately futile.
That's what I am saying :operational and strategic skills are more important than (possible) German tactical superiority .
About the mobile warfare :both armies only had a limited part of their forces inthe mobile units .For the Germans ,it was some 32 divisions of the 150.For the Russians,it was not that different :the number of mechanized corps (17400 men ) and Tank corps (11900 men ) was very limited (I forgot their number),while for the Germans 20% of their strength was in the mobile units,it was for the SU (as far I remember) even lower .
The reason was
a)that none had the means to fully motorize their forces
b) that,if they had,I doubt very much that such motorized forces could operate in Eastern Europe,with no roads,2 rasputitza's a year,the winter...)
That's why I doubt that mastery of mobile warfare would be that important on the Eastern frontIMHO,the combination artillery-infantry was more important.
Very wrong. The german superirity was tactical and operational. Mobile warfare on a grand scale is operations not tactics.
And it is the motorised part of the german army that achieved the big victories in the beginning of the war. Clearly,not the whole army needed to be motorised.
Your knowledge of ww2 is completely nonexistant because you clearly succeed in ignoring the deep penetrations by german armored divisions in the summer of 1941.
You will need to read a book about operation barbarossa.
Very original that you think german armored divisions were not able to operate in the USSR because there were no roads.
Actually,tanks do not need to drive on the roads.
It is amazing that a user on a forum like this can be so totally ignorant of the history of ww2.
Not only were the Germans desperate in september 1941,but also must you,because,you are using the classick strawman ,I did not write that German armored divisions were not able to operate in the SU because the,
re were no roads,
1st strawman :I did write :I doubt very much
2nd strawman :I did not mention armoured divisions,but motorized forces
3th strawman :you are "forgetting" that I also did mention:the 2 rasputitza's and the winter .
But,the most surprising is that you think that german armoured divisions could operate in the SU ,notwithstanding the bad roads,or that there were no roads,because tanks did not need to drive on the roads,unless,you are thinking that the only important thing in a Pz division was the number of tanks,and that the rest:infantry,artillery,supply were neglectable And,of course,you are ignoring that the deep penetrations by the Pz divisions in the summer of 1941,resulted in a failure,and that Barbarossa had already failed at the end of augustus ,because the success or failure of Barbarossa did not depend on what the Pz divisions could do,but on what the Red Army could and would do ;but,of course,that's not mentioned in the hagiographies of the German panzer generals ..
It is amazing that a user on a forum like this can be so totally ignorant of the history of WWII.