Why German generals tactically superior than Allied Generals

[butgen]

thus,more resources is always better than mastery of mobile warfare (which was not that important in the east),than a goodplan,than being tactically superior.

I disagree at least to some extent. What was important in the East was not only did the Soviets have more resources but their operational and strategic skills at least equalled and arguably surpassed that of the Germans in the latter parts of the war. This rendered German tactical superiority while still painful ultimately futile.

Actually the title of this thread was wrong because the superiority was also on the operational level.
Operationally the german army was always superior to the red army although this superiority could be shown less than would have been the case without Hitler's interference. A communist army can never have the same flexibility in command as a non communist army.

[butgen]

thus,more resources is always better than mastery of mobile warfare (which was not that important in the east),than a goodplan,than being tactically superior.

I disagree at least to some extent. What was important in the East was not only did the Soviets have more resources but their operational and strategic skills at least equalled and arguably surpassed that of the Germans in the latter parts of the war. This rendered German tactical superiority while still painful ultimately futile.

That's what I am saying :operational and strategic skills are more important than (possible) German tactical superiority .
About the mobile warfare :both armies only had a limited part of their forces inthe mobile units .For the Germans ,it was some 32 divisions of the 150.For the Russians,it was not that different :the number of mechanized corps (17400 men ) and Tank corps (11900 men ) was very limited (I forgot their number),while for the Germans 20% of their strength was in the mobile units,it was for the SU (as far I remember) even lower .
The reason was
a)that none had the means to fully motorize their forces
b) that,if they had,I doubt very much that such motorized forces could operate in Eastern Europe,with no roads,2 rasputitza's a year,the winter...)
That's why I doubt that mastery of mobile warfare would be that important on the Eastern frontIMHO,the combination artillery-infantry was more important.

Soviet normally had 26 Tank corps and 11 Mechanized Corps and had that number in June 1944. On 1 June 1944, German had 16 Panzer divisions and 7 PanzerGrenadier Divisions in the Eastern Front. But those division were extremely weak and most of them lacked tanks and SPW. The cream of German panzer forces were located in the West. The lack of strong armored forces in the eastern front during mid 1944-late 1944 which enabled Russian destroyed German force so easily.
Mobile warfare was of vital importance in the Eastern front, with relative weak armored forces in the second half of 1944, many German infantry divisions were destroyed by Russian without difficulty.Infantry and artillery strong were important and panzer troop needed them to cover flank, hold ground, lines and enemy, and but the latter were easily tp be cut off. Panzer troop was used to spearhead to cut off and break the enemy lines and they needed infantry to further their advance.
At that time, Russian had 427,000 motor vehicles , mostly provided by US, and 6,000 tanks and assault guns, was capable of cutting off many non-mobile infantry divison and artillery forces (towed guns). Suppose , without Western front, elite panzer forces in the West must save the German forces in mid 1944.

The first paragraph is clearly incorrect as german panzerdivisions in the east certainly had tanks and SPW. There were simply not enough armored divisions.

[Mark V]

The early advantage had more to do with an earlier start in the development cycle rather than any intrinsic German value or tradition.

Whatever advantage Germans during WW2 had in tactical command of their army was basically the same advantage that Imperial German Army had during WW1, which was basically the same advantage that Prussian Army had before that...

3rd Reich just added some elements that improved unit cohesion (severe but more fair dicipline, near equal chances of advancement for all classes, and Seect introduced more realistic training and demand that non-coms to have advanced skills also) to basically solid foundation of mission oriented command system that was older than the Germany itself.

No tradition ?

Regards

[LWD]

... Actually the title of this thread was wrong because the superiority was also on the operational level.
Operationally the german army was always superior to the red army

It's going to take more than just your statment to that effect. Indeed there are other threads on this forum that have made a strong case for the operational superiority of the Soviet army.

although this superiority could be shown less than would have been the case without Hitler's interference.

When exactly did Hitler's interfrence impact the operational superiority of the German army.

A communist army can never have the same flexibility in command as a non communist army.

Another statment without anything to back it up and by it's nature almost assuredly incorrect.

[butgen]

... Actually the title of this thread was wrong because the superiority was also on the operational level.
Operationally the german army was always superior to the red army

It's going to take more than just your statment to that effect. Indeed there are other threads on this forum that have made a strong case for the operational superiority of the Soviet army.

although this superiority could be shown less than would have been the case without Hitler's interference.

When exactly did Hitler's interfrence impact the operational superiority of the German army.

A communist army can never have the same flexibility in command as a non communist army.

Another statment without anything to back it up and by it's nature almost assuredly incorrect.

A flexible command system makes you better at operational and tactical level. Let a top german panzer commander do his thing and he wil always outoperate his soviet counterpart who will never have the same freedom of action. German commanders always felt superior at an operational level and that is why they were frustrated at being forced to simply defend lines. Operating means giving up terrain and creating opportunities for counterattack. The approach foloowed by Balck and Mellenthin during the exercise in 1980 which was mentioned here was an example of a bold operation.
I feel very confident in stating that a communist army suffers from defects inherent to communism. Actually the armies trained by the warsaw pact suffered from the same defects. You fight a communist army by facing it with the unexpected. I certainly did not invent this.

[ljadw]

I do know that mobile warfare was important(as were other things,as artillery,......) especially in the beginning ,later the importance of mobile warfare was decreasing .

A very surprising statement that raises two eyebrows with me. Any arguments?

because the Germans were forced into the defensive,and,if I am not wrong,and I don't think I am ,but whatever,if you are forced into the defensive,thus forced to retreat,there is less need on mobile warfare .There also is the fact that between Stalingrad and Bagration,there was no collapse of the German front,"only" a driving back of the Germans by the Russian steam-roller .It could not be different,because the Red Army was not more mobile in 1944 than in 1941
in 1941 :107000 trucks and 245000 horses for between 2.4 and 2.7 million men :1 truck for 24 men,1 horse for 10 men
in june 1944:217000 trucks for 6.75 million men(1 truck for 31 men) and 688000 horses(1 for 10 men )
It took the Red Army a long time to repel the Germans,amongst other,because of its structure;with a fully motorized army,the Russians would in Berlin before 1944.
In 1944,the Germans were less motorized and the Russians not more,thus the importance of mobile warfare was decreasing .

[LWD]

A communist army can never have the same flexibility in command as a non communist army.

Another statment without anything to back it up and by it's nature almost assuredly incorrect.

A flexible command system makes you better at operational and tactical level.

The Soviet system deliberately sacraficed tactical flexability to gain operational control (and to some extent flexability). In any case just becuase your system is more flexable doesn't mean that you are better than your opponents. One can argue for instance that the partizans were even more flexable than the Germans I don't think this made them superior tactically though ... do you?

Let a top german panzer commander do his thing and he wil always outoperate his soviet counterpart who will never have the same freedom of action.

That's certainly one opinion. You have however doen nothing to substantiate it and indeed there are clearly cases where the Soviets were operationally superior to the Germans late in the war.

... I feel very confident in stating that a communist army suffers from defects inherent to communism.

By the same token the German army suffered from defects inherent in its system.

Actually the armies trained by the warsaw pact suffered from the same defects. You fight a communist army by facing it with the unexpected. I certainly did not invent this.

All of which is rather irrelevant.

[butgen]

I do know that mobile warfare was important(as were other things,as artillery,......) especially in the beginning ,later the importance of mobile warfare was decreasing .

A very surprising statement that raises two eyebrows with me. Any arguments?

because the Germans were forced into the defensive,and,if I am not wrong,and I don't think I am ,but whatever,if you are forced into the defensive,thus forced to retreat,there is less need on mobile warfare .There also is the fact that between Stalingrad and Bagration,there was no collapse of the German front,"only" a driving back of the Germans by the Russian steam-roller .It could not be different,because the Red Army was not more mobile in 1944 than in 1941
in 1941 :107000 trucks and 245000 horses for between 2.4 and 2.7 million men :1 truck for 24 men,1 horse for 10 men
in june 1944:217000 trucks for 6.75 million men(1 truck for 31 men) and 688000 horses(1 for 10 men )
It took the Red Army a long time to repel the Germans,amongst other,because of its structure;with a fully motorized army,the Russians would in Berlin before 1944.
In 1944,the Germans were less motorized and the Russians not more,thus the importance of mobile warfare was decreasing .

The operation leading to the surrounding of 6th army was a mobile operation. The other big russian offensive operations were also mobile operations.
And german generals also still wanted to operate. Even as a defender you can do mobile warfare.
Your ignorance is amazing.

[ljadw]

thus,more resources is always better than mastery of mobile warfare (which was not that important in the east),than a goodplan,than being tactically superior.

I disagree at least to some extent. What was important in the East was not only did the Soviets have more resources but their operational and strategic skills at least equalled and arguably surpassed that of the Germans in the latter parts of the war. This rendered German tactical superiority while still painful ultimately futile.

That's what I am saying :operational and strategic skills are more important than (possible) German tactical superiority .
About the mobile warfare :both armies only had a limited part of their forces inthe mobile units .For the Germans ,it was some 32 divisions of the 150.For the Russians,it was not that different :the number of mechanized corps (17400 men ) and Tank corps (11900 men ) was very limited (I forgot their number),while for the Germans 20% of their strength was in the mobile units,it was for the SU (as far I remember) even lower .
The reason was
a)that none had the means to fully motorize their forces
b) that,if they had,I doubt very much that such motorized forces could operate in Eastern Europe,with no roads,2 rasputitza's a year,the winter...)
That's why I doubt that mastery of mobile warfare would be that important on the Eastern frontIMHO,the combination artillery-infantry was more important.

Soviet normally had 26 Tank corps and 11 Mechanized Corps and had that number in June 1944. On 1 June 1944, German had 16 Panzer divisions and 7 PanzerGrenadier Divisions in the Eastern Front. But those division were extremely weak and most of them lacked tanks and SPW. The cream of German panzer forces were located in the West. The lack of strong armored forces in the eastern front during mid 1944-late 1944 which enabled Russian destroyed German force so easily.
Mobile warfare was of vital importance in the Eastern front, with relative weak armored forces in the second half of 1944, many German infantry divisions were destroyed by Russian without difficulty.Infantry and artillery strong were important and panzer troop needed them to cover flank, hold ground, lines and enemy, and but the latter were easily tp be cut off. Panzer troop was used to spearhead to cut off and break the enemy lines and they needed infantry to further their advance.
At that time, Russian had 427,000 motor vehicles , mostly provided by US, and 6,000 tanks and assault guns, was capable of cutting off many non-mobile infantry divison and artillery forces (towed guns). Suppose , without Western front, elite panzer forces in the West must save the German forces in mid 1944.

I knew,the LL trucks would appear ,but,427000 motor vehicles were send -arrived? to the SU,but the Red Army did NOT (and I presume NEVER) had at any time 427000 operational LL motor vehicles .
The Dupuy Institute is giving for july 1943 22 tank Corps and 13 Mechanized Corps
22 TC X11900 =262000
13 MC X 17400=226000
The total =488000,of course,there were separate tank and mechanized units,let's take a total of 600000 ,then,we have 10 % of the Russian frontstrength .
As only a small part of the Russian army was concentrated in the mobile units,a logical conclusion would be that,for the Russian side,mobile warfare was not that important .

[butgen]

A communist army can never have the same flexibility in command as a non communist army.

Another statment without anything to back it up and by it's nature almost assuredly incorrect.

A flexible command system makes you better at operational and tactical level.

The Soviet system deliberately sacraficed tactical flexability to gain operational control (and to some extent flexability). In any case just becuase your system is more flexable doesn't mean that you are better than your opponents. One can argue for instance that the partizans were even more flexable than the Germans I don't think this made them superior tactically though ... do you?

Let a top german panzer commander do his thing and he wil always outoperate his soviet counterpart who will never have the same freedom of action.

That's certainly one opinion. You have however doen nothing to substantiate it and indeed there are clearly cases where the Soviets were operationally superior to the Germans late in the war.

... I feel very confident in stating that a communist army suffers from defects inherent to communism.

By the same token the German army suffered from defects inherent in its system.

Actually the armies trained by the warsaw pact suffered from the same defects. You fight a communist army by facing it with the unexpected. I certainly did not invent this.

All of which is rather irrelevant.

A lot of smoke without the beginning of substance. An army with a flexible command system will always inherently have operational and tactical superiority on an army in which there is much less initiative. More initiative and more flexibility means better decisions and better commanders. The red army only outoperated the german army y when Hitler refused this to the german army. That is where the frustration of german commanders like manstein lay.
NATO also felt superior to the Warsaw pact in this respect.

[butgen]

thus,more resources is always better than mastery of mobile warfare (which was not that important in the east),than a goodplan,than being tactically superior.

I disagree at least to some extent. What was important in the East was not only did the Soviets have more resources but their operational and strategic skills at least equalled and arguably surpassed that of the Germans in the latter parts of the war. This rendered German tactical superiority while still painful ultimately futile.

That's what I am saying :operational and strategic skills are more important than (possible) German tactical superiority .
About the mobile warfare :both armies only had a limited part of their forces inthe mobile units .For the Germans ,it was some 32 divisions of the 150.For the Russians,it was not that different :the number of mechanized corps (17400 men ) and Tank corps (11900 men ) was very limited (I forgot their number),while for the Germans 20% of their strength was in the mobile units,it was for the SU (as far I remember) even lower .
The reason was
a)that none had the means to fully motorize their forces
b) that,if they had,I doubt very much that such motorized forces could operate in Eastern Europe,with no roads,2 rasputitza's a year,the winter...)
That's why I doubt that mastery of mobile warfare would be that important on the Eastern frontIMHO,the combination artillery-infantry was more important.

Soviet normally had 26 Tank corps and 11 Mechanized Corps and had that number in June 1944. On 1 June 1944, German had 16 Panzer divisions and 7 PanzerGrenadier Divisions in the Eastern Front. But those division were extremely weak and most of them lacked tanks and SPW. The cream of German panzer forces were located in the West. The lack of strong armored forces in the eastern front during mid 1944-late 1944 which enabled Russian destroyed German force so easily.
Mobile warfare was of vital importance in the Eastern front, with relative weak armored forces in the second half of 1944, many German infantry divisions were destroyed by Russian without difficulty.Infantry and artillery strong were important and panzer troop needed them to cover flank, hold ground, lines and enemy, and but the latter were easily tp be cut off. Panzer troop was used to spearhead to cut off and break the enemy lines and they needed infantry to further their advance.
At that time, Russian had 427,000 motor vehicles , mostly provided by US, and 6,000 tanks and assault guns, was capable of cutting off many non-mobile infantry divison and artillery forces (towed guns). Suppose , without Western front, elite panzer forces in the West must save the German forces in mid 1944.

I knew,the LL trucks would appear ,but,427000 motor vehicles were send -arrived? to the SU,but the Red Army did NOT (and I presume NEVER) had at any time 427000 operational LL motor vehicles .
The Dupuy Institute is giving for july 1943 22 tank Corps and 13 Mechanized Corps
22 TC X11900 =262000
13 MC X 17400=226000
The total =488000,of course,there were separate tank and mechanized units,let's take a total of 600000 ,then,we have 10 % of the Russian frontstrength .
As only a small part of the Russian army was concentrated in the mobile units,a logical conclusion would be that,for the Russian side,mobile warfare was not that important .

You are as usual supposing and not knowing. There is not even a beginning of knowledge in you about russian offensives.

[ljadw]

Kelvin,I would be careful with saying that in 1944 the cream of the German Pzunits was located in France,unless you have sources that prove that PL,DR,HJ,LSSAH,.... were"better" (what is better?) than the PD located in Russia .Of course,I know people that would say this,even without a prove.
About the numbers :Source (for some one who always is claiming for sources):A post by M.Kenny on Armchair General on 20 june 2009 23.O2 in the Thread :Operational Panzernumbers
May 1944:
East :Operational Pz:1192,in repair 287 Assault Guns :1319/261
West:Operational Pz:1244,in repair :222 Assault Guns:318/27

[ljadw]

thus,more resources is always better than mastery of mobile warfare (which was not that important in the east),than a goodplan,than being tactically superior.

I disagree at least to some extent. What was important in the East was not only did the Soviets have more resources but their operational and strategic skills at least equalled and arguably surpassed that of the Germans in the latter parts of the war. This rendered German tactical superiority while still painful ultimately futile.

That's what I am saying :operational and strategic skills are more important than (possible) German tactical superiority .
About the mobile warfare :both armies only had a limited part of their forces inthe mobile units .For the Germans ,it was some 32 divisions of the 150.For the Russians,it was not that different :the number of mechanized corps (17400 men ) and Tank corps (11900 men ) was very limited (I forgot their number),while for the Germans 20% of their strength was in the mobile units,it was for the SU (as far I remember) even lower .
The reason was
a)that none had the means to fully motorize their forces
b) that,if they had,I doubt very much that such motorized forces could operate in Eastern Europe,with no roads,2 rasputitza's a year,the winter...)
That's why I doubt that mastery of mobile warfare would be that important on the Eastern frontIMHO,the combination artillery-infantry was more important.

Very wrong. The german superirity was tactical and operational. Mobile warfare on a grand scale is operations not tactics.
And it is the motorised part of the german army that achieved the big victories in the beginning of the war. Clearly,not the whole army needed to be motorised.
Your knowledge of ww2 is completely nonexistant because you clearly succeed in ignoring the deep penetrations by german armored divisions in the summer of 1941. You will need to read a book about operation barbarossa.
Very original that you think german armored divisions were not able to operate in the USSR because there were no roads. Actually,tanks do not need to drive on the roads.
It is amazing that a user on a forum like this can be so totally ignorant of the history of ww2.

Not only were the Germans desperate in september 1941,but also must you,because,you are using the classick strawman ,I did not write that German armored divisions were not able to operate in the SU because the,
re were no roads,
1st strawman :I did write :I doubt very much
2nd strawman :I did not mention armoured divisions,but motorized forces
3th strawman :you are "forgetting" that I also did mention:the 2 rasputitza's and the winter .
But,the most surprising is that you think that german armoured divisions could operate in the SU ,notwithstanding the bad roads,or that there were no roads,because tanks did not need to drive on the roads,unless,you are thinking that the only important thing in a Pz division was the number of tanks,and that the rest:infantry,artillery,supply were neglectable And,of course,you are ignoring that the deep penetrations by the Pz divisions in the summer of 1941,resulted in a failure,and that Barbarossa had already failed at the end of augustus ,because the success or failure of Barbarossa did not depend on what the Pz divisions could do,but on what the Red Army could and would do ;but,of course,that's not mentioned in the hagiographies of the German panzer generals ..
It is amazing that a user on a forum like this can be so totally ignorant of the history of WWII.

[Kelvin]

thus,more resources is always better than mastery of mobile warfare (which was not that important in the east),than a goodplan,than being tactically superior.

I disagree at least to some extent. What was important in the East was not only did the Soviets have more resources but their operational and strategic skills at least equalled and arguably surpassed that of the Germans in the latter parts of the war. This rendered German tactical superiority while still painful ultimately futile.

That's what I am saying :operational and strategic skills are more important than (possible) German tactical superiority .
About the mobile warfare :both armies only had a limited part of their forces inthe mobile units .For the Germans ,it was some 32 divisions of the 150.For the Russians,it was not that different :the number of mechanized corps (17400 men ) and Tank corps (11900 men ) was very limited (I forgot their number),while for the Germans 20% of their strength was in the mobile units,it was for the SU (as far I remember) even lower .
The reason was
a)that none had the means to fully motorize their forces
b) that,if they had,I doubt very much that such motorized forces could operate in Eastern Europe,with no roads,2 rasputitza's a year,the winter...)
That's why I doubt that mastery of mobile warfare would be that important on the Eastern frontIMHO,the combination artillery-infantry was more important.

Soviet normally had 26 Tank corps and 11 Mechanized Corps and had that number in June 1944. On 1 June 1944, German had 16 Panzer divisions and 7 PanzerGrenadier Divisions in the Eastern Front. But those division were extremely weak and most of them lacked tanks and SPW. The cream of German panzer forces were located in the West. The lack of strong armored forces in the eastern front during mid 1944-late 1944 which enabled Russian destroyed German force so easily.
Mobile warfare was of vital importance in the Eastern front, with relative weak armored forces in the second half of 1944, many German infantry divisions were destroyed by Russian without difficulty.Infantry and artillery strong were important and panzer troop needed them to cover flank, hold ground, lines and enemy, and but the latter were easily tp be cut off. Panzer troop was used to spearhead to cut off and break the enemy lines and they needed infantry to further their advance.
At that time, Russian had 427,000 motor vehicles , mostly provided by US, and 6,000 tanks and assault guns, was capable of cutting off many non-mobile infantry divison and artillery forces (towed guns). Suppose , without Western front, elite panzer forces in the West must save the German forces in mid 1944.

The first paragraph is clearly incorrect as german panzerdivisions in the east certainly had tanks and SPW. There were simply not enough armored divisions.

My term "lack" is wrong, I use "shortage "of tank and SPW in Pz divisions in June 1944 is much better ; both 13. and 14. Panzer divisions only had two and one Pz IV operational respectively on June 1 1944, on the same day, 3. Pz division only had 13 Pz IV and 23 SPW ready for action and this Bear division 's armored infantry battalion (I./Pz.Gren.Rgt.3) and Panzer Aufklarung abteilung 3 was missing (refitting in Germany) 16. Pz division only had 26 combat ready SPW. 7.Pz division 's armored infantry battalion ( II./Pz.Gren.Rgt. 6) and its own Flak abteilung were missing.(Refitting in Germany too)) Neither 12.Panzer division nor 20.Panzer division had their own panzeraukflarung abteilung ( Panzer Aufklarung 12 & 20) in the East ( refitting in Germany too.) Totenkopf only had 33 Panzer operatonal ( 2 x Tiger, 23 x Pz IV and 8 x StuG). Wiking Divison 's III./SS.Pz.Gren.Rgt. 9 Germania seldom had SPW at that time. Elite GroBdeutschland only had 60 SPW, 19 Tiger, 12 PzIV and 15 StuG in operational.18. and 20.PanzerGrenadier Divisons hardly had any StuG III on that day. SS.Frewilligen PanzerGrenadier Division only had 10 StuGIII and 5 Panther ready for action. You can see the Panzer divisions in the East were really in bad shape. The number of armored divisions were acceptable but their main problem were too many understrength panzer divisions.

[Kelvin]

thus,more resources is always better than mastery of mobile warfare (which was not that important in the east),than a goodplan,than being tactically superior.

I disagree at least to some extent. What was important in the East was not only did the Soviets have more resources but their operational and strategic skills at least equalled and arguably surpassed that of the Germans in the latter parts of the war. This rendered German tactical superiority while still painful ultimately futile.

That's what I am saying :operational and strategic skills are more important than (possible) German tactical superiority .
About the mobile warfare :both armies only had a limited part of their forces inthe mobile units .For the Germans ,it was some 32 divisions of the 150.For the Russians,it was not that different :the number of mechanized corps (17400 men ) and Tank corps (11900 men ) was very limited (I forgot their number),while for the Germans 20% of their strength was in the mobile units,it was for the SU (as far I remember) even lower .
The reason was
a)that none had the means to fully motorize their forces
b) that,if they had,I doubt very much that such motorized forces could operate in Eastern Europe,with no roads,2 rasputitza's a year,the winter...)
That's why I doubt that mastery of mobile warfare would be that important on the Eastern frontIMHO,the combination artillery-infantry was more important.

Very wrong. The german superirity was tactical and operational. Mobile warfare on a grand scale is operations not tactics.
And it is the motorised part of the german army that achieved the big victories in the beginning of the war. Clearly,not the whole army needed to be motorised.
Your knowledge of ww2 is completely nonexistant because you clearly succeed in ignoring the deep penetrations by german armored divisions in the summer of 1941. You will need to read a book about operation barbarossa.
Very original that you think german armored divisions were not able to operate in the USSR because there were no roads. Actually,tanks do not need to drive on the roads.
It is amazing that a user on a forum like this can be so totally ignorant of the history of ww2.

Not only were the Germans desperate in september 1941,but also must you,because,you are using the classick strawman ,I did not write that German armored divisions were not able to operate in the SU because the,
re were no roads,
1st strawman :I did write :I doubt very much
2nd strawman :I did not mention armoured divisions,but motorized forces
3th strawman :you are "forgetting" that I also did mention:the 2 rasputitza's and the winter .
But,the most surprising is that you think that german armoured divisions could operate in the SU ,notwithstanding the bad roads,or that there were no roads,because tanks did not need to drive on the roads,unless,you are thinking that the only important thing in a Pz division was the number of tanks,and that the rest:infantry,artillery,supply were neglectable And,of course,you are ignoring that the deep penetrations by the Pz divisions in the summer of 1941,resulted in a failure,and that Barbarossa had already failed at the end of augustus ,because the success or failure of Barbarossa did not depend on what the Pz divisions could do,but on what the Red Army could and would do ;but,of course,that's not mentioned in the hagiographies of the German panzer generals ..
It is amazing that a user on a forum like this can be so totally ignorant of the history of WWII.

Liddell Hart brought up one view in WWII history : shortage of track vehicles made the Barbarossa fail as only Panzer , I mean tanks could travel without road, but other German wheeled vehicles must need road to move. The number of Maultier were limited. The number of SPW (251 series) were also limited too in panzer grendier battalion. Panzer Aufklarung abteilung still relied upon weak 4 wheeled panzerspahwagen and Volkswagen or motorcycle instead of sd.kfz.250 and 251. ( This was why German introduced more powerful 8 x 8 armored cars and tracked recee vehicles 250/9 later)