Why German generals tactically superior than Allied Generals

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Piotr Kapuscinski
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Re: Why German generals tactically superior than Allied Gene

#331

Post by Piotr Kapuscinski » 16 Jan 2011, 20:10

In view of allied air superiority, moving the armored reserves forward from a central location would take too long and they would arrive too late because the enemy landingforce would already be too strong. Rundstedt had never experienced the effects of allied air superiority.Rommel had.
This can be prevented by carefully planning in advance movement roads for these armoured reserves and covering them with Anti-Aircraft defense (especially viaducts, bridges and crossroads). Similar thing was efficient during the German evacuation from Sicily when the Allies cancelled their air attacks against the withdrawing German units because of strong AA defenses along the coastline of the Strait of Messina. Apart from active AA defense also passive means such as camouflage and night marches could be implemented during those movements.

Counterattack on the beaches themselves could have been carried out by surprise and at night.

This would have reduced the effects of Allied naval gunfire support and air support.
And even if you only counterattack after the enemy has moved beyond the range of his naval guns,then you will still come under the fire of the naval guns once the enemy falls back to within range of them.
Why? What about attempting to encircle, cut off from the beaches and destroy enemy forces inland?

Armoured divisions were not designed to fight on a beach - they were designed to fight inland.
Wrong. 2 Panzerdivisions were taken away from Heeresgruppe northukraine(4. and 5.) and one from AGN(12.).
2 Panzerdivisions more would not have made a significant difference for Heeresgruppe Northukraine and the counterattacks conducted by these divisions were more usefull in the area of AGC.
If only two Panzerdivisions were taken from AG North Ukraine, then three more Panzerdivisions were taken from AG South Ukraine, which was later defeated in Moldova. Because in total from AGs South and North Ukraine for the collapsing AG Center Germans took 12 divisions, including as many as 5 Panzerdivisions.

These divisions were arriving singly - from time to time - to the area of AG Center and were being sent to counterattacks - one after another - along the 350 km wide gap in AG Center's frontline. This was doomed to failure. Gathering these divisions together and trying to re-establish frontline somewhere more to the west (instead of throwing them to futile counterattacks one after another) would have been a much better solution.
Defeat(=losing a lot of terrain)was always inevitable with the odds as they were.Heeresgruppe Northukraine was not destroyed anyway.
Wasn't destroyed but Soviet forces (80 divisions with 2,000 tanks) easily broke its defensive lines and later encircled large part of its forces in the Brody pocket. On 27 July Soviet forces captured Lwow and captured the bridgehead on the western side of the Vistula near Baranow Sandomierski. Despite the usage of new King Tigers Germans didn't manage to push the Red Army back behind the Vistula from this bridgehead. In the end the Soviet advance was stopped thanks to... divsions transferred there from AG South Ukraine (sic!) and some newly formed units.

Soon also AG South Ukraine - which had been giving its most valuable divisions to the remaining three AGs in the previous months - was attacked (on 20 August) and its 6. Army was destroyed in the Iassy-Kishinev pocket.

Also AG North suffered defeats - on 10 October its main forces were cut off in Courland.
The divisions taken elsewhere were not sufficient in number to form a new line and anyway the job of particularly the panzerdivisions was to counterattack to relieve those units that were surrounded. I do not think any of them were destroyed.
Some were - two Panzergrenadier divisions and one Panzerdivision were lost during "Bagration". Remnants of Panzergrenadier divisions were delivered to newly formed armoured brigades and remnants of that Panzerdivision continued to exist as a Combat Group (so in fact a regimental-size unit, not even close to division).

Apart from that 20 infantry divisions, 2 Luftwaffe field divisions, one Sturm division and one Corps Group were destroyed (their remnants were reorganized into 7 divisional groups - an equivalent of 7 regiments). And also further three infantry divisions transferred to AGC yet during "Bagration" and 3 Sicherungs divisions were destroyed.

And AG North Ukraine lost 5 infantry division, one Corps Group (a divisional-size unit), two Sicherungs divisions and one SS Grenadiers Division. AG North didn't lost any division completely but several suffered heavy casualties. However, many of the AG North's divisions were cut off in Courland and fought there until the end of the war.

AG South Ukraine lost 18 infantry divisions alone. I don't know how many divisions of other types it lost.

German AT defense suffered huge losses. Highest losses were suffered by 8,8cm Pak 43 and 43/41.
Defeat(=losing a lot of terrain)was always inevitable with the odds as they were.
"Defeat = losing a lot of terrain" maybe was inevitable considering the superiority Soviets had in 1944.

But defeat = losing several dozen divisions destroyed probably could have been prevented (at least partially).
'Succesfully defend' means stopping the enemy attack with insignificant loss of terrain.
This is tactical meaning of "successful defence". Operational and strategic meanings are often different. In other words - not always the purpose of defence is to stop enemy attack with insignificant loss of terrain. And when defining which defence is successful and which isn't we should take into consideration what the defender planned to achieve.

For example the entire Polish defensive plan of 1939 assumed withdrawal and delaying enemy advance while withdrawing (and waiting for the French counteroffensive in the West). So successful defence in this case would mean: preventing the enemy from encircling and destroying our armies during their gradual withdrawal.
the job of particularly the panzerdivisions was to counterattack to relieve those units that were surrounded
Panzerdivisions are not only very good in attack, they are also very good in defence. For example tanks can be entrenched and work as potentially mobile resistance nests of artillery, Anti-Tank and MG fire.
Shorter lines are always always better than longer ones and will make it more difficult for the enemy to breakthrough,also because of having more reserves but that does not mean the attack can be held off indefinitely and could in itself not even prevent a division being blown away in view of the firepower the red army had.
One can only try to prevent being blown away by deep zone defense which is obviously only feasible with shorter lines.
Even if not, then it could at least make blowing divisions away more time-consuming for the Soviets.

There would be also more divisions to blow away if AG Center was stronger than in reality.

As I wrote compare Rzhev to Bagration - force ratios similar, results different.
That was always impossible.A lot of ground was always going to be lost.
Much less ground could have been lost in those battles. And Soviet advance speed could have been slower.

This would prolong the entire Eastern Front war. Maybe this would allow the Western Allies to capture Berlin.

butgen
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Re: Why German generals tactically superior than Allied Gene

#332

Post by butgen » 16 Jan 2011, 21:31

Domen121 wrote:
This can be prevented by carefully planning in advance movement roads for these armoured reserves and covering them with Anti-Aircraft defense (especially viaducts, bridges and crossroads). Similar thing was efficient during the German evacuation from Sicily when the Allies cancelled their air attacks against the withdrawing German units because of strong AA defenses along the coastline of the Strait of Messina. Apart from active AA defense also passive means such as camouflage and night marches could be implemented during those movements.
Completely unrealistic. Protecting the roads over which a large armoured reserve would have to move from a central location somewhere behind Paris is impossible in view of the distance and also taken into account the extent of the allied air superiority. Actually most of the bridges over the Seine were destroyed. And having to move only dutring the night slows you down a lot.
Having to drive instead of moving by rail causes such wear and tear on the tracked vehicles that maintenance will be necessary after the long drive.


butgen
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Re: Why German generals tactically superior than Allied Gene

#333

Post by butgen » 16 Jan 2011, 21:37

Domen121 wrote:Counterattack on the beaches themselves could have been carried out by surprise and at night.

This would have reduced the effects of Allied naval gunfire support and air support.



Why? What about attempting to encircle, cut off from the beaches and destroy enemy forces inland?

Armoured divisions were not designed to fight on a beach - they were designed to fight inland.
The armored division divisions will not really have to go on the beach itself. And cutting the enemy of from the beach is a beautiful fantasy but in the circonstances not possible because the allies would be too strong once you would allow them to consolidate and enlarge the bridghead to the extent of the frontline being outside the range of the naval guns..

butgen
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Re: Why German generals tactically superior than Allied Gene

#334

Post by butgen » 16 Jan 2011, 21:46

Domen121 wrote:

If only two Panzerdivisions were taken from AG North Ukraine, then three more Panzerdivisions were taken from AG South Ukraine, which was later defeated in Moldova. Because in total from AGs South and North Ukraine for the collapsing AG Center Germans took 12 divisions, including as many as 5 Panzerdivisions.

These divisions were arriving singly - from time to time - to the area of AG Center and were being sent to counterattacks - one after another - along the 350 km wide gap in AG Center's frontline. This was doomed to failure. Gathering these divisions together and trying to re-establish frontline somewhere more to the west (instead of throwing them to futile counterattacks one after another) would have been a much better solution.
In july no panzerdivisions were taken from AG southukraine.
The counterattacks of the panzerdivisions were necessary and absolutely not futile(for example the atttack of 12.Pz towards the forces surrounded around Bobruisk. They contributed to stabilising the situation.

butgen
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Re: Why German generals tactically superior than Allied Gene

#335

Post by butgen » 16 Jan 2011, 21:52

Domen121 wrote:

Wasn't destroyed but Soviet forces (80 divisions with 2,000 tanks) easily broke its defensive lines and later encircled large part of its forces in the Brody pocket. On 27 July Soviet forces captured Lwow and captured the bridgehead on the western side of the Vistula near Baranow Sandomierski. Despite the usage of new King Tigers Germans didn't manage to push the Red Army back behind the Vistula from this bridgehead. In the end the Soviet advance was stopped thanks to... divsions transferred there from AG South Ukraine (sic!) and some newly formed units.

Soon also AG South Ukraine - which had been giving its most valuable divisions to the remaining three AGs in the previous months - was attacked (on 20 August) and its 6. Army was destroyed in the Iassy-Kishinev pocket.

Also AG North suffered defeats - on 10 October its main forces were cut off in Courland.
There is no link between the giving of a few divisions to stabilise the situation at AGC and the defeats of the other AG's which were always inevitable. The destruction of 6th army had a lot to do with the rumanians changing sides.
Anyway, the situation at AGC had to be retrieved.

butgen
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Re: Why German generals tactically superior than Allied Gene

#336

Post by butgen » 16 Jan 2011, 21:57

Domen121 wrote:


Some were - two Panzergrenadier divisions and one Panzerdivision were lost during "Bagration". Remnants of Panzergrenadier divisions were delivered to newly formed armoured brigades and remnants of that Panzerdivision continued to exist as a Combat Group (so in fact a regimental-size unit, not even close to division).

Apart from that 20 infantry divisions, 2 Luftwaffe field divisions, one Sturm division and one Corps Group were destroyed (their remnants were reorganized into 7 divisional groups - an equivalent of 7 regiments). And also further three infantry divisions transferred to AGC yet during "Bagration" and 3 Sicherungs divisions were destroyed.

And AG North Ukraine lost 5 infantry division, one Corps Group (a divisional-size unit), two Sicherungs divisions and one SS Grenadiers Division. AG North didn't lost any division completely but several suffered heavy casualties. However, many of the AG North's divisions were cut off in Courland and fought there until the end of the war.

AG South Ukraine lost 18 infantry divisions alone. I don't know how many divisions of other types it lost.

German AT defense suffered huge losses. Highest losses were suffered by 8,8cm Pak 43 and 43/41.
No panzerdivision was lost during Bagration and the other losses you mention are not the issue. The divisions that were sent as reinforcements were not lost .

butgen
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Re: Why German generals tactically superior than Allied Gene

#337

Post by butgen » 16 Jan 2011, 22:03

Domen121 wrote: "Defeat = losing a lot of terrain" maybe was inevitable considering the superiority Soviets had in 1944.

But defeat = losing several dozen divisions destroyed probably could have been prevented (at least partially).



This is tactical meaning of "successful defence". Operational and strategic meanings are often different. In other words - not always the purpose of defence is to stop enemy attack with insignificant loss of terrain. And when defining which defence is successful and which isn't we should take into consideration what the defender planned to achieve.

For example the entire Polish defensive plan of 1939 assumed withdrawal and delaying enemy advance while withdrawing (and waiting for the French counteroffensive in the West). So successful defence in this case would mean: preventing the enemy from encircling and destroying our armies during their gradual withdrawal.



Panzerdivisions are not only very good in attack, they are also very good in defence. For example tanks can be entrenched and work as potentially mobile resistance nests of artillery, Anti-Tank and MG fire.


Even if not, then it could at least make blowing divisions away more time-consuming for the Soviets.

There would be also more divisions to blow away if AG Center was stronger than in reality.

As I wrote compare Rzhev to Bagration - force ratios similar, results different.

Much less ground could have been lost in those battles. And Soviet advance speed could have been slower.

This would prolong the entire Eastern Front war. Maybe this would allow the Western Allies to capture Berlin.
I have already stated that AGC should have been allowed to retreat to the Beresina before the soviet offensive.
The point was that the taking away of a few divisions elsewhere did not cause any significant difference in the situation at other AG's.
Armored divisions are there to counterattack.
The force ratios at Rhsev were obviously totally different than those during Bagration.

Michate
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Re: Why German generals tactically superior than Allied Gene

#338

Post by Michate » 20 Jan 2011, 11:26

9 - 10 km per division was a regular defensive line of an infantry division in pretty much every military handbook of any armed forces of that time. During the battle of Rzhev Soviet forces - being 5-times superior in numbers - were not able to break the German defensive lines organized according to this rule. While during Bagration Soviet forces - having similar or even smaller superiority than at Rzhev - had literally "blown out" German divisions in one day.
I would really love to see the data supporting that Soviet forces at Rzhev were "5-times superior in numbers" and that their superiority in Bagration was "even smaller", or that they had "blown out" German divisions "in one day".
Another thing is that when a division has defensive lines of 9 - 10 km long, entire divisional artillery and large number of other means of fire can - at any given moment - concentrate their entire firepower against any given point of the frontline (which is - after all - a German concept of "concentrated fire support" - I forgot the German name).
This is very true, and it was a large obstacle for defense in areas of AG Center as well as AG North in summer 1944.
In German the concept is called "Feuerzusammenfassung" or "zusammengefasstes Feuer".

Ali M J
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Re: Why German generals tactically superior than Allied Gene

#339

Post by Ali M J » 24 Jan 2011, 14:58

Hi.

Possable reasons?

Was not the German military acadamany alot more stricter than the British,Americans?

&

All the german soldiers underneith the German General were all taught how to lead and become a general just in case the German general perished? but the British and Americans never did such a thing!

After wwI;the Germans stayed cleared from trench warfare and created a more modern battle tatics for a modrn war,while the British/Americans still harved on the old trench war tatics?

Boby
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Re: Why German generals tactically superior than Allied Gene

#340

Post by Boby » 18 Sep 2017, 12:10

ljadw wrote:
butgen wrote:
ljadw wrote: 1)A shorter line is not always better defensible
2 )In the West,the generals were advocating a rettreat before there was a breakthrough,and,such retreat would have resulted in the collapse of the front .
3)Nope :in june 1944 the Red Army had a such overwhelming superiority,that AGC was doomed
Men :1 :3,7
Tanks:1:23
AG:1:3.6
Artillery :1:9,4
Aircraft :1:10.5
Source :Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg Tome 8 P534
What Butgens said is what Frieser is repeating ad nauseam in DRZW 8: that it was all the fault of Hitler by his "absurd/irrational/paranoid orders". That on 24 June AGC would have been saved without the intervention of Hitler. Thus the huge numerical superiority on men, tanks, artillery and aircraft has no importance. Not a success of the Red Army, but, as usual, a failure of Germany (= HItler).

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