Stiltzkin wrote:This is what matters.
No it isn't.
Note the correlation between losses and production.
No, note what actually does matter. The figures given for monthly tank, StuG/PzJg, and AFV "strengths" are nothing of the sort. They are inventory numbers for the entire Wehrmacht. The actual "strength" that matters is the numbers available to the units at the fighting fronts and how many of those are actually operational.
So, viz. "January 1944" the "strength" was supposedly 5,266 "tanks". However, there were as of 3 January 1944, only 1,671 operational Panzers on all fronts. There were also 1,633 non-operational. Divided between 33 Panzer divisions, i.e., 50.6 operational and 49.5 non-operational Panzers per division. 100.1 per division when there was nominally supposed to be 225. Worse, to make up that shortfall of 124.9 Panzers, just 523 were in route or allocated from production resources...15.8 per division.
Nor was the "StuG/JgPz" situation much better. While the inventory was supposedly 3,882, the actual number of operational StuG was 1,362 operational, 724 non-operational, and 211 in route or allocated.
How about "June 1944". Geez, the Wehrmacht was swimming in Panzers then! They had a strength of 7,141, so the 34 Panzer divisions each had 210, so were 93.3% of full strength! No problem, right?
No. There were 3,045 operational as of 31 May. 89.6 per division, a significant improvement over January, yes, but still far short of requirements. Another 659 were non-operational, 19.4 per division, also a significant improvement in readiness rates. However, only 1,098 were in route, meaning total assets at best were 4,802, 67.2% of total inventory and only 141.2 per division...about 62.8% of total requirement.
Meanwhile, U.S. Army forces preparing for OVERLORD in England as of 30 May 1944, had 2,331 Sherman tanks of all types on hand with troops and another 753 in depot reserves, against a T/O&E requirement of 1,765 and a reserve requirement of 309. And their planners were worried about potential shortages...