Tigers at Prokhorovka

[Mobius]

That flickr link to photos has a photo of the tank ditch. There doesn't seem that anyone in it would have much of a view.

[gracie4241]

Since on July 12, 1943 at Prokhorovka the Russians lost(permanent) according to Glantz 372 tanks to 72 german losses-against mark 3 and 4's and Stugs in open terrain, please tell me again how "superior "the t-34 was again? Also an exchange rate of 5-1 certainly suggests continuing the battle( as desired by Manstein AND Hoth) with a couple of additional divisions wasn't far fetched at all .Please don't give me the same old song "they could afford more"-at 5-1 they most CERTAINLY could not. Also, as of that date ALL 5 of the Soviet tank armies then in existence had already been committed to the Kursk/Orel battle.Makes me wonder if 3-4 of the armoured divisions in Italy and the Med had been available(out of my count of 10(incl Greece and the Balkans) , and Manstein had also been given the 5th SSPG Viking and 17th panzer division in reserve what would have happened, Manstein always contended with a few more divisions a clear breakthrough was possible; in my scenario I just gave him SIX! With Richtofens' Air Fleet 2(or portions thereof) in the med as well.Are we sure a German victory was out of sight? I'm not

[Christian Ankerstjerne]

Since on July 12, 1943 at Prokhorovka the Russians lost(permanent) according to Glantz 372 tanks to 72 german losses-against mark 3 and 4's and Stugs in open terrain, please tell me again how "superior "the t-34 was again?

You can't extrapolate anything about the overall quality of a vehicle based on a single battle, and certainly not when the battle was fought with dubious tactics on the part of the Soviet commander.

Also an exchange rate of 5-1 certainly suggests continuing the battle( as desired by Manstein AND Hoth) with a couple of additional divisions wasn't far fetched at all .Please don't give me the same old song "they could afford more"-at 5-1 they most CERTAINLY could not.

Except that this 'exchange rate' didn't apply to the entire operation.

Also, as of that date ALL 5 of the Soviet tank armies then in existence had already been committed to the Kursk/Orel battle.Makes me wonder if 3-4 of the armoured divisions in Italy and the Med had been available(out of my count of 10(incl Greece and the Balkans) , and Manstein had also been given the 5th SSPG Viking and 17th panzer division in reserve what would have happened, Manstein always contended with a few more divisions a clear breakthrough was possible; in my scenario I just gave him SIX! With Richtofens' Air Fleet 2(or portions thereof) in the med as well.Are we sure a German victory was out of sight? I'm not

A clear breakthrough to where? Even before Hitler called off the offensive, the Soviets had broken through at the northern shoulder, and Kluge was pulling back the northern pincer. If the German armies had continued to link up at Kursk, the most likely outcome would have been their encirclement.

[Zinegata]

Since on July 12, 1943 at Prokhorovka the Russians lost(permanent) according to Glantz 372 tanks to 72 german losses-against mark 3 and 4's and Stugs in open terrain, please tell me again how "superior "the t-34 was again?

You do realize the many of the English languages sources that hold up the T-34 as the bestest tank ever come primarily from German sources, yes? Maybe you should ask them or question their motives first.

Moreover if you understand what happened to the 5th Guards then the loss rate wouldn't be surprising. Tanks in fact die very quickly in situations where they are basically just targets unable to respond to anti-tank guns; which in fact characterizes the majority of armor engagements and points to the utter uselessness of relying on technical statistics to divine who will win a battle.

[Stiltzkin]

You can't extrapolate anything about the overall quality of a vehicle based on a single battle, and certainly not when the battle was fought with dubious tactics on the part of the Soviet commander.

The result is a product of their strength, skill, armament and the circumstances present at that day, you can certainly say something about the units performance though, but note that the number of irrecoverables fluctuated around 15% for the Wehrmacht and approx. 50% for the Soviets, throughout the entire conflict. You can include damaged to write offs, but in order to assess performance one should rely on bloody casualties and irrecoverables, a far more reliable indicator. What you want to do ideally, is to sum up the losses by combat causes (damaged + written off) of opposing forces, minus other causes. How much can be really accredited to the repair system or a lack of spare parts is hard to say, but it seems that Soviet guns had a harder time to score a critical hit on a German AFV than the other way around (a consequence of Soviet projectile quality?). Tigers however had rather little to do with it, tanks did not duel, this was not jousting.

Except that this 'exchange rate' didn't apply to the entire operation.

Material and personnel losses can correlate. Day to day losses can jump substantially, as was the case in Citadel, these reports exist and show a 1:7 casualty exchange rate after the 11th. The global exchange rate was 1:3.5 (AGS), same for write offs (subtracted by things like mine damage and breakdowns etc.). The CEV was 2.54-2.6 vs 0.3-0.46. Pretty standard day on the EF. Depending on the (periodical) intensity of course.

You do realize the many of the English languages sources that hold up the T-34 as the bestest tank ever come primarily from German sources, yes? Maybe you should ask them or question their motives first.

Usually post war anecdotal evidence. You cannot base your knowledge solely off opinions, they can be helpful occassionally, but that is rarely the case (the amusing part here is that Soviet evaluations assign a higher combat rating to many German AFVs). There is no way around an engineering analysis and study of training institutions for sure, though the T-34 as it seems was rather a victim of wartime propaganda.

Moreover if you understand what happened to the 5th Guards then the loss rate wouldn't be surprising. Tanks in fact die very quickly in situations where they are basically just targets unable to respond to anti-tank guns; which in fact characterizes the majority of armor engagements and points to the utter uselessness of relying on technical statistics to divine who will win a battle.

So, we have the impact of leadership, AT battalions and offensive action. Classic example which could be quantified. The goal of a unit is primarily to diminish the combat power of the enemy formation, by maximizing their number of irretrievables in men and material. Whoever controls the battlefield and holds the initiative can salvage their vehicles more effectively. Repairing, commanding and salvaging are as relevant as fighting itself. Quality is a relative term and should be always measured to the adversary.
Note that German units suffered the highest AFV losses in the first days with the beginning of their approach. They engaged a well prepared and entrenched enemy, with almost double their strength - during this phase the fields were presighted by AT fortifications, as well.
Battle outcomes can be predicted, they are mostly deterministic with some stochastic elements to them.

[Cult Icon]

There is a book called "Demolishing the Myth" that goes into why the 5th GTA messed up at Kursk.

[seppw]

There is a book called "Demolishing the Myth" that goes into why the 5th GTA messed up at Kursk.

This book's author V. Zamulin, although he was born in 1968, is openly biased and sees the Wehrmacht as his personal enemy. He uses expressions like "we", "our troops", "our victory" when talking about the red army and "the Nazis", "foe" and "our enemy" when talking about the Wehrmacht. Unfortunately this is not the only sympton of his bias. While he does expose the obviously wrong number of 400 German loses, which had already been releaved to be completely false by western historians form all over world such as Frieser, Geogre Nipe, David Glantz, Jonathan House, Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson decades ago, he doesn't demolish the myth as his title would suggest, but rather revives it by making up a different fake number: 150.
On the 12th of July LSAH and Das Reich only suffered 5 permanent losses. The reason why the Soviets suffered 196 permanent losses at Prokhorovka on the same day is that they sent their tanks into one of their own antitank ditches. Wassilevski and Rotmistrov had to make up the number in order to save their own skin.

[Cult Icon]

What does this have to do with how the book is mostly about 5GTA's screwups?

[benwi]

Since on July 12, 1943 at Prokhorovka the Russians lost(permanent) according to Glantz 372 tanks to 72 german losses-against mark 3 and 4's and Stugs in open terrain, please tell me again how "superior "the t-34 was again? Also an exchange rate of 5-1 certainly suggests continuing the battle( as desired by Manstein AND Hoth) with a couple of additional divisions wasn't far fetched at all .Please don't give me the same old song "they could afford more"-at 5-1 they most CERTAINLY could not. Also, as of that date ALL 5 of the Soviet tank armies then in existence had already been committed to the Kursk/Orel battle.Makes me wonder if 3-4 of the armoured divisions in Italy and the Med had been available(out of my count of 10(incl Greece and the Balkans) , and Manstein had also been given the 5th SSPG Viking and 17th panzer division in reserve what would have happened, Manstein always contended with a few more divisions a clear breakthrough was possible; in my scenario I just gave him SIX! With Richtofens' Air Fleet 2(or portions thereof) in the med as well.Are we sure a German victory was out of sight? I'm not

A limited success was certainly still possible on the Southern pincer.Better to keep luring in red army reserves than losing the initiative completely.

[EugE]

The Red army defended the country where lived his ancestors. His grandfathers served in red army. He identifying itself with the ancestors writes - "we, our, our enemies". The red army has won war with the Third Reich for this reason he has written that "we have won".


According to the Tagesmeldung from 11.07 in the whole II SS-PzKorps had 97 Pz III, 91 Pz IV, 15 Pz VI Tiger + 58 StuG III.
Just for comparing in July 13 in the whole II SS-PzKorps had 70 Pz III, 65 Pz IV, 4 Pz VI Tiger + 64 Stug(Tk has lost -1 Stug, DR has lost -3, LAH increase from 10 to 20.)
Where is your 5 Pz?
T 354 R 605.

[hoot72]

How many Ferdinands did the German's have on the Northern flank and were they effective tank killers like the mighty Tiger?

[critical mass]

The Red army defended the country where lived his ancestors. His grandfathers served in red army. He identifying itself with the ancestors writes - "we, our, our enemies". The red army has won war with the Third Reich for this reason he has written that "we have won".


According to the Tagesmeldung from 11.07 in the whole II SS-PzKorps had 97 Pz III, 91 Pz IV, 15 Pz VI Tiger + 58 StuG III.
Just for comparing in July 13 in the whole II SS-PzKorps had 70 Pz III, 65 Pz IV, 4 Pz VI Tiger + 64 Stug(Tk has lost -1 Stug, DR has lost -3, LAH increase from 10 to 20.)
Where is your 5 Pz?
T 354 R 605.

The Tagesmeldung give only drop of strength data, which is different from permanent write off data. Drop of strength is composed of several sources: combat damage, combat permanent write off, mechanical write off, mechanical temporary damage.

Originally, no permanent combat write off was reported by IInd SS Korps for 12th of July and all damaged tanks were recovered. According to Frieser, 3 tanks and 1 StuG were re-reported later as TWO (written off after assessing that damage was beyond repair) for a total of 5 TWO.

the official loss reports for 12th of July can be found here:

http://kursk1943.narod.ru/docs/BArch-MA ... 12-07.html
the break down of total losses (both, mechanical and combat) for the 3 involved german divisions:

Pz III: 44 in short time repair/maintenance, 11 in long time repiar (one of them later written off)
PzIV: 30 in short time repair/ maintenance, 20 in long time repair (two of them later written off)
TIGER: 13 in short time repair/ maintenance, 12 in long time repair
StuG: 16 in short time repair/ maintenance, 12 in long time repair (one of them later written off), 1 written off permanently

The combat intensity was high on this day and this accounts for the immediate need for maintenance and repair of minor combat damage.

[seppw]

the official loss reports for 12th of July can be found here:

http://kursk1943.narod.ru/docs/BArch-MA ... 12-07.html
the break down of total losses (both, mechanical and combat) for the 3 involved german divisions:

Pz III: 44 in short time repair/maintenance, 11 in long time repiar (one of them later written off)
PzIV: 30 in short time repair/ maintenance, 20 in long time repair (two of them later written off)
TIGER: 13 in short time repair/ maintenance, 12 in long time repair
StuG: 16 in short time repair/ maintenance, 12 in long time repair (one of them later written off), 1 written off permanently

The combat intensity was high on this day and this accounts for the immediate need for maintenance and repair of minor combat damage.

The 1 immediate permanent StuG loss is in the "Gr. D." column.

[critical mass]

I stand corrected. Thanks for pointing the mistake out, seppw.

What isn´t clear to me, at least in absence of 11th and 13th records, is whether or not the report from July 12th can be regarded as referring to losses exclusively registered on that day or rather cumulative strength reports, where the AFV losses are given cumulative in break down. I suppose -tentatively, and without good evidence for it- that the record belongs to the former category but I may be wrong.

[seppw]

The Red army defended the country where lived his ancestors. His grandfathers served in red army. He identifying itself with the ancestors writes - "we, our, our enemies". The red army has won war with the Third Reich for this reason he has written that "we have won".

I understand that. However, although what you described is applicable to many histrorians, it is regarded as unprofessional and unacceptable for historians to pick a side like that - at least in the west. It's a grave formal mistake that could cost you your career.

I stand corrected. Thanks for pointing the mistake out, seppw.

What isn´t clear to me, at least in absence of 11th and 13th records, is whether or not the report from July 12th can be regarded as referring to losses exclusively registered on that day or rather cumulative strength reports, where the AFV losses are given cumulative in break down. I suppose -tentatively, and without good evidence for it- that the record belongs to the former category but I may be wrong.

I think the 5th permanent loss was another tank that was written off later on. However I can't say that for sure, because it's long ago since I did the research.
Nonetheless I'm fairly certain that the number of 5 permanent losses is correct, because Roman Töppel came to same conclusion.
In case anyone is interested, Töppel wrote a book about the battle of Kursk as well.
https://www.amazon.com/Kursk-1943-Great ... %C3%B6ppel