Photos of vehicles in the Falaise gap

[STURMBOCK]

I can t open your picture ........

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Badge of Polish 1. Armoured Division:



General Stanisław Maczek - commander of Polish 1. Armoured Division (also commander of 10. Motorized Brigade during the Polish Campaign of 1939 and of Polish 10. Armoured Brigade during the Battle of France 1940):



Operations of Polish 1. Armoured Division during the battle of Falaise - yellow colour:

Polish division was attacking from the north towards the south - towards Chambois, which was captured by the Polish division and where it soon met with the 2nd battalion of American 359th Infantry Regiment from 90th Infantry Division, which was also attacking towards Chambois but from the south.

During the last phase of the battle of Falaise Polish division fought mainly along the line Boisjos - Coudehard - hill 269 - Montormel - hill 259 - hill 252 - hill 262 (also called "Maczuga") - hill 113 - Chambois, closing the gap / pocket, blocking the German retreat and repulsing counterattacks of the German forces from the east and breakthrough attempts from the west:





Some of Polish photos from the Falaise gap:

German units after combat with Polish division - somewhere near Mont Ormel:





German convoy destroyed by Polish soldiers in "Korytarz Śmierci" (the "Corridor of Death"):



Infantry of Polish 1. Armoured Division in the thick forest of hill 262 (also called "Maczuga" - "Mace"):



German Stug destroyed by Polish soldiers - eastern parts of hill 262:



German equipment destroyed by Polish soldiers near Mont Ormel:



German column destroyed by Polish division near Chambois:



German units destroyed by Polish division near Chambois - somewhere along the road Chambois - Vimoutiers, near "Maczuga" ("Mace") - in the area called "Psie Pole" ("Dog's Field"):







In Chambois - Polish 10th Dragoon Regiment (mot.) from 1. Armoured Division advancing towards Chambois from the north established contact with American 359th Infantry Regiment from 90th Infantry Division advancing towards Chambois from the south - they met in Chambois, finally closing the Falaise pocket.

Chambois - in the left we can see podporucznik Władysław Kłaptocz, on the right we can see major Leonard C. Dull:



Polish dragoon from 1. Armoured Division helping civilians during combats in Chambois:



Destroyed by Polish division in the area of "Maczuga" ("Mace"):



The same place - "Mace" - we can see knocked out Polish Sherman:



The same Sherman - still "fresh" and "smoking":



"Mace" again - destroyed Pz-IVs:





Destroyed by Polish division in Boisjos:

In all, they lost 2,300 men. But in a stunning display of valour, the unwavering Polish soldiers had sealed the fate of the German forces in Normandy.

Polish division lost 2,097 men - this includes 446 killed, 1,501 wounded and 150 missing - but since the beginning of the Normandy campaign (including initial combats south of Caen during Operation "Totalise") until the end of the Normandy campaign.

According to general Stanisław Maczek (book "Od podwody do czołga") his division reported a total of 1,441 casualties during the proper battle of Falaise (Operation "Tractable" until 22nd of August), including 325 killed (21 officers), 1002 wounded (35 officers) and 114 missing. 656 casualties - including 121 killed, 499 wounded and 36 missing - were sustained during the second phase of Operation "Totalize" (which is, however, sometimes considered as the first phase of the battle of Falaise - which has got three phases then).

Out of 121 soldiers and officers of Polish 1. Armoured Division who were killed during the second phase of Operation "Totalise", 44 were killed by American bombs on 8th of August 1944. Out of 325 Polish soldiers who were killed during the proper battle of Falaise, 50 lost their lives during the second mistaken American bombing on 14th of August 1944. Several dozens were also wounded during the first mistaken bombing on 8th of August and even more (but also several dozens) during the second one on 14th of August.

So out of 446 Polish soldiers and officers killed during both Operation "Totalise" and Operation "Tractable", 94 were killed by American bombers.

During the battle of Falaise Polish division (according to general Maczek) reported capturing 5,113 German soldiers (and according to general Skibiński - 5,650 German soldiers) - including 1 general (according to Skibiński he was the commander of Panzerkorps), 4 colonels (Oberst), 2 Oberstleutnants and 150 other officers.

General Elfeld in Polish captivity on hill 113:



Both figures, however, might be too low. In fact Polish division could capture even up to around 6650 - 7150 German POWs during the battle of Falaise. It is possible that some of them were killed in captivity.

Btw:

During the batlle of Falaise Maczek and his men confronted - among other divisions - with the 2nd "Wiener" Panzer-Division. It was their old and worth enemy from the Polish Campaign of 1939. For the first time they confronted with the 2nd Panzer-Division during the battle of Jordanów and Wysoka on 2nd of September 1939 (battle of Wysoka and Jordanów: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 5&t=108963 ) - since that day they fought many battles and combats against it - many of which were successful - until they finally - due to the Soviet agression of 17th of September 1939 - crossed the Hungarian border in full organizational density, in full order and with all initial guns with which they were starting the campaign, on 18th of September 1939. During the Polish Campaign they were only fighting defensive battles against the German 2nd Panzer-Division and were successfully and painfully slowing it down, but could not stop it because their 10. Motorized Brigade was just too weak to destroy a German Panzer-Division and they did not receive any orders to attack, only to withdraw and slow down or eventually carry out some small-scale counterattacks to slow the German advances. During the French Campaign of 1940 they did not meet their old enemy in combat. Now they finally for the first time had the possibility, motivation and enough strength to attack and destroy their old enemy - and they did it.

---------------------------------------------------------------

After the end of the battle of Falaise Polish division was resting and repairing vehicles for several days. On 29th of August 1944 it saw action again - starting its 10-days pursuit of the German forces, through the areas of Northern France and Belgium.

During this 10-day pursuit, Polish division advanced for 470 kilometres towards Germany, captured 3,487 German soldiers (including 40 officers), 47 field guns, 2 tanks, 3 armoured cars, 2 military tractors, 8 mortars and 2 AA guns with a loss of 227 men - 57 killed and 170 wounded.

[spannermann]

Hi Domen121,

Thank you for your interesting article on the Polish Armoured Division in Normandy, however to clarify some of your photosgraphs,

Photo 1 Panther and other destroyed equipment on a road, the Panther is very likely to be from SS Pz Rgt 1.

Photo 2 Exactly the same photo as above but printed in reverse.

Photo 6 Panther, Lynx, Armoured Maultier etc., photo taken at the Trun collection dump approximately 1946, this is
many miles from Mt Ormel and nothing to do with it.

Photo 7 Destroyed German transport column, one of many photos of this column, claimed to have been destroyed by aircraft of the RAF's 2nd TAF.

Photo 8 Is another view of the same vehicles in photos 1 and 2

Photo 9 Is the same German column as photos 1, 2 and 9.

From your narrative, you cannot claim the Polish to be "blocking the German retreat", if in the enemy is still able to escape around Hill 262, left and right, for several more days which they did. A hinderance to the enemy, yes, but not necessarily fatal.

Also all that about being a "cork in a bottle", it should be rememberd that to have a cork in a bottle there has to be a bottle, you may recall that the bottle was in fact made up of half a million or so Canadians, British, Free French, Belgiums, and quite a few Americans.

Your claimed Polish dead and wounded are appauling for sure, and one wonders why so bad when so many of the enemy were still able to fight their way past Hill 262 and other battle sites, were not the level of Polish casualities the cause for questions being raised by the higher Allied command at the time, after all we were winning, but sustaining casualities levels that were not unusal for many German formations at the time, it was the cause of some concern about tactics and leadership to the Allied command.

A typical wayward claim is the destruction of the 2nd Panzer Division, according to the historian Niklas Zetterling, whilst the 2nd Pz Div did indeed have a difficult time breaking out of the pocket, they did actually succeed, and was still intact enough to be in combat as a organised formation as of 4th September in Northern France. Also be aware that the 2nd Pz Div at the time it clashed with the Polish had already been in continious action against all the other Allies from 18th June, which was approximately 50 days, and were only at about 40% full strength and very very tired. Whereas the Polish Armoured Division was relatively fresh only having been in Normandy a couple of weeks by then, and was a much larger armoured formation that 2nd Pz had ever been, even when it was a fresh division earlier on the 18th June.

Was not Hill 262 occupied by accident anyway, the Polish armour should have entered Chambois but instead got lost and went to Champeaux instead some kilometers away, and then on to Hill 262. Maybe a fortuitious mistake, but nevertheless a mistake.

Heres hoping for more objective comments on Normandy, regards spannermann

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

according to the historian Niklas Zetterling, whilst the 2nd Pz Div did indeed have a difficult time breaking out of the pocket, they did actually succeed, and was still intact enough to be in combat as a organised formation as of 4th September in Northern France.

As an organized formation - maybe.

As the division - certainly not. From the division only name: "division" left. It's real strength was far lower than strength of a unit which can be called division.

they did actually succeed

Some of them succeeded in escaping from the Falaise gap. But the more of similar "successes", the faster would have Germany lost the war.

By the way - how many of German Panzers managed to escape from the gap, and how many of them remained and were captured by the Allies?

When you answer this question, you will see how big "success" the Germans achieved in the battle of Falaise...

Also be aware that the 2nd Pz Div at the time it clashed with the Polish had already been in continious action against all the other Allies from 18th June, which was approximately 50 days, and were only at about 40% full strength and very very tired.

So how can anyone claim that it was not destroyed as the division during the battle of Falaise, if after Falaise its strength certainly decreased terribly once again.

If at the beginning of Falaise it had got only 40% of its initial strength, then what was its strength after Falaise? Even not an equivalent of a strength of one single regiment probably.

Heres hoping for more objective comments on Normandy, regards spannermann

Yes, it should be said that Montgommery totally bungled his job in Normandy.

What the allies managed to destroy was certainly not the result of his plan - and much more could have been achieved if his plan had been better.

Of course he didn't manage to realize his plan - because he wanted to encircle the German forces in Normandy by capturing the Orlean's Gate, and pressing them to the Loire line. He never ever even considered encircling the Germans in the Falaise - Chambois - Argentan region.

Luckily at least the battle of Falaise was partially succesful - although it was never planned by Montgommery to encircle the Germans there - the whole thing was rather accidential.

Was not Hill 262 occupied by accident anyway, the Polish armour should have entered Chambois but instead got lost and went to Champeaux instead some kilometers away, and then on to Hill 262. Maybe a fortuitious mistake, but nevertheless a mistake.

Chambois was also captured by the Poles so I don't think that it was an accident.

First of all - the whole battle of Falaise was a fortuitious mistake of Monty.

It was Monty's fault that just three division - Polish 1st, Canadian 4th and American 90th - were opposing the whole German army, the whole German "bull" in Normandy, trying to grab its horns - and at the same time for example 7th Armoured, and Guard's Armoured Division were doing practically nothing, and 11th Armoured was only "slapping the bull on the back"...

He was certainly lucky that everything ended in a victorious way for the Allies - or he just had good soldiers under his command.

Photo 1 Panther and other destroyed equipment on a road, the Panther is very likely to be from SS Pz Rgt 1.

This photo was taken by the Polish soldiers on 19th of August 1944 on the road Chambois - Vimoutiers.

Photo 6 Panther, Lynx, Armoured Maultier etc., photo taken at the Trun collection dump approximately 1946, this is
many miles from Mt Ormel and nothing to do with it.

Yes, here you are most probably right. I should never believe someone else's descriptions if I am not shure .

Photo 7 Destroyed German transport column, one of many photos of this column, claimed to have been destroyed by aircraft of the RAF's 2nd TAF.

Photo was taken by Polish soldiers - you can even see two of them in the photo.

The column is said to have been destroyed by Polish division, which is more probable than "the RAF version", as all photos of this column were taken by the Poles.

I will try to find further info on it.

Your claimed Polish dead and wounded are appauling for sure

Yes, casualties were heavy.

During the whole Operation Overlord around 13% casualties (dead, wounded, missing) from both combat (here big part due to American friendly fire) and non battle reasons.

13% of the initial strength of course - if counting also reinforcements it would be less than 13%.

and one wonders why so bad

2nd SS Panzer Korps was counterattacking the Polish division from the east, and 16 German divisions were trying to escape through the Polish positions from the west.

[Michael Kenny]

Your claimed Polish dead and wounded are appauling for sure, and one wonders why so bad when so many of the enemy were still able to fight their way past Hill 262 and other battle sites, were not the level of Polish casualities the cause for questions being raised by the higher Allied command at the time, after all we were winning, but sustaining casualities levels that were not unusal for many German formations at the time, it was the cause of some concern about tactics and leadership to the Allied command.

The Poles were 'green' and as such had a lot to learn. There were concerns about them not being as effective as the veteran Divisions. They did it the hard way but they surely did it.

Yes, it should be said that Montgommery totally bungled his job in Normandy.

It could be said. It could also be said that the Germans totaly bungled their defense by not defeating The Allies.
From the beaches to the German border in 3 months is quite a 'bungle' by any standards.

What the allies managed to destroy was certainly not the result of his plan

Actualy it was. He was the overall ground force Commander for most of this period

and much more could have been achieved if his plan had been better.

There are many scenarios where it could be 'what-ifed' out better but then the reverse is also true. It could have gone horribly wrong. Blaming the man because it MIGHT have gone better seems a funny sort of criticism. I think though that is never going to be any acceptance by the Monty Haters that he could do anything right.

the whole thing was accidential.

What was it Napoleon said about 'lucky' Generals?

- the whole battle of Falaise was a fortuitious mistake of Monty.

He always seemed to land on his feet.................maybe it wasn't all luck?

It was Monty's fault that just three division - Polish 1st, Canadian 4th and American 90th - were opposing the whole German army, the whole German "bull" in Normandy, trying to grab its horns - and at the same time for example 7th Armoured, and Guard's Armoured Division were doing practically nothing, and 11th Armoured was only "slapping the bull on the back"...

I would not go down that road. The 3 Divisions you mention had borne the brunt of the Armoured fighting in the previous weeks. All had suffered considerably, 11th AD in particular.


]

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

The Poles were 'green' and as such had a lot to learn.

Not so "green".

Big part of them was serving in 10. Motorized Brigade during the Polish Campaign of 1939 and in 10. Armoured Brigade during the French Campaign of 1940.

I suppose that huge part of them was far more experienced than an average American or Canadian soldier.

More over - all of them were volunteers so all of them wanted to fight against Hitler very much.

Blaming the man because it MIGHT have gone better seems a funny sort of criticism.

I don't blame him for the result (the result was quite good - could be better). I blame Montgommery for so high casualties of 1st Armoured, 4th Armoured and 90th Infantry - for cost of the result.

He had got 5 Armoured divisions - two of them (Polish and 4th Canadian) - were sent to block the German retreat and were fighting against the whole German army in Normandy.

Third of them was just advancing behind the retreating Germans, not having many things to do - just a "Sunday walk".

And the remaining two were... in reserve !!!

No surprise that some part of the Germans managed to escape, if he was disposing of his best forces (the fastest and strongest ones) in SO irresponsible way !!

He always seemed to land on his feet.................maybe it wasn't all luck?

Really? Always? Monty? I really do not think so.

He had got not only one "bridge too far" during his career :roll:

What the allies managed to destroy was certainly not the result of his plan

Actualy it was. He was the overall ground force Commander for most of this period

The problem is that he wanted to do one thing, and he did another thing.

He didn't manage to realize his plan - he (or rather his soldiers) did something else.

It was also a success, but not so big as Monty wanted and planned.

And things which led to the success were rather "improvisation" than actions consistent with his previous plan.

[Michael Kenny]

Not so "green".

They were. The problems they faced in their first actions mimic the mistakes of 7th AD in the opening weeks. No matter how much experience you had elsewhere Normandy was a different game.
Perhaps your bias against Monty is as a result of the criticism he leveled at the Poles? He sacked a lot of very senior British Generals in his time so you can not claim he singled the Poles out.

I blame Montgommery for so high casualties of 1st Armoured, 4th Armoured and 90th Infantry - for cost of the result.

Look at 11th AD losses for Goodwood. 7th during Perch. Tell me they were worse than 1st Polish?

He had got 5 Armoured divisions - two of them (Polish and 4th Canadian) - were sent to block the German retreat and were fighting against the whole German army in Normandy.

Third of them was just advancing behind the retreating Germans, not having many things to do - just a "Sunday walk".

And the remaining two were... in reserve !!!

Standard practice to hold some units back as a reserve. If you are trying to say the others held back then I suggest you look up the efforts of 11th AD during Goodwood and August 1st-6th. Using your logic I could ask where were the Poles then

No surprise that some part of the Germans managed to escape, if he was disposing of his best forces (the fastest and strongest ones) in SO irresponsible way

Part of the ongoing and relentless effort to trash Montgommery and all his achievements. Hardly the thing to open up here.

He had got not only one "bridge too far" during his career

Yes he was not infallible. He sometimes got it wrong but it is fun to watch the very same people who castigate him for being too cautious turn around and castigate him for being too reckless!
Heads you win, tails I lose.

What the allies managed to destroy was certainly not the result of his plan

It was.

The problem is that he wanted to do one thing, and he did another thing.

He didn't manage to realize his plan - he (or rather his soldiers) did something else.

It was also a success, but not so big as Monty wanted and planned.

And things which led to the success were rather "improvisation" than actions consistent with his previous plan.

Plans adapt to circumstances. The enemy reaction can not be worked out in advance. That said Mony said he would be at the Seine in 90 days. Tell me how that worked out?

[spannermann]

Hello Domen 121,

Maybe you are not aware that WWII finished 65 years ago, and that this particuler thread and this forum are not the place to post versions of WWII that are very 1940's and 50''s in their nationalistic and one-sided content. Its a misuse of this sites' purpose and is not condusive to the international attendance on this site.

My reason for adding some remarks to your tirade on Polish activities in Normandy was to try and get a few objective facts/comments into the "Hollywood" version you presented, as is also Micheal Kenny's input so likewise.

Some great person once said of military campaigning, that all plans are obsolete from the first moment of contact with the enemy and thereafter its largely initiative and reaction and hopefully you can do this faster and better than your enemy. In this sense Normandy was no different to any other battle before or after.

You should understand that the Polish forces were a small cog in a very big machine, and it takes all cogs to do the best they can for the machine to succeed, to over emphasise the value of one cog against the rest is not correct, helpful or historically accurate.

regards spannermann

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Hi spannermann!,

Maybe you are not aware that WWII finished 65 years ago, and that this particuler thread and this forum are not the place to post versions of WWII that are very 1940's and 50''s in their nationalistic and one-sided content. Its a misuse of this sites' purpose and is not condusive to the international attendance on this site.

Well, I don't understand your point at all.

Which content is one-sided or "nationalistic"?

You don't like that I criticize Monty?

You should understand that the Polish forces were a small cog in a very big machine

Polish forces were 33% of a "machine" that was ordered to halt the German withdrawal in Normandy.

I think 33 percent is more than enough to call them something more than just "small cog".

into the "Hollywood" version you presented

Some of your British historians has got much more funny versions to present - for example A. McKee in his book about the battle of Caen (but it is also about the battle of Falaise) seem to try very much to avoid the word "Polish" or "Poles" in his book (unfortunately he had to include it in several cases).

He describes with details operations of Canadian 4th Armoured Division, but he does not write almost anything about operations of the Polish division (maybe few words).

And word "Mace" or "hill 262" (because it is the same) do not appear in his book even once - while fightings around "Mace" were the most bloody combats during the whole battle of Falaise.

I'm not even talking about those programmes on Discovery about Falaise, in which positions of Polish forces were represented by the Austrian or Monaco's flag instead of the Polish flag - I am not talking about it because those were not proffesional historic programmes, but popular programmes, so they theoretically had right to commit some mistakes, but I expected that British historic programmes should represent at least some proper "level".

It is also commonly known that general Maczek was not well-liked during the WW II by his British fellows from the army, so since the beginning they were trying to minimize his achievements (in exactly the same way like the British were - and some of them - but, of course, I'm not talking about you, Michael Kenny - still are - trying to process Monty into "the greatest allied commander of WW II") - some of British historians later tried to continue this trend.

Some great person once said of military campaigning, that all plans are obsolete from the first moment of contact with the enemy

Stefan Mossor wrote something even more intelligent:

"[...] War operation is coming into being in a similar way like a precious tapestry, because it also consists of three components: keen operational composition, colorful silk tactical yarn, and - at last - gray, thick and solid warp of proper performance, on which the whole beautiful picture is stringed. Let's unpick from the tapestry this gray, strong warp of material war reality, and only colorful cloud of silk will remain. This mist will be dispersed after any gust of combat misfortune, leaving only a feeling of momentary illusion and permanent disappointment. [...]"

Stefan Mossor, "Sztuka wojenna w warunkach nowoczesnej wojny" ("The art of war in conditions of the modern warfare"), published in 1938, page 618.

Stefan Mossor was a brilliant war theorist and a member of Polish GISZ (General Inspectorate of Armed Forces).

When he published the results of his analysis, in which he declared that the Polish Armed Forces will be able to put up an organized resistance against the III Reich for a maximum of 14 days - and thus he proposed to reach an alliance against the III Reich with the USSR -, he was dismissed from GISZ for defeatism.

He had got the chance to verify his assumptions because he was fighting during the Polish Campaign as the commander of 6. Horse Rifle Regiment in Kresowa Cavalry Brigade (in Army "Łódź").

Hi Michael Kenny!,

Standard practice to hold some units back as a reserve.

Some units - yes, but the bulk of his forces?! I know his forces weren't very big, but still he left over 40% of his best units in reserve, while the Germans had no longer enough strength to counterattack - so in that moment he should have pushed all of his forces into action, IMO.

He sacked a lot of very senior British Generals in his time so you can not claim he singled the Poles out.

Yes, I know - and often it wasn't right.

Perhaps your bias against Monty is as a result of the criticism he leveled at the Poles?

I don't think so .

Regards,
Domen

[spannermann]

Hi domen121,

I really think you have a serious persecution complex, its medical and ought to be attended to.

there will be no more input from me and I hope this thread reverts back to the excellent Falasie photographic thread it was previously.

spannermann

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

The video below shows some scenes from "Maczuga" after the battle there ended - including the cross with Jesus Christ located at the top of the hill - destroyed and abandoned German equipment and vehicles can be seen:

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Casualties of 1st Polish Armoured Division during the whole war according to Tadeusz Wysocki "1 Polska Dywizja Pancerna 1939 - 1947. Geneza i dzieje", Warszawa 1994:

Numbers of officers in brackets:

1. Armoured Regiment:

Dead: 56 (10)
Wounded: 147 (26)
Missing: 4

2. Armoured Regiment:

Dead: 65 (9)
Wounded: 253 (51)
Missing: -

24. Uhlan Regiment:

Dead: 69 (13)
Wounded: 147 (22)
Missing: -

10. Horse Rifle Regiment:

Dead: 90 (7)
Wounded: 231 (41)
Missing: -

Podhalańscy Rifle Battalion:

Dead: 173 (9)
Wounded: 477 (21)
Missing: 10

8. Brabantcy Rifle Battalion:

Dead: 187 (5)
Wounded: 632 (30)
Missing: 6

9. Flandryjscy Rifle Battalion:

Dead: 219 (10)
Wounded: 726 (51)
Missing: -

1. Independent HMG Squadron:

Dead: 21 (1)
Wounded: 86 (6)
Missing: -

10. Dragoon Regiment:

Dead: 194 (12)
Wounded: 502 (34)
Missing: -

And here is the name list:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 3#p1321743

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Your claimed Polish dead and wounded are appauling for sure, and one wonders why so bad when so many of the enemy were still able to fight their way past Hill 262 and other battle sites, were not the level of Polish casualities the cause for questions being raised by the higher Allied command at the time, after all we were winning, but sustaining casualities levels that were not unusal for many German formations at the time, it was the cause of some concern about tactics and leadership to the Allied command.

Well it is quite silly to claim that Polish Armoured Division suffered "appaling losses" in the battle of Falaise, giving the number of German forces they were facing, the number of German attacks they repulsed while outnumbered, and the number of casualties they inflicted to the Germans - which amounted to no less than 2000 KIA, 5650 POWs and thousands of wounded. So German losses inflicted by Polish forces were actually several times higher than Polish losses. Polish units held their positions against counterattacks of overwhelming enemy forces and fulfiled their task, inflicting heavy losses on the Germans and preventing as many of them from escaping as possible:

Prelude:

In the final stages of the Normandy Campaign the bulk of two German armies had become surrounded by the Allies near the town of Falaise, and the Mont Ormel ridge, with its commanding view of the area, sat astride the Germans' only escape route. Polish forces seized the ridge's northern height on 19 August and, despite being isolated and coming under sustained attack, held it until noon on 21 August, contributing greatly to the decisive Allied victory that followed.

The American success of Operation Cobra provided the Allies with an opportunity to cut off and destroy most of the German forces west of the River Seine. American, British and Canadian armies converged on the area around Falaise, trapping the German Seventh Army and elements of the Fifth Panzer Army. On 20 August Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model ordered a withdrawal, but by this time the Allies were already across his path; during the night of 19 August, two battlegroups of Stanisław Maczek's Polish 1st Armoured Division had established themselves in the mouth of the Falaise pocket on the northernmost of the Mont Ormel ridge's two peaks.

His forces encircled, on 20 August Model organised attacks on the ridge from both within and outside the pocket, and the Germans managed to isolate the position and force open an escape route. Lacking the fighting power to close the corridor, the Poles nevertheless directed constant and accurate artillery fire on German units leaving the sector, causing heavy casualties. Exasperated, the Germans launched fierce attacks throughout 20 August, inflicting severe losses on Hill 262's entrenched defenders. Exhausted and dangerously low on ammunition, the Poles managed to retain their foothold on the ridge. The following day, less intense attacks continued until midday, when the last German effort to overrun the position was defeated at close quarters. The Poles were relieved by the Canadian Grenadier Guards shortly after noon; their dogged stand had ensured the Falaise pocket's closure and the collapse of the German position in Normandy.

The Canadians reorganised and on 14 August launched Operation Tractable. Three days later Falaise fell. The Allied noose was closing around von Kluge's force and it fell to the Poles to draw it tight. In a meeting with his divisional commanders on 19 August, Simonds emphasised the importance of quickly closing the Falaise Pocket to General Stanisław Maczek. Assigned responsibility for the Moissy–Chambois–Coudehard area, Maczek's Polish 1st Armoured Division had split into three battlegroups each composed of an armoured regiment and an infantry battalion and been sweeping the countryside north of Chambois. However, facing stiff German resistance and with Loszutski's battlegroup having "gone astray" and needing to be rescued, the division had not yet taken Chambois, Coudehard, or the Mont Ormel ridge. Following his meeting with Simonds, Maczek was determined to get his men onto their objectives as soon as possible. The 10th Dragoons (10th Polish Motorised infantry Battalion) and 10th Polish Mounted Rifle Regiment (the division's armoured reconnaissance regiment) drove hard on Chambois, the capture of which would effect a link-up with the United States 90th Infantry Division who were simultaneously attacking the town from the south. Having taken Trun and Champeaux, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division reinforced the Poles, and by the evening of 19 August the town was in Allied hands.

Although the arms of the encirclement were now in contact, the Allies were not yet astride Seventh Army's escape route in any great strength and their positions came under frenzied assault. During the day an armoured column from the 2nd Panzer Division had broken through the Canadians in St. Lambert, taking half the village and keeping a road open for six hours until it was closed again towards nightfall. Many Germans escaped along this route, and numerous small parties infiltrated through to the River Dives during the night.

Initial drive for Falaise:

Operation Tractable began at 12:00 on August 14 when 800 Lancaster and Halifax bombers struck German positions along the front. As with Totalize, many of the bombers mistakenly dropped short of their targets, causing 400 Polish and Canadian casualties. Covered by a smokescreen laid down by their artillery, two Canadian divisions moved forwards. Although their line of sight was reduced, German units still managed to inflict severe casualties on the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, which included its Armoured Brigade commander Brigadier Leslie Booth as the division moved southward towards Falaise. Throughout the day, continual attacks by the 4th Canadian and Polish 1st Armoured Divisions managed to force a crossing of the Laison River. Limited access to the crossing points over the Dives River, allowed counterattacks by the German 102nd SS Heavy Panzer Battalion. The town of Potigny fell to Polish forces in the late afternoon. By the end of the first day, elements of the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions had reached Point 159, directly north of Falaise, although they had been unable to break into the town. In order to bolster his offensive, Simonds ordered the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division to move towards the front, with the hope that this reinforcement would be sufficient to enable his divisions to capture the town.

Although the first day's progress was slower than expected, Operation Tractable resumed on August 15; both armoured divisions pushed southeast towards Falaise. The 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions, with the support of the 2nd Canadian (Armoured) Brigade continued their drive south towards the town. After harsh fighting, the 4th Armoured Division captured Soulangy but the gains made were minimal as strong German resistance prevented a breakthrough to Trun. On August 16, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division broke into Falaise, encountering minor opposition from Waffen SS units and scattered pockets of German infantry. Although it would take two more days to clear all resistance in the town, the first major objective of Operation Tractable had been achieved. Simonds began to reorganize the bulk of his armoured forces for a renewed push towards Trun to close the Falaise Pocket.

Drives for Trun and Chambois:

A Polish Bren Gun Carrier moving through Fontaine-les-Bassets, towards the final objective of Chambois. The drive for Trun by Polish and Canadian Armoured Divisions began on August 16, with preliminary attacks in preparation for an assault against Trun and Chambois. On August 17, both armoured divisions of the 1st Canadian Army advanced. By early afternoon, the Polish 1st Armoured Division had outflanked the 12th SS Panzer Division, enabling several Polish formations to both reach the 4th Armoured Division's objectives and significantly expand the bridgehead northwest of Trun. Stanisław Maczek, the Polish divisional commander, split his forces into three battlegroups each of an armoured regiment and an infantry battalion. One of these struck southwest, cutting off Trun and establishing itself on the high ground dominating the town and the Dives river valley, allowing for a powerful assault by the 4th Canadian Armoured Division on Trun. The town was liberated on the morning of August 18.

As Canadian and Polish forces liberated Trun, Maczek's second armoured battlegroup manoeuvred southeast, capturing Champeaux and anchoring future attacks against Chambois across a six-mile front. At its closest, the front was four miles from forces of the US V Corps in the town. By the evening of August 18, all of Maczek's battlegroups had established themselves directly north of Chambois (one outside of the town, one near Vimoutiers and one at the foot of Hill 262). With reinforcements quickly arriving from the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, Maczek was in an ideal position to close the gap the following day. The presence of the Polish Armoured Division also alerted Field Marshal Model of the need to keep the pocket open.

August 19 - Closing the Gap:

Early on August 19, General Simonds met with his divisional commanders to finalize plans for closing the gap. The 4th Armoured Division would attack towards Chambois, on the western flank of two battlegroups of the Polish 1st Armoured Division. Two additional Polish battlegroups would strike eastward, securing Hill 262 to cover the eastern flanks of the assault. The 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions would continue their grinding offensives against the northern extremities of the Falaise Pocket, inflicting heavy casualties on the exhausted remains of the 12th SS Panzer Division. The assault began almost immediately after the meeting, with one battlegroup of the Polish 1st advancing towards Chambois and "Currie Task Force" of the 4th Armoured Division covering their advance. Simultaneously, two Polish battlegroups moved for Hill 262. Despite heavy German resistance, Battlegroup Zgorzelski was able to secure Point 137, directly west of Hill 262. By early afternoon, Battlegroup Stefanowicz had captured the hill, annihilating a German infantry company in the process.

By late afternoon of August 19, Canadian and Polish forces had linked with the American 80th Division and 90th Division already stationed in the town. The Falaise Gap had been closed, trapping Model's forces. As the linkup occurred, Model's 2nd SS Panzer Corps had begun its counterattack against Polish forces on Hill 262, hoping to reopen the pocket. With American and Canadian forces facing German counterattacks in their sectors, the Polish forces would have to defend against two veteran Panzer divisions to keep the gap closed.

Hill 262 (Mont Ormel):

Northeast of Chambois, an elongated, wooded ridge runs roughly north–south above the village of Coudehard. The ridge's two highest peaks - Points 262 North (262N) and 262 South (262S) - lie either side of a pass within which the hamlet of Mont Ormel, from which the ridge takes its name, is situated. A road runs through the pass east from Chambois, heading for Vimoutiers and the River Seine. Historian Michael Reynolds describes Point 262N as offering "spectacular views over much of the Falaise Pocket". Viewing the feature on an Allied map, Maczek commented that it resembled a caveman's club with two bulbous heads; the Poles nicknamed it the Maczuga, Polish for "mace". The ridge, known to the Allies as Hill 262, formed a crucial blocking position for sealing the Falaise Pocket and preventing any outside attempts to relieve the German Seventh Army.

19 August:

Shortly after noon on 19 August, Lieutenant-Colonel Zgorzelski's battlegroup (the 1st Armoured Regiment, the 9th Infantry Battalion, and a company of anti-tank guns) made a thrust towards Coudehard and the Mont Ormel ridge. Two companies of the Polish Highland (Podhalian) Battalion led the assault up the north peak, followed by the squadrons of the 1st Armoured Regiment who picked their way up the ridge's only vehicular access—a narrow, winding track. The Poles reached the summit at approximately 12:40 and took captive a number of demoralised Germans before proceeding to shell a mixed column of tanks and other vehicles moving through the pass between the peaks along the Chambois–Vimoutiers road. The Germans, despite being "shocked" to discover that Point 262N was now in Polish hands, quickly responded with a bombardment from rocket-launchers and anti-tank guns. The Poles counterattacked and more Germans, including wounded, were taken prisoner. These were moved to a hunting lodge (the Zameczek) on the ridge's northern slope. Point 137, near Coudehard, fell just after 15:30, yielding further captives.

At around 17:00 Lieutenant-Colonel Koszutski's battlegroup, consisting of the 2nd Armoured Regiment and the 8th Infantry Battalion, arrived at the ridge, followed by the rest of the Polish Highland Battalion and elements of the 9th Infantry Battalion at 19:30. The remainder of the 9th Infantry Battalion and the anti-tank company had remained around Boisjos 2 kilometres (1.2 mi) north of Coudehard, but the bulk of two battlegroups—some 80 tanks, 20 anti-tank guns, and around 1,500 infantrymen was now concentrated on and around Point 262N. However, the Poles did not occupy Point 262S. Although Lieutenant-Colonel Zdzisław Szydlowski, commanding the 9th Infantry Battalion, was given orders to take the southern peak, with darkness falling and thick smoke from the burning German column obscuring the battlefield, this was deemed too hazardous to attempt before next light. The Poles spent the night fortifying Point 262N and entrenching the southern, southwestern, and northeastern approaches to their positions.

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20 August:

Of the approximately 20 German infantry and armoured divisions trapped in the Falaise pocket, around 12 were still operating with a degree of combat-effectiveness. As these formations retreated eastwards, they fought desperately to keep the jaws of the encirclement—formed by the Canadians in Trun and St. Lambert, and the Poles and Americans in Chambois—from closing. German movement out of the pocket throughout the night of 19 August cut off the Polish battlegroups on the Mont Ormel ridge. On discovering this, Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksander Stefanowicz, in command of the Polish 1st Armoured Regiment, conferred with Koszutski. Lacking sufficient means to either seal the pocket or fight their way clear, the two decided that their forces' only chance of survival lay in holding fast until relieved. Although the Polish soldiers on Point 262N could hear movement from the valley below, other than some mortar rounds that landed among the positions of the 8th Infantry Battalion the night passed uneventfully. Without possession of Point 262S the Poles were unable to interfere with the large numbers of German troops slipping past the southern slopes of the ridge. The uneven, wooded terrain, interspersed with thick hedgerows, made control of the ground to the west and southwest difficult by day, and impossible by night. As it grew light on 20 August Szydlowski prepared to fulfil his orders of the previous night and organised two companies of his 9th Infantry Battalion, supported by the 1st Armoured Regiment, for an attack across the road towards Point 262S. However, hampered by the wreckage littering the pass the attack soon bogged down in the face of fierce German resistance.

While Currie's force stalled German forces outside of St. Lambert, two battlegroups of Maczek's Polish 1st Armoured Division were engaged in a protracted battle with two well-trained SS Panzer divisions. Throughout the night of the 19th, Polish forces had entrenched themselves along the south, southwest and northeastern lines of approach to Hill 262. Directly southwest of Mont Ormel, German units moved along what would later become known as "The Corridor of Death", as the Polish inflicted heavy casualties on German forces moving towards Mont Ormel with a well-coordinated artillery barrage.

From the northeast, the 2nd SS Panzer Division planned an assault in force against the four infantry battalions and two armoured regiments of the Polish 1st Armoured Division dug in on Hill 262. The 9th SS Panzer Division would attack from the north, while simultaneously preventing Canadian units from reinforcing the Polish armoured division. Having managed to break out of the Falaise Pocket, the 12th SS, 10th SS and 116th Panzer Divisions would then attack Hill 262 from the southwest. If this major obstacle could be cleared, German units could initiate a full withdrawal from the Falaise Pocket.

The first attack against Polish positions was by the "Der Führer" Regiment of the 2nd SS Panzer Division. Although the Podhale Rifles battalion was able to repel the attack, it expended a substantial amount of its ammunition in doing so. The second attack was devastating to the dwindling armoured forces of the Polish battlegroups. A single German tank, positioned on Point 239 (northeast of Mont Ormel), was able to destroy five Sherman tanks within two minutes. At this time, the 3rd Parachute Division, along with an armoured regiment of the 1st SS Panzer Division, attacked Mont Ormel from inside the Falaise Pocket. This attack was repulsed by Polish artillery, which "massacred" German infantry and armour closing in on their positions.

Around midday the Germans opened up an artillery and mortar barrage that caused casualties among the ridge's defenders, and would last for the entire afternoon. As the assault from the southwest ran out of steam, the 2nd SS Panzer Division resumed its attack on the northeast of the ridge. Since Polish units were now concentrated on the southern edges of the position, the 2nd SS Panzer Division was able to force a path through to the 3rd Parachute Division by noon, opening a corridor out of the pocket. At about the same time, Kampfgruppe Weidinger seized an important road junction northeast of Coudehard. By mid afternoon, several units of the 10th SS, 12th SS, and 116th Panzer Divisions managed to clear a corridor past Point 262N, and upwards 10,000 German troops had escaped out of the pocket. Despite being overwhelmed by strong counterattacks, Polish forces continued to hold the high ground on Mont Ormel, which they referred to as "The Mace" (Maczuga), exacting a deadly toll on passing German forces through the use of well-coordinated artillery fire.

Irritated by the presence of these units, which were exacting a heavy toll on his men, Colonel General Paul Hausser — commanding the Seventh Army — ordered the positions to be "eliminated". At 15:00, substantial forces, including remnants of the 352nd Infantry Division and several battle groups from the 2nd SS Panzer Division, inflicted heavy casualties on the 8th and 9th Infantry Battalions. By 17:00 the attack was at its height and the Poles were contending with German tanks and infantry inside their perimeter. Grenadiers of the 2nd SS Panzer Division very nearly reached the summit of the mace before they were repulsed by the well dug in Polish defenders. The integrity of the position was not restored until 19:00, by which time the Poles had expended almost all their ammunition, leaving themselves in a precarious situation. At about this time a 20-minute ceasefire was arranged to allow the Germans to evacuate a large medical convoy, after which fighting resumed with redoubled intensity.

Earlier in the day, Simonds had ordered his troops to "make every effort" to reach the forces on Hill 262. At a "sacrificial" cost, the surviving remnants of the 9th SS Panzer and 3rd Parachute Divisions had succeeded in preventing the Canadians from intervening. Dangerously low on supplies and unable to evacuate their prisoners or the wounded of both sides—many of whom had received further injuries from the unremitting hail of mortar bombs—by the evening the Poles had hoped to see the Canadian 4th Armoured Division coming to their rescue. However, it became clear that no Allied relief force would reach the ridge that day. Lacking the means to interfere, the exhausted Poles were forced to watch as the remnants of the XLVII Panzer Corps left the pocket. Fighting died down as night fell and was sporadic throughout the hours of darkness; after the brutality of the day's combat, both sides avoided contact. However, frequent Polish artillery strikes continued to harass German forces retreating from the sector and bombard every German unit that entered the evacuation corridor.

20th of August - German counterattacks and breakthrough attempts repelled by Poles

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20 August - St. Lambert-sur-Dives and Hill 117:

On the morning of August 20, at the same time when two German formations, the 2nd and 9th SS-Panzer Divisions, attacked Polish positions on Hill 262, the 16th Infantry and 12th SS Panzer divisions attacked American and Canadian forces from within the pocket, opening small channels through Allied positions. By mid-morning, 2,000 survivors of the German 2nd Fallschirmjäger Korps had managed to breach Canadian positions along the Dives River, as well as at Point 117. At approximately noon, several units of the 10th SS, 12th SS and 116th Panzer Divisions managed to break through these weakened positions.

By mid afternoon, reinforcements from an armoured battlegroup under Major David Vivian Currie managed to reach St. Lambert-sur-Dives, denying two German armies evacuation of the pocket. Over the next 36 hours, the battlegroup repulsed almost continual attacks by German forces, destroying 7 German tanks, 12 88 mm antitank guns and 40 vehicles. In the brutal fighting around Lambert-sur-Dives, Currie's battlegroup was able to inflict nearly 2,000 casualties on attacking German forces, including 300 killed and 1,100 captured. By the evening of August 20, the Germans had exhausted their attack against St. Lambert-sur-Dives; the surviving members of the 84th Korps, commanded by General Elfeld, surrendered to Canadian and American forces near Chambois. For his actions at St. Lambert-sur-Dives, Major Currie was awarded the Victoria Cross, the only Canadian so honoured for service in the Normandy Campaign.

21 August:

After the brutality of the combat that had occurred during the day, night was welcomed by both German and Polish forces surrounding Mont Ormel. Fighting was sporadic, as both sides avoided contact with one another. Frequent Polish artillery barrages interrupted German attempts to retreat from the sector.

In the morning, despite poor flying weather, an effort was made to air-drop ammunition to Stefanowicz's men. Learning that the Canadians had resumed their push to reach the ridge and were making for Point 239, at 07:00 a platoon of the 1st Armoured Regiment's 3rd Squadron reconnoitred the German positions below the Zameczek.

Further German attacks were launched during the morning, both from inside the pocket along the Chambois–Vimoutiers road, and from the east. Raids from the direction of Coudehard managed to penetrate the Polish defences on Mont Ormel on and take captives. As the remaining Polish forces repelled the assault, their tanks were forced to use the last of their ammunition. The final German effort was launched at around 11:00 by SS remnants who had infiltrated through the wooded hills to the rear of the 1st Armoured Regiment's dressing station. This "suicidal" assault was defeated at point-blank range by the 9th Infantry Battalion, with the 1st Armoured's tanks using their anti-aircraft machine guns in support. The machine guns' tracer set fire to the grass amongst the German troops, killing wounded men on the slope. As the final infantry assaults melted away, the German artillery and mortar fire targeting the hill finally subsided as well. There would be no further attacks; the two battlegroups of the Polish 1st Armoured Division had survived the onslaught, despite being surrounded by German forces for three days. At 12:00 a Polish forward patrol encountered the Canadian vanguard around 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) north of Point 262N, near Point 239. The Canadian Grenadier Guards reached the ridge just over an hour later, having fought for more than five hours and accounted for two Panthers, a Panzer IV, and two self-propelled guns along their route. By 14:00, with the arrival of the first supply convoy, the position was relieved.

The Falaise pocket was finally considered closed by evening of 21 August. Tanks of the Canadian 4th Armoured Division had linked up with the Polish forces in Coudehard, and the Canadian 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions had fully secured St. Lambert and the northern passage to Chambois.

Aftermath:

Both Reynolds and McGilvray place the Polish losses on the Hill 262 at 351 killed and wounded and 11 tanks lost. McGilvray estimates the German losses in their assaults on the ridge as around 500 dead with a further 1,000 taken prisoner and many hundreds wounded, most of these from the 12th SS Panzer Division. He also records "scores" of Tiger, Panther and Panzer IV tanks destroyed, as well as a significant quantity of artillery pieces. Within an hour, The Canadian Grenadier Guards managed to link up with what remained of Stefanowicz's men. By late afternoon the remainder of the 2nd and 9th SS Panzer Divisions had begun their retreat to the Seine River. The Falaise Gap had been permanently closed, with a large number of German forces still trapped in the pocket.

According to military historian Gregor Dallas: "The Poles had closed the Falaise Pocket. The Poles had opened the gate to Paris." Simonds stated that he had "never seen such wholesale havoc in his life", and Canadian engineers erected a sign on Mont Ormel's summit reading simply "A Polish Battlefield".

In 1965 on the battle's 20th anniversary, a monument to the Polish, Canadian, American and French units that took part in the battle was erected on Hill 262. Marking the occasion, former President Dwight D. Eisenhower commented that "no other battlefield presented such a horrible sight of death, hell, and total destruction." The Mémorial de Coudehard–Montormel museum was constructed on the same site on the battle's 50th anniversary in 1994.

Due to the rapidity of successive offensives during early August, exact Canadian casualties for Operation Tractable are unknown. However, figures for the combined losses during Totalize and Tractable are put at 5,500 Canadian casualties.

Exact German casualty figures during Operation Tractable are also uncertain. Although semi-reliable figures can be found for total casualties within the Falaise Pocket, no statistics are available for how many of these were taken as a result of Canadian operations during Tractable. In the aftermath of the Falaise Pocket, the German 7th Army was effectively annihilated, losing anywhere from 50,000–200,000 men in the pocket, as well as over 200 tanks, 1,000 guns, and 5,000 other vehicles. In the fighting around Hill 262 alone, German casualties totaled 2,000 killed, 5,000 taken prisoner, in addition to 55 tanks, 44 guns and 152 armoured vehicles.

By contrast, Polish casualty figures for Operation Tractable (until 22 August) are known. The Poles reported a total of 1,441 casualties during the operation. Of these, 325 were killed (including 21 officers), 1,002 were wounded (35 officers), and 114 missing. This includes 263 men lost before the Chambois and Ormel actions on August 14–18. Of the Polish losses, 50 were killed (and many dozens wounded) by American bombs during the second American bombing on 14 August.

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If it comes to the fact that some Germans were still able to retreat from the pocket, despite all efforts:

August 19th, the 4th Canadian armoured detached a column made up of South Alberta Regiment and Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders under the command of major D.V. Currie, in direction of Saint Lambert sur Dives. During three days, this group would repel the massive attacks of the Germans seeking to leave the pocket, and will take hundreds of prisoners. During Currie’s struggle for Saint Lambert, main Canadian forces were driving towards Polish positions on hill 262, but were stopped on hill 240 by negligible German opposition. It failed to deliver its attack before the morning of August 21st, which obliged the Poles to fight isolated, and made it possible for thousands of Germans to escape from the Falaise pocket. This controversial performance resulted in Kitching, commander of the Canadian division, being dismissed from his command.

From:

http://www.memorial-montormel.org/?id=71

I have an impression that Polish participation in the battle of Falaise is not given enough recognition.

For example Tucker-Jones in his "Falaise: The Flawed Victory" only MENTIONS the Polish division, while there should be at least one entire chapter devoted to operations of the Polish armoured division.

[Michael Kenny]

Anyone using A Tucker-Jones to prove a point must be desperate.

Here are the wartime casualties for the 'standing around doing nothing' 11th Armoured Division compared to the Polish losses.

Total 11th AD KIA 1944-45 1816

Polish AD KIA 1944-45 1400

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Total 11th AD KIA 1944-45 4394

I don't know where did you get this number of KIA but it is over 2 times too high.

British 11th Armoured Division lost some 1820 killed in 1944 and 1945.

Polish AD KIA 1944-45 1400

Losses in KIA were a bit smaller than 1400.

One Polish secondary source says (casualties 1944 - 1945):

1074 killed, 20 missing, 3201 wounded,

And another Polish secondary source (casualties 1944 - 1945):

1014 killed, 305 missing, 3595 wounded.