Why didn't the Allies build their own 'tiger'?

[WEISWEILER]

Due to the repeated design and production delays, initially only 20 Pershing tanks were introduced into the European theater of operations - after the Battle of the Bulge(thus in 1945). The Ardennes showed the serious mismatch between Allied and German armor. The 105 mm Shermans hadn't solved the problem. As said here above, Pershing is valid but can't be considered as a swift answer to the Tiger (used from late summer 1942 in Russia and early 1943 in N-Africa).

You have a point about the airforce though. Analysis of destroyed tanks after the Normandy battle showed a "hit-rate" for the air-fired rockets of only 4%.[37] In Operation Goodwood (18 to 21 July), the 2nd Tactical Air Force claimed 257 tanks destroyed. A total of 222 were claimed by Typhoon pilots using rocket projectiles. Once the area was secured, the British "Operational Research Section 2" analysts could confirm only ten out of the 456 knocked out German AFVs found in the area were attributable to Typhoons using rocket projectiles.

Then again we should be able to see the overall kill number air to ground, because there were alot of aircraft out there... Or do you have this?

[Richard Anderson]

Due to the repeated design and production delays, initially only 20 Pershing tanks were introduced into the European theater of operations - after the Battle of the Bulge(thus in 1945).

There were design and production delays, but from inception of the initial T20-series program to initial production acceptance was 25 May 1942 to initial production acceptance in November 1944 was two and a half years. That could be compared to the four years of the Tiger I or the Panzer III.

The Ardennes showed the serious mismatch between Allied and German armor.

It did? It seems to me it was becoming evident about five months earlier in June.

The 105 mm Shermans hadn't solved the problem.

It wasn't intended to solve "the problem". The 105mm Howitzer-armed medium tank was an armament planned in OCM 17202 of 11 September 1941, rather a bit before a "problem" was identified. I tried to get clarity from you regarding your statement that 105mm howitzer-armed tanks "Didn't have the same protection and were slower"? I'm not sure where you're going now?

As said here above, Pershing is valid but can't be considered as a swift answer to the Tiger (used from late summer 1942 in Russia and early 1943 in N-Africa).

It is? "Pershing", i.e. Medium Tank T26E3 and later Heavy Tank M26 was not an American "Tiger" and was never meant to be an "answer" swift or slow to the Tiger.

You have a point about the airforce though. Analysis of destroyed tanks after the Normandy battle showed a "hit-rate" for the air-fired rockets of only 4%.[37] In Operation Goodwood (18 to 21 July), the 2nd Tactical Air Force claimed 257 tanks destroyed. A total of 222 were claimed by Typhoon pilots using rocket projectiles. Once the area was secured, the British "Operational Research Section 2" analysts could confirm only ten out of the 456 knocked out German AFVs found in the area were attributable to Typhoons using rocket projectiles.

Indeed, 4% is not "many".

Then again we should be able to see the overall kill number air to ground, because there were alot of aircraft out there... Or do you have this?

The "overall kill number" of what? Do I have what? The sortie numbers?

[Michael Kenny]

See here the puny Sherman. 8 penetrations prove what a weak tank it was. How could it be penetrated so easily?

See here the mighty Tiger. It is so powerful it needed 6 hits to destroy it. Can you imagine any other tank needing that many hits to knock it out. What other tank would need that many hits to knock it out?

[Ulater]

Indeed, Tiger was a mighty tank.

[critical mass]

Keep in mind that most TIGERs were in the british sector of the front at Nromandy.
The brits -unlike the US Army- removed the HE filler from their AP ammunition. This might, as I would expect, cause a higher number of "penetrations" needed to visibly disable /knock out the tank due to the reduced post penetration effect of plain solid AP-shot.

[critical mass]

See here the puny Sherman. 8 penetrations prove what a weak tank it was. How could it be penetrated so easily?

Sherman graveyard, Bray (2)c.jpg


See here the mighty Tiger. It is so powerful it needed 6 hits to destroy it. Can you imagine any other tank needing that many hits to knock it out. What other tank would need that many hits to knock it out?

SS 102 223 7 hits Tiger-horzer.jpg

I count eight through holes in the M4 but only three in the TIGER.

[Michael Kenny]

I count eight through holes in the M4 but only three in the TIGER.

I count 6 in the Tiger . Note also the crack in the armour/weld at the turret base.
It was knocked out on Hill 112 on Aug 3rd 1944. It is one of those mythical Tigers that get knocked out in battle and get towed away to sit in a repair dump until the Allies capture it and suddenly it is no longer a 'combat loss' but listed as 'abandoned'.

Glad to see my 'dead cat' post has garnered the response I was expecting.

[MarkF617]

The answer from the British point of view is simple, they didn't want one. They experimented with the Black Prince but despite heavy armour the late war German high velocity guns still went straight through the armour. IIRC the priority for late war cruisers had armour only forth in order of prilrity. British tankers may have wanted more armour but the generals wanted tanks that were mobile, didn't break down and carried big guns. When given an option of additional welded on sloped armour for the Comet the generals commanding the british armoured divisions in NW Europe all turned it down as they would lose the bow gun for minimal extra protection. ( I think this was for Comet but it could be for Cromwell. I will have to look it up later).

Tigers were always available in small numbers so 1 Firefly per troop of 4 was considered plenty. It was the advent of large numbers of Panthers that made the British switch to 2 Fireflies per troop. Once a decent high explosive shell was developed, Monty wanted all of his tanks to be Fireflies, he never wanted Churchills and believed the Sherman could be used as a universal tank and perform all tasks. Again a senior British officer who didn't want more armour, just a big gun.

Thanks

Mark.

[yantaylor]

Are we talking about just the Tiger I here?
If it was so good then why did the German's jack in production after only 1350 [give or take a few] and start building Tiger IIs instead.

If Germany was only fighting against the western allies then the Panther could have sufficed as an all round battle tank without the need for any Tigers.
It was against the Soviets with their JS series that the need for a heavy tank was paramount.

Yan.

[Christian Ankerstjerne]

Apart from the fact that probably the claims were overrated by the crews, if you compare the ratio’s of the Tiger with the other German vehicles, it seems pretty clear the Tiger wasn’t a piece of crap. And that the myth is rooted in facts, not in lies or what else.

Unit Vehicle Dates Claimed kills Losses Claimed ratio
Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503 45 Tigers Jul 5– Aug 17 385 7 55:1
13. Kompanie/SS-Panzer-Regiment 1 13 Tigers Jul 5– Aug 14 150 2 75:1
Schwere Panzerjäger-Regiment 656 89 Ferdinants Jul 5– Aug 27 502 39 12.9:1
Panzer-Regiment 39 200 Panthers Jul 5– Aug 17 263 58 4.5:1
Total 1200 106 12.3:1



Source: https://panzerworld.com/german-tank-kill-claims

I don't think you read the article. As I go on to show, those ratios are complete fantasies.

[WEISWEILER]

@ Christian, the loss rates aren't fantasy because they couldn't be tricked by crews... I'm open to every argument though. But look at the following:

I found something entirely different as reason. If we agree that the T26 was a worthy counterpart of the Tiger, and we ask why he wasn't deployed earlier, here's something to consider. An article that says it was (strongly) delayed cause of a discussion inside the army. There was opposition against the concept of a heavy tank for practical reasons. I don't know much about the source but it's an interesting view to elaborate I think.



"With the emergence of the new German Panther and Tiger tanks, efforts began within the Ordnance Department to develop a heavier tank to compete with them. This resulted in the T25 and T26 series which built upon the earlier T23.


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Devised in 1943, the T26 saw the addition of a 90 mm gun and substantially heavier armor. Though these greatly increased the tank's weight, the engine was not upgraded and the vehicle proved underpowered. Despite this, the Ordnance Department was pleased with the new tank worked to move it towards production.

The first production model, T26E3, possessed a cast turret mounting a 90 mm gun and required a crew of four. Powered by the Ford GAF V-8, it utilized a torsion bar suspension and torqmatic transmission. Construction of the hull consisted of a combination of castings and rolled plate. Entering service, the tank was designated M26 Pershing heavy tank. The name was selected to honor General John J. Pershing who had founded the US Army's Tank Corps during World War I.

Production Delays:

As design of the M26 came to completion, its production was delayed by an ongoing debate in the US Army regarding the need for a heavy tank. While Lieutenant General Jacob Devers, the head of US Army forces in Europe advocated for the new tank, he was opposed by Lieutenant General Lesley McNair, commander Army Ground Forces. This was further complicated by Armored Command's desire to press on the M4 and concerns that a heavy tank would not be able to use the Army Corps of Engineers' bridges.

Supported General George Marshall, the project remained alive and production moved forward in November 1944.

While some claim that Lieutenant General George S. Patton played a key role in delaying the M26, these assertions are not well supported. Ten M26s were built in November 1943, with production escalating at the Fisher Tank Arsenal. Production also commenced at the Detroit Tank Arsenal in March 1945. By the end of 1945, over 2,000 M26s had been built. In January 1945, experiments began on the "Super Pershing" which mounted the improved T15E1 90mm gun. This variant was only produced in small numbers. Another variant was the M45 close support vehicle which mounted a 105 mm howitzer."

Source: https://www.thoughtco.com/world-war-ii- ... ng-2361329

[Christian Ankerstjerne]

@ Christian, the loss rates aren't fantasy because they couldn't be tricked by crews... I'm open to every argument though. But look at the following:

The number of destroyed tanks could be, and demonstrably were, heavily inflated. That is what makes such ratios complete fantasies.

[MarkF617]

Aaaaaagh lost my post.

No time to re-type so short version:

McNair had nothing to do with any delays in M26 getting into service.
Development time for M26 was similar to other tanks.
M26 and British Centurion were intended to be used more like Panthers not Tigers.

Thanks

Mark.

[critical mass]

I count eight through holes in the M4 but only three in the TIGER.

I count 6 in the Tiger . Note also the crack in the armour/weld at the turret base.

Three of the six turret side hits are dents, and therefore incomplete penetrations.

[critical mass]

Are we talking about just the Tiger I here?
If it was so good then why did the German's jack in production after only 1350 [give or take a few] and start building Tiger IIs instead.

If Germany was only fighting against the western allies then the Panther could have sufficed as an all round battle tank without the need for any Tigers.
It was against the Soviets with their JS series that the need for a heavy tank was paramount.

Yan.

When the TIGER appeared on the battlefield during 1942 and 1943, it was highly resistent to the most commonly employed enemy anti tank guns (2pdr, 75mm, 76mm F34, 45mm, 6pdr) over a wide range of distances and obliquities. This gave it a tactical edge in the offensive breakthrough role conceived as the main purpose for a heavy tank, which had to negotiate heavy anti tank belts to open a path for more mobile forces.
During 1944, it lost it´s key advantages in this field due to the ongoing upgunning efforts in anti tank guns (76mm HVAP, 17pdr, 85mm, 100mm and 122mm guns).

Had the allies felt the need to make their aequivalent, it would need to conform to the breakthrough idea and provide a high degree of resistence vs commonly employed german anti tank guns (75mm PAK40/ 88mm FLAK18 in 1942/43 but 75mm L/70 and 88mm PAK43 in 1944/1945), the level of armor required for such an AFV would be prohibitively high and might cause poor compromises.