US Tank crew casualties.............

[Michael Kenny]

Found this hidden away on the internet. Some interesting revelations.

https://np.reddit.com/r/ShitWehraboosSa ... lty_rates/

There is a follow-up here:

https://www.reddit.com/r/ShitWehraboosS ... lty_rates/

There is a very high 'noise to signal' ratio but you can work out which posts are the important ones.

In a nutshell for those confused by the tables:

''the Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II Final Report, 7 December 1941-31 December 1946 (Statistical and Accounting Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, 1 June 1953) actually has a major flaw in it which makes it sort of unreliable to use as a final metric or bodycount.

Apparently a significant portion of tank crewmen assigned to the Armored Force actually served in the Infantry branch and their casualties were counted up as part of the Infantry, not the Armored Corps.''

Don't know enough to give a reasoned critique but I have to say I always thought the figures he disputes always seemed too low to me. The revised totals given do not (to me) change the reality-that tank crew casualties were far lower than the 'Sherman was a death trap' fan-club want us to believe.

[Richard Anderson]

That is actually mostly incorrect. The NCO and EM assigned to the Armored Force tank units after it was organized in June 1940 were Armored Force. Officers retained their original commission branch though, since Armored was not an official branch. There is evidence that some of the EM replacements assigned to tank units in the ETO during the replacement crisis in 1944/1945 we're not Armored, but that is it. Btw, in combat about one of every four tanks in a company could have an officer in it.

Sorry, further details.

At least 9,329 EM that formed the initial Armored Force units in June-July 1940 (I Armored Corps, 1st AD, 2d AD, 70th Tk Bn) WERE drawn from existing Cavalry "Combat Car" and Infantry Tank regiments (basically the 7th Cavalry Brigade, Provisional and the Provisional Tank Brigade). Another roughly 2,000 were National Guardsmen called to federal service in 1940-1941, who were also enlisted Infantry Branch. Insofar as I know, those roughly 11,000-12,000 men retained their original enlisted branch. It was not until the Armored Force Replacement Training Center was established 1 October 1940 that EM (usually Selective Service draftees, there were few volunteers prior to Pearl Harbor) were assigned to the Armored Force as their initial service branch (even though it was not an official Regular Army branch). However, since there was no formal "Armored Branch" they were enlisted as "Branch Immaterial" or as "Branch Not-Specified" in their enlistment records, so it is difficult to pin down just how many EM eventually were counted as Armored.

The situation is further complicated in that while the Armored Force Replacement Training Center graduated 168,228 soldiers, the Armored RTC instruction initially included Armored, Armored Reconnaissance, Armored Infantry, Armored Field Artillery, Armored Engineer, and so on...all aspects of being part of an Armored Division. It was not until 9 June 1941 that basic training of quartermaster, signal, medical, ordnance and engineer
components was assigned to the RTC of those Branches. Complicating things even more, while many of the Armored RTC graduates were used to fill out the mobilizing divisions and battalions of the Armored Force in CONUS, not all such men sent to theaters of war were used as replacements in tank units. The last complication is that the 9th AD was formed essentially by the reflagging of the 2d Cavalry Division, so many of its Tank Battalion EM personnel as well as officers, were originally Cavalry and probably retained that Branch designation. That involved probably on the order of 7,000-8,000 EM.

[Ulater]

Also, The Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II Final Report, 7 December 1941-31 December 1946, atleast in the form it is published on https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/re ... index.html, appears to have recorded 0 officer casualties in Armored force, If I am reading it correctly.

Also, it is not as if Shermans were used just by US.

[Richard Anderson]

Also, The Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II Final Report, 7 December 1941-31 December 1946, atleast in the form it is published on https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/re ... index.html, appears to have recorded 0 officer casualties in Armored force, If I am reading it correctly.

To repeat, there were NO U.S. Army Armored Force officers in World War II. According to U.S. federal law, an Army officer is commissioned in one of the recognized Branches. In World War II, "Armored" was not a recognized Branch. ALL U.S. Army Armored Force officers in World War II were commissioned in another, recognized, Branch. For example, Bruce Clarke was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers. Adna Chaffee was commissioned in the Cavalry. Jake Devers was Field Artillery. And so on.

Also, it is not as if Shermans were used just by US.

I am not sure that has anything to do with the point.

Anyway, a more accurate method - maybe - of looking at it is by totaling the number of tanks "lost" (i.e., written off in combat) and multiplying it times the known percentage of crew casualties. In the ETOUSA that works out to be 4,567 medium tanks and 1,507 light tanks...give or take. The casualty rate was 50.8% in medium tanks and 65.1% for light tanks. So that works out to 3,301 crew casualties.

If we look at the Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II Final Report, 7 December 1941-31 December 1946 (Statistical and Accounting Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, 1 June 1953) we find the total "Armored Force" EM casualties were 5,778...so 2,400 casualties for the tanks hit and damaged in combat, but not written off.

Works for me.

[Michael Kenny]

Also, it is not as if Shermans were used just by US.

And this is significant because................?

[Ulater]

Also, The Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II Final Report, 7 December 1941-31 December 1946, atleast in the form it is published on https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/re ... index.html, appears to have recorded 0 officer casualties in Armored force, If I am reading it correctly.

To repeat, there were NO U.S. Army Armored Force officers in World War II. According to U.S. federal law, an Army officer is commissioned in one of the recognized Branches. In World War II, "Armored" was not a recognized Branch. ALL U.S. Army Armored Force officers in World War II were commissioned in another, recognized, Branch. For example, Bruce Clarke was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers. Adna Chaffee was commissioned in the Cavalry. Jake Devers was Field Artillery. And so on.

Also, it is not as if Shermans were used just by US.

I am not sure that has anything to do with the point.

Anyway, a more accurate method - maybe - of looking at it is by totaling the number of tanks "lost" (i.e., written off in combat) and multiplying it times the known percentage of crew casualties. In the ETOUSA that works out to be 4,567 medium tanks and 1,507 light tanks...give or take. The casualty rate was 50.8% in medium tanks and 65.1% for light tanks. So that works out to 3,301 crew casualties.

If we look at the Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II Final Report, 7 December 1941-31 December 1946 (Statistical and Accounting Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, 1 June 1953) we find the total "Armored Force" EM casualties were 5,778...so 2,400 casualties for the tanks hit and damaged in combat, but not written off.

Works for me.

Ah, sorry. It is just confusing that they included a category they do not recognise.

Im sure that ignoring half of the information you based your conclusion on is going to impact the conclusion.

[Stiltzkin]

I am not sure that has anything to do with the point.

->

change the reality-that tank crew casualties were far lower than the 'Sherman was a death trap' fan-club want us to believe.

If it is about the Sherman then it does, but I never saw them as being abnormal, contrary to the overglorifying stories and threads found on the internet on Soviet armour (considering the immense losses, I am surprised that this view still continues to spread), so it was always political. Did the utilization of LL Shermans differ substantially from their employment in the MTO and ETO? I doubt it.

My theory is that "the Sherman was a death trap" belief might have manifested itself as a consequence of cold war propaganda and reinforced by post war stories of former Wehrmacht personnel. Communist propaganda aimed to degrade Western systems in all possible ways, we can observe this phenomenon e.g., in the Vietnam conflict, debates on equipment, battle rifles, AR-15 and Ak-47s. What many people do not realize is that even in the academic field, scholars might be financed by various parties to enforce a view. If dictatorhips want to discredit american methods and equipment, they are not going to do so by publishing their own analysis, rather they will finance western scholars to attack from within, which is then subsequently picked up by commoners.

[Richard Anderson]

Ah, sorry. It is just confusing that they included a category they do not recognise.

It must have been confusing if you had to be told it again after reading my post where I explicitly said it was the case.

Im sure that ignoring half of the information you based your conclusion on is going to impact the conclusion.

What "half of the information" am I ignoring? How do you think it "impact[s] the conclusion" that the figures in Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II Final Report, 7 December 1941-31 December 1946 (Statistical and Accounting Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, 1 June 1953) does not actually have a "major flaw in it", but simply states facts. That you and others have difficulty digesting that simple fact is not my problem.

Or do you think the conclusion it impacts is that the personnel casualty rate was 50.8% in medium tanks and 65.1% for light tanks "knocked out" in Coox and Naisawald's study? If so, then that is not my conclusion, it is their's, so arguing that I ignored something in drawing that conclusion is bizarre.

[Ulater]

Ah, sorry. It is just confusing that they included a category they do not recognise.

It must have been confusing if you had to be told it again after reading my post where I explicitly said it was the case.

Im sure that ignoring half of the information you based your conclusion on is going to impact the conclusion.

What "half of the information" am I ignoring? How do you think it "impact[s] the conclusion" that the figures in Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II Final Report, 7 December 1941-31 December 1946 (Statistical and Accounting Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, 1 June 1953) does not actually have a "major flaw in it", but simply states facts. That you and others have difficulty digesting that simple fact is not my problem.

Or do you think the conclusion it impacts is that the personnel casualty rate was 50.8% in medium tanks and 65.1% for light tanks "knocked out" in Coox and Naisawald's study? If so, then that is not my conclusion, it is their's, so arguing that I ignored something in drawing that conclusion is bizarre.

Yes, retaining an unrecognised officer type in their documents is confusing.

"Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II Final Report, 7 December 1941-31 December 1946 (Statistical and Accounting Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, 1 June 1953)" IS half the information, for ETO, in this case, unless of course I am gravely mistaken and it contains the armored branch losses of British army.

I have absolutely no problem digesting anything, but go ahead, Im used to strawmen on this forum.

[Richard Anderson]

Yes, retaining an unrecognised officer type in their documents is confusing.

I'm sorry, you must remain confused, since they did not "retain" anything of the sort? What "unrecognized officer type" are you referring to that you think is found in Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II?

"Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II Final Report, 7 December 1941-31 December 1946 (Statistical and Accounting Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, 1 June 1953)" IS half the information, for ETO, in this case, unless of course I am gravely mistaken and it contains the armored branch losses of British army.

What part of "it is a report on the losses of the U.S. Army" confuses you? Why ever should it contain losses for any branches of the British Army?

I have absolutely no problem digesting anything, but go ahead, Im used to strawmen on this forum.

It is a strawman argument to point out to you that a report of American Army losses does not contain information on British Army losses? Seriously? I am beginning to think that it is rather a case of trolling on your part.