Tankers Without Tanks

[Michael Kenny]

As for Normandy June 1944, the frontline was very condensed and short. German armor strengths remained decently high. I haven't read of any occurrence of using tankers as infantry there.

German strengths 'decently high'? An absurd statement. By mid July 12th SS was reduced to 50% of its tank establishment as was 21st PD. Lehr was down to around 33%. Vehicle losses were substantial. A check on all the other tank Units will reveal similar situations. Despite this I know of no organised infantry Unit formed from unhorsed Panzer crews.

I have seen photos of them as infantry.................

I suppose the large number of tankers walking back home after they abandon their mounts could technically be called 'infantry'.

Tiger crew from sPzAbt 503 walking away from their derelict Tiger II. From 45 Tiger en Normandie, Didier Lodieu 2002 pgs 176-177

[Michael Kenny]

According to Jentz, Panzertruppen 1 p. 221 it was a norm during the winter 41/42 to use tankless tankmen as infantry. "...Instead of pulling out and being refurbished, the Panzer-Divisins remained in the front lines and the crews without Panzers were employed as infantry..."

I have no doubt a Division not expecting replacement tanks would use the crews for other tasks but that is not what was claimed:

Panzer crews were constantly used as infantry in the war to supplement the weak infantry strengths...............

This is a ubiquitous occurrence in german panzer division unit histories....especially in the winter of 41-42, 42-43, and 43-45 in the Eastern front..............

[Juha]

Hello Michael
it seems to have been a norm amongst the 19 PzDivs on the Eastern Front during the winter 1941/42 just because the front was collapsing, decisive lack of infantry and little hope of substantial number of replacement tanks. It was 80s when I went through numerous PzD histories and I cannot recall for sure what happened during the winter of 42-43.

[Michael Kenny]

Hello Michael
it seems to have been a norm amongst the 19 PzDivs on the Eastern Front during the winter 1941/42 just because the front was collapsing, decisive lack of infantry and little hope of substantial number of replacement tanks. It was 80s when I went through numerous PzD histories and I cannot recall for sure what happened during the winter of 42-43.

The Jentz text:

To get the context of how dire the situation was for the Germans see page 209.
It notes that as of Dec 22 1941 the Germans had 1,185 tanks in 16 Panzer Divisions but only 405 were operational. Losses to that date were a staggering 2,735 tanks. To say the Panzer Arm had been gutted would be an understatement. c. 70% of the panzers had been destroyed and only 11% of the start number were operational 5 months later. By all measures the winter of 41-42 was the absolute nadir for the panzers. Having that many idle panzer crew with no replacement tanks was exceptional.

[Juha]

Yes I know, but situation wasn't substantially better during the winter 42-43, Feb 1943 981 operational and Mar 43 902 operational panzers. Jentz Panzertruppen 2 p. 43. And May 1944 c. 1,100 operational StuGs & Panzers with Panzertruppen, 148 being StuGs. Same p. 205. In 1943 the lowest point has been 30 Sept. 605 operational tanks (p. 110).

[Richard Anderson]

The US Army was different in that if your disabled tank took too many days to fix, you lost it. That means you had to go to the repairs yard and pick one that was available. US Tankers were picky about what Sherman they liked. Some liked one gun or another, many liked the Ford V8, some liked cast armor, etc. The Germans did not have this 'surplus' of repaired spares, or replacements.

Sort of, but not exactly. Vehicles were classed as operational or operational in less than 6 hours, non-operational, but repairable in less than 24 hours, and non-operational and not repairable in less than 24 hours. Typically, the first two represented repairs that could be done by unit 1st, 2d, and 3d echelon maintenance at the division/battalion. The third were usually evacuated as battle damage or as a major repair to a Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank) from the division by an Ordnance Evacuation Company.

Replacement tanks were allocated from resources - replacements or repairs - by the army/army group and were transported by the Ordnance Evac Company back to the division where it was issued to a crew. The crew had no real say in the matter, especially given the perilous state of tank reserves in the ETOUSA from July 1944 to early 1945 (although the situation eased by March 1945 it was always a problem).

Newly deployed units, like the 9th, 10th, and 11th AD in November and December 1944 were a little different since they were issued tanks from ETOUSA depots shipped in quantities specifically for them. Uniquely, the 9th ID was issued all 76mm-armed tanks as its "gun tank", while the 10th and 11th were issued about two-thirds 75mm and one-third 76mm armed tanks.

About the only case I can think of where the crews got to "pick and choose" was George Rubel's 740th Tank Battalion, which First Army threw into action to stem the advance of Kampfgruppe Pieper on 19 December 1944. About 11 November, the battalion, which was a CDL battalion authorized to reorganize as a standard tank battalion, drew nine Medium Tank M4 with 75mm and two with 105mm from the scant First Army reserve. Later it also drew two Light Tanks M5 and another M4 75mm. However, on 16 December, First Army ordered the battalion to turn all the 75mm-armed M4 over to the 745th Tank Battalion. Two days later, First Army ordered the battalion to the front after drawing all available vehicles from a British ordnance depot at Sprimont, Belgium. That turned out to be an odd assortment of tanks and gun motor carriages in various states of disrepair; the battalion was only able to get fifteen of twenty-five vehicles operational.

[Michael Kenny]

Yes I know, but situation wasn't substantially better during the winter 42-43, Feb 1943 981 operational and Mar 43 902 operational panzers.

The key difference is that the later years Panzer Divisions were allowed to retire and rebuild-as they did in France in 42-44. Winter of 1941 it was so desperate Panzer Division manned the trenches with the infantry.
Side issue anyway because there was no mass conversion of Panzer crews to infantry. In extremis yes, as a ubiquitous occurrence or constantly no.

[Yoozername]

About the only case I can think of where the crews got to "pick and choose" was George Rubel's 740th Tank Battalion, which First Army threw into action to stem the advance of Kampfgruppe Pieper on 19 December 1944. About 11 November, the battalion, which was a CDL battalion authorized to reorganize as a standard tank battalion, drew nine Medium Tank M4 with 75mm and two with 105mm from the scant First Army reserve. Later it also drew two Light Tanks M5 and another M4 75mm. However, on 16 December, First Army ordered the battalion to turn all the 75mm-armed M4 over to the 745th Tank Battalion. Two days later, First Army ordered the battalion to the front after drawing all available vehicles from a British ordnance depot at Sprimont, Belgium. That turned out to be an odd assortment of tanks and gun motor carriages in various states of disrepair; the battalion was only able to get fifteen of twenty-five vehicles operational.

I never said they could 'pick or choose', I just said they had preferences. Typically an officer was sent (I believe Belton Cooper comes to mind), and the tanks would come back in convoy. And I would wager the repair people also liked to work on one model or another. But maybe it's like a box of chocolates?

But, let me make this clear...since you said as much in another thread...Don't say you are being 'sucked into something'. I did notice you did not bother to 'contribute' to the thread I started regarding what Germans considered destroyed tanks. I will let that go.

That being said in this thread, and people that I have blocked are populating it; I will bow out since the point has been made, and it isn't worth pursuing (IMO).

edit: There is an irony in the Preface in Belton Cooper's book...they actually had more tanks than trained crews at a certain point....what they (raw crews pressed into service) had as a preference, I don't know!

https://www.amazon.com/Death-Traps-Surv ... 0891418148

[Richard Anderson]

I never said they could 'pick or choose', I just said they had preferences.

Sorry, yes, you actually said "you had to go to the repairs yard and pick one that was available. US Tankers were picky about what Sherman they liked." That is not true.

Typically an officer was sent (I believe Belton Cooper comes to mind), and the tanks would come back in convoy. And I would wager the repair people also liked to work on one model or another.

Belton worked at the 3d AD Ordnance Maintenance Battalion, repairing tanks at the division-level. They also received replacement tanks, either new or repaired and prepared them for issue to the division. The crews did not "pick one", they were issued one. The division did not "pick one", they were issued one. That makes it difficult to be "picky" about it.

OTOH, both the ETOUSA AFV&W Section and the 12th Army Group Armored Section tried to issue tanks in a orderly fashion to make maintenance easier, but they still had to deal with most of the initial issue consisting of M4 and M4A1, followed in the fall of 1944 by shipments of M4A3, and emergency transfers of M4A2 and - oh the horror! - M4A4 to American units in early 1945 to make up the shortfalls of the Ardennes and Nordwind.

Yes, early on there were preferences in equipment expressed, which resulted in delays issuing the 76mm-armed M4 until after D-Day. Yes, the 4th AD did not initially want the 76mm and were not unique. In the end though, beggars can't be choosers, so they pretty much got what they were sent.

But maybe it's like a box of chocolates?

Thank you Forrest.

But, let me make this clear...since you said as much in another thread...Don't say you are being 'sucked into something'. I did notice you did not bother to 'contribute' to the thread I started regarding what Germans considered destroyed tanks. I will let that go.

Sorry, what thread was that? Since I have no idea what you're talking about I'm quite okay with you letting it go.

That being said in this thread, and people that I have blocked are populating it; I will bow out since the point has been made, and it isn't worth pursuing (IMO).

Sorry again, but what point was that?

edit: There is an irony in the Preface in Belton Cooper's book...they actually had more tanks than trained crews at a certain point....what they (raw crews pressed into service) had as a preference, I don't know!

It is ironic, but the true irony is in why there were shortages of trained crews...they were diverted to be truck drivers or armored infantry. The problem was the Armored Force/Command/Center lost control of their replacements once they left CONUS. Since armored replacements received extensive training as vehicle drivers, many were utilized as truck drivers when they arrived in theater and were never assigned to an Armored Division or Tank Battalion. Perhaps worse, when General Gillem conducted an inspection of Armored units in North Africa, he discovered that all 1,435 Armored Force enlisted men replacements in theater were planned as armored infantry replacements, even though none had received any infantry training. The mismatch got so bad that by early 1945, just as the tank shortage eased, the crew shortage really began having an effect. That is why John P. Irwin, among others, got stuck into tanks with minimal training.

[Yoozername]

The US Army was different in that if your disabled tank took too many days to fix, you lost it. That means you had to go to the repairs yard and pick one that was available. US Tankers were picky about what Sherman they liked. Some liked one gun or another, many liked the Ford V8, some liked cast armor, etc. The Germans did not have this 'surplus' of repaired spares, or replacements.

The German system of mixing new recruits and tank-less tankers in the casual company, and having them do training, etc., must have had a good effect. The vets could check out the newbies and think about using them to replace a lost crewmen. The new guys could get some experience and knowledge and ease their introduction into the regiment.

This is what I said. You confused what I said. Can't help that.

Sorry again, but what point was that? Sorry, what thread was that? Since I have no idea what you're talking about I'm quite okay with you letting it go.

The point is that you, specifically, are not worth having a discussion with. You showed your stripes in the other thread, demanded me to back up a point, caused a thread to be obliterated with censorship, and then didn't have the face to man up when I did in another thread. So, that's the point. But, again, this isn't worth it. But it is worth it to point out your lack of real character.

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[Michael Kenny]

I'm quite okay with you letting it go.

Do not bite.

[Yoozername]

Since it has been brought up in this thread regarding providing information regarding backing up posts people make, I will say that I support it. Making a across the board statement especially regarding 'constancy' of a SOP is clearly in need of backing up.

Anyone that wants to call me out can. I will do it. And I did.

There is a line where tediousness is crossed. Perhaps as a venue to pontificate multiple paragraphs to impress oneself. Hopefully, in my golden years, I won't be getting my jollies from that.

Eh, I am not impressed.

Edit: Also, I think the OP is a sock-puppet probably of canadian derivative....

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Juha,

Thanks very much. That gives us some hard facts and sources to go on.

Do you know the dates and circumstances in which 6th and 1st Panzer Division tankers were used as infantry?

I originally pointed out to Cult Icon that "It would be a waste of their skills to use them as infantry except in absolute extremis and as a very temporary measure" and wonder whether your examples qualify as temporary and/or in extremis?

I have no doubt that this was an occasional occurrence in extreme circumstances, but my question of Cult Icon was regarding the evidence that it was a more habitual activity, or as he put it a "ubiquitous occurrence" that they were "constantly used as infantry in the war to supplement weak infantry strength".

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Cult Icon,

You seem to think that our opinions have value here without supporting evidence. They don't, because this a historical site requiring some means of verification to give them weight.

If, as you say, "I've done the work.....", then please show us some evidence of this, rather than offer a mere, unsupported opinion.

This is all the more important as your proposition, right or wrong, is counter-intuitive.

"IIRC" is not an adequate substitute for hard facts and sources, because it presumes (1) that you were originally well informed in the first place and (2) that your memory is sound, neither of which we can ascertain without hard facts and sources we can use in evidence. If it is true that, "The panzer division histories of G.D., 3.Pz, 23.Pz, 24.Pz (D of a LH) have some concrete examples", please give us some details.

Nobody is making demands of you, just asking for evidence to support your opinion. Without supporting evidence, none of our opinions here have any substantive value.

I would suggest that following the form of Juha's answers would be more helpful to us. He gives us hard facts and sources.

You may or may not be right, but how can we know if you won't give us hard facts and sources?

Cheers,

Sid.

[Richard Anderson]

This is what I said. You confused what I said. Can't help that.

Yes, I know that is what you said about American crews going "to the repairs yard and pick one that was available. US Tankers were picky about what Sherman they liked." I'm not confused at all and it remains incorrect. Tanks evacuated to the Ordnance collection point and repaired by the division were reissued within a day or so at most, although there was some vestige of the German hanger queen habit (Category C tanks should have been evacuated and dropped from the count, but often were not for some days). Little choice involved or opportunity for pickiness when its the same tank already held by the division.

Otherwise, tanks were delivered to the division by an Ordnance Evacuation Company from either COMZ/ADSEC as a newly arrived replacement or occasionally as a repair from an Ordnance Base Depot or as a repair from an army group/army Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Heavy). In that case, the decision to deliver that particular vehicle to that particular division was the choice of the ETOUSA AFV&W Section and/or the 12th Army Group Armor Section, which made the allocations. Again, not much choice on the part of the end users, although given "gun tanks" were either 75mm or 76mm there could have been some decision over that matter. Maybe they flipped a coin or just like with a box of chocolates maybe they just took what they got?

The point is that you, specifically, are not worth having a discussion with. You showed your stripes in the other thread, demanded me to back up a point, caused a thread to be obliterated with censorship, and then didn't have the face to man up when I did in another thread. So, that's the point. But, again, this isn't worth it. But it is worth it to point out your lack of real character.

viewtopic.php?f=47&t=237658

Sorry, but what was that proof of again? The "other thread" was about shooting until the tank "changed shape" or "burned" wasn't it? Very good, you've established that the Germans and Soviets did try to establish a criteria for that. Thank you and congratulations on finding the directive.