Tankers Without Tanks

Discussions on the vehicles used by the Axis forces. Hosted by Christian Ankerstjerne
Yoozername
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Re: Tankers Without Tanks

#61

Post by Yoozername » 29 Oct 2018, 01:38

Perhaps more on topic....Regarding spare crews specifically Tigers... somewhat of a fantasy (IMO) to have these Ergänzungsstaffel!
Structure of the Company-Tiger as up to this moment.


A problem that is repeated again and again is that when losing battle tanks, a large number of well-trained crews, due to the lack of reserve tanks, can not be used in armored combat.

The number of spare crews ( Wechselbesatzungen ) can be reduced. Generally they have not been totally instructed, they increase the number of personnel but without increasing the combat capacity.

A ' complement squad ' ( Ergänzungsstaffel ) with 2 tanks per Company would be desirable for the Tiger and Panther Companies. These tanks would be manned only by a driver and a soldier (spare crew). Thanks to the creation of this reserve, it would be possible to prevent the loss of combat capacity in point 2), by temporarily losing a good part of the soldiers with the tank.

In order to achieve the creation of an effective Armored Weapon, it should be able to withstand the disadvantage of raising the demand for tanks, against the advantage of being able to maintain the combat capacity of these tanks, while saving the number of soldiers.

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Re: Tankers Without Tanks

#62

Post by Yoozername » 29 Oct 2018, 03:39

10 Panzer Regiment strengths
1 July 1943
Type
Number
Pzkpfw. II
14
PzKpfw.38(t)
3
PzKpfw. III (Kurz)
25
PzKpfw. III (Lang)
30
PzKpfw. IIIN
4
PzKpfw. IV (Kurz)
8
PzKpfw. IV (Lang)
14
PzBefw.
6

(104 tanks 65 Panzer III variants)

27 August, 1944
Type
Number
PzKpfw. V
44
PzKpfw. IV (Lang)
44
PzBefw.
4


Richard Anderson
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Re: Tankers Without Tanks

#63

Post by Richard Anderson » 29 Oct 2018, 23:01

Yoozername wrote:
29 Oct 2018, 03:39
10 Panzer Regiment strengths
1 July 1943
Type
Number
Pzkpfw. II
14
PzKpfw.38(t)
3
PzKpfw. III (Kurz)
25
PzKpfw. III (Lang)
30
PzKpfw. IIIN
4
PzKpfw. IV (Kurz)
8
PzKpfw. IV (Lang)
14
PzBefw.
6

(104 tanks 65 Panzer III variants)

27 August, 1944
Type
Number
PzKpfw. V
44
PzKpfw. IV (Lang)
44
PzBefw.
4
Yes, and...?
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

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Re: Tankers Without Tanks

#64

Post by Yoozername » 30 Oct 2018, 17:39

And ..draw your own conclusions, or pick nits, doesn't matter.

Clearly from looking at the various tank strengths and varying equipment they fielded, the transition to Panthers and Panzer IVs was done in varying ways. An example from Das Reich 2nd SS Panzer Regiment...

https://www.scribd.com/document/1048968 ... fore-Kursk
“Das Reich” SS Panzer Grenadier Division at Kursk

Of the three SS divisions in the battle, Das Reich was sort of in the middle between the other two when it came to the transition process to a full panzer division.

Das Reich 2nd SS Panzer Regiment: Like with LAH, Das Reich’s 1st Battalion was back in Germany undergoing training in the new Panther tanks. When it left in the late spring of 1943, it left all of its tanks with the regiment, thus allowing the 2nd Battalion to be at full strength. The 2nd Battalion was organized into four companies, each with four platoons. However, there were too many tanks for the 2nd Battalion to contain in its organization so an unusual procedure was implemented to alleviate this overage of tanks. The Das Reich SS Motorized Anti-Tank Battalion was stripped of all of its Marders and the command personnel and the organization were used to create a temporary panzer battalion for the leftover tanks. The 2nd Battalion had about 18 Pz IVF/2, 24 Pz IIIJ, and 5 command tanks operational at the time of the battle. The Heavy Tank Company started the day with one operational Tiger tank but during the morning a second Tiger tank returned from the field repair shops so there were two of them when battle was joined. Of these one was knocked out in the day’s combat (it was hit 83 times!).

Das Reich 2nd SS Panzer Jager Battalion: This was the proper name of the division’s motorized anti-tank battalion. The Marder II companies that were part of the battalion were parceled out to other units in the division. One company went to the assault gun battalion where it became the 4th Company in that unit. The other two went to the panzer grenadier regiments, one to each, to become part of their 14th Companies. The battalion, as a tank unit, was organized into three companies of three platoons each. This battalion was equipped with captured T-34c tanks. It is not clear whether there were two companies of T-34’s and one company of Pz IIIJ’s or one company of T-34’s and two companies of Pz IIIJ’s. Different sources list both types. The 2nd Panzer Jager Battalion had about 15 T-34c, 10 Pz IIIJ, and 2 command tanks at the time of the battle.
DR had before Kursk
Panzer II x1
Panzer III x 62
Panzer IV x33
Tiger I x14
Bef 1x
T34 x25

I would venture that most crews sent back were from the Panzer III. The Panzer III had stopped production in mid-1943, so having 'mixed' units would decline rapidly. The battalion sent back was in late spring of 1943, this chart shows the small numbers of Panzer IV and Tiger at the time.

Image

https://www.scribd.com/document/1048968 ... fore-Kursk

The link above shows tank strengths before Kursk for these divisions. Clearly, there is no uniformity.
Last edited by Yoozername on 30 Oct 2018, 17:51, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Tankers Without Tanks

#65

Post by Yoozername » 30 Oct 2018, 17:46

To get back on topic, things were done in different ways, in different divisions, as far as 'excess crews'....SS Totenkopf had to send personnel to man up it's coming Tiger I and Panzer III N company. According to one source, they sent 'excess crews', and supposedly kept the experienced crews in place. Evidently this was not enough manpower, and they had to send more personnel and this time from the recon elements, I assume these would be more experienced troops. There is some reports that at the very end of the war, after losing all remaining AFV, tank men from this division used panzerfausts as tank killers.

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Re: Tankers Without Tanks

#66

Post by Richard Anderson » 30 Oct 2018, 17:59

But I thought they did not send "excess crews", but rather units? The regular practice was to transfer personnel from the departing unit to fill up the remainder to strength, along with all the heavy equipment. In DR the returning battalion was the I. Abteilung, but in other regiments it was the II. Abteilung. It is possible "crews" were kept together, but may not have always happened either as key personnel were shuffled around.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
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Re: Tankers Without Tanks

#67

Post by Yoozername » 30 Oct 2018, 18:12

In the case of Panthers (Like DR and others), I believe they sent a battalion, but in the case of the smaller Tiger I company for TK, they sent excess crews initially. Since they didn't send enough crewmen (it was 9 Tiger I and 9 Panzer III N), they had to send recon troops. Total manpower strength for the Tiger company was 250 men all ranks. There were probably fresh guys also sent from the tank schools, and who knows what transfers, etc. the guys at TK might want to do to keep key recon NCO's etc.

I suppose there is also the case of a whole Panzer division being taken off the line and rebuilt. Something like a transfer off the East front to France. In which case all crews came back. In some cases leaving behind much of their equipment to be parceled out.

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Re: Tankers Without Tanks

#68

Post by Richard Anderson » 30 Oct 2018, 19:42

Okay, yes, good point about the Tiger Kompanie. The Tiger Abteilungen too were a different process too IIRC. The entire division Auffrischung was also a different process.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

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Re: Tankers Without Tanks

#69

Post by Yoozername » 30 Oct 2018, 20:34

Some feedback from the Panther Training guys....

Excerpt from the content of a conference held on 10.9.1943 in Paris by the commander of the Tank Courses 'Panther' (Panzer-Lehrgänge 'Panther') and aimed at commanders of the Armored Weapon elect to take command of new Panther Battalions after requalification of its personnel to the new tank. In these documents, it is a question of giving the commanders an overview of the process of requalification to the Panther tank.
Note :
In the 'Panther' Tank Courses in Erlangen the new tank was trained and re-qualified since March 1943 by officers, platoon leaders, driving instructors as well as personnel from the repair and maintenance services of equipped Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS units with Panther. Thanks to the proximity of Erlangen to Nürnberg, where the MAN headquarters were located and the Panther was produced, as well as to Grafenwöhr, where a test field was located, the 'Panther' Tank Courses had excellent support and assistance by industry and the army.
Tank Courses 'Panther' ( Panzer-Lehrgänge 'Panther' )
Commander

Paris, on 10.9.1943


Experiences in new formations

(extract from a speech from the commander of Tank Courses 'Panther' in front of tank commanders)



Our Generaloberst Guderian has received the commission from the Führer to prepare for the next matches the best German Armored Weapon. For you, gentlemen, who collaborate in this mission, this end must also be a commitment. The power to command a Battalion-Panther is not only a distinction, it also supposes a special obligation. In combat you will have to justify with your Battalion the confidence that the Inspector General of the Armored Troops has placed in you.

Due to its nature, the creation of new units is accompanied by difficulties. These difficulties can not be overcome with complaints and criticism but with dynamism and interest.

The formation of a new Panther-Battalion is usually structured in 3 different temporal phases :
Personal supplement and pre-instruction
Re-qualification to the Panther in the 'Panther' Tank Courses in Erlangen
Equipment - Associated instruction ( Verbandsausbildung ) - Preparation for combat


I. Personal complement and pre-instruction

As a personal complement, whenever possible, old and experienced commanders and crews will be employed . Naturally all personnel must be fit for the active service ( Kriegsverwendungsfähig )

The 'Organization and Composition Tables' ( KStN ) and the 'War Equipment Documents' ( KAN ) for Panther Battalions will apply:

KStN Staff ( Stab ) of a Panther Battalion Nr.1107 of 1.6.1943
Headquarters Company ( Stabskompanie ) of a Panther Battalion Nr.1150a from 1.6.1943
Companies of a Panther Battalion Nr.1177a of 10.1.1943
Platoon Workshop ( Werkstattzug ) of a Panther Battalion Nr.1185a of 10.1.1943
In addition to the corrections established in the 'General Information of the Army' 1943 ( AHM 1943 ), Nr.287 and Nr.473

KHAN Staff ( Stab ) of a Panther Battalion Nr.1107 of 1.6.1943
Headquarters Company ( Stabskompanie ) of a Panther Battalion Nr.1150a from 1.6.1943
Companies of a Panther Battalion Nr.1177a of 10.1.1943
Platoon Workshop ( Werkstattzug ) of a Panther Battalion Nr.1185a of 10.1.1943
In addition to the corrections established in the 'General Information of the Army' 1943 ( AHM 1943 ), Nr.241 and Nr.473

From the first day of its creation it should be strengthened that the different crews, platoons and companies strengthen personal ties with each other.

Pre-instruction An
indispensable condition to ensure an optimal pre-instruction is to check the general military knowledge and in the field of tanks of all officers, non-commissioned officers and troops up to the smallest detail. For example:

Commanders : Knowledge about the principles of use and operations of tanks, combat tactics, tank technique, tactical shooting and radio communication commands, ammunition tactics, etc.
Gunners : Knowledge of the doctrine of shooting, good knowledge of identification of tanks, combat behavior, basic knowledge of mock combat in the sand pit, total domínio of the pistol and machine gun, etc.
Drivers : General knowledge about motor vehicles, driving experience, holding the B-class driving license for tracked vehicles as an indispensable condition to obtain the Class C license; this check is, when we are in the 5th year of war, especially important for driving instructors: here it is also essential to be in possession of the license of driving instructors class B for the purpose of obtaining the license of instructors of Class C driving

These same checks should naturally be carried out on the rest of the staff (radiotelegraphists, radio mechanics, shippers, weapons experts, maintenance and repair service personnel, tow groups and platoons, and workshop personnel).

After having been checked the general knowledge of personnel with a long stay at the front should be granted their deserved permission.

The pre-instruction, as the experience shows, is carried out improvised and without 'Panther' .

It may be advantageous to perform a pre-instruction in conjunction with replacement troops based on instructional plans (especially driving instruction).

Going deeper into the guidelines of pre-instruction would exceed the framework of this discourse. The important thing is that the pre-instruction is done under combat conditions . Documents in this regard:
Combat experience, reports on combat experiences, relevant directives, the Inspector General's bulletin, instruction orders, information brochures, etc.

The planning and execution of the pre-instruction is the function of the commander. He is personally responsible for gathering the documents for instruction, getting the improvised means for its realization as well as establishing instructional plans for each of the instruction groups.

The number of trainees must be in accordance with the available equipment and must allow 100% use of the instruction period .

The opinion "we are now in our country and we are going to have a good time until we get back to the front"It must be combated energetically. Everything that is not learned now can not be recovered and will have very negative consequences later in combat in relation to the battalion's combat capacity.

The commander personally and not the heads of company or platoons, must constantly verify the correct performance of the pre-instruction.

Indication of instruction: Reconnaissance squad
( Erkunderzug ), engineering platoon ( Pionierzug ), maintenance and repair squads and groups ( I-Staffeln / I Gruppen ), platoon and recovery group ( Bergezug / Bergegruppe), platoon workshop ( Werkstattzug )

Indication on the use of commands in the factory ( Fabrikkommandos )

Indication on the timely supply of ammunition and fuel

Indication of premature delivery of personnel to the Tank Courses 'Panther' Erlangen (does not make any sense then it does not suppose any gain of time and generally it is accompanied by disadvantages in the instruction since there is no control over if the apprentice performs his instruction correctly - total shortage of 'Panther').

A positive and efficient re-qualification to the 'Panther' is only possible if the pre-instruction has been carried out in a meticulous and exhaustive way.



II. Tank Courses 'Panther' - Erlangen

It is explicitly stated that in the Tank Courses 'Panther' - Erlangen there are no general tank training courses but the requalification of, at best, old and experienced tankers to the 'Panther' ' .

Due to the short time that is available to carry out the requalification to the 'Panther', it must be dispensed with anyone who does not have a general instruction of tanks or whose instruction is insufficient. Otherwise this would mean for the 'Panther' Tank Courses a useless additional work, the waste of fuel and ammunition and the destruction of the 'Panther' training tanks. This is especially true for driving instructors, drivers and mechanics .

The start of the requalification for the different instruction groups will be communicated in time to the battalions.

In order to comply with the general plans of instruction, exact knowledge of the number of participants is required as well as their implementation in time . Those who arrive latethey can not be incorporated to the courses later and therefore can not be reclassified .

On the basis of relevant orders, the 'Panther' Tank Courses must instruct each Battalion-Panther the following number of instructors:

90 weapons instructors (the best commanders and gunners)
32 driving instructors (in cases of emergency assistants of driving instructors or very good and experienced drivers)
7 weapons masters
( Waffenmeister ) (gunsmiths or assistants)
20 radiotelegraphists (masters of radiotelegraphy, radiotelegraph bosses of battalion, company, platoon)
10 officers (at least one for each group of instruction)


In your own interest, for the above-described positions, the Battalion must command the best , since they may have to assume the instruction of the rest of the Battalion. Until now, except for the mechanics and craftsmen, in the 'Panther' Tank Courses, it has been possible to instruct all the Battalions in all their personnel and in the future they will do everything possible to keep this going well. . Even so, the Battalions do not have the right to have 100% of their personnel trained.


Re-qualification times :

Commanders, gunners and porters, driving instructors, drivers, radiotelegraphists and mechanics of radio communication equipment and personnel of the armory 14 days
Mechanics 6 weeks
Craftsmen Without instruction


Person in charge of the requalification is the personnel of the Tank Courses 'Panther'. Even so and in the interest of the own Battalions, it is advised that the commanders and heads of company take a personal interest in the process and the realization of the requalification.

Commanders will be given reclassification plans on time for the different training groups.

Special wishes of battalion commanders in relation to requalification will naturally be taken into account.

With the arrival of the first apprentices and not to alter the general functioning, they must be sent by each battalion: 1 sergeant major ( Hauptfeldwebel ), 1 recorder (Schreiber ), 1 accountant ( Rechnungsführer ), 1 sub-officer for barracks team ( Uffz.f.Kas.Gerät ), 1 chef, 1 assistant chef.

The personnel listed above can also be commanded to the 'Panther' Tank Courses 2-3 days before the start of the requalification.

It is important to remember that it is important for the personnel to be equipped with a good uniform according to the directives, equipment (gun, gas mask) as well as correct and valid documents: military wallet ( Soldbuch ), identity documents ( D-Ausweise ), Vergleichsmitteilung (unknown translation)


III. Equipment - Associated instruction - Preparation for combat

The reception of equipment generally takes place after the realization of the requalification (formations in the West).

The "Panther" Tank Courses Training Course - Major Major Waldeck - is responsible for all questions regarding new training. He is still momentarily in the Grafenwöhr Field of Instruction; his next transfer to France is planned. For this reason, the commanders are requested that in case of doubts or questions concerning the new formations, they should contact the Responsible Training Plan.

Commanders should be sympathetic to the difficulties in everything related to the team. Although it would be desirable for the troops, in the 5th year of war we can not afford the maintenance of reserves or illegal stocks.

If a Battalion is fully equipped or not, it is decided by the OKH


Associated Instruction

The Inspector General of the Armored Troops has planned to grant the Panther Battalions an associated instructional time period of 14 days.

Experiences made up to this moment:
Depending on the level of training as well as the experience on the front, the need and the associated instruction time may vary.

It is considered as indispensable:
3 combat practices at platoon level
2 combat practices at the company level
3 combat practices at battalion level
At least 1 practice of firing at the level of the platoon, company and battalion


Preparation for combat

This preparation requires time, especially to equip and prepare all wheeled vehicles. Also here, in the 5th year of war and in the shortage between other iron and wood materials, you can not ask for what is desirable but whatabsolutely necessary (for example, it is totally useless for a commander to consider his battalion inoperable because his vehicles have not been painted or marked with badges).

In the face of all the difficulties, shortages and in part insufficient equipment with spare parts and components, the commander must in these cases show his willingness to consider his battalion still and as well as operational.


Indications about the Troop Engineer ( Truppeningenieur )

Indication about the possibility of using Tigerfibel for instruction in the 'Panther'.
After having absolved the requalification to the 'Panther' the instructors can use the Tigerfibel to complement and deepen the training. Those sections that do not correspond to Pz.Kpf.Wg. V must be modified by the instructors. Due to the necessary modifications the distribution of the Tigerfibel among the men of the 'Panther' is not considered. The following chapters of Tigerfibel must be modified:
"Gustavo, the SUV" ( Gustav der Geländegängige )
"The long cable" ( Die lange Leitung )
"Mo-Fa-Fu-La-Ba damage to the ceiling" ( Mo-Fa-Fu-La-Ba der Dachschaden )


Indications on the Tigerfibel shooting doctrine :
Because the technical data of the two vehicles are very similar, the Tigerfibel's shooting doctrine can also be used for the 'Panther'. Because its understandability is still not good, it may be that the normal man of the 'Panther' can not understand it. Its objective is for the moment to give suggestions to the instruction personnel. Going into everything that is not valid for the 'Panther' would exceed the content of this event. For this reason it is more convenient to deepen the training to lean on what was learned during the requalification in the 'Panther' Tank Courses,Unterrichtstafeln ) as well as the technical notes published by the 'Panther' Tank Courses.



Signed: Streit
Major and Regiment-Kommandeur

Sid Guttridge
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Re: Tankers Without Tanks

#70

Post by Sid Guttridge » 30 Oct 2018, 20:50

The Greek Sacred Squadron captured a Tiger using a jeep in Tunisia.

The Tiger had thrown a track and was immobilized. The Greek jeep kept the crew inside with machine gun fire until the burning midday sun forced the dehydrated Tiger crew to surrender without offering any resistance.

Unfortunately, I have only seen the history of the Sacred Squadron/Battalion/Regiment in French, not English.

Conditions presumably had to be right for tank crews to fight outside their vehicles usefully.

Cheers,

Sid.

Yoozername
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Re: Tankers Without Tanks

#71

Post by Yoozername » 30 Oct 2018, 21:00

Some feedback from the troops regarding the training and requalification. Evidently, the group sent back did not cover the personnel needs and 'FNG's (hopefully that went through basic tank school), were incorporated.

report of I./Pz.Rgt.2

Report on the experiences obtained in the operations between 9 and 19.10.1943 {10 days}

Tactical instruction
Due to the circumstances necessarily very short instruction with the tank has not had negative consequences. This has been the case because the units still have 50% of commanders and crews with experience in the Eastern Front. Within this group of old people, the new young people have been coupled in an extraordinarily effective way and have been able to alleviate their inexperience quickly. The many young drivers, partly very poorly educated, have met expectations and with great enthusiasm and independently have tried to keep their vehicles operational. The existence of experienced platoon leaders and commanders has been decisive in any case.

Previous technical training in the Reich
During the training courses, part of several weeks of duration, the drivers and tank mechanics have not been given what in their future functions they will need. For example, it has happened that soldiers with great attitude and disposition have been employed for several weeks in a single type of work, for example in the assembly of wheels, thus being impossible to obtain an overview of the function and design of the Pz. Kpfw. V. In many cases a course of less duration under an expert direction would have endowed these people with better and fundamental knowledge. The possibilities for this have existed in all the factories.

bam
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Re: Tankers Without Tanks

#72

Post by bam » 05 Nov 2018, 14:24

Henry Metelmann, in his book about his war service, "Through Hell for Hitler" tells of his transition from panzer driver to Infantryman.
It's awhile since I read it, but as IRC, he was a fully trained Pz. III driver from 41. I can't recall which unit. In autumn 42 his tank was destroyed; during a battle, it had become entangled and immobilised in barbed wire, and as he was the driver, he was ordered to climb out and cut them free. While doing this, a T34 shot his tank up and killed the rest of his crew, Henry was mostly unhurt.
Because of a lack of new tanks, he then got assigned to a 5cm Pak 38, which was later seconded to a Rumanian unit on the Don. On 19th November, the soviet Uranus Stalingrad offensive literally steamrollered straight over Henry's position and he was the sole unwounded survivor, cos he had hidden instead of fighting the hordes. He then started walking west, until finding another German unit days later. He was incorporated into an alarm unit as infantry, and fought as a humble landser on the Ostfront for the rest of the war.
I've often wondered why the Germans didn't get him back driving, as they were always short of experienced tank drivers, who took a lot of time & effort to train. Henry hints in the book that after stalingrad, he was utterly defeatist and just wanted to survive, something he thought more likely if he avoided tanking, which he now regarded as a suicide mission. Considering his chances in a Pz.III, vs. the T34 hordes in 1943/4, I'd have to agree...

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Re: Tankers Without Tanks

#73

Post by Yoozername » 05 Nov 2018, 19:41

That book is cheap enough to pick up on ebay. But I wonder what tank commander would send out the driver??? Typically, the loader is the gopher and would do such dangerous jobs. Seems sketchy that only one crewman would even do it, I have cut barbed wire and commo wire out of tracks, it isn't easy. If left wrapped around the works, it can erode parts, But that must have been some wire to immobilize a Panzer III. The driver would be needed to run the tracks back and fourth during the task..... Hmmmm...

So, the other tankers eat it? Then there are no tanks, and he gets assigned to a Pak 38 in the tank division? What division?, I searched and it isn't available online. I guess I have my doubts about the story. It was more dangerous and less privileged to be in a infantry unit (what division??). Maybe easier to hide?

The Germans were short of all drivers. It wasn't a country like the United States that had a society of drivers. I read a Wespe report that had the usual issue with drivers.

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Re: Tankers Without Tanks

#74

Post by Stiltzkin » 05 Nov 2018, 21:29

Henry Metelmann, in his book about his war service, "Through Hell for Hitler" tells of his transition from panzer driver to Infantryman.
It's awhile since I read it, but as IRC, he was a fully trained Pz. III driver from 41. I can't recall which unit. In autumn 42 his tank was destroyed; during a battle, it had become entangled and immobilised in barbed wire, and as he was the driver, he was ordered to climb out and cut them free. While doing this, a T34 shot his tank up and killed the rest of his crew, Henry was mostly unhurt.
Because of a lack of new tanks, he then got assigned to a 5cm Pak 38, which was later seconded to a Rumanian unit on the Don. On 19th November, the soviet Uranus Stalingrad offensive literally steamrollered straight over Henry's position and he was the sole unwounded survivor, cos he had hidden instead of fighting the hordes. He then started walking west, until finding another German unit days later. He was incorporated into an alarm unit as infantry, and fought as a humble landser on the Ostfront for the rest of the war.
I've often wondered why the Germans didn't get him back driving, as they were always short of experienced tank drivers, who took a lot of time & effort to train. Henry hints in the book that after stalingrad, he was utterly defeatist and just wanted to survive, something he thought more likely if he avoided tanking, which he now regarded as a suicide mission.
Sounds like something straight out of a Kurowski book :), especially considering that tankers had a higher survivability than front line infantry units.
I also love the expression "hordes of T-34s", you can immediately say something about the quality of given information, this line gets repeated a lot. Thats the typical WW2 enthusiasts perception of WW2, "hordes of T-34s won WW2" (just on a side note, in late 42 and early 43, Soviet formations were heavily battered and thus understrength). Entire days could have passed before a regular infantry man might have even seen or engaged a T-34.
Judging that the Wehrmacht was frequently able to maintain its tank strength throughout offensives more effectively (compare the day to day reports for the Battle of Kursk), contrary to their Soviet opponents, his story seems very "colorized".
What people usually refer to and quote, is the data from serious setbacks post 43 (or encirclements such as Stalingrad) after major operations and continous commitment, to support this view of "insufficient number of tanks". To me this is a comparison of apples and oranges.
Not only was the focus and organization of the armies different, but if you want to find an analogy on the Allied/Soviet side, then observe the initial advances in the opening phases of Barbarossa or the May of 1940. Judging that tanks came with replacement units, or had to be shipped over via supply trains, a surplus of vehicles would have resulted in a reshift of personnel (which was needed elsewhere) and the Soviets would have captured a substantially greater number of German tanks than they historically did, once in control of the battlefield.
I would say formations would be disbanded and crews would be assigned to repair workshops, only at the later stages of the war (or in desperate situations), with an ever increasing demand for manpower, the shuffling of dedicated branches occured. The overall worth of tank crews was below that of field surgeons and pilots though.
Considering his chances in a Pz.III, vs. the T34 hordes in 1943/4, I'd have to agree...
Considering that about 50% of T-34s in the 4th quarter of 1942 were destroyed by 50mm fire and at least half of those must have been inflicted by Panzer IIIs (so at least 1,500 AFVs, at a loss of approx. 500 Totalausfällen), his chance of survival was certainly higher than for the Soviet counterpart and the combat losses of T-34s in the later stages of the war remained high.

bam
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Joined: 08 Sep 2005, 23:10
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Re: Tankers Without Tanks

#75

Post by bam » 07 Nov 2018, 13:46

Wow, I've stirred a hornets nest...
I agree, and said, that i also think it strange that a qualified driver was left in the infantry. His book isn't usually one of those cited as semi fiction. His descriptions are un-hyped, accurate and thoughtful. I urge anyone to read it, it's very good, then criticise it if u want. He's had a history channel documentary made about him. He seemed genuine on camera, genuinely sickened by having to serve in a lost war. He was bitter. So maybe that explains why he actively avoided going back into tanks, or maybe once he was in an infantry unit, he couldn't get out; there was a perpetual shortage of experienced infantry and units were loath to give any up.
Henry regarded the tankers as always getting the dangerous assignments, moved from one hot-spot straight to the next, ad infinitum, and he didn't think he'd survive. He writes of his dread at his first sight of a T34, it's squat angled armor and long 7.62cm gun looked lethal compared to his boxy Pz. Iii with short 5cm gun. He realised they were inferior to the T34, and so every fight felt like his last.
After his experience of getting steamrollered by the soviet November 42 offensive, when THERE WERE hordes, 100s, of t34s launched against the rumanian front section that he was supporting, of seeing the overwhelming numbers, seeing his gun and its crew, his comrades, literally crushed under tank tracks, Henry's belief in final victory was shattered. His is one of the few German accounts that speak of the change in attitude amongst ordinary infantry after stalingrad. He says in his unit, respect for officers disappeared. Men refused to undertake dangerous attacks, or didn't participate effectively. He says they all just prioritised survival. Henry vowed never to volunteer for anything, and to sod the war.
As for the incident where he was ordered out to cut the wire, and why wasn't the radio operator sent...Henry described the Battle as cose quarters, the T34 that shot them was less than 100 meters away,. While the tanks immobilised, the driver is a bit superfluous, and the radio operator can defend the tank with his mg34, and Call help on the radio. There was only one pair of wire cutters.
As for u not approving of MY use, not Henry's, of the phrase "hordes of t34s", i can't see a problem. It's a bit flippant, but They were building 1000+ t34s a month, and pretty much employing them en masse, as 1-use, 1 way weapons, what with the awfully brief crew training and no radios and poor doctrines. Nearly every German tank unit account that I've read says they always fought against superior numbers. And are u trying to argue that a pz. III was a good tank to be in vs. a T34?
You'd expect most t34s to be knocked out by 5cm rounds in 1942, because there weren't many 7.5cm guns around. The pak 40 was still rare then, most Fall Blau pz. Divs only had only 12 to 20 Pz. IV Gs with long 7.5cm compared to 100+ pz. IIIs 5cm. When 6th panzer div came straight from refitting in France to Russia in Dec 42, it had 73 pz. III 5cm and 32 Pz. IV long (says Jentz) and its main AT gun was pak38 not pak40.

Jus my 2 cents..

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