Das Reich 7 July 1943 Combat Success Data

[Miles Krogfus]

Using primary data, not figures gathered from secondary sources, my posts revealed that on July 7,1943 the 2 SS Division caused the Russians to totally lose 35 tanks compared to 1 or 2 Das Reich write offs. Thus the title "Das Reich 7 July Combat Success Data." My replies were simply responses to posts (including questions asked me) by others. Unfortunately, the careless term "casualties," appearance the GD division, and of GOODWOOD misdirect attention from the matter at hand. I have no desire to leave fellow AHF members ignorant of important realities but do not wish to have my posts treated as invitations for wanderings off the topic, trash deposits and immature remarks.

[Yoozername]

A primary source report that may be of interest....from Panzer-Elmito...it is in Spanish but can be translated online

Copy published by Panzeroffizier beim Chef GenStdH on 5.8.1943 of a writing originally written on 21.7.1943 by the Commander of the III Panzer-Korps (General der Panzertruppen Hermann Breith) and where this, based on the experiences lived during Zitadelle, dá indications on the cooperation between Tiger and the rest of Weapons.

Note :
During Zitadelle it was assigned to the Armee-Abteilung Kempf, where the III was established. Panzer-Korps, s.Pz.Abt. 503 with a total of 45 Tiger I

http://panzer-elmito.org/tanques/tiger_ ... 943_E.html

[Michael Kenny]

Using primary data, not figures gathered from secondary sources, my posts revealed that on July 7,1943 Das Reich caused the Russians to totally lose 35 tanks compared to 1 or 2 Das Reich write offs. My replies were simply polite responses to posts (including questions asked me) by others. Unfortunately, the careless term "casualties" and appearance of GOODWOOD misdirect attention from the matter at hand. I have no desire to leave fellow AHF members ignorant of important realities but do not wish to continue to have my posts treated as invitations for trash deposits and immature remarks.

'My' information is taken from page 73 of Restayn's 'Operation Citadel Vol I The South (JJF 2002. ISBN 0921991703)

This:

Restayn also mentions that some tanks that were placed in the repair category were left behind in the German retreat thus because total losses.

If those figures are disputed then show where the errors occur.

The term 'casualty' is not vague in any way as it is a normal term to describe a tank that is rendered unable to fight. A tank that is completely smashed to pieces is a total loss but it also is a casualty. A tank that has hit a mine and loses a wheel is a casualty but not a total loss. Anyone who claims they do not understand the distinction between the two has no business commenting on tank losses.

[Yoozername]

I am sure it covers every possible cause of damage. Just like Allied loss totals. I leave the mithering over what constitutes a valid 'combat loss' to others.

That depends on what you want to assess. Battlefield control (abandonment), repair services and recovery are always relevant, but it is better to look at all types of losses and clean them for all sorts of inflicted damage by AT/gunfire. Irrecoverables as a consequence of gunfire are far more relevant for Tank models. The Panzer Divisions maintained their strength quite well during Kursk. From there on they remained substance to almost continuous comittment, until operational readiness declined. I am also unsure whether it should be dismissed as "mithering", rather bias, since many authors either avoid or refuse to do these steps, which is detrimental in the understanding of the interaction of forces, combat and the potency of involved weapon systems. There is obviously a solid correlation between personnel casualty figures and AFV material losses.

So will I. That is why I posted the count for the two dates.

Another way is of course a visual examination, such as Dr. Wheatley's article https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10 ... 19.1606545

Exactly. Many aspects of tank warfare are of interest to the community. It is a History forum. People are interested in all aspects of tank technology. Not just what one person thinks is what matters.

In any case, mechanical drop-outs of armor rarely entail crew casualties. They can help turn-around the repair. 'Casualties', like these, can almost be accounted for as 'lateness', and in effect, reinforcements. That is, they can drop out on the way to an attack, fix the fuel pump, or track, or head gasket, leak, etc, and join the attacking force.

I am sure as the battle wore on, fall-outs from mechanical issues increased drastically as the machines were being pushed harder. Just looking at some macro-stat over a longer time period, may prove some moot point, but I guess that is what is being 'discussed' now. Personally, I wish Miles could share all the reports like that, for the Corp in that battle, as the data points would show a truer picture.

I have read that the main aim of the Soviet Defense at Kursk was the writing-down of the German armor. While the Germans certainly lost in regards to not achieving an encirclement, I wouldn't say that they had their armor written-off. Damaged, yes, but still somewhat intact. The Soviets had something like half the armor they started the battle with. They did recover much of it since they occupied the battle fields after the Germans withdrew. And they continued to out-produce the Germans and pushed hard after Kursk.

[Stiltzkin]

In any case, mechanical drop-outs of armor rarely entail crew casualties. They can help turn-around the repair. 'Casualties', like these, can almost be accounted for as 'lateness', and in effect, reinforcements. That is, they can drop out on the way to an attack, fix the fuel pump, or track, or head gasket, leak, etc, and join the attacking force.

Indeed, what I wanted to point out was that the whole "damaged vs destroyed" debate is somewhat incomprehensible, as the former metric is relevant to give us an overall picture (with special attention to the context of the battle, the control of the battlefield and the ability to maintain armour during the offense), while the significance for the assessment of the Panzerarm lies in the latter.
http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2019 ... yed-tanks/
http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2019 ... july-1943/
http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2019 ... vka-posts/
Dr.Zetterling left a good statement in the comment section (summation link).

I advocate and tend to list totals with a breakdown into multiple categories, under the condition that they are available. My assumption here was, that the only reason for relying on the overall ratio was to pursue a certain narrative and to demonstrate that "the disparity might not have been that pronounced", which is not only a misunderstanding of tank warfare, but that of mechanized warfare during offensive action in general.
Irrecoverable casualties correlate with irrecoverable material losses, so do temporary losses and damaged material.
Interestingly, the claims made by the German crews and Luftwaffe personnel during Zitadelle were relatively accurate, so the figures reported by "das Reich" do not seem implausible. As far as I know, Miles is also more interested in Tank engagements.

AGS (5.7-20.7) and
Voronezh Front (5.7-23.7):
– [(KIASov + WIASov + MIASov)/(KIAGer + WIAGer + MIAGer)] ~ 1:3 or
– [bloodyCasSov/bloodyCasGer] ~ 1:2.35
– [AFVCombat/Cas] ~ 1:2.02
– [IrrCasSov/IrrCasGer] ~ 1:7.2
– [AFVirrSov/AFVirrGer] ~ 1:7.5

Regression and also running tests for dependency results in high coefficients.

I have read that the main aim of the Soviet Defense at Kursk was the writing-down of the German armor.

A lot of temporary damage and delaying action was definitely induced by mines. Day for day losses are available in the KDB (Kursk database), featured in various studies such as https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36719401.pdf
Though the main reason for their failure lied in the overload of tasks, caused by the shortage of available IDs (Töppel).
C.Lawrence listed The Panzer Corps daily losses in his Prokhorovka book.

            SS Panzer Corps   Opposing Soviet     Exchange

Date     Tank Losses           Tank Losses          Ratio

5th         54 tanks                     30 tanks               1:0.56

6th         79                            149                         1:1.89

7th         55                              86                         1:1.56

8th         47                           164                          1:3.49

9th         34                           135                          1:3.97

10th         3                             55                          1:18.33

11th       16                              9                           1:0.56

           ——                       ——-

           288 tanks              628 tanks                    1:2.18

55 overall losses with a write off figure of 0.12-0.15, gives us 8 irrecoverables, so 2 Totalausfälle of "das Reich" seem plausible.

And they continued to out-produce the Germans and pushed hard after Kursk.

There is no such thing as "outproduction". This is a general misunderstanding of war economy. Production is a function of allocation, doctrines and losses. If so, then the opposite would be the case.
The Soviets produced more tanks, because they allocated a larger share of their smaller resources to tank production, since they had a bigger army and suffered greater losses.
download/file.php?id=441134&mode=view
This was rather a sign of inefficiency, since it prevented them from allocating these valuable resources for the production of other assets, such as a greater number of APCs or to expand the output of munitions. The extent is not measured in the number of tanks, but the investment and volume. The density of tanks (per capita) in the Oboyan sector was also similar. The German production rate was set at ~15% (Ausfallrate, this sufficed until the levels shrunk due to the contraction of their controlled territory and non-stop commitment of units), opposed by the Soviet at about 45-60%, depending on the period (and posture). While it may seem to appear more reasonable to assume that it was more supply than demand driven (as was in the German case), most of the AFVs during an offense were still repaired and fed into the battle, just to be damaged or destroyed again. The situation somewhat reversed: In 41 the swift advances made recovery impossible, while from 44-45 the Panzerwaffe faced similar problems. The Wehrmacht was in continuous decline, but managed their forces well until their Army Groups were finally destroyed (with various exceptions, such as the encirclement at Stalingrad, where the losses were not just confined to the men in the foxholes and all branches must have suffered equally), while the Soviet trend was rather volatile and they managed to outlast their enemy by relying on a constant stream of manpower.
The Soviet tank arm was shot to pieces in almost every quarter during the war, in the later phases they held the initiative, hence could recover their vehicles more effectively. Note that the increase in the mechanization of forces however, does not always give better results, as you have to shift personnel from other sectors to pursue other tasks (e.g. maintenance, support roles), that may weaken the frontlines.

Restayn also mentions that some tanks that were placed in the repair category were left behind in the German retreat thus because total losses.

If that is the case, then these will be listed as Totalausfälle.

The term 'casualty' is not vague in any way as it is a normal term to describe a tank that is rendered unable to fight. A tank that is completely smashed to pieces is a total loss but it also is a casualty. A tank that has hit a mine and loses a wheel is a casualty but not a total loss. Anyone who claims they do not understand the distinction between the two has no business commenting on tank losses.

Indeed, that is why the overall category is the suitable metric, but not for tank vs tank warfare. A mine is not a tank. Based on the munitions expenditure of 2ndSSPzK, we know that the vast majority of Soviet tanks were knocked out by Jägers, Assault guns (i.e. StuK 40) and Panzer IVs, KwK 40 L43/48 (and that by no insignificant amount of APCR and Hl rounds).

[Michael Kenny]

If that is the case, then these will be listed as Totalausfälle.

Obviously but the point is that they will not be listed as such until a later date. The will not be listed or referred to as losses for the day they were knocked out only in overall numbers for the whole campaign.

Indeed, that is why the overall category is the suitable metric, but not for tank vs tank warfare. A mine is not a tank. Based on the munitions expenditure of 2ndSSPzK, we know that the vast majority of Soviet tanks were knocked out by Jägers, Assault guns (i.e. StuK 40) and Panzer IVs, KwK 40 L43/48 (and that by no insignificant amount of APCR and Hl rounds).

Bogus comparison. The only thing that matters is the total of all incapacitated tanks. This routine winnowing of German tank losses to arrive at a meaningless 'combat loss' total (i.e.the lowest possible number and thus the most flattering ' tank v tank kill-ratio') is a pointless exercise. The same rigour is never applied to enemy losses and I know from NWE numbers every single damaged Allied tank is almost always automatically counted as a total loss and (incorrectly) described as 'confirmed by Unit Documents'. For example Norbert Számvéber does this routinely in his 12th SS book citing Reynolds as his source.

[Stiltzkin]

Obviously but the point is that they will not be listed as such until a later date. The will not be listed or refereed to as losses for the day they were knocked out only in overall numbers for the whole campaign.

All reports are plagued by delays. I am not only concerned about the German data, so it is probably wise to look at figures which were compiled at a later stage. The data obtained from the battles around Kursk are probably one of the most accurate of the entire war, compilations made day by day were a rarity.

[Michael Kenny]

Obviously but the point is that they will not be listed as such until a later date. The will not be listed or refereed to as losses for the day they were knocked out only in overall numbers for the whole campaign.

All reports are plagued by delays. I am not only concerned about the German data, so it is probably wise to look at figures which were compiled at a later stage. The data obtained from the battles around Kursk are probably one of the most accurate of the entire war, compilations made day by day were a rarity.

I did use overall numbers. It is not me that is parsing the figures so as to use an artificially 'low' number of total losses for specific days.

I advocate and tend to list totals with a breakdown into multiple categories, under the condition that they are available. My assumption here was, that the only reason for relying on the overall ratio was to pursue a certain narrative and to demonstrate that "the disparity might not have been that pronounced", which is not only a misunderstanding of tank warfare, but that of mechanized warfare during offensive action in general.

That is the total reverse of the situation. The constant lowering of German loss-numbers is an obsession with those in pursuit of a bogus 'tank-kill ratio'. The silly 'only X numbers of Tigers were total losses at Kursk' argument where the result of the battle and the subsequent headlong retreat is not considered important enough to warrant any consideration.

[Stiltzkin]

I did use overall numbers. It is not me that is parsing the figures so as to use an artificially 'low' number of total losses for specific days.

That is totally fine. Now all other users who are actually interested in tank warfare can get back on track (the pun ).

[MarkN]

Using primary data, not figures gathered from secondary sources, my posts revealed that on July 7,1943 the 2 SS Division caused the Russians to totally lose 35 tanks compared to 1 or 2 Das Reich write offs. Thus the title "Das Reich 7 July Combat Success Data."
...
Unfortunately, the careless term "casualties," appearance the GD division, and of GOODWOOD misdirect attention from the matter at hand. I have no desire to leave fellow AHF members ignorant of important realities but do not wish to have my posts treated as invitations for wanderings off the topic, trash deposits and immature remarks.

Hmmmmm....

I do not know what purpose you had in mind when you decided to post. However, like so many other posts of this kind on this forum, it quickly became an invitation for off topic rambling. I notice you had no problem with the off topic ramble into armored trains but take exception to those that question your 'revelation'. Why is that? Any attempt to compare apples with oranges as a basis for statistical comparison is going to run into trouble.

Your posts do NOT reveal "combat success data"; they reveal German claims set against a narrow tank statistic. Apples with oranges. Moreover, the timeframe you have chosen for your combat success data revelation would suggest a high degree of intent to misrepresent the bigger picture.

Furthermore, the German claims of Red Army losses may well be accurate numerically, but offers no indication of the 'true' combat damage they inflicted. The German data on their own losses similarly offers no indication of the 'true' combat damage inflicted upon them. In otherwords, you compare apples with oranges in an attempt to sell bananas!

[Miles Krogfus]

Remember that Alexander von Grundherr double checked Russian armor wrecks and found more than first reported by Das Reich for July 7th. Thus German "claims" were not merely confirmed at 29 but raised to the actual 35. Certain of the replies here, with secondary sources used for mention of Grossdeutschland, Goodwood and ... and ... intruded.
I believe in scholarly manners and so avoid wandering away from the specific topic when I post replies and expect other posters to do the same.
( I ate a banana for breakfast but left apples and oranges untouched.)

[Yoozername]

Bogus comparison. The only thing that matters is the total of all incapacitated tanks. This routine winnowing of German tank losses to arrive at a meaningless 'combat loss' total (i.e.the lowest possible number and thus the most flattering ' tank v tank kill-ratio') is a pointless exercise. The same rigour is never applied to enemy losses and I know from NWE numbers every single damaged Allied tank is almost always automatically counted as a total loss and (incorrectly) described as 'confirmed by Unit Documents'. For example Norbert Számvéber does this routinely in his 12th SS book citing Reynolds as his source.
Last edited by Michael Kenny on 16 Sep 2019 03:31, edited 3 times in total.

So, is it 'casualty' or now 'incapacitated'?

[Terry Duncan]

A post from MarkN and another from Yoozername were removed by this moderator for incivility and contributing nothing to the topic. If people cannot be civil to each other and refrain from personal comments such as have been seen in this thread recently, a short hiatus to cool down can be arranged, although that is not a desirable outcome it is inevitable if people are incapable of not being rude!

Terry Duncan

[MarkN]

Terry Duncan,

In my last post l wrote that poster Miles Krogfus is misrepresenting the evidence he has produced here followed by the comment that this was not "good scholarly manners". You will notice that l have simply reversed his own words to reverse the claim.

You deleted that post for "incivility".

Is it now forum policy to consider posters "incivil" if they have the temerity to call out somebody for misrepresenting historical evidence?

Miles Krogfus has misrepresented the evidence he has produced here in multiple ways. For brevity, l will only highlight the two most blatant.

Using primary data, not figures gathered from secondary sources, my posts revealed that on July 7,1943 the 2 SS Division caused the Russians to totally lose 35 tanks compared to 1 or 2 Das Reich write offs. Thus the title "Das Reich 7 July Combat Success Data."

Remember that Alexander von Grundherr double checked Russian armor wrecks and found more than first reported by Das Reich for July 7th. Thus German "claims" were not merely confirmed at 29 but raised to the actual 35.

The first document he produced refers to prisoners and captured equipment up to and including (bis einschl.) 7.7.43. Miles Krogfus claims it is only for the single day 7.7.43. Read his words: "on July 7,1943" and "for July 7th" not up to and including. Also look at the title of the thread: does it imply up to 7th or just the 7th?

The daily reports are to be found in the same file as that document. Those documents confirm that the misrepresentation is not a simple error of translation.

The wording of his second document infers just the single day but where does the document state it is based upon "double checked Russian armor wrecks"? Those words are a misrepresentation of what is just another claim by another source. That claim does not supersede the other in validity or accuracy, it simply contradicts it.

[Yoozername]

Words like 'mitthering' or 'Winnowing' are not conducive to civil conversation.