Michael Kenny wrote: ↑05 Jan 2019, 19:52
critical mass wrote: ↑05 Jan 2019, 17:42
MK,
You might want to modify the words of Your response, considering that Avalancheon referred only to the "front" of tank and Your response does, as far as I recognize, also cover (mainly) hits from the flanks (without pointing out this subtle but important difference).
My statement is factually correct. The wording is concise and unambiguous. It says what it says and until such time as someone points out that it does not mean what I take it to mean then it stands.
I am not convinced. As pointed out previously, not the statement You made is under doubt but the fact that You accidentally or intentionally omitted a very important point by not stressing that the 75% figure You cited in critique of Avalancheon statement refers to a sample which is not related to front hits, which was, as I understood, the point Avalancheon raised in the first place. Thus, You handling of factual data is fraud by false attribution, in which an important passage for understanding is removed and may cause a change of the meaning. I was trained to understand this as a misrepresentation of handling with primary sources (contextomies), and for the record, I also train my students and collegues to be sensitive against this sort of error in their handling of primary source data.
I have identified another misrepresentation here:
The 1945 'Post Rhine Crossing' survey of UK tank casualties is much more detailed and found 148 AP penetrations in 135 tanks and 119 'scoops/deflections'. That is a 40% failure/scoop rate. I suspect this is because the 1945 survey far more detailed than anything the OR Teams ever did.
Tables 3 & 4 (pgs 17-18) of WO205/1165 'A Survey Of Tank Casualties Amongst Armoured Units In North West Europe 1945
The problem here lies in the implicit presumption behind Your interpretation of what actually constitutes a "failure" or "scoop". The data tabulations of WO205/1165 are taken rather unreflected, with the implicit presumption that a "scoop" actually means that a projectile physically ricochetted off an armor plate. I have studied this (very interesting) sample and found this presumption is not supported by the details of the hit descriptions and thus cannot be regarded as a valid presumption. A "scoop" in WO205/1165 is virtually anything, and frequently, will not involve touching the principal hull armor in the first place (f.e. a penetration through an opened hatch, which never had a chance to physically contact any hull armor or, oblique penetrations of a road wheel with the projectile behind went under the belly, again without making physical contact with the hull armor).
The vast majority of clean hits on exposed hull or turret surfaces penetrated. The ratio is not dissimilar to the Normandy sample, in both cases, approx. 3/4 of the front turret/hull hits penetrated. "Scoops" on the other hand are overrepresented only in two major areas: Appandages (mind the aforementioned caveates) and the area- (not exactly the side hull) of the running gear. Much less frequently so, also in the copula, main gun, front bottom plate and roof plates (caused, as an educated guess, by extreme oblique effects). This is a very detailed sample and much can be learned from it (compare attachment).
Interesting side note on the hit percentages. Only 20% of the hits on the Panthers were frontal. This is significantly lower compared to many other samples of tanks. If you want to lay this out in favour of the Panther you could argue the Allied soldiers were already adapting by trying to hit the flank thereby reducing their effectiveness and also avoiding frontal shoots even in case of opportunity.
Christianmunich, I don´t hink this can be readily stated. The sample was only from AFV, which were knocked out and could not be recovered. AFV, which were hit but could be recovered will not be inside the sample. Thus, the sample is expected to be biased in disfavour of areas, where we know that a lot of hits were rejected, for example, that 3/4 of the front hits (75%) failed to damage the tank in the presented sample and biased in favour of flank hits, which will lead more readily to a result involving the AFV beeing made part of this sample. It´s rather not a representation of actual hit area frequencies -or, for that matter, penetration percentages- but for the dispositional pattern of hits related to unrecovered AFV.
Mind, the most common source for AFV write offs are operational causes for the defender, and likely the attacker, too. More research is necessary here to understand all the principles involved, but my feeling is that armor (or lack thereoff) is a significant, but neither a decisive nor irreplacable factor. I state this, rather sceptical perception in full confidence of years of study in armor-projectile dynamics. Of course, this does not refer only to the Panthers discussed, and one has to point out that this goes both ways in the Normandy sample (95% of hits on Sherman penetrated in the same operational sample). An unbiased sample would involve all AFV damage from a certain operation and/or time period.
hope it helps,
cm