Cult Icon wrote: ↑12 Dec 2018, 16:48
This came up on ACG many times and Kenny took his usual 100% British apologist line which turn threads into a mess.
Don’t think you understand Britons too well. Unlike most nation’s historians, British historians tend not to be that nationalistic. In fact, I'd describe criticism of Britain is pretty de riguer amongst UK historians. I’d describe M.Kenny as being, to possibly coin a phrase, un- British.
Cult Icon wrote: ↑12 Dec 2018, 16:48
But it's intriguing Alt history and deserves its own thread- could the British/CW succeed at Caen and the normandy campaign in a more efficient manner? With what other tactics and operations? Were they in fact, missing certain capabilities and skills such as night attacks, combined arms coordination? Were the allies in fact at the beginning at their "learning curve" and not at "peak performance?" Were there flaws in their close air support, bombing, and artillery fires? What impact did the "Infantry shortage" in Britain have on their infantry doctrine and tactics, and execution in Normandy? How did this effect armor? did the units attack/exploit hard & fast enough or was their decision cycle too slow?
Sounds like the topic of an interesting thread. Perhaps you could take some reading tips from M. Kenny, he’s already recommended several works.
Cult Icon wrote: ↑12 Dec 2018, 16:48
Some of these aspects have been touched upon, hinted at by various historians but never decisively so as far I can tell. The others I recognize from Soviet breakthrough operations on the eastern front. It doesn't seem like a comfortable/politically correct topic.
Describing Nazi apologists like Kurowski as not politically correct is fair. However the larger problem, at least from my prospective, is more the inaccuracy of WW2 histography particularly in regards to german compentence, or lack there of.
Cult Icon wrote: ↑13 Dec 2018, 04:19
A better question is why you hate the tank aces and the people who like german armor so much.
I can’t speak for the poster you’re trolling. But, for me, having a “like” of particular elements of history and using terms like ace is juvenile.
Cult Icon wrote: ↑10 Dec 2018, 18:09
It would be interesting to see this attitude for once deployed on Soviet and allied reports- and their Heroes of the Soviet Union, VCs, MOH's, DSC's.
Pretty much a strawman argument that no one else mentioned.
But, you do touch on an important point. High awards were conferred on German tank crews making claims of multiple kills, which wasn’t something people got a VC or CMOH for. Alongside the propaganda/ political incentives for creative after action reports, German crews got bling.
Cult Icon wrote: ↑13 Dec 2018, 21:45
People can self publish these days:
The Great Panzer Ace conspiracy by Michael Kurkowski
Five Tigers One Sherman: The Final Verdict by Michael Kurkowski
Tommy Lafayette Green-Pool, Sherman Ace VC: 270 Kills ...
This isn’t even juvenile, it’s childish and beyond moronic. You can join Christian on my not to reply to list.
Sheldrake wrote: ↑12 Dec 2018, 17:24
The choice of the point at which the allies broke the German lines in Normandy was determined as much by the Germans as by the Allies.
100% agree with the excerpt I’ve quoted here, as well as, the rest of your post. But would like to mention in addition that Normandy being the decisive battleground made the job easier for tac air than the job would have been if they had to fly further into France. Also, Normandy allowed the Allies to take full advantage of naval gunfire support and in the event of a proper German assault on the bridgehead it may have proved vital.
Avalancheon wrote: ↑11 Dec 2018, 01:26
Oh, they won the war alright. After the German army had been bled white by three years of war against the Soviet Union, which saw the loss of its youngest, best trained, most competent soldiers. But even when they landed in Normandy, the British and Americans experienced repeated setbacks and needed far more time to retake France than the Germans had needed to originally conquer it back in 1940. Even though they had an enormous material superiority, and outnumbered them by three fold. And had complete air superiority which immobilised the enemy in daylight. And could decode their encrypted messages through ULTRA.
I also meant the US won the battles as well as the war. The only setback in Normandy was the storm that destroyed a Mulberry, the rest went pretty much as expected. Or, at least, largely conforming to one of the contingency plans.
Aren’t sure why you mention 1940. Aachen to, say, Le Havre is much shorter distance travel than Newport News to Utah beach.
Yes, ULTRA wasn’t good for the Germans. Was a pity for them they couldn’t do computers.
Yes, air superiority would have been nice for them to have. Was a pity, for them, they couldn’t match Allied high performance fighters.
But the 3 to one… When was that, late July? Is a bit pointless trying to divie up the responsibility, for that coming to pass, between the Allies and the Germans. But, it could be argued that was 100% due to German ineffectiveness.
Avalancheon wrote: ↑11 Dec 2018, 01:26
This was partly due to the German armys higher fighting power, I.E., their leadership, training, initiative, cohesion, flexibility, etc. But it was also due partly to their more modern tank and anti-tank weapons. This cannot be denied.
Here we go. I can’t see us agreeing, or changing each others viewpoints. But, you took the time to reply.
I’d deny the German army had a higher fighting power. If I had to classify it, I’d describe the German army, of WW2, as being unfit for purpose and being a collection of vain- glorious egotists led by criminally incompetent morons. To be generous, I could perhaps describe it as lions being led by donkeys.
Avalancheon wrote: ↑11 Dec 2018, 01:26
If the British and Americans had fielded something better than the Sherman and Cromwell, they would have made faster progress in Normandy. .
I wouldn’t, unequivocally, take that as a given. But that’s quite possible/ probable.
antwony wrote: ↑10 Dec 2018, 12:25
In retrospect, serial production and issuing of the M26 to combat formations earlier seems like a good idea, but see above comment.
Avalancheon wrote: ↑11 Dec 2018, 01:26
I see no real substance to your 'above comment', just snobbish ego stroking and a holier-than-thou attitude. The Americans were completely negligent to avoid bringing heavy tanks to Normandy. Theres no real excuse for this decision, other than the weight limits of shipboard cranes. (A problem that could easily have been overcome with some out of the box thinking) That was never a real limitation, it was just the pre-text the U.S. army used.
I am holier- than- most, so can see where you’d get that from. Ego- stroking, OK. But, snobbish???
Avalancheon wrote: ↑11 Dec 2018, 01:26
They had a fetish for fast medium tanks that could rip roar through the enemy rear areas. And to be sure, the Shermans were quite good at this task... But only when they could punch through the Germans front lines. Which they repeatedly failed to do for the first couple months of Normandy. A massed attack by Shermans would usually go 'splat' whenever it ran into a line of enemy tanks or anti-tank guns.
By 1944, pretty much every massed armoured attack would get splatted a lot. There wasn’t many Mathilda I/ II or T34/ KV1 vs. 37mm mismatches anymore. Actually, you don’t really need to go that deep in the WW2 timeline. Right through North Africa you had the 8th Army or D.A.K/ Italians armoured attacks getting splatted on the opposition’s AT guns
Avalancheon wrote: ↑11 Dec 2018, 01:26
If the armored divisions had been spearheaded by heavy tanks that could dish out and receive alot of punishment, they would have done considerably better.
Noticed you haven’t mentioned M26’s. Presume you have some hypothetical US heavy tank in mind. Jumbo Sherman’s not being ready in time for Overlord was pretty negligent. The Black Prince Churchill variant, or at least Churchill formations having something 17 Ilber equipped (which they may have had, I know nothing about that) sounds like a good idea.
Fundamentally, I don’t like hypothetically discussions. Sorry about that.
Avalancheon wrote: ↑11 Dec 2018, 01:26
Fair enough. But keep in mind that the Tigers in question were rolled into the TOE of the Hermann Goering panzer division, a poorly organised, poorly led, and dysfunctional formation. These factors undoubtedly had an influence in their poor tactical employment. .
Sure, I know next to nothing about the HG Panzer Div. Was trying to help the original poster come up with US vs. Tiger I combat and that was all I had. I wasn’t trying to criticizing the Germans. If anything I was trying to pass judgement on early bazookas.
Avalancheon wrote: ↑11 Dec 2018, 01:26
Anyone who used the Shermans in Normandy ended up getting outclassed by the German 'Cats'[/b]. The British, the Canadians, the Polish, etc. As I said before, the British were facing the lions share of the heavy tank battalions. Thats why they (and the Canadians) had a track record of so many abortive, failed offensives. Villers-Bocage was a minor engagement compared to the stuff that happened later.
Once again, we are at odds. I wouldn't describe any of the offenses you listed as failures. For me, they were all comparable to mid period WW1 style “Bite and Hold” operations. Take the Germans front lines, then defeat the inevitable counter attack. Keep repeating till they run out of forces to counter attack/ hold the line.
Main difference I see between the wars was Royal Artillery’s role was changed for shifting the box barrage (in WW1) a couple of hundred yards to, ensuring that AT guns got forward and were emplaced before the Panzers turned up.
Well, that and the Imperial German Army in WW1 had competent and professional leaders who eventually worked out what the Commonwealth forces were up to and restrained their subordinates more effectively and prevented them from taking advantage of the temporary tactical opportunities offered by an enemy advance and didn't allow them to fritter away their commands to the detriment of the general situation.