Avalancheon wrote: ↑05 Jan 2019, 06:37
U.S. army officers had many deficiencys, chief among them was their lack of initiative.
Sigh...they did not "lack initiative", but they were not trained to use initiative, and it was not part of doctrine, to emphasize initiative in junior officers. That problem was even more pronounced in British junior officers...and was a feature of the leadership problems identified by the Heer in 1939-1940. So from that experience they worked on it and emphasized dealing with the problem,
When the fight veered away from the plan, they tended to halt and wait for orders, rather than improvise a new plan on the spot.
Indeed, a salient problem with junior leadership in all armies, over all ages...creating a means and a training regimen to cure it became a major focus for the Germans during the war and for the British and Americans late war and postwar.
They also had little understanding of how the armys other branches worked. An infantry officer knew nothing about artillery or armor, and an armor officer knew nothing about infantry or artillery. There was no cross branch training, as in the German army.
That, in fact, is quite incorrect. Many of the "Armor" officers in the U.S. Army were actually Artillerymen, others were Infantry, Cavalry, and Engineers. If a junior Infantry officer knew anything in the U.S. Army, it was to work with his Artillery liaison - that was where the "combined arms" training emphasis was. It was failing to include armor - direct support tank units - in the training regimen that was the major fault.
The tactics of infantry officers were particularly unimaginative and rudimentary (as you noted yourself).
The "tactics" you refer to were actual doctrinal and were based on limited interwar exercises and aa false belief in what worked in the Great War. So, as one battalion S-3 of my acquaintance put it, when it came time for his battalion to execute a counterattack in the Ardennes (106th ID on 17 December), his battalion commanders orders were "form up on me, I'm the line of departure, Rifle Company on line on the left, Rifle Company on line on the right, Rifle Company in reserve, and Weapons Company in support". This at a time when experienced battalions were advancing in column of companies or even platoons (and in one case I know of, by individuals) through dead ground. Experience again.
This came down to the deficiencys of the officer candidate schools where they were trained. They had been brought into existence in 1940 with little forethought to create large numbers of junior officers with minimal delay, and were based on the West Point academy whose shortcomings had been criticised in the 1930s.
Sorry, but NON, SENSE. The requirement for OCS was c. 1941, when the Army began expanding from ten peacetime reduced strength divisions to what was eventually 89 divisions. West Point was an engineering school first and foremost and not a tactical training school at all, the notion that it trained junior officers for wartime is a pernicious notion that will not die.
''The American second lieutenants, who were then about four to six years older than their German counterparts, left West Point to command their platoons -or even companys- without a deeper understanding of tactics and the efficiency of weapons in the inventory of the U.S. Army. Without the help of seasoned NCOs, they would excel in spit and polish operations but not much else.'' -Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, by Jorg Muth.
Interesting. Herr Muth might want to do some math. If an "American second lieutenant" graduated at age 21 (typical, especially with the accelerated wartime graduations, then that means that his "German counterparts" that were five to six years younger were 15 or 16 years old.
You're forgetting operation Atlantic and operation Spring, where the Canadians failed to breakthrough German lines. And numerous instances during operation Epsom and Goodwood when the British also failed to breakthrough. These failures were caused mainly by the inadaquate armor and firepower of the Sherman.
Um, Canadians? How am I "forgetting" Canadians when I am addressing an issue with the American Army organization and doctrine? Please try to follow along.
The ability of a tanks main gun to punch through enemy armor is obviously of very great importance. Perhaps not ''the most important aspect of the tank armament'', as ChristianMunich believes, but certainly very relevant. To blindly assert that there are no facts to support this viewpoint is kindof mindboggling.
It is, quite literally, at most, about half of its "very great importance". Blindly asserting the contrary is the hallmark of a wheraboo...or a WoT addict.
The most self evident fact of all is that the tank division is the main maneuver element for an entire army. When they achieve breakthroughs into enemy lines, they will tend to be counter-attacked by enemy tanks. This requires one of two separate approachs. You either have two types of specialised tanks, one to deal with infantry and one to deal with tanks. Or you have one type of general tank which can deal with both, by use of a dual purpose gun.
Yep, WoT wehraboo. Sorry to be cruel, but that simply is as schematic as the notion that armored divisions were designed for exploitation only. Anyway, the U.S. Army did have "one type of general tank which can deal with both", rather than a breakthrough heavy tank, a heavy medium tank and a light medium tank, for breakthrough and exploitation...so where is the problem?
ChristianMunich
Is an idiot and a poser. Full stop.
is overstating his case by saying that the armor penetration of a tank gun is its most important attribute (to the exclusion of everything else). But it is nonetheless a very important requirement. The armored divisions reliance on the poorly armed Sherman tank is what caused many promising operations to come to a premature and unsatisfying end. In operation Goodwood, you will recall that while most of the divisions managed to break through German lines to some degree, they were unable to stop the armored counter-attack that came afterwards.
There is simply no evidence that a more heavily armored and armed tank would have made much difference in Normandy or later. The armored counterattack in GOODWOOD had virtually no effect...and a similar ineffective counterattack on 29/30 July did nothing to stop the breakout. Same tanks, similar defense, different result. Go figure.
Thats obviously not the case, because the strategic situation of Russia and America were polar opposites of each other in 1942 and 1943. America would get to pick the time and place where it chose to fight the Germans, and would have plety of time to choose the weapons it needed without the pressure of time or circumstance. Its main problem was that it had to cross the Atlantic before facing its enemy.
Um, in 1942...at the beginning of the year, just four weeks after being pitchforked into the war, the U.S. military committed to producing 25,000 medium tanks...in that year. At the time, the War Department was committed to and planning on building 880 medium tanks. Please explain to me how they had "plety" or plenty of time to do so.
Russias situation could not have been more different. It was already engaged in a desperate fight for survival with the Germans, who were occupying a large portion of the Soviet Union. Thousands of men were dying each and every day, and they had to choose weapons based on how quickly and how many of them could be produced. They had no choice but to continue making obsolescent weapons for their armys, because any attempt to change their production lines would result in a potentially fatal shortage of the new weapons needed.
Yep, and they were already programmed to produce nearly 3,000 tanks per year.
{Edit: Sorry, hopefully those corrections clear up some of my late-night thoughts]