Forczyk & Nibelungenwerke: Panzer IV 1942 Production

Discussions on the vehicles used by the Axis forces. Hosted by Christian Ankerstjerne
Yoozername
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Re: Forczyk & Nibelungenwerke: Panzer IV 1942 Production

#16

Post by Yoozername » 20 Feb 2019, 21:10

There is also a 1941 'back-story' to the whole Porsche Tiger (P) saga. Todt evidently got involved and was voicing Hitler's preference for a Flak 41s and Turret diameters, etc. Really comical, that a head of state would get involved in any such details. Evidently, it is easy to put any old FlaK gun in a turreted tank... or that they could be made as AAA by snapping someone's fingers... I believe they only built a few hundred for the whole war...

{Letter written on 23.09.1941 by the then Minister of Armament and Ammunition Fritz Todt and addressed to the Heereswaffenamt Chief, Artillery General Ritter von Leeb.}
Reichsminister
Dr.Ing. Fritz Todt
Nr.:5493/41


Dear General!

There are a series of issues that cause me great concern. Because I have only been one day in Berlin and the remaining approximately eight days I will pass them out, I have to write to you. I would have preferred to clarify these issues with you personally.

The Heereswaffenamt has ordered that the Porsche tank be equipped not with the turret with a diameter of 2,000 mm provided by Professor Porsche but with the Henschel turret with a diameter of 1,900 mm. From the moment that Hitler called to join the project to Prof. Porsche I have the impression that Heereswaffenamt intends to gain the prestige of finally building a Heereswaffenamt tank . In the turret with a diameter of 1,900 mm it will not be possible to incorporate the Flak 41 . I have to inform you that during any appearance before the Führer, he asks me repeatedly if it is possible to equip the Porsche tank with the powerful Flak 41 . Prof. Porsche has assured me that he works to be able to incorporate it. I can not order Prof. Porsche to abandon this project, alleging that the Flak 41 should no longer be incorporated because the Heereswaffenamt has ordered the use of a smaller turret.

The Führer does not trust too much that instead of the Flak 41 another 8.8 cm cannon is built. The Führer wants the new heavy tank to be equipped with the Flak 41. I want to warn today about the Führer's reproaches that we will have to endure all of us if after the first presentation of the vehicles these are equipped with another cannon that is not the Flak 41 .

Personally and as Minister of Armament and Ammunition I defend by conviction but also because it is my obligation to defend with all my energy the interests of the Führer , the one in the new heavy tank that does not incorporate another cannon that is not the Flak 41 .

Because I manage this subject by personal order of the Führer, claim that fundamental modifications of the project are not carried out, such as the abandonment of the Porsche turret in favor of the Henschel turret, without first having communicated it to me. Today I have informed Prof. Porsche in writing that the Führer , as he has repeatedly made clear, expects the Porsche tank to be equipped with the Flak 41 in its current design.


During the meeting with Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, the Führer expressed his dissatisfaction because up to this moment only one single order of 300 units of Flak 41 has been made . The Führer is of the opinion that the industry should be entrusted with the production of several thousand Flak 41 in this way, since it would be a mass production, arouse their interest and involve themselves with greater energy. Also in relation to this issue I will personally take on the management with great dedication. After the first investigations, Rheinmetall has informed me that he has only been given a quota for the Flak 41of 60 guns. Regardless of the contingent, Rheinmetall has already planned the production of the next 60 cannons. I have informed Rheinmetall that, in cooperation with other companies, it should design a program to achieve the highest production of Flak 41 . I have assured Rheinmetall that they will have the necessary quota. I request that the Heereswaffenamt immediately order a quota for the production of the next 100 - 200 cannons. The Führer has proposed moving the production of Flak 41 to a new factory that was from the beginning equipped with all the means of a modern production and that had a great productive capacity. For the time being I have asked Rheinmetall to examine the planning of a factory that meets these requirements. Contrary to the proposals made up to now, it must be achieved that the production of the Flak 41 has no repercussions on the Flak 36 production .

Yoozername
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Re: Forczyk & Nibelungenwerke: Panzer IV 1942 Production

#17

Post by Yoozername » 20 Feb 2019, 21:22

Forgive me if I strain anyone's eyes by copy/pasting the retort to 'Todt The Nazi''s letter....People like Todt are very common BTW...luckily flight was dangerous back then...

(thanks to Panzer-Elmito)

{Faced with serious accusations of impartiality and boycott of the VK4501 (P) design in the development process of the new heavy tank (Tiger project) contained in a letter from the Minister of Armaments and Ammunition (Fritz Todt) to the Heereswaffenamt Chief, the latter orders Two days later, on September 25, 1941, the Chief of the Wa Prüf 6 (Oberst Fichtner) wrote a reply to the Minister with the aim of clarifying and defending the position of the Heereswaffenamt. Oberst Fichtner sent this letter on 27.09.1941 to the Head of the Heereswaffenamt as well as to different departments (in total 11 copies). }

Note :
Very interesting writing where the Chief of the Wa Prüf 6 makes a compact and clarifying summary about the origins and the development process that would lead to the Tiger I.

Wa Prüf 6
Head of Department
Nr.:990/41 g.Kdos.

In reference to : Letter from the Minister of Armament and Ammunition of 23.9.1941
In relation to : Order of the Head of Department of 25.9.1941 to present a declaration.


Directed to the Head of the Department :

Communicated:

The Prüf 6 has not issued an order to reduce the diameter of the turret for the Porsche tank. The reduction of the diameter of the Porsche KG originally planned turret of 2,000 mm to the current 1,820 mm, is solely and exclusively the result of the development work of the company Krupp.


The manifest opinion of the Minister of Armament and Ammunition that for reasons of prestige is intended to make a tank of the Heereswaffenamt forces to go into details about the development of tank 4501 (model Porsche and Henschel).

The tank 4501 that is currently developed by Henschel is the evolution of the 30-tonne tank that since the beginning of 1937 is under construction and tested by this company. Based on the guidelines issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army ( ObdH ), for the heavy tank model Henschel, the incorporation of the 7.5 cm KwK L24 gun and later a 10.5 cm KwK L28 was foreseen., which required a turret diameter of 1,650 mm. In 1939 Dr. Porsche was entrusted with the development of a heavy tank of between 25 and 30 tons that should be equipped with at least a 7.5 cm KwK L24 cannon, ideally with a 10.8 cm cannon. In 1941 and during the process of increasing the power of the tank guns, it was decided to foresee the incorporation of the 8.8 cm KwK L56 in the Porsche tank. The turret was then commissioned immediately by Porsche KG to Krupp and developed in close collaboration by both companies. The Department, against the normal procedures, did not carry out any commission to the Krupp company.

After evaluating the experiences made during the war and due to the Führer's demand to increase the armored penetration power, it was decided to plan for the start of production in May / June 1942 a 4501 Porsche model with a cannon 8.8 cm and a vehicle 3601 model Henschel with the 0725 cannon. Due to a new demand of the Führerin which the use of cannons with conical tubes was ruled out, had to adapt in the Henschel model tank, after carrying out slight modifications, the turret developed by Porsche in Krupp, because due to the shortage of time no other solution was possible. This measure forced Henschel to modify the chassis, which is why the Henschel model also became a 45-tonne vehicle.

Therefore, there has never been a Henschel turret with an 8.8 cm gun and a diameter of 1,900 mm; On the contrary: the Porsche turret is incorporated in the Henschel vehicle.


The Prüf 6 has supported the company Dr. Porsche KG in everything it could. I mention:

The Krupp company was instructed to take into account for the development of the turret all the experiences acquired during many years of close collaboration with the Waffenamt .

The Siemens-Schuckert-Werke company was instructed to incorporate for the development all the experiences acquired over many years of close collaboration with the Waffenamt in the field of automotive electric vehicles of the Porsche KG company.

The gentlemen of the company Porsche KG have been invited for years to the tests of the Automotive Testing Department ( Kraftfahr-Versuchsstelle ) of the Waffenamt , giving them the opportunity to know all the vehicle developments of the Waffenamt , to see in operation enemy tanks captured as well as vehicles with automotive internal combustion engine - electric that are under development by the Waffenamt .

Any question or desire raised by the company Porsche KG al Waffenamthas been satisfied, either through the companies involved in the development or directly based on Waffenamt's own experiences . Additionally and at the request of the same company, the plans of the following developments were made available: guide wheel, gear wheel for tractor wheel, chain link with central tooth, 7.5 cm barrel, 80 mm ball assembly for machine gun, 80 mm gate for driver's viewfinder, driver's viewfinder mount, fixed viewfinder, viewfinder glass block, 80mm dome entrance cover, driver's hatch and radiotelegraph on the roof of the front area, ammunition feed system for machine gun, contour of the MG-34, connection of the turret, radio communication equipment with transformers, antenna coupling system, electrical connection for radiotelegraphy equipment, screws with conical head, armored hinges.

In addition, meetings have been held in Berlin or Zuffenhausen, where advice has been given and suggestions have been made in the field of rolling systems, engines, chassis, interior equipment, etc.

To further support Dr. Porsche plans and documentation have been claimed with the aim of, once studied, being able to advise, being Porsche KG naturally the one that has decided at all times to value or not these suggestions. The plans have not yet been delivered to us by Dr. Porsche KG.

I have repeatedly informed Prof. Porsche that the Heereswaffenamt is at his full disposal and willing to collaborate with him, contributing all his experience and supporting the development of the Porsche tank. Favoring the production of tank 4501 (Porsche), the collaboration between Henschel and Krupp has been dispensed with, which has forced Henschel to collaborate with other companies that, unlike Krupp, do not have any experience in the production of heavy tanks.


With reference to the issue of the use of the 8.8 cm Flak 41 :
By writing dated 21.6.41 the company Dr. Porsche KG was commissioned to study whether it would be possible to incorporate the Flak 41 instead of the planned 8.8 cm KwK L / 56 . By telegram, 10.9. Dr.Porsche KG reported that in VK4501 for the moment only the incorporation of L / 56 was considered.


In the course of a meeting on 25.7.41 in Zuffenhausen I told Prof. Dr. Porsche that the Krupp turret was not convincing to me and that in the long term I expected a better solution that could be incorporated into both the Porsche model and the Henschel model. As the Minister knows, in mid-July 1941 the Department commissioned Rheimetall a turret capable of housing a cannon with a penetration capacity of 140 mm to 1,000 m, without expressly dictating the 8.8 cm caliber. This decision is justified in the directive given by the Führer on 26.5.1941 in the Berghof:

"In the event that a barrel of a caliber smaller than 8.8 cm (for example 6 or 7.5 cm) reaches the same power characteristics, it could be favored for reasons of ammunition kit and turret weight. The chosen caliber must be able to fight tanks, land targets and bunkers. "

The company Rheinmetall tries to reach that power through a cannon with a cylindrical tube based on the Führer's demands for the Pak 44. It would be wrong to ignore this project of Rheinmetall, because based on all requirements (shooting rate, ammunition kit, weight of the balanced turret, observation conditions) this could lead to a better turret than the Krupp turret currently planned.


The Department has commissioned the companies Krupp and Rheinmetall to present a turret project for the 4501 tank (Porsche and Henschel) armed with an 8.8 cm Flak 41 cannon .


I would like to be allowed to add that the Prüf 6 is not interested in matters of prestige but to achieve equip the German army with the best tanks, in the greatest number and as quickly as possible by availing itself of all the available intellectual and material capabilities.


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Re: Forczyk & Nibelungenwerke: Panzer IV 1942 Production

#18

Post by Yoozername » 25 Feb 2019, 18:28

I suppose it is easy, in hindsight, to see how things were being mishandled by the Germans at this stage of Panzer development, and the looming new plans for the war. Without a doubt, they may have been in the dark as far as Soviet tank technology, and even in the numbers of all types of Soviet tanks before June 22, 1941, but they were certainly completely in the dark as far as the Soviets production and capabilities in 1942.

Or were they? The Germans had conquered great masses of land and cities and facilities within the Ukraine, Poland and the Soviet Union. They had captured much artillery, ammunition, and destroyed or semi-working armor. But, had they captured any tank assembly plants? Tank gun plants? Any plants, destroyed or otherwise, that might give German Intelligence some basis on which to predict what and how many tanks the enemy was capable of producing? A reasonable question might be "Where did all those Soviet tanks come from? And, how many more will they be making?" The Germans had been driven back from Moscow by now, so it wasn't exactly defeatism, but rather pragmatism.

The Germans clearly were wrought with fear of super-heavy tanks that they had already encountered, and some that had not even been made yet (or would). The early discussions of what super-heavies the Germans must make, even at this early stage, gives an insight into what the German mindset was. Basically, aside from their fears, they were in a reactive mode. They had lost a large part of their precious fleet of panzers, through destruction and obsolescence, and they sat in the spring muds of 1942 planning their next move. Given the strategic developments, that is December 7th, 1941, and the US coming full-on into the war, the Germans were feeling the heat to finish off the Soviets, and then get back to beating the Western powers.

All this while in a state of design and production flux. The word was that Todt had died in a plane crash (who knows). He didn't even live to see the Panzer IV L43 roll out, but (supposedly), he fell out with Hitler. In any case, Todt was out, he had poured his last concrete, and Speer was in. But really, neither could make the panzer improvements, and new designs, nor the numbers needed. The Germans would continue on using the 'Blitzkrieg', stressing the lines of logistics once again, fight panzer wars on two fronts, and set themselves up for another death in the snow.

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Re: Forczyk & Nibelungenwerke: Panzer IV 1942 Production

#19

Post by Yoozername » 25 Feb 2019, 19:06

The Germans in Spring of 1942 were basically committed to two production MBT, and a assault gun.

The Panzer III, somewhat of the R&D problem child pre-war, was actually the mass produced turreted AFV of 1942. With its longer gun, and improved armor, and matured design, it was the weapon that the Germans were going to war with in 1942. Also, along with these, many L42 versions still remained in the tank fleet. The chassis was also used in the Sturmgeschutz, and this also became an important part of the German armored fleet with the armor defeating L43 weapon.

The Panzer IV which had never been a high volume item, was to be the answer to the Soviet armor, that is, till the Germans could produce their own 'super-heavy' tanks. The Panzer IV design was able to fit the KWK 40 weapon, albeit with an armored external housing on the mantlet for the recoil elements, and would become a dangerous adversary for the T34s, that pushed for numbers and kept their two man turrets. Panzer IV production, which was mostly centered at Krupp (also the design was there), was expanded to the other facilities, and would increase as more space, and sub-component systems (guns, hulls, motors, etc.), allowed.

The Germans produced around ~4300 of the three fielded AFV in 1942. The Tiger tanks were fielded in extremely small numbers and light tanks had stopped being produced. The Soviets produced around 15,000 T34 and KV tanks. The Soviets also kept producing light tanks after the Germans had stopped. 9000 in 1942. The Germans would launch another Blitz in the East in 1942. The Germans were fighting in the desert also. I wonder IF they knew just how outproduced they were, would they have continued on another attack they could barely support logistically?

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Re: Forczyk & Nibelungenwerke: Panzer IV 1942 Production

#20

Post by Yoozername » 27 Feb 2019, 18:47

So, this was the state of the Panzer fleet in 1942. As far as turreted MBT, they had two in the field, and two in the oven (Tiger I and Panther). Initial reports of those units that had deliveries of Panzer IV F2, and used them in mixed battalions with Panzer III L60, showed great promise. The Soviets were still learning, and the panzers had the edge in training, communications, Tactics, etc. Tactics leveraging the great power of the KWK 40 showed large number of kills, and low numbers of losses. One commander, even at this early stage, stated that only MBT can expect results like this. Antitank guns can't, and FlaK guns were worse. They were spotted quickly, and lost after a few shots. His prediction (around Spring 1942) that only turreted panzers with superior guns, and StuGs (for infantry), could possibly defeat great hordes of armor without undue losses, proved prophetic. As much as people seem to like the Marders and such, they really had no place in mobile combat especially when all combatants were getting greater amounts of artillery, and air power.

But the mixed battalions of Panzers, and the different guns, created a new logistics problem. Having both long and short barreled versions of weapons meant that the trains would need to stock 7,5 cm KWK 40, 7,5 cm KWK 37, 5,0 cm KWK 39, 5,0 cm KWK 36 ammunition...in all its variants. Worse yet, the best of the lot, that is the 7,5 cm KWK 40 Pzgr 39, was also used in the StuK 40, and production was just ramping up. This meant another round had to also be stocked, the HL/B version since there were not enough Pzgr 39. In addition to all this, the chassis of the AFVs required different parts as well as other maintenance issues.

The Soviets had no such issues. The made 76.2 mm ammunition that was used in T34, KV-1 and many field guns. I believe it could be both percussion and electrically fired. It probably wasn't very good in 1942, but they had it, and they had the numbers of tanks also. They developed tactics around this. The Soviets had an applique armor period during this time, perhaps further upsetting the reactionary German bigwigs, but they soon dropped it, and eventually they would drop Heavy tanks.

In any case, the Germans were going to have another go at it in sunny Russia 1942. Both sides had quite a loss of armor in 1941. Both sides had taken steps they saw as important to getting the advantage in 1942. The Germans had developed one of the best guns/ammunition of the war (7,5 cm Pzgr 39 used in KWK 40, StuK 40 and Pak 40), in quite a short period of time, and were changing 'rifles' mid-stream on weapon systems, as the Soviets scrambled to make as many T34 as possible, and wind down the Heavy Tank production. The Germans, trusting in their army to not only hold the line but to attack in 1942, were just getting started in the heavy tank biz. And they would soon learn the issues that come with it.

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Re: Forczyk & Nibelungenwerke: Panzer IV 1942 Production

#21

Post by Yoozername » 08 Mar 2019, 22:37

An interesting graphic showing where the Soviets relocated to.

https://www.o5m6.de/redarmy_old/Numbers_Armour.html

Image

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