Yoozername wrote: ↑02 Mar 2019 19:18
Interesting picture even if it does not meet the 'criteria' needed. Supposedly the antitank fire came at the turret from about the 7 o'clock position. Extreme obliquity shows some ricochets, and at least two penetrations along with two bolts from it.
In Death Traps, Cooper describes his impression that almost every 75 mm hit was damaging. Of course, his experience was with very close terrain indicating close range early in France, followed by greater penetrating weapons later.
Anecdotal evidence (from my reading), details that even with penetration, it was not a conclusive knock-out or kill. Some do not describe any functioning of the HE. Cooper describes repairing one sherman using the spent Pzgr itself and welding it in the hole it made.
Do I believe a M4A3 was Pak 40/KWK 40/StuK 40/Pak/39 proof from the front (7,5 cm Pzgr 39)? Nope.
shermpzgr39.jpg
I have seen the picture as well, I believe in Zalogas Armored Champion.
My interpretation was the shots didn'T get "deflected" per se but mostly moved through the armour, they were just not heading towards the interior. My picture interpretation is not unfailable quite the opposite so I want to say this just my opinion but I believe the shots were not deflected but the projectile was just glancing the armour.
You are correct in your assumption about none penetrating hits that knock out. I have studied the British late war sample in-depth, nearly any hit immediately knocked out a Sherman even glancing blows. My interpretation was that soldiers in general tend to leave the vehicle if under fire and hit which was exacerbated by knowing you were in a zero protection vehicle. The British sample was really quite enlightening to me, nearly any hit and the Sherman was out of combat. This goes so far that sometimes the tank was left before impact or when another tank was hit.
The sample also shows the "shoot until it burns" myth to be false, Shermans in this sample in most cases got a single hit, multiple hits were rare. The Sherman was tank basically offered no protection and hits were the end of the mission for the crew, not all of those were eventually destroyed but Sherman crews remaining in combat after sustaining a hit was really rare. Quite a bummer that no such data exists for German vehicles, I would assume the urge to survive was strong in every soldier of any army but I wonder if knowing your tank is downright garbage in terms of protection changed the behaviour of the occupants. Even non-penetrating hits prompted the crews to abandon the tank frequently.
This goes along my general claim of ripple effects in performance due to protection. I can only assume how different crews tend to operate in a vehicle that offers some protection versus one which offers none. Most of the evidence for the German side is anecdotal in nature and biased due to sampling very experienced soldiers but you get the feeling that crews in German heavy tanks more often remained combat alert when sustaining a hit.
Very hard to tell but the British late war sample most certainly shows where the rift between empiric evidence ( 10k destroyed Shermans, slow advanced ) and recent opinions ( war winner ) lays.
