Tiger and Stug tactics

Discussions on the vehicles used by the Axis forces. Hosted by Christian Ankerstjerne
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Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Cult Icon » 18 Jul 2019 03:25

Interesting report found in "Sturmartillerie", Anderson.

Lt. Colonel Christ of StuGErsAusbAbt 200 visited 11 x Stug battalions in August 1943. These claimed 432 kills vs. 18 write-offs of their own in this eventful month.

Among his assessments is his belief in the superiority of Stugs to Panzers in tank to tank fighting on the Eastern Front.

-different doctrinal role, infantry coordination with stug, armor protection and optics superior, low profile of the Stugs.
A senior officer told me: “I prefer a Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung to a Panzerdivision”. Another regimental commander stated: “Two Sturmgeschütz are more useful than ten tanks.”
pg.207

I have noticed from Stug histories that infantry support drills were a feature of their training. Also, as pointed out in Stug 202, their optics were of a far greater magnification (also including scissor scopes). Further, they were recruited from artillerymen.

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Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Cult Icon » 18 Jul 2019 16:53

Interesting snapshot of German armor composition from "Stug vs M-10" (Osprey), Zaloga

Normandy July 1944: 72% Pz, 28% Stug/PzJ

Ardennes Dec 16, 1944: 53% Pz, 47% Stug/PzJ

Defense of the Rhine, Feb 5, 1945: 27% Pz, 73% Stug/PzJ

Defense of the Reich, April 28, 1945: 19% Pz, 81% Stug/PzJ

-------------

German AFV losses in the West:

June-Sept 1944: 68% Pz, 32% Stug/PzJ

Oct 1944- Nov 1944: 38% Pz, 62% Stug/PzJ

Figures mirror the temporary insertion of German panzer divisions in the West for Normandy and the Ardennes. Once they were pulled out, the Stug/PzJ arms more heavily bore the burden of the defense.

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Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Yoozername » 29 Jul 2019 17:47

Perhaps not exactly addressing StuG tactics, it certainly outlines the state of politics in the use and issue of the StuGs. Tigers were issued to Tiger Battalions and some armored divisions.

Very interesting document written on 23.12.1943 by the General of Artillery in the General Staff of the Army, Fritz Lindemann, addressed to the Chief of the General Staff. Lindemann highlights the importance and effectiveness of the assault artillery and the negative consequences of the policy of disintegration of the production of assault cannons among the different weapons of the army.
The development of the Assault Artillery ( Sturmartillerie )

The tactical importance of the Sturmartillerie .

The Sturmartillerie is for our infantry, often faced with missions almost impossible to carry out, really the spine and where it acts, it is usually decisive in the results of the fight .

Its function cannot be overrated. The opinions of the commanders of all weapons coincide at this point.

The effectiveness of the Sturmartillerie is based on:

A technically formidable weapon, developed by artillery since 1936 as an armored vehicle for direct support of the infantry .

The fact that the Sturmartillerie represents the elite within the great artillery weapon (1.3 knight crosses per battalion).

A very thorough shooting training based on the principles of artillery.

A thorough analysis and acquisition of all tactical and technical experiences obtained in combat, a special merit of the assault cannon school ( Sturmgeschützschule ) of Burg .


The Panzeroffizier beim Chef Gen.Stab in his letter Nr.1063 / 43g.Kdos of 6.12.1943 and based on different statistical documents, has concluded that the Sturmgeschütz :

Of all the armored vehicles, it has caused the most enemy casualties,

Of all the armored vehicles it has suffered the least casualties,

Of all armored vehicles, it is the one with the highest percentage of operating vehicles.

The developed artillery Sturmgeschütz has become, based on its initial function, the most effective armored weapon in the field of infantry .

The Sturmartillerie has so far destroyed 12,000 tanks .


Probable development in the future course of the war .

The consumption of the strength of the physically and psychologically worn individual fighter, as can be seen in any long war, increasingly highlights the importance of artillery. Many high commanders certify that combat is carried out primarily with artillery. The spearhead of the artillery , based on its function of exonerating infantry in all aspects, is the Sturmartillerie .

The enemy , whose assault guns are organized in regiments belonging to the army's artillery (order of the main administration of the artillery of the Red Army of March 1943), underlines in its directives, among other points, that the regiments of assault cannons will only reach their maximum firepower when the entire regiment operates against in coordination with Infantry and tanks. The enemy values ​​the effects of the assault cannon fire from open positions and distances of up to 1,000 m as " decisive for the success of an infantry attack ."

The directives for the operations of the Russian assault artillery provide for the use of the assault guns as follows:

As a support weapon of the infantry, tanks or cavalry against the main direction of the attack.

As a combat reserve to repel enemy counterattacks.

As artillery support for tank depths.


These directives highlight the importance of this weapon, its tactical grouping on the battlefield with the objective of creating a center of gravity ( Schwerpunktbildung ) and should be evaluated as very timely.

The way in which the Russian evaluates our Sturmartillerie is reflected in an order of the Marshal of the Woronow artillery of 2.7.43, where it is written (excerpt):

The combat of enemy assault cannons must be given maximum importance and must be use all possible means to achieve its destruction:

Officers and the troop should be informed about the assault cannons . These should be able to differentiate them from a tank .

Anti-tank guns must receive special training for combat against assault guns.

When fighting enemy tanks with artillery, whenever possible, the assault guns that accompany them must be located first and the fire must be opened first.

Cannons used to make direct fire must always, as long as they do not have to defend themselves, fire first on assault cannons .

pp.

Based on the order of the popular commissioner for defense, No. 0387 of 24.6.43, anyone who has distinguished himself by the destruction of assault cannons will receive a decoration.


The Russian has the following calibers in his assault guns:

7.62 cm on T 70 chassis
8.5 cm on T 34 chassis
12.2 cm on T 34 chassis (seems to be that inefficient)
15.2 cm on KW chassis
20.3 cm on KW chassis (information is available, has not yet appeared in combat)


Based on captured documents as well as testimonies of prisoners there are:

Light assault cannon regiments with 5 batteries (7.6 cm)
Medium assault cannon regiments with 4 batteries (8.5 cm)
Heavy assault cannon regiments with 6 batteries (15.2 cm)


Throughout the next new year and in the infantry fighting field, German and Russian assault cannons will therefore collide on many occasions. The result of these combats will decide on the fate of the infantry over the place.


Conclusions :

Increase in the production of assault guns - already ordered by decision of the Führer

Based on the uniform organization of the Russian assault artillery, joint organization of the Sturmartillerie , as all the means are available:

Weapons

the staff

Training media (Burg assault cannon school) for the analysis of experiences gained in the fighting


In reality this weapon is fragmented , as the assault cannons, as of 1.12.43, are found in:

54% inside the Sturmartillerie
25.3% inside the Panzerwaffe
5.5% with the tank destroyers Infantry
2.2% within the Luftwaffe campaign divisions
13% within the Waffen-SS


Analysis of this situation :
The most effective weapon in the field of infantry is organizationally fragmented rather than being closely grouped, so to take advantage of the experiences obtained by the Sturmartilleriein combat in a uniform way in the training centers as well as to be able to carry out the creation of new formations with officers, non-commissioned officers and experienced troops, as naturally happens within the Sturmartillerie .

In front of the Russian assault artillery , uniformly organized and in combat directed by artillery chiefs, are the German assault cannons, organizationally fragmented between artillery divisions, Panzerwaffe , Panzergrenadiere , within the tank units in infantry divisions , within the Luftwaffe campaign divisionsor of the Waffen-SS. The most effective weapon of our severely touched infantry, is tactically fragmented into different weapons and is deprived of tactical training as well as a uniform way of operating, despite the existence of all personal and material requirements for it. It cannot be expected in this way to obtain the greatest possible efficiency.

The need for Panzertruppe is recognizedto assume a part of the production of assault guns, as long as it is a small number of vehicles and these are essential for the armored divisions. On the other hand, it is questioned that the tank units that have so far been equipped with anti-tank guns on wheels, assume assault guns, because the adaptation to armored vehicles is for these units something totally new. This lack of experience will be paid on the front with more losses of personnel and material.

For this reason it must be claimed that the tank destroyer units that are to be rearmed with assault cannons are assigned to the artillery. These units would be organized in the manner that has been previously mentioned on several occasions, mixing experienced officers, non-commissioned officers and Sturmartillerie troops , thus taking full advantage to relieve the infantry.

Facing the uniformly directed technical developmentof the Russian assault cannons, the German is again faced with a dualism, because according to the ordinances of the Inspector General of the Armored Troop the "heavy assault cannons" are subordinated to him, the light ones are not. The difference between the two is not clear.

It must be claimed that for the technical development of the Sturmartillerie , as well as for its organization and tactical employment, there is only one responsible.

The enemy develops super heavy assault guns that at some point may not be able to be fought with assault guns armed with 7.5 cm and 10.5 cm. Surprises in this field can have very unpleasant consequences.

It should be noted that the Sturmartillerie is being extrangulated :

In its technical development, it is missing the differentiation with the Panzerwaffe .

In its organizational structure, because the production of vehicles is fragmented.


From the conviction that in combat against a growing number of assault cannons and Russian tanks, the Sturmartillerie during the next year will see its importance increased in the battlefields, I am obliged to propose organic development again of a Sturmartillerie with a uniform formation .

Reducing the number of assault guns produced delivered to the Panzerdivisionen and Panzer-Grenadierdivisionen (transition period).

Assigning the tank destroyer units that must be rearmed with assault guns to the Sturmartillerie .

Clearly differentiating technical development and responsibility between:

The Panzerwaffe : Tanks (turret) in Panzer and Pz.Gren. Divisionen order and tactically operational act independently.

The Sturmartillerie : Assault cannons (without turret) of all sizes within assault cannon battalions as an army troop in order to cooperate directly with the infantry.

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Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Cult Icon » 31 Jul 2019 04:24

Very interesting read from the Stug lobby, thanks. Guderian has a fairly well known report where defensively argues about halting the decline of the tank vis a v the proliferation of the SPG-type. His argument was that the SPG-type's successes were due mainly to its doctrinal role and that overall the tank was a superior to SPGs with more tactical options.

It may be that the effectiveness of the Stug battalions/brigades was heavily attributable to the way they trained their personnel and the special qualities of German artillerymen- it would be interesting to see reports on the use of the SPGs in PzJager units and how they fared vs the artillerymen.

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Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Sheldrake » 31 Jul 2019 10:11

Cult Icon wrote:
31 Jul 2019 04:24
Very interesting read from the Stug lobby, thanks. Guderian has a fairly well known report where defensively argues about halting the decline of the tank vis a v the proliferation of the SPG-type. His argument was that the SPG-type's successes were due mainly to its doctrinal role and that overall the tank was a superior to SPGs with more tactical options.

It may be that the effectiveness of the Stug battalions/brigades was heavily attributable to the way they trained their personnel and the special qualities of German artillerymen- it would be interesting to see reports on the use of the SPGs in PzJager units and how they fared vs the artillerymen.
The debate about the relative effectiveness of yanks versus SP Guns is bound up with intra-service German Army politics. The Panzer Arm had Guderian as one of its main historic advocates and professional head as Inspector General. They owned tanks, defined as an AFV with a turret. The Panzer arm also owned all the schnelltruppen that made up Panzer Divisions. Panzer doctrine was rooted in the idea of concentrating armour to use at the right point.

The artillery arm owned SP Artillery including the Sturmartillierie that owned the StuG. The StUG were to provide the intimate support for infantry across the battlefield and grew in the niche left by the Panzer arm.

The arguments pro and against SP Guns and tanks put by either arm needs to take account of bias, as the Artillerie and Panzertruppen were in competition for AFVs, manpower and glory.

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Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Cult Icon » 31 Jul 2019 12:52

Yep. During the war the Assault gun/tank destroyer won major ground against the tank- starting from a minority of AFVs in 1939-1942 to up to about half in 1944, and then outnumbering the tank sometime in 1945.

It would be interesting to see sources about Stug training and if there was some correlation between artillery training and increased effectiveness in a AFV.

Stug.Abt.197- one of the first Stug units that was later refitted with the Ferdinand, was recruited from fully trained artillery officers and men. These were volunteers from the artillery branch, and about 50% were rejected.

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Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Yoozername » 31 Jul 2019 16:37

Sturmartillerie units could be attached to Panzer Divisions, and tactics and differences in operations came up. Specifically, , the StuG battalion would be assigned to the Panzer Division to make up for a tank battalion away on training (Panthers), or heavy losses in the PD tank battalions.

The StuG (that is, sturmartillerie) did not like to operate with either the tanks, nor the SPW battalion. They preferred to operate with the Panzergrenadiers that were on foot. And quickly became favorites of them since the StuG tactics allowed for low casualties and good results. When operating with the panzers, they would have issues with keeping up with them, and also had casualties from communication issues. The panzers operated on different radios.

Panzer units could have inherent StuG vehicles as issue, either as part of the tank destroyer battalion, or used as ersatz panzers. I would assume they would install 'panzer' radios, and were adopted to be used as needed.

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Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Yoozername » 01 Aug 2019 17:51

A 'snap-shot' of the state of the German Panzer and StuG in Jan 15 1945...first number operational, 2nd number in repair, 3rd number 'on the way'

Eastern Front

Panzer (all types)
1175 589 486

StuG
1803 394 434

{Of note, only 146 Tigers at this time are operational}

Other Fronts

Panzer
979 646 342

StuG
670 468 280

{96 Tigers operational}

I would assume that Hetzers and jagdpanzers would be under 'StuG'.

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Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Sheldrake » 01 Aug 2019 19:12

Yoozername wrote:
31 Jul 2019 16:37
Sturmartillerie units could be attached to Panzer Divisions, and tactics and differences in operations came up. Specifically, , the StuG battalion would be assigned to the Panzer Division to make up for a tank battalion away on training (Panthers), or heavy losses in the PD tank battalions.

The StuG (that is, sturmartillerie) did not like to operate with either the tanks, nor the SPW battalion. They preferred to operate with the Panzergrenadiers that were on foot. And quickly became favorites of them since the StuG tactics allowed for low casualties and good results. When operating with the panzers, they would have issues with keeping up with them, and also had casualties from communication issues. The panzers operated on different radios.

Panzer units could have inherent StuG vehicles as issue, either as part of the tank destroyer battalion, or used as ersatz panzers. I would assume they would install 'panzer' radios, and were adopted to be used as needed.
Are you sure about this?
SS Panzer Divisions had an organic Sturmgeschutz battalion, which were presumably trained as Sturm artillerie.

In Normandy StuGs also formed the equipment of the panzer battalion of some Panzer Grenadier Divisions e.g 17th SS, and part of II/10th SS Panzer regiment. But these seem to have been manned by panzertruppen rather than sturmartillerie.

In late 1944 at least part of Panzer Regiment 35 of 7th Panzer Division seems to have been equipped with the PzJ IV. Again panzer truppen not panzer jaeger.

The sturm artillerie arm was formed to provide close artillery support for the infantry. I cannot find details of training programmes to compare with the Panzerr arm

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Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Yoozername » 01 Aug 2019 19:45

Document published on 11.05.1943 by the Chief of the General Staff of the Army ( Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres ) based on excerpts from a report on the experiences lived by Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 232 between January and March 1943 on the Eastern front. The document defends among other aspects the use of the Sturmartillerie as an independent weapon and support for the infantry and criticizes its frequent subordination to the Panzerwaffe and the disadvantages that this entails for assault cannons.
Excerpts from the report of Stu.Gesch.Abt.232

During the period of operations the following experiences have been made:
Tactical experiences
Except for a few occasions, the commander has not had the possibility of directing his battalion together in combat from his vehicle. Unfortunately, it has also been a great exception that a battery has operated jointly under the direction of its boss. The ideal type of operations is naturally that in which the battalion or at least one battery operates completely on the ground. Due to the subordination of the battalion to the 7. Panzer-Division and the fact that the division has always reserved the decision-making capacity for the operations of each of the vehicles, on many occasions it has happened that a single vehicle has operated in an isolated way, an unsustainable situation and that repeatedly but without success has been protested. However, this demonstrates the combat value attributed to our assault cannons, even when they have operated in isolation. The fact that this lonely vehicle was lost, partly because of small things, is normal. Assault cannon operations have almost always been ordered directly from the division and without knowing the battalion. For this reason in many Ocasons the battalion has totally unknown where and in what unit their vehicles have been found. Assault cannon operations have almost always been ordered directly from the division and without knowing the battalion. For this reason in many Ocasons the battalion has totally unknown where and in what unit their vehicles have been found. Assault cannon operations have almost always been ordered directly from the division and without knowing the battalion. For this reason in many Ocasons the battalion has totally unknown where and in what unit their vehicles have been found.

The battalion differentiates between the different types of operations: operations with grenadiers on foot, operations with grenadiers in semi-tracked vehicles ( SPW ) and operations with tanks.
Operations with grenadiers raised in the assault canyon
After a brief period of time the coordination between the two has been perfect. This type of operation has reaped great successes from the assault guns at the cost of very low casualties among the grenadiers. Also the losses between the assault guns have been very low, not producing until now no total loss. The only total losses that the battalion has suffered have occurred when they have operated within an armored group. Both the grenadiers and the assault cannons have been fully aware that one depended on the other, which is why there has always been a perfect understanding that has led to exceptional cooperation between the two.

This is valid to a greater extent only for the grenadiers who have fought climbs in the assault cannons, as the chiefs of these grenadiers have demonstrated against them, for them already known battery or platoon chiefs, always a great understanding by the way of operating our weapon.

Operations of our assault guns with semi-tracked vehicles
They have been a disadvantage for us. The grenadiers have almost never abandoned their vehicles; The speed of semi-tracked vehicles, also in combat, has always been much greater than that of assault cannons, which is why 1. we have suffered breakdowns in vehicles and 2. our vehicles have not had the necessary protection and have They have often been put out of combat by their flanks because they cannot overcome, like semi-crawler vehicles, full-speed resistance nests.

Operations with tanks
These operations involve the following disadvantages:

It can be said that there is a general opinion that our assault cannons are operatively positioned at the same level as the tanks. Assault cannon operations have so far generally occurred based on this thought. Slowly it seems that we are managing to convince the relevant bodies that the assault cannons, both in their driving and in the way they operate, differ from the tanks.

A great disadvantage is the fact that communication with the tanks can only be carried out through a single assault cannon of the battalion, as our assault cannons use a different frequency than the tanks. Because the division has employed isolated assault cannons, these vehicles were generally isolated from the armored unit's communication.

During the attack we could not maintain the speed of the tanks due to the greater frontal load of our assault guns. Due to its good frontal armor our assault guns have sometimes been used as a shield far ahead of the tanks, which greatly increases the risk of being attacked by the flanks. Tanks usually fire during the march, so our assault guns have also suffered the threat of being hit by the tanks. When crossing enemy infantry lines without the support of the grenadiers, our assault cannons have been advanced by the tanks, which has always been a great threat (casualties among vehicle managers). When the enemy is flanked, the tanks advance at high speed and direct their cannon towards the enemy. Assault cannons have to advance without protection from their sides, which has led to losses due to scopes on their sides.

When they hit strong nests of enemy resistance, the tanks usually withdraw without notifying the assault guns, leaving these isolated and exposed to fire from all types of anti-tank weapons. Total losses have been lost for this reason.

During the attack on urban centers they have almost always been sent on the front line to the assault guns, followed by tanks that have fired in all directions. Once the assault cannons have broken the main resistance, the tanks have advanced at full speed to our cannons so that they have not again had the necessary lateral protection, so necessary in urban combats (casualties between vehicle heads by snipers and grenades). In urban and house-to-house fighting, it is necessary that the assault cannons be located transversely, which greatly hinders the attack of the tanks.

These experiences have shown that the operations of the assault guns with tanks and partially with semi-tracked vehicles have not been successful, because:

There has been no understanding at all of the way in which assault cannons operate.

Assault cannons have been used as tanks.

There have been abundant casualties as well as many breakdowns due to the large speeds of the tanks.

There have been very high losses caused by pockets of resistance and shooting from the flanks. The tanks at no time have thought it necessary to protect the flanks of the assault cannons.

The operations with the tanks have resulted in high casualties and total losses in exchange for a minimum, in many cases, no success.

Finally, it should be mentioned that all total losses have occurred only in cooperation with armored groups. In cooperation with the grenadiers, they have always alerted the assault cannons of resistance bulbs (anti-tank rifles, anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft, tanks, etc.) so that they can be put out of combat. 90% of the enemy anti-tank tanks and cannons destroyed by the battalion have been produced within the framework of operations next to the grenadiers.

The full recognition and praise of the assault cannon crews by the heads of the grenadiers, are a sign of the great support they have received as well as the exemplary behavior they have shown on the battlefield.

As a result of these experiences any platoon or vehicle chief tries to avoid cooperation with the tanks and instead tries by all means to enter into combat alongside the grenadiers.

Night operations and during the dark have to be considered at best as a moral strengthening of the troops employed. Only rarely have practical effects and successes been achieved in relation to the fight against the enemy. Even so, the assault cannons have been used at night almost always for protection purposes, instead of keeping them prepared behind the front line as a reserve force. Especially during the cold winter it is necessary to wonder if in case the enemy had managed to cross our lines, the assault guns could have been freed quickly from the enemy.

Often night reconnaissance operations have been carried out, operations in which we have rejoiced every time the assault cannon has returned unharmed. The many night marches, marches that due to the situation in the front have indeed been necessary on occasion, the technical state of the assault guns has suffered greatly, especially the engines, because due to poor visibility, drivers have had to drive in a very sharp way; Due to poor ground conditions, assault cannons have been continuously immobilized. In one case, during an overnight march, an assault cannon was completely lost when it fell down a slope.



Successes of the battalion between 7.1 - 12.3.1943

154 tanks
24 heavy anti-tank guns
109 light anti-tank guns
27 grenade launchers
130 machine guns
82 trucks
16 vehicles with trailers
61 anti-tank rifles
11 armored reconnaissance vehicles
29 cannons
2 bunkers
17 anti-aircraft
guns 2 salvage guns ( Salvengeschütze )
2 artillery observation vehicles
1 tugboat


Losses of the battalion

Personal:

Fallen Wounded Sick
Officers 3 4 two
NCOs 6 16 4
Troop 14 2. 3 twenty


Materials:

12 assault guns
3 trucks
1 Volkswagen
8 motorcycles with sidecar
1 motorcycle without sidecar

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Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Yoozername » 01 Aug 2019 19:49

Sheldrake wrote:
01 Aug 2019 19:12


Are you sure about this?
SS Panzer Divisions had an organic Sturmgeschutz battalion, which were presumably trained as Sturm artillerie.

In Normandy StuGs also formed the equipment of the panzer battalion of some Panzer Grenadier Divisions e.g 17th SS, and part of II/10th SS Panzer regiment. But these seem to have been manned by panzertruppen rather than sturmartillerie.

In late 1944 at least part of Panzer Regiment 35 of 7th Panzer Division seems to have been equipped with the PzJ IV. Again panzer truppen not panzer jaeger.

The sturm artillerie arm was formed to provide close artillery support for the infantry. I cannot find details of training programmes to compare with the Panzerr arm
I believe that Panzermen were used in the Organic StuG Bn inside Panzer Division. That is, they were not artillerymen trained for the Sturmartillerie arm. The main use of the Panzer StuG being as panzerjaeger.

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Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Yoozername » 01 Aug 2019 19:52

Double post

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Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Cult Icon » 01 Aug 2019 19:56

There was definitely a practice of attaching either a Stug or Tiger battalion to increase the combat strength of a panzer division, evident in operational histories.

I think the Yerger books on the SS formations can show clues about which training programs the SPG personnel took (The Waffen SS was trained with a lot of army courses). The Stugs of 2.SS "DR" reported more enemy armor destroyed per unit than the Panzer Regiment.

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Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Cult Icon » 04 Aug 2019 17:06

I remember now- in the 2.SS and 3.SS the GCG holders that crewed the AFVs were in most cases former infantrymen from earlier battles. They were retrained for new roles during the conversion process from motorized ID to PzD.

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Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Yoozername » 05 Aug 2019 01:53

Cult Icon wrote:
01 Aug 2019 19:56
There was definitely a practice of attaching either a Stug or Tiger battalion to increase the combat strength of a panzer division, evident in operational histories.
This is the common theme, that is, battalion sized units that could be attached to Divisions or be part of a Kampfgruppe, or a Corp asset. The Tiger tank battalions did include FlaK vehicles as organic elements (perhaps later units?), this IS something that the Sturmartillerie wanted, and they wanted something like the quad 20mm on a Panzer III chassis. I believe it was even prototyped, but again politics and fighting for resources probably got even worse as the war dragged on.

I don't think Tiger units, or StuGs, or many other AFV units, felt they could rely on the late war German infantry, and the FlaK afv were very potent additions.

I believe there are instances where Tiger units were attached to infantry Divisions. Traditionally, this is work the Sturmartillerie would do.

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