Tiger and Stug tactics

Discussions on the vehicles used by the Axis forces. Hosted by Christian Ankerstjerne
Michael Kenny
Member
Posts: 6154
Joined: 07 May 2002 19:40
Location: Teesside

Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Michael Kenny » 09 Sep 2019 20:59

Yoozername wrote:
09 Sep 2019 20:28

A nice clear picture....

Image

https://c1.staticflickr.com/5/4625/2540 ... c949_h.jpg
If you are going to copy Baz at least link to his site.
https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/archive ... ussion/all

This is the post you lifted the image from:

https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/archive ... .html#p261

and whilst I have no trouble with 'nice' the 'clear' seems a stretch. This is the uncluttered original from page 204 of 'The Forgotten Archives 1'
aug 16 2019510.jpg
You do not have the required permissions to view the files attached to this post.

Yoozername
Member
Posts: 2025
Joined: 25 Apr 2006 15:58
Location: Colorado

Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Yoozername » 09 Sep 2019 21:05

I didn't know you were made a moderator. Congrats. But, the main point is you made an incorrect statement as far as Sturmartillerie units not getting their 'escorts'?

So, can you link a source as far as StuG III/IV lasting only 30 seconds? I take it you do understand you made another rather bold statement?

User avatar
Terry Duncan
Forum Staff
Posts: 5673
Joined: 13 Jun 2008 22:54
Location: Kent

Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Terry Duncan » 09 Sep 2019 22:38

A pointless and inflamatory post from Michael Kenny was removed by this moderator, along with a further pointless response from Yoozername that added nothing to the topic other than to set up a possible flame war. You gentlemen have been here long enough to know the rules do not permit this sort of behaviour, so please refrain from acting in such a way. I am sure the senior staff here will look very dimly on such a display especially after having to take action previously on the same subject. Reasonable discussion where you address the points made by someone, and respond to them with actual details rather than personal remarks are perfectly possible from both of you, so please restrict your posts to the sort that fall within the rules, or you will likely be subject to further sanctions from the senior staff.

Terry Duncan

Yoozername
Member
Posts: 2025
Joined: 25 Apr 2006 15:58
Location: Colorado

Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Yoozername » 11 Sep 2019 15:47

A report from Panzer-Elmito site... August '43...seems almost all weapon systems had to deal with the masses of Soviet armor

Document drafted on 21.08.1943 and addressed to the Jüterbog Assault Cannon School where the commander of the 'StuG-Abt. 244 'proposes, within the process of improvement and development of assault cannons, the replacement of 7,5-cm-StuK 40 L / 48 with a better performance cannon against armored targets.

Note: Influenced especially for political reasons (increasing use of assault guns as tank vehicles) Assault Artillery would not strongly support equipping its assault cannons with better anti-tank performance cannons. (see eg this document )
Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 24
4


In relation to : Command of the assault cannon school, test group nr. 1470/43
Subject : Technical development of the assault cannon

In the annex, the Abteilung presents the answer to the questionnaire. In reference to the technical development of the assault cannon, the Abteilung also makes the following suggestions:

It must be an urgent matter to create an armed assault cannon with a cannon of effects equal to the 8.8 cm of the Tiger. Especially during the course of defensive fighting, assault guns have been used almost exclusively as tank vehicles. During the attack the Russians frequently support their tanks with heavy anti-tank guns located in very advanced positions; the tanks generally advance to the first line and clean it systematically. On flat terrain it has often been impossible to approach tanks at effective combat distances - approximately 1,800 meters for caliber 48 with Panzergranate 39 - (in one of these attempts the AbteilungOf 12 vehicles involved, 7 assault guns lost 2 of them total losses due to the fire of the anti-tank guns. For this reason in the future and in similar situations, such missions should be rejected, something that could have a very negative impact on the great prestige that this weapon still has. The Tiger normally destroys the T-34 and the KW I at distances of 3,000 meters with the fifth shot, with the second usually setting it on fire. For this reason he has always been able to help in this type of situation.

Also in the attack we have frequently encountered situations in which a superior effective range of fire would have been absolutely necessary.


Signed Großkreutz
Major and commander of the Abteilung

User avatar
Cult Icon
Member
Posts: 1612
Joined: 08 Apr 2014 19:00

Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Cult Icon » 11 Sep 2019 16:32

^
The book "Iron Cross Brigade" is about this unit and is a combination of memoir and unit history. I haven't read my copy yet though.

Very interesting report. If that was a general view of Stug units than it means that the L/70 was sought to improve sniping capabilities against Soviet anti-tank guns. The Soviets sealed off the Eastern Front and neutralized German armor operations to a severe degree with their vast quantity of anti-tank units. However, while strategically effective these AT weapons were frequently not efficient against German armored attacks. It's like they were used as a universally available/ shock-absorbing barrier to pre-empt the German armor from much higher value tasks.

Yoozername
Member
Posts: 2025
Joined: 25 Apr 2006 15:58
Location: Colorado

Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Yoozername » 11 Sep 2019 20:28

It is odd that the report does not mention the StuH? I would imagine that it could fight the antitank guns more effectively. I suppose it was somewhat rare. Here is a nice chart showing production.

http://www.stug.ch/produktion/

Image

Some of the ranges mentioned in that report seem rather long. I guess everyone exaggerates.

I always felt that Sturmartillerie units should have had both organic AA, and also some indirect fire capabilities. Even something like 12 cm mortars.

User avatar
Cult Icon
Member
Posts: 1612
Joined: 08 Apr 2014 19:00

Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Cult Icon » 16 Sep 2019 06:42

"Kampfgruppe Chill and the German recovery in the West between 4 September and 9 November 1944, a case study"

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/do ... 1&type=pdf

This was the basis of the expanded tome "Autumn Gale".

In reading this I find it an excellently researched study that covers, in-depth, use of Stug units with and around KG Chill in the fall of 1944. (PzJ 559 (1 x company Jadpanther, 2 x company Stug), Stug 667, Stug 280, Stug 244) Beyond that it focuses on the largely successful mobile defense actions of KG Chill and its overall strategic impact.

The many armored actions covered show one unsuccessful and several successful gegenstoss (hasty counterattacks) of SPG-type vehicles with significant casualties. The bulk of the actions covered are about successful blocking actions with Stug and Jadpanther in the defense.

User avatar
Cult Icon
Member
Posts: 1612
Joined: 08 Apr 2014 19:00

Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Cult Icon » 17 Sep 2019 00:58

observations regarding armored combat:

+ Heavy PzJ 559's first company (Jadpanther) was notably more durable than the Stugs of 2nd and 3rd against CW anti-tank weapons which resulted in a higher kill rate (559- This combat unit's AFVs were mostly written off in 3-weeks of heavy action). However, the tradeoff was inferior tactical mobility, which effected their deployment in the fighting.

+ In the case of Heavy PzJ 559, it's loss rate in counterattacks were noticeably greater than that of positional defense and the SPG type vehicles were sub-optimally used due to 1. their connection with the infantry- at times maldeployed- 2. lack of a tank's flexibility and features. 3. In a bridgehead counterattack, the unit was deployed in individual companies rather than as an entire battalion, which lead to repeated scenarios where SPGs were outnumbered by allied armor and forced into an uneven fight.

+engagements of all SPG units were in the main taken in ranges well beneath the long range capabilities of their guns- the smaller profile didn't seem to play a major role in them being disabled by Cromwells and Shermans (IIRC two skirmishes did). Stug's kill rate in these skirmishes were roughly the same as the allied mediums they were facing save for a few engagements where a troop or a squadron was shot up.

User avatar
Aida1
Member
Posts: 861
Joined: 04 Aug 2019 08:46
Location: Brussels

Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Aida1 » 03 Jan 2020 17:27

" Panzerjäger Abteilung 31 22 september 1943

concerns: conference concerning antitank questions with the Panzer offizier beim chef Gen stab d Heeres

I. Experiences with Pak Sf and Sturmgeschützen
1) The 7,5 cm PAK 40 Sf 38 t (motor 180 PS) has satisfied all requirements contrary to the 7,62 cm PAK 36 Sf 38 t(120 PS motor)
2) The equipment of Panzerdivisions with Pak Sf seems superfluous given the general tense material situation, on the contrary with the infantrydivisions it is more and more necessary
Motivation: In the Panzerdivisions the antitank defense is guaranteed with the henceforth almost exclusively available L 48 barrels
In the most recent fighting the Pak Sf in the Panzerdivisions were not only used for antitankdefense but also like tanks , a use for which it was not created and which therefore causes heavy losses.
Concerning the Pak mot Z , with its volume and weight getting bigger, and its towing means its camouflage and getting into position are more and more difficult . Consequence: heavy losses through artillery fire. Nevertheless, the PAK mot Z remains indispensable in the 14.companies.On the contrary, the PAK Sf of the Panzer Jäger Abteilungen can with correct positioning be removed from ennemy sight and enemy fire. In addition, a fast movement in threatened areas is possible, which has special importance in the east where divisional sectors are large.

3) The most favourable solution for the equipment of the Panzerjäger Abteilungen will be considered,as long as a pure equipment with Sturmgeschütze is not possible , the equipment of the Panzerjäger Abteilung with a company Pak Sf and a company of Sturmgeschütze.
Motivation:
a) The Pak Sf and the Sturmgeschütz supplement each other well, as the Pak Sf has better vision with lower armour, but the Sturmgeschütz has stronger armour with worse vision possibilities . Coupling Pak Sf and Sturmgeschütze has therefore proven itself.
b) the equipment of a Panzerjäger Abteilung with only one Pak Sf company without a Sturmgeschütz company is not functional because the infantry sees the Pak Sf as a Sturmgeschütz and from experience puts demands accordingly concerning its operations or even orders such a wrong operational use.
c) A further advantage of the Sturmgeschütz company within the Panzerjäger Abteilung is that the supervision of the appropriate use of the batteries of the Sturmgeschütz company distributed over 2-3 divisions is better guaranteed. The difficulties which appear again and again with batteries widely separated from each other come from
1. Maintenance services too far away
2. Difficulties in the supply of food,ammo and fuel
3.The continuous far movements without time for maintenance
4. Arrival at the last minute, going into action headlong without proper recce
d) It has also become apparent that Sturmgeschütze crews which only know their weapon and were newly set up, are not fully aware of the value of a Sturmgeschütz . Only the Panzerjäger, who has started with the 3,7 cm Pak and has moved up over the different PAK or Sf (Lorraine etc...), can measure the value of a Sturmgeschütz.
4. In the distribution of the Sturmgeschütze among the Panzerjäger Abteilungen, a preceding judgment of the Abteilung is necessary as there is a lot of difference in the battleworthiness and the will for a full effort among the Abteilungen. Reports on the battle worthiness of the individual divisions and thereby also its Panzerjäger Abteilungen can be given by the Armies.The judgement on the battle worth of the Panzer Jäger Abteilungen would also be one of the missions of the anti tank staff officer ."

User avatar
Aida1
Member
Posts: 861
Joined: 04 Aug 2019 08:46
Location: Brussels

Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Aida1 » 03 Jan 2020 21:00

" Panzer Abteilung 506 commander Abt.Gef. St. 30.9.1943

Preliminary experience report Panzer Abteilung 506

I.…..
II.Tactical use in the Saporoshe bridghead as mobile reserve

20 september 12.00 the Panzer Abteilung 506 was subordinated to the 9.Panzerdivision , which itself had only 3-8 Panzer operational. This was under the command of XXXX Pz Korps for dealing with local breakthroughs.
Conditioned by the forming of the bridghead, the companies were used individually, the 20.,21.,22. and 23 .where the russians tried to break through the weak positions.The Panzer strengths were per company 10,11 and 13 Panzer. Each time, with the help of the Tiger it was succeeded in beating back the russians.The continuous being in action and the many shiftings did not leave much time for technical maintenance of the Panzer. There was barely enough time to replenish the fuel and ammo.
The 24. the Abteilung was in action as a unit with all operational Panzer with a strength of 13 Panzer, the 25. with 11 and the 26. with 9. After the attack on 26.9 , which was a break out of the bridghead into the enemy artillery positions, no operational Tiger was available anymore.
The superior command was made aware that when attacks were made out of the bridghead, Panzer that were disabled and could not be towed away, would have to be blown up and fall into the hands of the enemy.
The 9.Panzerdivision used the Tiger correctly, unfortunately it,as well as me could not prevent that the Tiger were required to do too much and orders were given to the company commanders which lead to the loss or disabling of Panzer, which were not necessary. The propaganda in our press presented the Tiger as an invulnerable battering ram. However, it can be killed by a T 34 or a 7,62 cm frontally from 500 m and from the side and from the rear from 1500 m.When dealing with breakthroughs, the infantry , whose morale had not really been strengthened by the retreat ,only went forward when a Tiger accompanied it into the old positions. That a barndoor attracts all the fire on itself on the battlefield, and that this separates the infantry from the Tiger is an old experience, which is however not believed. The low Sturmgeschütze are better suited for this mission, but not the big and 2,88 m high Tiger. The strength of the Tiger is its wide ranging 88 mm gun and not the armour. It should not be used as a moving wall. When, during the bringing forward of the infantry, the Tiger stood behind a cover against sight, from which they could give fire support as well, the infantry went down and could not be moved forward anymore.Then came orders like : Tiger attack too lame, advance further.When the Panzer made a jump of 1 km, in order not to stand on the top of a rise, then the infantry went down again, the Tiger haven driven away from them. The tight grouping of infantry together behind the Panzer could not be avoided by orders or instructions, but only through enemy mortar fire. Often, the Tiger stood for hours far in front of the infantry in the enemy artillery and mortar fire, without the infantry coming up. Because of the long standing under fire , the traktion is shot,Panzerbüchsen mostly fire at gun and opticals and the PAK hits from a long distance cause damage to the Panzer, even when they do not penetrate.When the Tiger moves back and looks for a better position , the infantry moves back immediately. It believes that when this Panzer cannot hold out in the fire, then it certainly cannot.

Lesson: the Tiger supports the advance of the infantry by direct fire and must have its freedom of movement during this.The infantry should not stick behind the Tiger like grapes , otherwise it will sustain the fire meant for the Panzer. It must advance open as if there were no Tiger."
Translation to be continued

johnwilliamhunter
Member
Posts: 97
Joined: 22 Jul 2003 14:56
Location: Australia

Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by johnwilliamhunter » 04 Jan 2020 15:15

Yoozername wrote:
01 Aug 2019 17:51
A 'snap-shot' of the state of the German Panzer and StuG in Jan 15 1945...first number operational, 2nd number in repair, 3rd number 'on the way'

Eastern Front

Panzer (all types)
1175 589 486

StuG
1803 394 434

{Of note, only 146 Tigers at this time are operational}

Other Fronts

Panzer
979 646 342

StuG
670 468 280

{96 Tigers operational}

I would assume that Hetzers and jagdpanzers would be under 'StuG'.
The numbers are from Panzer-Lage and Sturmgeschützlage, there is a seperate Artl.- u. Pak (Sf.)- Lage which includes Jagdpanzer, so Hetzers and jagdpanzers are not under 'StuG', 'though the numbers for 'Panzer' do include Pz. IV L70.

User avatar
Aida1
Member
Posts: 861
Joined: 04 Aug 2019 08:46
Location: Brussels

Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Aida1 » 04 Jan 2020 18:05

" Panzer Abteilung 506 commander Abt.Gef. St. 30.9.1943

Preliminary experience report Panzer Abteilung 506

VI Conclusion

The Tiger was praised in the press and a lot of propaganda as invulnerable and a pure life Insurance, so that the superior commands as well as the ordinary infantryman belived they could do anything with this fortress all the time. But it is not so.The russian fires with all weapons at the traktion, the gun and the optikals . With the strong artillery and the dust and smoke, it was often not possible to fire ourselves. In the hits sustained by the Tiger , there were relatively few penetrations. Many vehicles were disabled but the crew mostly remained protected. Nevertheless, the Abteilung had the first 7 days and nights of operations with 45 Tiger(of which 41 in operation) :
9 dead of which 2 officers
16 badly wounded(of which 3 officers) and
20 lightly wounded (of which 3 officers)
After 7 days of operations, no Tiger was operational(6 total loss, shot up,burnt out and blown up).
Even the Tiger is vulnerable and should not be divided up along a broad front in the HKL. If the Tiger should be divided up because of the situation, then the Tiger in cover and lurking will be superior to any enemy moving up. However, in advances of a few Tiger in the enemy terrain they can easily fall victim to the concentrated fire of the enemy defensive weapons. Yes, in this case he is the victim of the propaganda."

Yoozername
Member
Posts: 2025
Joined: 25 Apr 2006 15:58
Location: Colorado

Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Yoozername » 05 Jan 2020 03:23


Yoozername
Member
Posts: 2025
Joined: 25 Apr 2006 15:58
Location: Colorado

Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Yoozername » 05 Jan 2020 07:09

johnwilliamhunter wrote:
04 Jan 2020 15:15


The numbers are from Panzer-Lage and Sturmgeschützlage, there is a seperate Artl.- u. Pak (Sf.)- Lage which includes Jagdpanzer, so Hetzers and jagdpanzers are not under 'StuG', 'though the numbers for 'Panzer' do include Pz. IV L70.
Thanks please post it.

Yoozername
Member
Posts: 2025
Joined: 25 Apr 2006 15:58
Location: Colorado

Re: Tiger and Stug tactics

Post by Yoozername » 05 Jan 2020 07:18

Cult Icon wrote:
16 Sep 2019 06:42
"Kampfgruppe Chill and the German recovery in the West between 4 September and 9 November 1944, a case study"

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/do ... 1&type=pdf

This was the basis of the expanded tome "Autumn Gale".

In reading this I find it an excellently researched study that covers, in-depth, use of Stug units with and around KG Chill in the fall of 1944. (PzJ 559 (1 x company Jadpanther, 2 x company Stug), Stug 667, Stug 280, Stug 244) Beyond that it focuses on the largely successful mobile defense actions of KG Chill and its overall strategic impact.

The many armored actions covered show one unsuccessful and several successful gegenstoss (hasty counterattacks) of SPG-type vehicles with significant casualties. The bulk of the actions covered are about successful blocking actions with Stug and Jadpanther in the defense.
Thanks. I printed it out.

Return to “The Ron Klages Panzer & other vehicles Section”