what were the panther tank flaw?

[Leo Niehorster]

Thanks for help, it is finally something definite, because the info from google seems to be conflicting on practically everything.

Sadly most of what I have concluded are by inference from the memorial at Mourmelon, since there is not much that isn't otherwise Wiki-based repeats of other snippets. Unfortunately, it seems most of our knowledgeable French members have fled from the extended influx of trolls here, otherwise I would think one of them would have responded by now. Bronsky, David Lehmann, and Claude Gillono would probably know, but I do not recall a post from them in years. Bronsky last visited in January 2019, I don't even remember David's or Claude's user name now. I could try emailing Claude and see if he knows.

Did you find out anything about these contributors?
--
Leo

[Richard Anderson]

Thanks for help, it is finally something definite, because the info from google seems to be conflicting on practically everything.

Sadly most of what I have concluded are by inference from the memorial at Mourmelon, since there is not much that isn't otherwise Wiki-based repeats of other snippets. Unfortunately, it seems most of our knowledgeable French members have fled from the extended influx of trolls here, otherwise I would think one of them would have responded by now. Bronsky, David Lehmann, and Claude Gillono would probably know, but I do not recall a post from them in years. Bronsky last visited in January 2019, I don't even remember David's or Claude's user name now. I could try emailing Claude and see if he knows.

Did you find out anything about these contributors?
--
Leo

No Leo, I have Claude's email and communicate infrequently, but don't think I've heard from him in years? David even longer and Bronsky has not posted in about forever. Sadly, the atmosphere is no longer conducive to thoughtful, evidence-based posted.

[Avalancheon]

No Leo, I have Claude's email and communicate infrequently, but don't think I've heard from him in years? David even longer and Bronsky has not posted in about forever. Sadly, the atmosphere is no longer conducive to thoughtful, evidence-based posted.

What makes you say that, Richard? Is it the sudden influx of all them upstart youngin's?

[Richard Anderson]

No Leo, I have Claude's email and communicate infrequently, but don't think I've heard from him in years? David even longer and Bronsky has not posted in about forever. Sadly, the atmosphere is no longer conducive to thoughtful, evidence-based posted.

What makes you say that, Richard? Is it the sudden influx of all them upstart youngin's?

No, its the influx of idiots doing everything they possibly can to change history by creating false narratives and whack-job "what ifs" like your late buddy christianmunich and others.

[critical mass]

For whats worth, I enjoyed readings of You (Richard Anderson, Art) and many others. But I agree that the problem is often encountered in poster to not attempt to understand the events as happening in lieu of a skewed narrative and whishful thinking. Or worse, to use this forum as a misguided arena of social competition in whiches cause factoids are buried under layers of insult. It makes me loose my temper, too. Thats why plain messages in Your contributions are not just appreciated but necessary.

[Stiltzkin]

For whats worth, I enjoyed readings of You (Richard Anderson, Art) and many others. But I agree that the problem is often encountered in poster to not attempt to understand the events as happening in lieu of a skewed narrative and whishful thinking. Or worse, to use this forum as a misguided arena of social competition in whiches cause factoids are buried under layers of insult. It makes me loose my temper, too. Thats why plain messages in Your contributions are not just appreciated but necessary

Then you are addressing the wrong people, as they are equally guilty of this.

[Leo Niehorster]

Makes popcorn.

--
Leo

[Aida1]

Translation of part of the conference note to the experience report Gen Insp/Chef-Gruppe Nr 80/43 gkdos of 17.07.1943

I. Panzerkampfwagen Panther

1. Tactical experiences

Command errors

a) Pulling back other weapons where Panther is used
b) deficient cooperation with other weapons
c) brigade staff was not effective due to personal frictions
Conclusions:

a)Use of the Panther at the center of gravity,with it all available other weapons
b) means against flank vulnerability of the Panther
- cooperation with other weapons
- broad disposition of the attack wedge

Opinion Panzer officer:
Necessary cooperation with other weapons is only given with incorporation of Panther Abteilungen in their old divisions(known there,cooperation is trained, confidence in the command etc...)

2. Organisation

a)composition of combat units worked out well(per company 4 platoons with 5 Panther and 2 PanTher in the company troop)
b) equipment with wheeled vehicles can be reduced
3. Training

a) level of training bad because of too much adaptations to the tank instead of training during the training period
b) large part of losses due to bad training

Opinion panzer officer:

More time for training

4. Technics

a) Gun good , observation made worse after a few shots due to powder smoke
b) vulnerability of the side(40 mm armour)
c) jamming of the turret hatch( getting out impossible in case of fire etc..)
d) fuel pumps do not work well , because of that mixture of fuel and oil in the motor compartment. The gas which is is created cannot get out because of the airtightness of the hull(amphibious capability), therefore burning out of the Panther when hit in the hull

Opinion of the Panzer officer:
Improve fuel pumps,give up the amphibious capability

……..
V. Summary

1) Main experience : No independent Panzer units but basically incorporation in the divisions. This way all failures due to lack of cooperation are eliminated from ther start(for example Panther Abteilung 51 back to 9. Pz, Panther Abteilung 52 back to 11. Panzer)
2) Panther is a very good Panzerkampfwagen after eliminating the technical defects and with thorough training.

[Aida1]

Translation of Annexe 1 to the report of Gen Insp d.Pz.Tr . Chefgruppe/ 80/43

"Account of the operations of Pz Rgt(Panther)v.Lauchert

1.Tactical experiences

The commitment of this new Panzer weapon does not free the command from acting according to the proven basic principles of Panzer operations.Specifically this is true for the cooperation with other weapons and the use of united Panzer units.
The General inspector had set up a brigade staff for the Grossdeutschland div. which was reinforced by a Panther Regt, in order to ensure the command over the 300 tanks of this division.This staff was ,initially, not used because of personal frictions.The command over the tanks suffered from this as well as the collaboration with other weapons. Personal feelings should play no role when the fate of the Reich is at play.
It is wrong to pull out other weapons where the Panther are used, only because the Panther are there.
Rather it is correct to build a clear additional center of gravity by other weapons-artillery,engineers,Airforce, Pz Grenadiere to achieve a resounding and quick success with light losses.
THe attack is to be carried fast into the depth of the enemy defense system to take out the enemy artillery and to ensure the accompanying by the infantry.
After the high losses of the first days,the further losses were relaively bigger because the number of the Panther going into battle was very lower. This was even more so as a support of the Panther by other weapons was not ensured.
The enemy defense by 7,62 cm and KwK was only succcessfull against the Panther by flanking fire.
There were no penetrations of the frontal armour. From this must be concluded that the monitoring of the flanks of the Pantherattack must be the main focus.
For this all other available weapons must be enlisted.
THe Panther unit must use a broad formation for the attack to eleiminate any flanking of the core of the attack.
When coming under fire,individual vehicles must be positioned frontally to the enemy fire.
During the breakthrough of a deep, mined main battle area,the subordination of radio controlled tanks will be provided in the future.
Timely cooperation with engineers is to be ensured in any case.Material for the crossing over marshland has to be temporarilycarried to avoid interruptions in the conduct of the attack.

II Organisation

The structure of the combat units of the Panther regiment has proven itself. Never should the platoons,companies and Abteilungen become weaker. The equipment with wheeled vehicles can be reduced., specifically because the supplying of all tanks will practically never be needed because of the contuinually occurring losses."

To be continued

[Richard Anderson]

Then you are addressing the wrong people, as they are equally guilty of this.

Sure. I don't suffer fools or dishonesty gracefully. Sue me. :roll:

[Aida1]

translation of Annexe 1 to the report of Gen Insp d.Pz.Tr . Chefgruppe/ 80/43

"Account of the operations of Pz Rgt(Panther)v.Lauchert

"III Training

The time for training was too short.The drivers therefore could not get the necessary practical experience.
The technical personnel is not sufficiently trained, the gunners and commanders did not get the necessary tactical training.
Because of the necessary rebuilding work in Grafenwohr,exercises were only done up to the platoon level.
This lack of training became very visible.
A large part of the tactical and technical losses are due to this.

IV Situation of the Regt after 7 days of operations

In the first days combat strength dropped strongly because of enemy action and technical breakdowns.

10.07 in the evening there were:

in action 10 Panther
total loss 25 Panther( of which 23 hit and burned out and 2 due to fires on the march)
in maintenance 100(56 with damage from hits and mines and 44 with technical damage)
60% of the technical damage is light
repaired and on the march to the front around 40 Panther
remainder of around 25 Panther not yet in the maintenance services

11.07 in the evening :
operational 38 Panther
total loss 31 Panther
in repair 131 Panther

A slow mounting of the operational strength can be seen.
The high number of Panther disabled by enemy fire(until 10.07: 81) shows the heavy nature of the combat."

to be continued

[Aida1]

translation of Annexe 1 to the report of Gen Insp d.Pz.Tr . Chefgruppe/ 80/43

"Account of the operations of Pz Rgt(Panther)v.Lauchert

" The deep heavily mined main battle area of the russians had to lead to an above average loss of material by fire and mines.
The Pnazer IV and Tiger were also not spared from this.
The fact that the Panther appeard for the first time on the battlefield exposed it to a lot of interest.
Comparisons were not made with the losses of other Panzer units.
Therefore commanders and troop came fast to the prepature conclusion = the Panther is unsuitable
To to this it has to be observed in conclusion:
The Panther has proven itself during operations. That there are more losses due to technical causes at first, should be expected,
because long testing by the troop was not performed.
The curve of operational vehicles is going up. After remedying the defects in the fuel pumps and in the motor, losses due to
technical causes will be kept at a normal level.
The above average level of losses due to enemy action exhibits the heavy nature of the fighting ."

[Mobius]

Flaw huh?
The Panther was too good looking.

[Yoozername]

An overall opinion is that the Panther design just tried too hard. Basically, the Germans went for a trifecta, and should have sacrificed the mobility (speed) aspect and just went with an excellent gun (among the best) and decent armor (facing within an arc of enemy fire).

[Peasant]

I'm gonna repost here a comment I've made elsewhere about Panther tanks:

At the expense of seeming a bit pedantic, just because Panther had similar weight to a heavy tank, does not mean we can say that "... it straddled the line between heavy and medium tank." it just means it was a badly designed and overweight medium tank.

(Classical) heavy tank designs have certain features, other than their weight, that sets them apart from medium tanks of the similar weight:

Their armour is weakly differentiated between the front/side/rear meant to protect it in a roughly similar measure from attacks from every direction, a feature required by it's tactical role as it will likely get under fire from side and rear as it pushes inside and beyond the enemy defensive line.

Operational range is usually smaller than that of other types of armored vehicles, as the vehicle is not required to move under it's own power for large distances, only a few dozen km at most, enough to breach the enemy front line, so the fuel storage capacity is sacrificed for smaller internal volume to keep the weight in check.

Being expected to operate under large, sustained volumes of fire gives rise to design decisions directing towards preserving the operational capability after sustaining numerous non-penetrating hits, like: extra protection for the turret ring to prevent its jamming from MG fire, extra robust design of tracks and suspension in general, that requires it not only to be strong enough to move the tank but operate after sustaining multiple hits.

This is by no means an exhaustive list of features that set heavy tanks apart from medium ones, just some I could get off the top of my head.

Which is to say, in my opinion, Panther was a medium tank design and should be compared to other medium/MBT designs like M26 Pershing/T-44 and Centurion, not with heavy tanks of similar weight, like the JS-2.