Cult Icon wrote: ↑31 Mar 2021, 05:37
Significant to this had to do with the chaotic and fragmented movement of the Pz divisions as they approached the landings. The allied air offensive made their approach to the beachheads poorly organized. Once there, they threw in hasty attacks with available assets to immediately lock down the Allies, which is typical of German combat doctrine (When confronting enemy attacks, Act first think later). The rest of their divisional elements were still in-transit. All three Panzer divisions (12.SS, 21.Pz, Pz Lehr) were not successful in challenging British-Canadians and their attacks were disorganized and hasty. However, they did lock down the British-Canadians and stop them from progressing further and taking Caen.
I don't disagree with most of this, but hastily throwing the Hitlerjugend's Panther companies against the enemy without a cogent plan was wasteful and sloppy. Allowing frustration over how long it took them to reach the beachhead to color their planning was also ill-advised. Now they had their orders, so maybe they had to attack. I just think it could have been done better. Look at the plan for their attack on 8 June. Attacking Bretteville and Cardonville Farm with two companies of panthers and a
single company of panzergrenadiers was a fool's errand. And, yes, I know they were expecting help from Mohnke's regiment. Fight your way to the church, send up a flare, and the tanks will meet you there, was not much of a plan. Bretteville was held by three Canadian infantry companies, plus a platoons of medium machineguns, and four batteries of anti-tank guns, two of which were 17 pounders. The Canadian infantry also had PIAT HEAT launchers, which meant that they could defend themselves effectively from German tanks, especially in town. The Germans were lucky not to have had heavier losses. The Canadians did a pretty pithy job of summarizing the hasty German counterattacks at Bretteville, Norrey and Cardonville farm, and described them as throwing in their resources as they arrived on the ground and without particular tactical skill or imagination. Courageous, yes. Smart, no. And again, the successful hasty counterattack, on 7 June, at Authie and Buron, was more thoughtfully planned, and was supported by the Panzer IV battalion.
You may have hit on one of the issues though, which was the use of Panther battalions as counterattack forces, since so many counterattacks in Normandy seemed to be hasty, ill-conceived, and dismissive of enemy strengths, scale of firepower and support. It took them a while to grasp that Eastern Front tactics were the wrong formula and didn't often yield success in Normandy. It seems like Hitlerjugend's most successful counterattack was at Authie and Buron on June 7, 1944, and it was supported by the Panzer IV's of their 2nd battalion.
This is basically not correct, the 12. SS HJ- and other armored units in Normandy- had many successful (albeit small, at the platoon and company level) armored counterattacks in those 3 months. Their most unsuccessful ones were in the beginning of the campaign. A successful battalion sized counterattack was the one they used to contain TOTALIZE- KG Waldmuller which destroyed the Worthington Force.
This is how they held the Caen and its environs for so long- by counterattacking. EPSOM-CHARNWOOD-JUPITER-TOTALIZE etc..
Where we differ here is whether these were defensive successes, or offensive successes. I just don't see much German offensive success in Normandy. Quite the opposite. Contrast it to Salerno, in September of 1943, where German mechanized kampfgruppe responded, counterattacked, causing at one point borderline panic on the beachhead. They inflicted over 3:1 in casualties, and then withdrew in fairly good order, to avoid being cut off by Montgomery's forces, approaching from the south. This was done largely supported with Panzer IV's and STUG's, and none of the "star" tanks like Tigers and Panthers. Admittedly these were somewhat veteran mechanized troops, but still, it's good soldiering.
9th SS and 10th SS were originally equipped without Panthers, having all Panzer IV's and STUGs in their panzer regiments, and I consider that they were largely involved in defensive successes in the west. Like everyone else, they were eventually attritted away and submerged in the end. Just like 12th SS was.
I just can't escape the impression that when I see poor tank handling by the Germans in the west, it is often with Panthers rather than Panzer IV's. Was it more common? I don't know, it may just be a recurring theme in the written accounts I have read. The Panther is a better defensive tank and should have had lower combat loss rates, and yes, better crew survivability. The only real advantages the Panzer IV has over the panther are a lower silhouette, and better automotive reliability. Obviously there are lots of examples of successful use of the Panther.
Again, I'm not advocating the theory that Panzer IV crews tended to be more experienced or better. I said that I had read it, and asked if it was true, seeking clarification from members on the forum. I then added that I see more examples of sober tank handling by Panzer IV crews than by Panther crews in the west. My impression. So citing examples of effective use of the Panther and then rebutting with effective use of the Panzer IV is not going to get us anywhere. There are so many variables involved in every example, that it's all just food for thought.
Maybe another way to approach it is, does one act differently as a tank crewman or tank commander, when you know your vehicle is vulnerable from most angles and common combat ranges to most common enemy anti-tank weapons? I'm sure many Sherman crewman would say that it does. Even the front of the Panzer IV turret was vulnerable to most of the anti tank weapons used by the Western allies. Maybe I'm giving largely conscript tank crewman too much credit for knowing the score about where they really stood on the battlefield, but the Germans were not naïve and did institutionally know about the ballistic vulnerabilities of their tanks. On the other hand, did Panther crewman and commanders often overestimate the armored protection their vehicle would provide?