what were the panther tank flaw?

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Michael Kenny
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Re: what were the panther tank flaw?

#151

Post by Michael Kenny » 31 Mar 2021, 16:11

Cult Icon wrote:
31 Mar 2021, 15:43


"The 116.Panzer-Division's Panther Battalion July-August 1944 in Normandy" by Didier Lodieu has a combat history focused on a single Panther battalion. This unit also came to the Normandy front late (late July) and had some moderate attack successes in the first 13 days of operations largely against Task Force 1 (US 3rd Armored Division) with 49 American tanks damaged and destroyed for 19 total loss (10 to Shermans, 1 to AT gun, 3 to artillery, 3 by air attack, 1 by mine, 1 abandoned).

That is not a like-for-like comparison The true measure should be all German casualties v all US casualties.
Comparing one sides total loss number to the others total casualty numbers gives a very skewed comparison

Michael Kenny
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Re: what were the panther tank flaw?

#152

Post by Michael Kenny » 31 Mar 2021, 16:33

The 9th SS paperwork is a puzzle and something 'big' happened during their first action in Normandy. It would seem the Panther casualties are seriously undercounted for this period.

https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/missing ... 21108.html


Yoozername
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Re: what were the panther tank flaw?

#153

Post by Yoozername » 31 Mar 2021, 17:16

ThatZenoGuy wrote:
31 Mar 2021, 03:31
I'd argue the turret was in desperate need of improvement.

The frontal thickness was approximately 100-110mm, with an additional spall catcher of unknown thickness and material behind it (Anyone got any sources on this?) and the side thickness was 45mm, enough to stop an anti tank rifle and not much else.

The M4A3 Sherman, a much lighter tank had just as much frontal turret armor, and 60mm+ side armor.

For its weight the Panther should have had, at least 130mm protection on the front, rendering it basically immune to anything smaller than an 85mm to near point blank range. The Schmalturm fixed this to some degree but it was a monolithic 120mm plate, at the time when curved pieces of armor was becoming especially common, and more effective layouts of armor was available.

Its strange that the Germans went for a rather modern 'slopes everywhere!' design for the hull, but then dropped the ball with the huge mantlet design ala the Tiger 1.

What was the first German vehicle to use a 'small mantlet' design turret? The Puma?
I do agree that the turret was a bad design. But the frontal turret armor is cast armor. This can probably be found here in a Miles thread. That is, not only is the curved mantlet a casting, but so is the turret frontal armor. This near vertical armor that extends on either side of the mantlet is the weakest aspect of the frontal armor presented by the tank.

The trunnion width, and large mantlet is a poor choice. Hits on the mantlet are taken up by the trunnions and transmitted to the weapon mount. The recoil elements are mounted side by side with the gun tube. This is not very well laid out, and having these elements either above or below is a much better design (see T34/85). The Tiger II seems to have learned this lesson. Keep the frontal armor narrow and use a small mantlet.

Many people claim the interlocking armor used in the German tanks to be superior way of mating up plate. Studying pictures of this armor that has been hit, it appears the Germans did not use deep welds to assemble this. In some cases it looks like barely surface welds. Having service troops weld up hit tanks is just another load on those troops.

The 'spall catcher' is actually the gun cradle. I would venture it is not armor per se, but might stop any cast armor pieces or nuts and bolts that fly inside. One report says the crews had to torque down the trunnion attachments after a few hits.

I think this image may show some 'protection' that it may give. The mantlet bolts to this at 4 points.

Edit: One good point is that the Panther turret was easier to make or assemble than the Tiger tanks.

Image

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Re: what were the panther tank flaw?

#154

Post by Yoozername » 31 Mar 2021, 18:26

This image shows what 'protection' the gun cradle gives the gunner. The sight is missing in the image. The black mass is the mantlet.Note that the sight is rigidly mounted to the roof. It has an articulated end that attaches to the elevating elements. Any impacts/shock would be transmitted to the optics.

The image shows how the trunnions are fastened with the two 'allen' bolts on the left, and the two bolts on the right go all the way through the gun cradle to the mantlet. Actually a very long bolt IMO.
gunnerp.jpg

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Re: what were the panther tank flaw?

#155

Post by Yoozername » 31 Mar 2021, 18:49

This image gives a good idea how this is all held together. Of note is the 'H' shaped device which is the bearing that goes around the trunnion. It is on a 'slide' structure and is held in from the rear by the 'allen' bolts mentioned above. The long black mantlet bolts are seen protruding.

Note the casting number 106 on the bottom of the turret armor. It has not been covered with zimmerit. Also, the 'ears' are part of that casting as well as the triangular areas of the turret face. The Germans never went for big castings like sherman turrets. i don't think that the extra armor on sherman turret sides was worth it either. In any case, the Germans were welding plate armor into cast armor. The side armor of the turret is mated to the cast armor through a notched area cast into the front, and the side armor plate is cut to lay in it and be welded. I believe there was a design change on how they interlocked.
turrtpv.jpg
This display shows more details. The gun is out of battery, perhaps to make it balance. In any case, the bearings for the trunnion are pointing upward, the holes should be facing backwards.

Image

This image shows the bare turret w/o gun, etc. It might also reveal some extra protection. The guides for the trunnion bearings is apparent. But the casting appears to show thicker side armor on the 'ears' of the casting. The ears are said to be only 5 cm thickness, but if you look closely, the armor further back would be thicker. Also, the overlap of the mantlet and casting is apparent along the edge area. A penetration of the mantlet along the outer edge of the mantlet , while destroying the bearing/trunnion, is facing more cast armor. The casting is drilled out and worked, of course. the small holes are for some weather proofing. The guides for the bearings are probably machined, etc.
barepanturr.jpg
Last edited by Yoozername on 31 Mar 2021, 19:17, edited 1 time in total.

AKahl
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Re: what were the panther tank flaw?

#156

Post by AKahl » 31 Mar 2021, 19:04

Cult Icon wrote:
31 Mar 2021, 05:37

Significant to this had to do with the chaotic and fragmented movement of the Pz divisions as they approached the landings. The allied air offensive made their approach to the beachheads poorly organized. Once there, they threw in hasty attacks with available assets to immediately lock down the Allies, which is typical of German combat doctrine (When confronting enemy attacks, Act first think later). The rest of their divisional elements were still in-transit. All three Panzer divisions (12.SS, 21.Pz, Pz Lehr) were not successful in challenging British-Canadians and their attacks were disorganized and hasty. However, they did lock down the British-Canadians and stop them from progressing further and taking Caen.

I don't disagree with most of this, but hastily throwing the Hitlerjugend's Panther companies against the enemy without a cogent plan was wasteful and sloppy. Allowing frustration over how long it took them to reach the beachhead to color their planning was also ill-advised. Now they had their orders, so maybe they had to attack. I just think it could have been done better. Look at the plan for their attack on 8 June. Attacking Bretteville and Cardonville Farm with two companies of panthers and a single company of panzergrenadiers was a fool's errand. And, yes, I know they were expecting help from Mohnke's regiment. Fight your way to the church, send up a flare, and the tanks will meet you there, was not much of a plan. Bretteville was held by three Canadian infantry companies, plus a platoons of medium machineguns, and four batteries of anti-tank guns, two of which were 17 pounders. The Canadian infantry also had PIAT HEAT launchers, which meant that they could defend themselves effectively from German tanks, especially in town. The Germans were lucky not to have had heavier losses. The Canadians did a pretty pithy job of summarizing the hasty German counterattacks at Bretteville, Norrey and Cardonville farm, and described them as throwing in their resources as they arrived on the ground and without particular tactical skill or imagination. Courageous, yes. Smart, no. And again, the successful hasty counterattack, on 7 June, at Authie and Buron, was more thoughtfully planned, and was supported by the Panzer IV battalion.
You may have hit on one of the issues though, which was the use of Panther battalions as counterattack forces, since so many counterattacks in Normandy seemed to be hasty, ill-conceived, and dismissive of enemy strengths, scale of firepower and support. It took them a while to grasp that Eastern Front tactics were the wrong formula and didn't often yield success in Normandy. It seems like Hitlerjugend's most successful counterattack was at Authie and Buron on June 7, 1944, and it was supported by the Panzer IV's of their 2nd battalion.
This is basically not correct, the 12. SS HJ- and other armored units in Normandy- had many successful (albeit small, at the platoon and company level) armored counterattacks in those 3 months. Their most unsuccessful ones were in the beginning of the campaign. A successful battalion sized counterattack was the one they used to contain TOTALIZE- KG Waldmuller which destroyed the Worthington Force.

This is how they held the Caen and its environs for so long- by counterattacking. EPSOM-CHARNWOOD-JUPITER-TOTALIZE etc..

Where we differ here is whether these were defensive successes, or offensive successes. I just don't see much German offensive success in Normandy. Quite the opposite. Contrast it to Salerno, in September of 1943, where German mechanized kampfgruppe responded, counterattacked, causing at one point borderline panic on the beachhead. They inflicted over 3:1 in casualties, and then withdrew in fairly good order, to avoid being cut off by Montgomery's forces, approaching from the south. This was done largely supported with Panzer IV's and STUG's, and none of the "star" tanks like Tigers and Panthers. Admittedly these were somewhat veteran mechanized troops, but still, it's good soldiering.

9th SS and 10th SS were originally equipped without Panthers, having all Panzer IV's and STUGs in their panzer regiments, and I consider that they were largely involved in defensive successes in the west. Like everyone else, they were eventually attritted away and submerged in the end. Just like 12th SS was.

I just can't escape the impression that when I see poor tank handling by the Germans in the west, it is often with Panthers rather than Panzer IV's. Was it more common? I don't know, it may just be a recurring theme in the written accounts I have read. The Panther is a better defensive tank and should have had lower combat loss rates, and yes, better crew survivability. The only real advantages the Panzer IV has over the panther are a lower silhouette, and better automotive reliability. Obviously there are lots of examples of successful use of the Panther.

Again, I'm not advocating the theory that Panzer IV crews tended to be more experienced or better. I said that I had read it, and asked if it was true, seeking clarification from members on the forum. I then added that I see more examples of sober tank handling by Panzer IV crews than by Panther crews in the west. My impression. So citing examples of effective use of the Panther and then rebutting with effective use of the Panzer IV is not going to get us anywhere. There are so many variables involved in every example, that it's all just food for thought.

Maybe another way to approach it is, does one act differently as a tank crewman or tank commander, when you know your vehicle is vulnerable from most angles and common combat ranges to most common enemy anti-tank weapons? I'm sure many Sherman crewman would say that it does. Even the front of the Panzer IV turret was vulnerable to most of the anti tank weapons used by the Western allies. Maybe I'm giving largely conscript tank crewman too much credit for knowing the score about where they really stood on the battlefield, but the Germans were not naïve and did institutionally know about the ballistic vulnerabilities of their tanks. On the other hand, did Panther crewman and commanders often overestimate the armored protection their vehicle would provide?
Remain yourself, in spite of all the mighty do.

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Re: what were the panther tank flaw?

#157

Post by AKahl » 31 Mar 2021, 19:06

Sorry, I guess I messed up trying to quote sections and respond to them in part. Still, if you read it carefully, you can see where the quotes end and I start talking.
Remain yourself, in spite of all the mighty do.

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Re: what were the panther tank flaw?

#158

Post by AKahl » 31 Mar 2021, 19:10

Cult Icon wrote:
31 Mar 2021, 05:37
AKahl wrote:
31 Mar 2021, 04:39

You listed some of the examples with the 12th SS Division's use of its Panther battalion, some of which seemed almost non-sensical. Like, "let's bumrush the enemy, with minimal infantry support, expose our flanks and toss aside every advantage our tanks have."
Significant to this had to do with the chaotic and fragmented movement of the Pz divisions as they approached the landings. The allied air offensive made their approach to the beachheads poorly organized. Once there, they threw in hasty attacks with available assets to immediately lock down the Allies, which is typical of German combat doctrine (When confronting enemy attacks, Act first think later). The rest of their divisional elements were still in-transit. All three Panzer divisions (12.SS, 21.Pz, Pz Lehr) were not successful in challenging British-Canadians and their attacks were disorganized and hasty. However, they did lock down the British-Canadians and stop them from progressing further and taking Caen.
I don't disagree with most of this, but hastily throwing the Hitlerjugend's Panther companies against the enemy without a cogent plan was wasteful and sloppy. Allowing frustration over how long it took them to reach the beachhead to color their planning was also ill-advised. Now they had their orders, so maybe they had to attack. I just think it could have been done better. Look at the plan for their attack on 8 June. Attacking Bretteville and Cardonville Farm with two companies of panthers and a single company of panzergrenadiers was a fool's errand. And, yes, I know they were expecting help from Mohnke's regiment. Fight your way to the church, send up a flare, and the tanks will meet you there, was not much of a plan. Bretteville was held by three Canadian infantry companies, plus a platoons of medium machineguns, and four batteries of anti-tank guns, two of which were 17 pounders. The Canadian infantry also had PIAT HEAT launchers, which meant that they could defend themselves effectively from German tanks, especially in town. The Germans were lucky not to have had heavier losses. The Canadians did a pretty pithy job of summarizing the hasty German counterattacks at Bretteville, Norrey and Cardonville farm, and described them as throwing in their resources as they arrived on the ground and without particular tactical skill or imagination. Courageous, yes. Smart, no. And again, the successful hasty counterattack, on 7 June, at Authie and Buron, was more thoughtfully planned, and was supported by the Panzer IV battalion.
Remain yourself, in spite of all the mighty do.

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Re: what were the panther tank flaw?

#159

Post by AKahl » 31 Mar 2021, 19:13

Cult Icon wrote:
31 Mar 2021, 05:37
You may have hit on one of the issues though, which was the use of Panther battalions as counterattack forces, since so many counterattacks in Normandy seemed to be hasty, ill-conceived, and dismissive of enemy strengths, scale of firepower and support. It took them a while to grasp that Eastern Front tactics were the wrong formula and didn't often yield success in Normandy. It seems like Hitlerjugend's most successful counterattack was at Authie and Buron on June 7, 1944, and it was supported by the Panzer IV's of their 2nd battalion.
This is basically not correct, the 12. SS HJ- and other armored units in Normandy- had many successful (albeit small, at the platoon and company level) armored counterattacks in those 3 months. Their most unsuccessful ones were in the beginning of the campaign. A successful battalion sized counterattack was the one they used to contain TOTALIZE- KG Waldmuller which destroyed the Worthington Force.

This is how they held the Caen and its environs for so long- by counterattacking. EPSOM-CHARNWOOD-JUPITER-TOTALIZE etc..
Where we differ here is whether these were defensive successes, or offensive successes. I just don't see much German offensive success in Normandy. Quite the opposite. Contrast it to Salerno, in September of 1943, where German mechanized kampfgruppe responded, counterattacked, causing at one point borderline panic on the beachhead. They inflicted over 3:1 in casualties, and then withdrew in fairly good order, to avoid being cut off by Montgomery's forces, approaching from the south. This was done largely supported with Panzer IV's and STUG's, and none of the "star" tanks like Tigers and Panthers. Admittedly these were somewhat veteran mechanized troops, but still, it's good soldiering.

9th SS and 10th SS were originally equipped without Panthers, having all Panzer IV's and STUGs in their panzer regiments, and I consider that they were largely involved in defensive successes in the west. Like everyone else, they were eventually attritted away and submerged in the end. Just like 12th SS was.

I just can't escape the impression that when I see poor tank handling by the Germans in the west, it is often with Panthers rather than Panzer IV's. Was it more common? I don't know, it may just be a recurring theme in the written accounts I have read. The Panther is a better defensive tank and should have had lower combat loss rates, and yes, better crew survivability. The only real advantages the Panzer IV has over the panther are a lower silhouette, and better automotive reliability. Obviously there are lots of examples of successful use of the Panther.

Again, I'm not advocating the theory that Panzer IV crews tended to be more experienced or better. I said that I had read it, and asked if it was true, seeking clarification from members on the forum. I then added that I see more examples of sober tank handling by Panzer IV crews than by Panther crews in the west. My impression. So citing examples of effective use of the Panther and then rebutting with effective use of the Panzer IV is not going to get us anywhere. There are so many variables involved in every example, that it's all just food for thought.

Maybe another way to approach it is, does one act differently as a tank crewman or tank commander, when you know your vehicle is vulnerable from most angles and common combat ranges to most common enemy anti-tank weapons? I'm sure many Sherman crewman would say that it does. Even the front of the Panzer IV turret was vulnerable to most of the anti tank weapons used by the Western allies. Maybe I'm giving largely conscript tank crewman too much credit for knowing the score about where they really stood on the battlefield, but the Germans were not naïve and did institutionally know about the ballistic vulnerabilities of their tanks. On the other hand, did Panther crewman and commanders often overestimate the armored protection their vehicle would provide?

(this is a cleanup of my failed attempt to quote and respond earlier)
Remain yourself, in spite of all the mighty do.

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Re: what were the panther tank flaw?

#160

Post by AKahl » 31 Mar 2021, 19:27

My bad. Hohenstaufen had been joined by it's panther battalion with 79 Panthers by the time it deployed to Normandy. It was Frundsberg which had only Panzer IV's and STUG's.
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Re: what were the panther tank flaw?

#161

Post by AKahl » 31 Mar 2021, 20:35

ThatZenoGuy wrote:
31 Mar 2021, 03:31

What was the first German vehicle to use a 'small mantlet' design turret? The Puma?
I don't know if it was the first, but the Puma turret was a lighter armored version of the turret for the VK 16.02 Leopard light tank, which was never put into series production. The tank itself, designed for a recon role, looked like a little panther, with a 50mm front glacis plate and a 5 cm KwK 39 gun.
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Re: what were the panther tank flaw?

#162

Post by ThatZenoGuy » 01 Apr 2021, 04:05

Yoozername wrote:
31 Mar 2021, 17:16
I do agree that the turret was a bad design. But the frontal turret armor is cast armor. This can probably be found here in a Miles thread. That is, not only is the curved mantlet a casting, but so is the turret frontal armor. This near vertical armor that extends on either side of the mantlet is the weakest aspect of the frontal armor presented by the tank.
The turret was cast, but it was in a shape that didn't really exploit casting as a sloping method, and in fact resulted in a shot trap potentially.

The lower and upper parts of the mantlet were technically much tougher than 100mm of armor, but the centre bit was 'only' 100mm thick, not a good idea when the hull front is nearly 150mm effective, and the turret is the first place to be shot at usually.
AKahl wrote:
31 Mar 2021, 20:35
I don't know if it was the first, but the Puma turret was a lighter armored version of the turret for the VK 16.02 Leopard light tank, which was never put into series production. The tank itself, designed for a recon role, looked like a little panther, with a 50mm front glacis plate and a 5 cm KwK 39 gun.
Huh, I think I might recall information like that...When was the Leopard supposed to be created? Before or after the Panther?

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Re: what were the panther tank flaw?

#163

Post by AKahl » 01 Apr 2021, 09:04

ThatZenoGuy wrote:
01 Apr 2021, 04:05
AKahl wrote:
31 Mar 2021, 20:35
I don't know if it was the first, but the Puma turret was a lighter armored version of the turret for the VK 16.02 Leopard light tank, which was never put into series production. The tank itself, designed for a recon role, looked like a little panther, with a 50mm front glacis plate and a 5 cm KwK 39 gun.
Huh, I think I might recall information like that...When was the Leopard supposed to be created? Before or after the Panther?
Wikipedia says early 1943. Then they cancelled it and never built any prototypes. Just went with the Luchs, I guess, and then cancelled that too.
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Re: what were the panther tank flaw?

#164

Post by Cult Icon » 05 Apr 2021, 05:47

AKahl wrote:
31 Mar 2021, 19:13

Where we differ here is whether these were defensive successes, or offensive successes.
The German method of defense was the...offense!. They immediately counterattack breaches in the line with local forces. That's what armor do in the defense.

The Germans were on the strategic defensive the whole time between early attacks of 21.Pz, Pz Lehr, and 12.SS. in the first week until the Mortain counterattack. The fresh 116.Pz with a few depleted formations. This counterattack's scale resembled most closely, that of those routinely practiced by individual armies or army groups in the East. The battle ended up into an attritional fight until superior US forces came in to cause the Germans to quit.

The Germans attempted to position themselves to make a massed Panzer offensive by I SS and II SS Pz Corps (there are famous diagrams of such) but were pre-empted by the extreme pressure being put on their units by the Allied offensives. So their units were locked down by these assaults. The SPWs (armored halftracks) of the Pz Lehr division and 2.SS division were placed in the rear area, probably similar for the other Pz divisions. Operation Perch and the fighting for Point 103, Cristot, Tilly-sur-Selles, etc and the struggle to prevent the taking of Villers-Bocage and the outflanking of Caen inflicted over 3,000 casualties on the Panzer Lehr division before it was moved to the US sector circa June 25th. Ritgen claims that these losses fell predominantly on the infantry. Bayerliein (Pz Lehr) called his division fought-out and wasted as an offensive asset at this point. Besides that the Germans in Normandy and the West had to contend with the tactical superiority and extremely superior volume of Allied artillery and air support, which broke up their combined arms team. The hasty attack of the 9.SS "H" with elements of the 2.SS (II SS Pz Corps counterattack) was heavily effected by this superiority and the attack degenerated into a slow attritional slugfest with the Scotts.

The book I mentioned in a prior post- the 116.Pz's panther battalion- covers the attack of I./Panzer-Regiment 24 (which provided 14 Panthers for a mixed battlegroup attached to the 2.Pz) in more detail. This unit made the furthest advance in the Mortain counterattack, but was soon encircled by superior American forces while fighting elements of 4.ID, 2.AD, 3.AD, etc. that threatened to cut them off and destroy them. They were severely attacked with artillery fire and ground-attack aircraft. The commander of the KG, Colonel Scharke was killed by US self-propelled artillery gun fire and replaced by von Meyer, the commander of I./Panzer-regiment 24, the Panther battalion.

Like Peiper the spearhead was surrounded. Unlike Peiper this commander managed to perform a fighting retreat and leave the high-water mark in-tact. He was rewarded the RK for this and the details of the award can be seen here:

https://www.tracesofwar.com/persons/120 ... o.htm?c=aw

The 11.Pz, equipped with Panthers, had an interesting and special ways of attacking in the west aimed at minimizing the effects of their opponent's tactical superiority. Their unit was successful in southern France- admit a disastrous overall situation and in the Lorraine. The commander Wietersheim has an interesting post-war interview on their methods. The fighting at Rechicourte la Petite Sept 26-29 against their nemesis throughout the last year of the war- US 4th Armored- is covered in various literature and illustrates this clearly.

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Re: what were the panther tank flaw?

#165

Post by Cult Icon » 05 Apr 2021, 06:02

The following excerpt written by Generalleutnant Graf von Schwerin describes how Meyer would receive the Knight’s Cross…

“On the 06.08.1944 Major von Meyer, commander of the I./Pz.Rgt. 24, was subordinated to Kampfgruppe Oberst Scharke (2. Panzer-Division) for the attack from the Sourdeval area (8 km north of Mortain) towards the west and the thrust towards Avranches.

At the head of his Abteilung, he broke through well built enemy positions and thrusted in the direction of le Mesnil Tove under the heaviest of opposing fire. After a short but fierce battle the village was captured. The enemy suffered substantial losses. As the Kampfgruppe commander became a casualty while in this village, Major von Meyer stepped into this role on his own initiative and without hesitation. Then, after allowing the Panzergrenadiers to mount up onto his Panzers, he capitalized on the success thus far by advancing to Mesnil-Adelee.

After reaching the village the enemy launched a counterattack following a strong preparatory barrage and bomber attacks. Unfazed by the enemy, and despite being wounded in both arms, Major von Meyer directed the Panzergrenadiers into position and inspired them to resist through his own personal example. At 10:00 on the 07.08.1944 the enemy managed to penetrate into the northern part of the village in battalion strength and with tank support. Major von Meyer personally responded with 2 Panzers and was able to throw the enemy back in a counterattack. There was persistent heavy fire on the village.

After this penetration had been resolved the enemy tried again by attacking from the south, and were once again able to penetrate into the SW part of the village with a weak battalion and tanks. The German infantry were forced out, and they retreated back to a ravine 1 km west of le Mesnil Tove. Von Meyer remained in the village with his Panzers and, as all Kompanie leaders had fallen, he once again personally led a counterattack which captured the southern edge of the village.

Since the enemy now threatened to cut off the village from the East, Major von Meyer took his Panzers and formed a hedgehog position 1.5 km east of le Mesnil Adelee. Along the way he gathered up straggling Grenadiers and deployed them as infantry security. Here the Kampfgruppe (which was inspired to the highest resistance by its commander) was able to hold out until 04:00 on the 08.08.1944 despite heavy air/artillery strikes and constant enemy attacks. Then, after receiving orders to retreat and break out to friendly lines near Sourdeval, the Kampfgruppe disengaged. West of le Mesnil Tove, Meyer linked up with the separated SPW Gruppe and was able to reach the German lines after heavy fighting.

Successes: 18 enemy tanks destroyed
Own losses: 5 Panzers

Major von Meyer is well known to his Abteilung as a dashing commander, who demands the utmost from himself and his troops. It is to his credit that the Kampfgruppe of Oberst Scharke could break through to a depth of 10 km into the enemy lines. He fought at the head of his Abteilung and the Kampfgruppe as a whole during the penetration, and despite the fall of the original commander and his own wounds he continued the attack on his own initiative upon recognizing the necessity of swift action.”

4091st Award.

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