Classification of a wreck

[Tom from Cornwall]

Thanks to those who clarified the terms in the 16 Pz Div war diary. Still a bit ambiguous, as usual!

Are there any details from the Italian front in either of the “Repairing the Panzers” volumes?

Regards

Tom

[Ulater]

Probably a side-topic, but the Panzerworld numbers show Panzer I and II being repaired in substantial numbers. While they had a need for training vehicles, it seems a bit much.

There were 10 transmissions and engines for Pz II still distributed in spare part depots in february 1945.

Thanks to those who clarified the terms in the 16 Pz Div war diary. Still a bit ambiguous, as usual!

Are there any details from the Italian front in either of the “Repairing the Panzers” volumes?

Regards

Dunno, much of the stuff I posted is within 10 pages of pages Kenny sourced.

So far, I was only able to find about how germans loved Sherman as a recovery vehicle in Italy, because they could park it next to a disabled vehicle, crawl out of the floor hatch, and cut the tracks while being under hard cover.

[Yoozername]

deleted

[Yoozername]

Dunno, much of the stuff I posted is within 10 pages of pages Kenny sourced.

So far, I was only able to find about how germans loved Sherman as a recovery vehicle in Italy, because they could park it next to a disabled vehicle, crawl out of the floor hatch, and cut the tracks while being under hard cover.

That is interesting. I imagine they would feel the same way as T34 being used the same way. Also, it seems the Germans did refer the the M4 as a 'Sherman' or 'General Sherman' in reports.

[Ulater]

Pz IIs were used well past their first service role.

[Ulater]

"Wilhelm Pirch, was ordered to reconnoiter toward Varvarovka, while a Kgr. of II./Pz.Rgt.15 and I./Pz.Gr.Rgt.111 thrust east in a dogged engagement. (Major Kaldrack took over Pz.G.R.111.) Nonetheless Russian forces entered Krivoi Rog on 25 October—though they were then forced out again—and they captured Dnepropetrovsk that same day. With the division near Krivoi Rog and the maintenance shops 300 kilometers (186 miles) back north at Smela near Cherkassy, on the 26th Wietersheim ordered the I-Dienste forward, sending vehicles lacking replacement parts or not repairable in ten days back to the Berdichev depots." (12)

Ganz, A. Harding. Ghost Division (pp. 205-206).

(12) XXXX. Pz.Korpsbefehl 24.10.43, KTB Ia, T-315/600/001506; Div. Befehl für Instandsetzungsdienste aus Smela, Anlage zum Ia KTB, T-315/602/000856. Normally, short-term repair was that made within fourteen days, long-term after.

Ganz, A. Harding. Ghost Division (p. 351).


Another thing that I find, is that the definition of both total losses and duration of repairs seemed to change a lot.


Anybody has ID on that Panzer IV pic from 1st post? Mr. Kenny seems to be unwilling to share ... for some reason.

[Michael Kenny]

Looks like you got your monies worth from that paragraph.

Not just the one source

Earlier you wrote:

A good read if anyone wants

https://history.army.mil/html/books/104 ... _104-7.pdf

and your own source provides confirmation that total wrecks were recovered and wrecks were kept with the unit





Page numbered 19 (pdf.27)
Under these circumstances, the personnel at the field repair shops preferred to deadline the tanks for prolonged periods or even cannibalize them rather than use the depot maintenance services. Among the armored forces in Russia there was a strong aversion to allowing a disabled tank to leave the regimental area. Even though cannibalization of a tank meant its loss, this procedure enabled the maintenance personnel to put other tanks back into operation..............................

page numbered 36 (pdf.44)
The Germans experienced very few instances in which it was not considered worthwhile to recover a disabled tank. The guiding principle was that no tank would be abandoned unless it was blown to bits or completely burnt out. In every other case recovery was mandatory, even though cannibalization was often the only possible use
to which the the recovered vehicle could be put.
.............................

[Ulater]

Looks like you got your monies worth from that paragraph.

Not just the one source

Earlier you wrote:

A good read if anyone wants

https://history.army.mil/html/books/104 ... _104-7.pdf

and your own source provides confirmation that total wrecks were recovered and wrecks were kept with the unit





Page numbered 19 (pdf.27)
Under these circumstances, the personnel at the field repair shops preferred to deadline the tanks for prolonged periods or even cannibalize them rather than use the depot maintenance services. Among the armored forces in Russia there was a strong aversion to allowing a disabled tank to leave the regimental area. Even though cannibalization of a tank meant its loss, this procedure enabled the maintenance personnel to put other tanks back into operation..............................

page numbered 36 (pdf.44)
The Germans experienced very few instances in which it was not considered worthwhile to recover a disabled tank. The guiding principle was that no tank would be abandoned unless it was blown to bits or completely burnt out. In every other case recovery was mandatory, even though cannibalization was often the only possible use
to which the the recovered vehicle could be put.
.............................

(Page 18-19.)

"Theoretically, the maintenance company field repair shop handled only those repairs which could be completed within a specified time.
Work requiring more than 14 days was supposed to be turned over to depot maintenance installations. In practice, however, most of the
field repair shops were able to handle all types of repairs, provided adequate stocks of spare parts were available. Usually the larger items
were in short supply. If, for example, three tanks were disabled because of damaged engines and the time required to supply the necessary parts was 3 weeks, the tanks would usually remain at the shop and return to service within 4 weeks. Had they been dispatched to some depot maintenance installation, the unit of origin would surely have been compelled to wait longer for their return and probably would not have seen them again. This unsatisfactory condition was caused by jurisdictional conflicts, the critical shortage of spare parts, the great distances between depot maintenance installations and the front lines, as well as inter- and intra-theater transfers of armored units."



recovery of "total wrecks" = "The guiding principle was that no tank would be abandoned unless it was blown to bits or completely burnt out."
recovery of total wrecks = abandoning of total wrecks.



Another helpful example - Repairing the Panzers pg. 188




Unit had 16 combat days. During this period, 20 Panzer IVs and 16 StuGs were written off. Within 35 days, 52 Panzer IVs and 74 StuGs were repaired.

Thats a rate of 126 repaired AFVs for 7 that "could be canibalised" - or 5% difference.

And they are still total losses.

[Tom from Cornwall]

[Edited to add: in order to inform comparison between German and British "heavy" workshops resources in Normandy, I thought these extracts might be of use...]

A couple of small snippets from the Administrative History of 21st Army Group for the period in Normandy:

21 Advance Base Workshop which landed complete over the beaches on D+40 was working within four days of landing. This unit, although nominally 4th line heavy repair workshops and under normal conditions static, was in fact made fully mobile with all heavy machinery mounted on trailers.

[…]

Shortly after the capture of CAEN, three advance base workshops were established in field sites in the area of the CAEN-BAYEUX road. The chief commitments at this stage were the conversion of certain AFVs to personnel carriers, assistance in inspection and repair of artillery equipment of RA regiments undergoing re-organisation, conversion of tank transporters to load carriers, vehicle recovery and backloading. Recovery resources were used with the primary object of keeping roads clear for fighting troops and supplies and most of this work was done under army control in order to relieve corps of responsibilities in rear of their areas. Back-loading into workshop sites and collecting points took second priority and had to be done at night. All "crocks" were back-loaded to corps backloading points (CBPs), the priority being firstly repairable vehicles, then BRITISH "W" (write-off) "crocks" and lastly enemy vehicles. As these dumps of crocks were collected during the advance, third line workshops were dropped off and worked on them until nothing worth repairing remained. This policy of setting down third line workshops at intervals on the line of advance was found to work well but due to the distances involved control was extremely difficult, although the wireless net proved invaluable and was the only way in which "crock" states could be obtained. During this period third line workshops were controlled and moved entirely by corps headquarters. It was found that handling "crocks" and operating the CBPs should be primarily the responsibility of workshops rather than recovery units, and that it was better to use the latter for ferrying crocks and for their responsibility to cease after off-loading. Classification and cannibalisation were more effectively controlled by a foster unit such as an armoured troop workshops rather than by recovery units.

Looking at the war diaries for the individual Advance Workshops (20, 21, 22 and 23) the "shortly after the capture of CAEN" statement seems a bit early - more like late July/early August.

Regards

Tom

[Ulater]

[Edited to add: in order to inform comparison between German and British "heavy" workshops resources in Normandy, I thought these extracts might be of use...]

A couple of small snippets from the Administrative History of 21st Army Group for the period in Normandy:

21 Advance Base Workshop which landed complete over the beaches on D+40 was working within four days of landing. This unit, although nominally 4th line heavy repair workshops and under normal conditions static, was in fact made fully mobile with all heavy machinery mounted on trailers.

[…]

Shortly after the capture of CAEN, three advance base workshops were established in field sites in the area of the CAEN-BAYEUX road. The chief commitments at this stage were the conversion of certain AFVs to personnel carriers, assistance in inspection and repair of artillery equipment of RA regiments undergoing re-organisation, conversion of tank transporters to load carriers, vehicle recovery and backloading. Recovery resources were used with the primary object of keeping roads clear for fighting troops and supplies and most of this work was done under army control in order to relieve corps of responsibilities in rear of their areas. Back-loading into workshop sites and collecting points took second priority and had to be done at night. All "crocks" were back-loaded to corps backloading points (CBPs), the priority being firstly repairable vehicles, then BRITISH "W" (write-off) "crocks" and lastly enemy vehicles. As these dumps of crocks were collected during the advance, third line workshops were dropped off and worked on them until nothing worth repairing remained. This policy of setting down third line workshops at intervals on the line of advance was found to work well but due to the distances involved control was extremely difficult, although the wireless net proved invaluable and was the only way in which "crock" states could be obtained. During this period third line workshops were controlled and moved entirely by corps headquarters. It was found that handling "crocks" and operating the CBPs should be primarily the responsibility of workshops rather than recovery units, and that it was better to use the latter for ferrying crocks and for their responsibility to cease after off-loading. Classification and cannibalisation were more effectively controlled by a foster unit such as an armoured troop workshops rather than by recovery units.

Looking at the war diaries for the individual Advance Workshops (20, 21, 22 and 23) the "shortly after the capture of CAEN" statement seems a bit early - more like late July/early August.

Regards

Tom

I think these would roughly translate to something along the line of Riga, Dnjepropetrovsk and Smolensk Workshops?

[Yoozername]

recovery of "total wrecks" = "The guiding principle was that no tank would be abandoned unless it was blown to bits or completely burnt out."
recovery of total wrecks = abandoning of total wrecks.

Some people try to move the goal posts...sometimes the goal posts fall on them...

[Michael Kenny]

Ulater,

Which book are those pages from?

Forgot to get back to you about this but have you not got a copy of the Royal Armoured Corps Half-yearly Progress Reports? That is what Zetterling uses and it is in effect a count of every Commonwealth tank written off/scrapped in WW2 by theatre

Sample:
7/1942-12/1942, Appendix I:

Wastage 3/9/1939 - 23/12/1942


i. Middle East

Light Tanks: IIA 3, IIB 2, III 3, VI 27, VIA 86, VIB 113, VIC 9, VIAA 7, Stuarts 372, various 10. Total 632

Cruiser Tanks: Mk I 24, Mk II 2, Mk IIA 72, Mk IIA CS 11, Mk IVA 79, Crusader I 280, Crusader I CS 19, Crusader II 152, Crusader II CS 24, Crusader III 25. Total 688 Cruisers
M3 Medium 350, Sherman 66. (416) (632 + 688 + 416 =1736)


Infantry tanks: Matilda I 2 [training machines only - CM], Matilda II 30, Matilda III 186, Matilda III CS 2, Matilda IV 10, Matilda IV CS 11. Total Matildas (241).
Valentine II 290, Valentine IV 27, Valentine V 4. Total Valentines 321.
Total Infantry tanks 562
562 + 1736 = 2298

Total tanks 2298

The red bits are my additions and I can email the full 1939-45 version.

[Michael Kenny]

recovery of "total wrecks" = "The guiding principle was that no tank would be abandoned unless it was blown to bits or completely burnt out."
recovery of total wrecks = abandoning of total wrecks.

Some people try to move the goal posts...sometimes the goal posts fall on them...

The full quote:


The Germans experienced very few instances in which it was not considered worthwhile to recover a disabled tank. The guiding principle was that no tank would be abandoned unless it was blown to bits or completely burnt out. In every other case recovery was mandatory, even though cannibalization was often the only possible use

That last bit means that tanks were being recovered that never got repaired and were used as a source of spare parts.

Both sources state categorically that there was a recognised problem with Panzer Units hanging on to wrecks that they were specifically told should be sent further up the repair chain.

[Michael Kenny]

I suppose this is Homeland Mixed Repair?

download/file.php?id=448395&t=1

Sanok Poland viewtopic.php?p=1562332#p1562332

[Yoozername]

I think the whole disingenuous use of the word 'wreck' is now a Kenny-Herring.