RichTO90 wrote:Igorn wrote:There is no need to suspect or guess. As per the official Red Army Statistics Collection No1 published in Moscow in 1996, as of June 22, 1941, Red Army had over 600 units of T-28 tank in different modifications.
I see, so now you are agreeing that you were incorrect when you stated that "602 units of T-28 have been produced.... On top of it a number of (approx. 100 units) special purpose T-28 modifications such as bridgelayer, flamer models and experimental models like T-29, as was already stated in this thread, have been produced"?
It is another way around. You claimed earlier that "How is it that the Soviets could have "600 units of T-28 tanks" in June 1941 when only 503 were manufactured and only 456 were on hand as of 1 April 1941?" but now you agree with me that the Red Army in June 1941 had over 600 units of T-28. By the way, the official Red Army Statistics Collection No1 published in Moscow in 1996 giving number of T-28 in the Red Army as of over 600 units refers to the Central Archive of the Russian Defence Ministry (ZAMO RF, f.38, op. 11353. d 904, l.90) 8)
RichTO90 wrote:
In 1933 the Medium Tank T-28 was added to the arsenal of the Red Army. At that time there was no match to T-28 in the world.
Sorry, but I do have to say it, you do realize that nobody is arguing these rather obvious facts, and that your constant repetition of them, while admirably Homeric, do absolutely nothing to bolster your argument?
Again, you agreed with me that Russian T-28 was the world strongest medium tank in 1933
RichTO90 wrote:
In 1937 was created a special purpose version – T-28 PH (Underwater motion).
And what exactly does that have to do with anything? It is an admirable solution for getting tanks across rivers where there are no bridges, or where the bridges aren't sturdy enough, but it is rather a simple solution as well. Of course there is another solution, that in some ways is even simpler, create a more robust bridging capability that is better able to handle heavy vehicles, which - correct me if I'm wrong - was the solution that the RKKA used more often in World War II. And of course the first solution was also engineered by the Germans, first by the Tauchpanzer, which were used of course in Barbarossa, and then as an expedient measure for getting the rather overweight Tigers across river obstacles.
...the Pz-I was intended only as a training vehcile, the Pz-II as a light reconnaissance vehicle, but not as a "battle tank" in the sense that I think you mean, any more than the Soviet T-27, T-37, T-38, and T-40 were
Your statement that Germans had tanks capable to "swim' and cross rivers as well as your arrogance towards Russian "swimming" tanks and attempts to compare them with Pz-II is laughable. Some facts:
Let’s start with the lightest Soviet tank T-37A, which was placed in service on August 11th, 1933. The weight of T-37A was 3.2 tons, 2 men crew, anti-bullet armor protection, armament-one machine gun. An engine capacity of 40 h/p. Max. Speed 36-40 km/h on the ground and 6km/h on the water. Everybody is laughing about these characteristics. Don’t look for praise or good words about this tank in western books. T-37A was a light tank. But a light does not mean bad or obsolete. T-37A was the first in the world “swimming” tank placed in service. Soviet Union tested, placed in service and launched serial production of “swimming” tanks when in the rest of the world nobody was doing that. Even if T-37A was really bad even than placing in service T-37A was the technical breakthrough of great importance since other countries did not have anything comparable. To laugh at T-37A is the same as to laugh at the first and maybe not perfect satellite (sputnik) of the Planet Earth when nobody in the world had any satellites. Yes, T-37A was a light tank. But light weight is not a problem for a “swimming” tank. Let’s what happens with the heavy tank, for example, with a German Tiger if it tries to swim across the Dnepr River, somewhere in the area of Cherkassy or Kremenchug. “Swimming” capabilities of heavy, medium and even light tanks, if they were not created as “swimming” are equal to “0”.
That’s why let’s not criticize a “swimming” tank for its light weight. To consider light weight of a “swimming” tank as a disadvantage is the same as to criticize ballet dancer for lack of big breast, heavy hips and big ass. But T-37 had just anti-bullet armor protection and only machine gun armament! Yes, everything has its price. Either we work out with 48kg weight iron on the bank of a river or we leave 48 weight iron on the sand and swim in a river. But nobody could combine anti-shell tank armor protection with capabilities of a tank to swim as swimming of a sportsman with 48kg iron weight in hands. By the way, German Pz-I was placed in service one year later in 1934 and having almost the same weight as T-37 -3,5 tons, the same crew of 2 men, similar anti-bullet armor protection and machine-gun armament. But Pz-I couldn’t swim. And when westerners laugh at my T-37A I suggest comparing the oldest, the lightest Russian “swimming” tank with the best, most powerful German “swimming” tank. A then laughing stops. It turns out that Germany never had “swimming” tanks neither before the war nor during the war or after the war. Gross Deutschland entered into 21 century without “swimming” tanks but USSR had “swimming” tanks in early 30s of 20 century. In this matter we bypassed Germany by almost a century. France and Britain did not have “swimming” tanks either. July 10th is the birthday of the US tank troops. When Wehrmacht was crushing with its panzers Poland, Belgium, Netherlands, France and British forces in Continental Europe and when Red Army was crushing with its tanks 6th Japanese Army in Khalkin-Gol and “liberated” Finland, Estonia, Latvia , Lithuania, Bessarabia and Bukovina, USA had no tank forces at all. And only after defeat of France and defeat of British troops on the Continent, US generals figured out that it was a time to create tank forces. In a year, inJune 1941, USA had less than 400 tanks (British and American Tanks of World War II. New York: ARCO, 1969. p. 11).
Everebody (e.g Germans, French, British) are laughing at T-37: “your ‘swimming’ tank of 1933 had weak armament and armor protection. It was obsolete!” Obsolete? Compared to what “swimming” tank? And now some information about capabilities of T-37A.
In August 1935 seven T-37A, executing an order of Marshal Voroshilov, started from Leningrad, went on tracks around a hundred kilometers, than “swam” along Luga River through impassable algaes, then –Shalon River and then through storming Ilmen Lake. Route through Ilmen Lake was 55 kilometers. It took tanks 8 hours and 15 minutes to cover that distance swimming through storming Lake. Further was Volkhov River, Novo-Ladoga Channel and Neva River. All seven tanks finished in Leningrad near Petropavlovsk fortress. During 11 days, these T-37A covered 700 kilometers including around 600km on the water without single accident and maintenance service. Since 1935 and up to now nobody superseded this record and achievement of seven Russian T-37A crews is unmatched so far.
And how Germans could match to this record if they see “swimming” tanks only at the enemy side? And now let’s throw mud at T-37A, call it light, obsolete and say that Russian tanks forces were not ready to the war. Situation in the area of the “swimming” tanks did not change till 1941. In 1941 USSR remain the only country having “swimming” tanks in service.
Situation: armor column stopped at the water obstacle. All heavy, medium and non-swimming light tanks lose all their assault capabilities and become worthless. They need a bridge. But enemy safeguards bridges and if necessary explode bridges. Bridges need to be beaten off. It is better to do it not from our side but from enemy’s side where an enemy does not expect an attack. And in this scenario the value of “swimming” tanks drastically goes up. If two, three or ten such tanks in the night crossed a river and then by rapid breakthrough from rear capture the bridge that such a maneuver could solve a destiny of the whole operation. When a bridge is captured than all heavy and medium tanks and SP- guns, artillery and supplies could be moved on the opposite bank of the River. If we failed to capture bridges than “swimming” tanks get priceless. If we don’t have captured bridges we have to build and engineer our own crossing and pontoon bridges. In order to do it we would need bridgeheads on the opposite bank of the River. And we cast infantry into combat with small boats and logs to cross the river under fire of machine guns, submachine guns and mortars. And in this situation if five-ten light tanks would swim next to defenseless solders and cover them with machine guns fire would be of a great help. And when solders reached an opposite bank of the river the main thing will be to dig out and set up defense positions. Our wet and wounded infantry don’t have heavy weapons, artillery and enough ammo. (Did you try to cross the Vistula in October with submachine gun and full arsenal of ammo and two grenades?) In first and the most dangerous minutes on the opposite bank of a river the support of light tanks armed with submachine guns were much more important than tens of super-heavy KV or Tigers tanks, which remained on our bank of the River. The quantity of the Soviet “swimming” tanks was hushing up for almost 50 years. Now, this number is available: 2,627 units of T-37A were built. In local conflicts T-37A were almost not used and by 1941 almost all of them remained in service. In 1936 the production of more advanced “swimming” tank was started. Serial production continued to 1939. In total, 1375 units of T-38 were built. Westerners and communists called this tank an obsolete as well. Question: how a tank of 2-5 years age, which did not have analogs in the world could become an obsolete?
December 19th, 1939 was an outstanding day in the history of the world tank-building. On that day the full spectrum of newest armor was placed to service in Red Army: three newest tanks. The light “swimming” T-40 tank, medium T-34 tank and heavy-breakthrough KV tank. KV remained the strongest world tank in the first half of the War up to Stalingrad Battle. No one country in the world had similar tanks to KV but even did not have in this weight category. KV had a great design reserve that allowed to went through several modernization from KV-1 to KV-13 to transform it to JS-1 and then to JS-2, the most powerful tank of the World War II. T-34 was the best world medium tank. In its category, T-40 was also the best world tank. T-40 had new body shape, had a weight of 5.5 tons and was armed with two machine guns: DSHK and normal DT. There was a version of T-40 armed with 20 mm automatic gun instead of DSHK. Officially, by June 22nd 1941 222 units of T-40 had been produced. But now having “Statistical Collection N1, with reference to Russian State Military Archives” we can clarify that number. Red Army had 222 units of T-40 in service as of May 31, 1941. But factories worked and shipped new goods. Additional 27 units of T-40 were shipped to the Red Army before June 21st,1941. The wonderful book on page 234 allows us to learn than ten units of T-40 had been shipped on May 31, 1941 to Novograd-Volynsky railroad station and 17 units of T-40 tank had been shipped on June 12, 1941 to Brody station. Besides it, the factory No37 manufactured 28 extra units of T-40 but did not ship to Army. If one says that these tanks were not shipped ex-factory my reply would be that it was better for them. They fought but avoided first sudden strike. In total by June 21, 1941 two hundred seventy seven units of T-40 tanks were produced.
RichTO90 wrote:
BTW, how many T-28PH were actually built, issued and used in combat?.
The destiny of “swimming” Soviet tanks was sad. They did not have application in the defensive war. Where to swim in defensive war? Thousand tons of fuel supplies and spare parts prepared to support rapid offensive of the Red Army was lost at the borders. In the first days of the war these strategic supplies were caught under enemy’s fire or was captured by enemy. 4,000 light “swimming” tanks required great number of fuel but in defensive war they were not of great value. That’s why commanders ordered to pass remaining fuel from “swimming” tanks to medium or heavy tanks and ordered to destroy, explode or leave intact light “swimming” tanks. The best in the world without fuel is worse than the bad tank with fuel.
RichTO90 wrote:
No one German panzer or any other tank could be compared to T-28.
Gee, I think we have beaten this one to death.
There were no German tanks in 1933 to compare to the T-28. So what exactly do you think you are arguing?
Don't be stupid. I was saying that
in June 1941 no one German panzer could be compared to T-28 by armament, armor protection etc. 8)
RichTO90 wrote:
At the end of 1937 Germans started production of Pz-IVA. That was the most powerfull German panzer.
Hard to say really, since unlike the Pz-III it was intended as a support vehicle providing the hi-explosive capability that was lacking in the Pz-III. Like most nations, the Germans were experimenting with the best way to combine an anti-armor and anti-soft target capability into armored formations, and - again like most nations - felt that engineering limitations meant that two types of vehicles were required. They also initially thought that since the Pz-IV was not intended for an anti-armor role, then it had little requirement for armor that was more than splinter and bullet proof. Of course those ideas began to change as vehicles were produced and tested, and changed even more radically as they began to see combat.
Ok, if you believe that in June 1941 Pz-III was the most powerful German panzer be my guest to compare its specs with T-34 and T-28E.
RichTO90 wrote:
On the subsequent models of their most powerful tank (Pz-IV) Germans installed HL-120TR - 300 h/p but failed to reach 500 h/p of T-28.
Yep, in the Ausf. B and C, by the D they had gone to the HL-120TRM, with detail modifications, but still producing 300 HP, and in the J of course the output was reduced to 272 HP at lower RPM. Do you think that maybe the German engineers simply accepted the power output limitations in their design and worked around them? Or where they just stupid? After all, they did have more powerful engines available. So why not something like the M-17T in the T-28, after all, it was only a 46.9 liter displacement - wait, that's more than four times the displacement of the 10.8 liter HL108TR and the HL120 series. So how do you fit it in? Gee, maybe they could use the HL-174, it was under development - accelerate production, accept a few defects here and there, and presto, 550 HP. But wait, the damn thing is almost twice as big as the 108 and 120. How to fit it into the engine compartment?.
Pls. put off aside your emotions and call me the German tank engine with the capacity of 500 h/p installed on the serial German tanks of June 1941? 8)
RichTO90 wrote:Germans enhanced an armor of Pz-IV to 30mm. Russian response – T-28E, max. armor of 80mm.
Sorry, this is simply too silly. The Ausf. D began production in October 1939 with armor increased beyond the original splinter and bullet-proof protection requirement. But production of the T-28E began in December 1939, pretty quick "response" - those Soviet spys must have been pretty good. Of course they missed 2-million odd men and almost 4,000 tanks assembling on the Soviet border in 1941, but never mind, it was probably all part of Stalin's plot to let the Germans invade. ?.
It is not that silly as you think. Open up a "Hitler's table talk" book and you will learn that even Adolf Hitler reckoned that USSR much superseeded Nazi Germani in the area of espionage. Red Army, compared to Germany, did not find any uknown models of German tanks in June 1941. What Hitler's generals and tank designers knew about Red Army and their tanks before the war? Did Germans have information and knew about T-34 and KV before the war?
Some facts about "smart" German intelligence service:
In 1939 T-40, T-34 and KV-1 were placed in service in Russian Army. In 1940 KV-2 were tested in Finland during ‘Winter war’ and placed in service. By summer 1941 Russian army had over 2,000 only T-40,T-34, KV and KV-2 tanks. Russian military industry was already working in a war mode and was able to produce these tanks in large quantities.
On May 1st 1941 military parade Russian T-34 and KV were demonstrated to the whole world but for some reasons German intelligence didn’t notice them. At the early June 1941 in Germany books for solders with the profile and features of Russian tanks were published. T-34 and KV were not even mentioned there ! German intelligence service even didn’t notice what was demonstrated for them.
On 24 June 1941 General Halder received messages that newest Russian tanks were encountered and he noted in his military diary: …new Russian heavy tank appeared with approx. 80mm gun, according to Heer Group North even 150mm gun that very unlikely.
German Army had encountered KV (76mm gun) and KV-2 (152mm gun) on the battlefield and reported that to Halder. Halder believed in the first news but didn’t believe the second one. That proves that German intelligence service before 24TH June had no clue about Russian KV-2 tank ! Russian tank designers were well aware about German Pz-III and Pz-IV panzers not only from messages of intelligence service.
Some information in this regard from an excellent book of Russian tank researcher Daniyar Ibragimov:
"... On August 1939 Germany and Soviet Union signed a Treaty and soon after that the Soviet trading delegation comprising from military engineers headed by NarCom (Minister) of the Heavy industry, Tevasyan arrived to Germany. Among other members,delegation included Professor Gruzdev, Head of Tank Department of the Soviet Military Academy, Korobkov, Deputy Head of Armor vehicles forces of the Red Army, Zavijalov, Chief engineer of the Russian Leningrad tank plant.
Hitler allowed to the Soviet delegation to visit some Wehrmacht units and purchase some German tanks including Pz-III. During this visit German metallurgist didn’t hide their arrogance to the Russians when they arrived to the factories manufacturing armor. “… we can show you this process. We adopted it in ten years. It will take twenty years for you. During that time we will progress so far that current technology would be interesting just for historians.”. During the visit Russian delegation purchased a Pz-III tank, which was delivered to the Russian tank testing ground near Moscow. It was thoroughly tested and dispatched to the Kharkov tank factory to get acquainted and studied. The Pz-III appeared at Kharkov factory when the first lot of T-34 was about to be released from the plant. From Pz-III body and turret armor samples were taken and sent to the factory lab. The results of chemical analysis demonstrated that quality of the German armor was much worse compared to the Russian armor. During several days a comparative testing of Pz-III and T-34 tank was conducted at the Kharkov Tank Factory testing ground. Artillery was firing and shooting the both tanks from the same distance. While in the armor of T-34 only some dents were found and scratches, PZ-III’s armor was penetrated and pierced through and through. Deputy of the Russian chief designer A.Morozov applied for the first time a tank shooting against another tank. Shells launched from 76mm T-34’s gun penetrated armor of Pz-III from the distance of 2000 meters while PZ-III gun penetrated only some parts of the side armor of T-34 and only from 500 meters..."
RichTO90 wrote:Outstanding world acheivement goes to the US Army Ordnance then I guess, for the Wright G-200, developed for potential heavy tank designs and producing 800 HP. Or almost for the D-200A developed by Caterpillar for heavy tractors and used later in the war in the M4-A6, producing 497 HP. At under 30 liter displacement they rival the Soviet "super" engines. BTW, the D-200A was a diesel.
Clown, call me a US or German tank of June 1941 having tank engine of 500 h/p and higher.
RichTO90 wrote:
Don't be silly in turn. Soviet spies supplied Soviet engineers with detailed data on German tanks, so they could uparmor the T-28, which was being phased out of production at the end of 1939 and whcih ceased production in January 1940? And these same super spies missed the preparations for Barbarossa? Oh, sorry, I forgot, Stalin's plot and all that.
Historic truth is that "smart" Hitler ordered to host a delegation of the Soviet tank designers soon after signing Soviet-German Peace Treaty and permitted to show factories producing German panzers and allowed Soviet delegation not only to see German tanks but even to purchase Pz-III tanks and other equipment. In March 1941 another Soviet delegation visited Nazi Germany and Hitler showed to Russian tank designers the latest German Pz-IV. Heinz Guderian is witnessing: "...Russians observing our new Pz-IV tank refused to believe that it was our heaviest combat machine. They declared many times that we are hiding from them our newest models, which Hitler promised to demonstrate them. The persistence of the delegation was so great that our manufacturers and officers of Weapons Department made a conclusion: 'It seems that Russians possess heavier and more advanced tank models than we are.'..."
RichTO90 wrote:
Funny, that pretty much matches what I said, 1,225 T-34 had been accepted by the RKKA by 1 June. Thank you for the additional information on production to 22 June, but that still doesn't mean they were "with units" - they had been produced. But that does explain where the 1,400 figure comes from. BTW, other sources say that only 222 T-40 had been completed to 22 June.
We are talking here about number of T-34, KV and T-40 produced by June 22, 1941 and not about April or June 1. Don't twist facts. I proved to you with the reference to the archival documents that as of June 22, 1941 the Red Army had 1400 T-34's, 711 KV and 277 T-40 tanks The official Red Army Statistics Collection No1 published in Moscow in 1996 with reference to the Russian State Military Archive: RGVA, f. 31811, op.4, d.4, ll. 134-174. Full stop. 8)
RichTO90 wrote:I am not disputing that not all BT tanks had a radio station.
Really? Could have fooled me. In reply to my statement that less than half of the BT had radios you replied "For your information, BT-5 and BT-7 tanks were equipped with 71-TK 1 Radio station." It would appear that you were disputing me and implying that most or all BT were equipped with radio..
Where did I say that
all BT tanks were equipped with radio satation? Your sick imagination can tell you anything. But I am not interested in your perceptions or interpretations
RichTO90 wrote:
My point was that 45mm tank gun of BT tanks could penetrate armor of
any German tank in June 1941. But I wonder if German 37mm or 50mm tank gun could penetrate armor of KV tank?
Granted.....
RichTO90 wrote:
And yet the incapable German Panzers, numerically inferior and with inferior guns, were capable of knocking out most Soviet tanks? Or was it an act of God that knocked out all of the Soviet tanks that were lost?
..
Please specify the number of Soviet tanks knocked out by German panzers in 1941. This figure should not include tanks left immobile without fuel or lost due to aviation strikes or German 88-mm flak.
RichTO90 wrote:I note that along with your other standard debating techniques you utilize the one that calls for the selective use and quoting of source material that favors your position, while ignoring material from the same sources that does not favor your position. Thus, you carefully use and refer to material from "The Russian Battlefield" and "RKKA" site that you find "acceptable" but ignore material from the same site that does not support your view.
I am amazed by your observations and don't need your advises what to quote and what to refer to.
RichTO90 wrote:
Such as:
"Such a dramatic situation is quite understandable. The T-34 was a completely new tank and required new technologies to be introduced successfully....With enormous effort Factory #75 could produce a V-2 engine that worked 150 hours without a failure! Such huge problems! ....All atomizers, valves and needles were manually ground in."
And what ? Did I dispute that T-34 was completely new tank? Or did I dispute that creation and production of T-34 in large quantities demanded enormous efforts of the Russian workers, mostly women and teenagers? And when you laugh at V-2 tank wich initially worked only 150 hours without a failure I urge you to recall that despite enormous efforts German tank industry failed to create a tank diesel engine similar to the Russian B-2
RichTO90 wrote: Or:
"At the same time according to order #76791 of the Minister of Defence (October 25, 1940), the first three T-34s were tested extensively on the Kubinka proving ground. A special commision revealed so many defects and drawbacks that it doubted the T-34s combat capabilities. Questions about cancellation of production and even the whole project (!!!) were raised."
Note further references to the V-2 engine in the A-34 prototypes breaking down after 250, 650 and then 350 kilometers respectively. Or in the "T-34 in Action" section the references to lack of recovery vehicles and equipment capable of handling the T-34.?
."[/quote]
I can reply to you that almost all these defects, drawbacks were eliminated. And what A-34 prototype has to do with combat capabilities of the serial T-34 tanks? As far as recovery vehicles are concerned, I can tell you the the Soviet tractors were capable to "handle" T-34. With all my respect to www. battlefield.ru I don't blindly agree with all information they post.
RichTO90 wrote:
Only in one year from June 1940 to June 1941 sixty one new tank divisions were formed.
Strange, in one place you claim 122 tank divisions were created between June 1940 and June 1941 and now you claim 61. Which is it? Division numbers 1-61 were all authorized and accounted for prior to June 1941, another ten in the 100-series being mobilized may be accounted for as well (the 122th was formed from seperate tank regiments and could well have been created in March, the 111th is more shadowy, but in either case that ten were created is well documtented).
The lier! Where did I say that 122 tank divisions were created between June 1940 to June 1941? Send a link to my statement and prove that I have said this. If not you are the lier and falsificator. What I said was as follows:
"Officialy, Stalin had 61 tank divisions (
http://www.rkka.ru/i22.htm) but in reality on June 22th 1941 61 additional tank divisions were under deployment. " and "Only in one year from June 1940 to June 1941 sixty one new tank divisions were formed. Officially Stalin had sixty one tank divisions but in reality already in March 1941 the number of Soviet tank divisions exceeded digit “100” . And there is no need to dig up in secret archives; one can look up in the book: “The Great Patriotic War. Encyclopedia, P. 206. This book went through state and military censorship and was edited my Generals Kozlov, Sredin, Zhilin and many other famous Generals, professors and Science Doctors. From this book one could lean that Colonel A.L. Getman was appointed as a Commanding General of the 112th Tank Division in March 1941. "
RichTO90 wrote: For example, 4th Mechanized Corps, Commanding General Potapov had “only” 892 tanks. Even “under strength” Soviet tank corps was stronger than two German panzer corps’.
Sorry, but we are getting into semantical difficulties here. A German corps had no fixed organization and could consist of differing numbers of dvisions and supporting formations. The comparison as you phrase it is meaningless.
The comparisson is not meaningless as you think. But let’s compare Stalin tank formations with Wehrmact's ones. In June 1941 Hitler engaged 10 tank corps’ into war with USSR. In average each corps’ had 340 tanks. Stalin was forming 29 mechanized corps of 1031 tanks including real medium tanks (T-28 and T-34) and heavy ones. Yes, not all Soviet Mechanazid Corps’ were having full numeric strength on June 1941. For example, 4th Mechanized Corps, Commanding General Potapov had “only” 892 tanks. Even “under strength” Soviet tank corps was stronger than two German panzer corps’. Amongst other tanks 4th Mechanized Corps’ had 413 units of T-34 and KV tanks. Not enough? Maybe yes, if not to compare with Wehrmacht. In all ten German panzer corps’ as well as in all other armies in the world there was not a single tank comparable with T-34 and KV.
Hitler had not a single tank corps of thousand tank each. He didn’t have a single tank corps of eight hundred to nine hundred tanks. Hitler didn’t even a single tank corps of 600 tanks in 1941. German Panzer divisions had different organizational structure and different number of tanks from 147 (hundred forty seven) tanks in 13th Panzer division to 299th tanks in 7th Panzer division. All tanks were light and so calles "medium". German tank formations didn’t have heavy tanks in 1941 at all.
Russian tank division of 1941 had 375 (Three hundred seventy five) tanks including light, medium and heavy tanks. Yes sometimes tank divisions were not brought up to the full strength. For example, 1st tank division started the war having 370 tanks and 53 armored vehicles. German motorized divisions didn’t have tanks. But Soviet Motorized division of 1941 had 275 tanks! In June 1941 on the East Front Hitler had only seventeen Panzer divisions which were split in four Panzer Groups. Each Panzer Group had from eight to fifteen divisions including three-five Panzer divisions and two-three motorized divisions. 8)
RichTO90 wrote:
100% agree. I advise you to compare the ground pressure of the best German panzer in June 1941, Pz-IIIA (ground pressure 0,94 kg on 1 sq. sentimeter) with T-34. Amost one kg on 1 cm of ground. Of course, it will get stuck in mud. Pz-III had a specific capacity (weight/capacity ratio) of 13.0 h/p on one ton of weight. It was not power but impotence.
Sources vary, but the Ausf. A actually had a ground pressure of 0.67 kg/cm2, not 0.94, that was found later, in the Ausf. E/G at 0.92 and the H and J at 0.97. The problem for the Germans of course was that the weight of the vehicle went up while the track width remained essentially unchanged (well, Ostketten helped, but you know what I mean). So I don't think you need to "advise" me of anything, especially
since I have never argued any of these facts with you.
If we put off your emotions tt means that you agreed that by these important parameters: Broad tracks allowing a tank to move cross-country (e.g. mud, snow etc.) and ground pressure Soviet tanks of 1941 superseded German panzers!
RichTO90 wrote:
In June 1941, B-2 diesel engine design was not new.
Of course it wasn't, since it was based upon a Junkers diesel aircraft engine developed in the 1920s...Actually all engineers understood the theoretical benefits of diesels in any large equipment use, butthey alsoo understood the disadvantages as well, which have been explained to you ad infinitum without any acknowledgement on your part. Furthermore, the Soviet designers had an advantage in that - except for minor French, British, Italian and Japanese development work, they were about the only nation working on serial production of tanks, so were the only group with any experience in such development.
Did you see it in your dreams that B-2 diesel was based upon a Junkers diesel aircraft engine developed in 20s?
If so, why "smart" German designers failed to create a tank diesel during the war. Why they simply did not install Junkers diesel engine at their panzers?
And why despite diesel disadvatages after the World War in 50s-60s all main military powers moved from gasoline tank engines to diesel engines? Why they didn't stay with gasoline engines?
RichTO90 wrote:
We have a choice either to believe World War II German Generals Guderian, Hoth, von Langermann, von Kleist, Mellentin and Russian Generals Lelyushenko, Katukov, Rokossovsky who reckoned that T-34 and KV were the best tanks in 1941 or believe Mr. RichTO90 who thinks differently.
Is it just me or do you think possibly everybody may have noticed that yet again you refuse to answer a simple question and instead insert irrelvancies?.
Pls. clarify what a simple question you are talinkg about??? 8) On my part I noticed that you are convenietly avoiding to answer my simple questions, for example, the following:
1. How many heavy panzers Wehrmacht had as of June 22, 1941 ?
2. How many panzers Wehrmacht had as of June 1941 with anti-shell armor protection (80mm and more) ?
3. How many tanks Wehrmacht had as of June 1941 with the long-barrel tank gun of 76mm and higher with muzzle velocity of 555m/s and higher?
4. How many "swimming" Panzers Wehrmacht had as of June 1941?
5. How many tanks with diesel engine Wehrmacht had in 1941?
6. How many tank corps' with number of tank greater than 600 units Wehrmacht had in June 1941?
7. Did any tank gun of Wehrmacht tanks including all tanks penetrated armor of Russian KV tanks?
8. Did Wehrmacht has a tank gun comparable by its characteristics (e.g. muzzle velocity, armor penetration etc.) to Russian L-10 tank gun installed on "obsolete" Russian T-28E tank?
9. How many panzers with engine capacity of 500 h/p Wehrmacht had in 1941?
etc. etc. etc. etc.
RichTO90 wrote:
BTW, how do you know that I don't think that the T-34 or KV were the "best" tanks in "1941"? Would you please provide a quote from me that makes that statement? Oh, and also BTW, since you will not be able to find me making such a statement, I would appreciate it if you would refrain from putting words in my mouth.
It's great to see my friend RichTO90 agreeing that T-34 and KV were the best tanks in 1941
In this point I am 100% with you!!!
RichTO90 wrote:
I would like to see the stastics of number of T-34 and KV tanks destroyed by German panzers in 1941 vs. number of lost T-34 and KV destroyed by their crew or left immobiled due to lack of gaz & ammo or destroyed by German aviation.
Gee, so would I - if they existed.
Of course, since they don't your statement is yet another in your endless series of obfuscations. It is also interesting of course that after spending endless time in claiming that the Soviet fuel (and presumabaly ammunition as well) supply preparations were perfected, that the T-34 and KV were the most modern and reliable tanks in the world, that RKKA recovery assets were fully in place as of June 1941, that now evidently large numbers of Soviet tanks were lost to lack of gaz [sic, I guess you mean diesel
] and ammo (certainly more than could be knocked out by ignorant, laughable and ill-equipped Germans)? Or were they all lost to Stukas?
How many time I should repeat to you that in June 1941, Red Army was preparing an agressive and offensive war. Yes, the Red Army was not ready at all for defensive war. 8)
OK, one more time:
According to Russian General Telegin, '... due to the point that a war intended to be at the enemy territory all the strategic supplies from the internal areas were moved to the areas near frontier..'.
In June 1941 when Hitler suddenly attacked all above mentioned armies were in motion to their new positions and the war caught many units in the railroad cars.
One of the main reason why Germans achieved tactical success in June-July 1941 was the point that Russian army including tank units was not prepared for defense. Many tanks and aircrafts were concentrated near frontier and were destroyed by German aviation in the first few hours of the war, stategic diesel and oil supplies were lost near the border. After the sudden German attack and loss of aviation on the ground, Russian tank units were deprived the air coverage and were vulnerable for German aircrafts. The Russian army was preparing offensive and had no defense plans and that's why after sudden German attack units lost manageability. After retrieval from the frontier hundred tons of tank oil and diesel were lost at the frontier making Russian tanks immobile because of lack of oil etc... BUT if Russian army attacked first in 1941 than the same thing could have happened with Wehrmacht. If Wehrmacht lost its aviation on the ground and supplies of weapon and gasoline that their tanks could be vulnerable and immobile. Stalin was preparing an agressive war and that's why Red Army was ready just for offensive agressive operations BUT not for a defensive war.
In 1990s and 2000s after the fall of the Soviet Union there were number of articles published in the Russian military magazines & newspapers (The Russian Military History Magazine, The Red Star newspaper, Izvestia newspaper) as well as some books based on the Soviet archival materials about the Soviet assault plans (e.g. “On the Eve of the war: Materials of the High RKKA Command Conference”, December 23-31, 1940, Moscow, Terra, 1993.)
In summer 1940 Stalin and Hitler changed the face of Europe. Germany defeated & invaded France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxemburg. The Soviet Union annexed Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bessarabia, North Bukovina and chunk of Finland. Only two Super Powers remained in Europe: German Army and the Soviet Army. The formed situation had to be discussed and in September 1940 commanders of all Soviet Military Districts, commanders of all Armies and Heads of their Staff, selected Corps’ and divisions commanders received a message that in December 1940 the Soviet High Command Conference will take place in Moscow. On the December 23rd 1940 the Conference of the RKKA High Command was opened in Moscow. It lasted for nine days without days-off and ended in the evening of December 31, 1940. The conference was attended by the leadership of the Defense Folks Commissariat(Defense Ministry), General Staff, commanders & Head of Staff of all Military districts and armies, generals-inspectors of all type of forces, managers of all Military Academies, selected corps’ and division commanders. In total two hundred seventy six marshals, generals and admirals. As was expected the conference was attended by Stalin and all political leadership of the Soviet Union. Conference was held in the strictly secret conditions. Generals were arriving in Moscow in the closed railroad cars and war planes. They were secretly picked up and delivered through the back door to the Hotel Moskva. Generals who arrived to Moscow from interior locations were not allowed to leave the hotel. In the early morning, generals were secretly transported in closed buses to the General Staff building and in the evening were transported back to the hotel. It goes without saying that Hotel was closed for other guests and was controlled by NKVD. By the time of fall of the Soviet Union all materials of this conference were considered as a top secret and were never published. Possible German invasion against the Soviet Union was not even discussed there. The Soviet assault was on the agenda. That’s why all materials about this conference remained confidential until the fall of the Soviet Union.
This conference was attended not only but Stalin but by all members of the Soviet Leadership (Politburo). The conference participants were supposed to hear and discuss some key note reports. The key report: “The character of the modern offensive operation” was done by the Kiev Special Military District, Army General Georgy Zhukov. On the conference Zhukov didn’t say a single word about repelling of possible German aggression but talked about the necessity to complete the goals of the World Revolution and Europe liberation. From the speech of General Zhukov: “… The victory in a war will be gained by the party, which will be more efficient in the management and creation of surprise conditions in using forces and resources. Element of surprise is one of the critical success factors in a modern offensive operation. We have to attach a special significance to an element of surprise. All methods of camouflage (masking) and enemy deception should be widely implemented into the Red Army. Camouflage (masking) and enemy deception must be the dominant theme of troops and staff commander’s education & training.
«“On the Eve of the war: Materials of the High RKKA Command Conference”, December 23-31, 1940, Moscow, Terra, 1993, P. 151). In his memoirs Zhukov mentioned the topic of his report on the conference but for some reasons didn’t publish details. Here they are: “…in total in an area of 30 kilometers to 30 kilometers we have to concentrate 200,000 men, 1500-2000 cannons and mortars, significant number of tanks, trucks and other resources”. That was said by Zhukov about concentration of one of the Soviet Armies before an assault. He added that number of such Armies will be great. In compliance with Zhukov report no one out of twenty six Soviet Armies in Europe was positioned in defense. Not a single corps or a single division was positioned for defense. All of them were gathered into shocking grouping on the very narrow front segments as per recommendations of Zhukov. Zhukov presented some other suggestions in his report: wounded should not be evacuated deep inside the rear areas, strategic supplies have to be placed near the borders: “… we have to set up bases and warehouses just in 15-20 kilometers from the front line…” Everything was done as per Zhukov. German Army captured hundreds thousand tons of ammo, oil & gas, food and other supplies and Red Army was left without shells, bullets, petrol and food. From the report of General Zhukov: “…Superiority in the air is the critical to the success of an operation. Air superiority can be achieved by sudden powerful strikes of Air forces against the enemy aviation in the areas of their air fields… Fighter aircrafts should be based on the air fields within 30-50 kilometers from the front line and bombardment aviation should be based within 75-100 kilometers from the front line.” But in this case our aviation can be vulnerable to a surprise enemy strike. Here is Zhukov response: “… a special concern of the Air forces commanders should be a care of their own aircrafts protection. The best method to achieve that is a surprise sudden strike of our aviation against enemy’s air fields… An element of surprise is the key critical success factor.” Other methods to protect own aviation was not suggested by Zhukov. All these recommendations were accepted. But later, in spring 1941, Zhukov insisted on placement of fighter aviation in the range of 20-30 kilometers from the front line and bombardment aviation in the range of 50-70 kilometers. «“On the Eve of the war: Materials of the High RKKA Command Conference”, December 23-31, 1940, Moscow, Terra, 1993.
Next speaker was Head of Staff of the Baltic Special Military District, General Klenov with a report about Assault operations of the initial period of a war when enemy forces had not complete concentration and positioning. General Klenov urged for decisive measures to attack an enemy with massive forces of aviation and tanks before an enemy completed preparation for the war. “… Significant tank forces have to be used despite existence of strong engineered fortifications and tank units will solve tasks of offensive to the opponent soil. “On the Eve of the war: Materials of the High RKKA Command Conference”, December 23-31, 1940, Moscow, Terra, 1993, P.153-154).
The third speaker was the Red Army Air Forces Commander, General Rychagov with the report – “The Air forces in an assault operation and in the fighting for superiority in the air”. From the report of General Rychagov: “… The best technique of eliminating of the opponents aviation on the ground is a strong simultaneous air strike against big number of air fields of the enemy’s aircrafts possible placement.” “On the Eve of the war: Materials of the High RKKA Command Conference”, December 23-31, 1940, Moscow, Terra, 1993, P.177).
Another speaker was General Pavlov, Commander of the Western Special Military District with a report on “Using mechanized formations in a modern offensive operation and engagement of the mechanized corps in the breakthrough”. From the report of General Pavlov: “…Poland collapsed in 17 days. Operations in Belgium and Netherlands were over in 15 days. Operation in France was over in 17 days. We have to take these figures into account as a benchmark when planning our offensive operations.” “On the Eve of the war: Materials of the High RKKA Command Conference”, December 23-31, 1940, Moscow, Terra, 1993, P.255).
The report “Character of the modern defense operation” was delivered by Commander of Moscow Military District, General Tyulenev: “… today we don’t have a theory of defense… We have to use defense only on the rare cases and on the secondary directions… Defense is an integral part of our assault. Defense is a necessary combat method to be used on the selected secondary directions in order to save forces for offensive operations and preparation for a blow…”
“On the Eve of the war: Materials of the High RKKA Command Conference”, December 23-31, 1940, Moscow, Terra, 1993, P.255).
From the speech of Marshal Timoshenko, The Soviet Union Defense Minister (Narcom)”…we have to plan implementation of two, three or even four offensive operations simultaneously by forces of several Fronts (Group Armies)in order to strategically overwhelm an opponent’s defense ability as wide as possible.” “On the Eve of the war: Materials of the High RKKA Command Conference”, December 23-31, 1940, Moscow, Terra, 1993, P.350). On the main directions defense was not intended even theoretically. Only on the selected secondary directions. The conference of the RKKA High Command was over on the December 31st 1940 at 6.00 p.m. The greater part of generals, who took part in the conference, were secretly transported back to their units. Only the most important generals remained in Moscow to participate in the strategic military games. “…Prior to the RKKA High Command Conference completion on December 31, 1940 at 11.00 a.m. assignments to the strategic-operational military game were handed over to the group of 49 the highest rank commanders. The military game between “Western Grouping” and “Eastern Grouping” were going to take place. That game was the largest by its scope and importance for all years before the war. (The Military History Magazine, December 1986 issue, P.41). The “Eastern Grouping” in other words Soviet forces were headed by the Commander of the Western Special Military District, The Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel-General Dmitry Pavlov. The “Western Grouping” in other words German forces were headed by the Commander of the Kiev Special Military District, the Hero of the Soviet Union, Army-General Georgy Zhukov. The “Western Grouping” of General Pavlov comprised from 28 generals including the Head of Staff, the head of Operational department, the commander of Air Forces, Armies and corps’ commanders, the Baltic Fleet commander. The “Eastern Grouping” of General Zhukov was comprised from 21 generals who imitated Germans. Three hours were given to study an assignment. Afterwards there was a final session of the conference and then at the New Year eve, additional three hours were given to the game participants to make up a directive to their troops in accordance to their position as per the game assignment. Afterwards, all confidential documents were taken out. One day and two nights were given to analyze the assignment. During that time participants were supposed to have no documents or records in hands. The game started in the morning of January 2, 1941 at the building of the RKKA General Staff. The scenario of the future war was played. The Game Director and Referee was the Soviet Union’ FolkS Defence Comissar (Defense Minister), Marshal Semen Timoshenko. The management of the game included twelve the highest RKKA commanders including four Marshals of the Soviet Union. The military game observers: Joseph Stalin and all political leadership of the Soviet Union (Poliburo).
On the huge maps the colossal battle was played. The two most powerful armies in world clashed on the map. Several days & nights without rest and sleep, the Staffs of both parties were assessing the situation, giving orders and directives. Thousands of tanks, aircrafts, cannons and mortars, millions of solders were engaged in the battle, on the paper yet. Divisions, corps’ and armies were engaged in the breakthrough. Masses of troops, ammunition and gas supplies were transferred from the rear areas. Now days materials about the strategic military game were published and on June 1993 in the Russian Izvestiya newspaper appeared an article called “In January 1941 the Red Army assaulted to Kenigsberg”. Than a big article about this game was published in the Russian Military History Magazine, July 1993 edition. Our generals worked out the storm of European cities not because of academic interest but because preparation to Europe liberation was in the final phase. The official topic of the game was “An offensive front operation with breakthrough of fortification areas”. An assault to Germany or to be precise to the Eastern Prussia, which was protected by the fortification line, was played. In the course of the game, “German” grouping headed by Zhukov didn’t assault at all. An offensive party was Russian Eastern front of General Pavlov. Pavlov carried out an offensive to the Eastern Prussia to Koenigsberg and forces of General Zhukov defended. In 1993 the group of Russian military historians leaded by the Prof. General Zolorev drew up an official statement about these games. Here is a conclusion of twenty three leading Russian military experts: “On January 1941, the High RKKA Command played a war scenarios, which were not planned by Germany in reality” “On the Eve of the war: Materials of the High RKKA Command Conference”, December 23-31, 1940, Moscow, Terra, 1993, P.389)
The result of the first game: “…the combats took place on the territory of the Eastern Prussia and Poland. The North-Western Front of “Eastern Grouping” of General Pavlov, fulfilling the task to reach Vistula River by September 3, 1941, on August 1, 1941 started an offensive and in its first days crossed Neman River capturing Suvalki Bulge where big “Western Grouping” was encircled in a pocket. And on the left flank front of “Western Grouping” of General Zhulov was broken and Mechanized corps’ were engaged in the breakthrough, which by August 13, 1941 reached an area located in 110-120 kilometers to the west of the Soviet Union frontier…” (Izvestia Newspaper, June 22, 1993). The forces of General Zhukov retreated but later Zhukov inflicted a counter-attack by engaging strong reserve grouping. When the game was over the management of the game announced a draw results with a comment that position of units of General Zhukov was more preferential.
First of all, Zhukov defended, which is easier than assault. The second point, inflicting a blow in the Eastern Prussia, Pavlov had to cross a number of rivers. For Pavlov, these rivers were obstacles but for Zhukov suitable defense lines. Besides it, Eastern Prussia was cut by some canals, which were obstacles for tank operations. The third point, Eastern Prussia was defended by fortifications line and a chain of strongholds (Schwere Punkts) like Konigsberg. Taking all these into account, the management of the game came to the conclusion that “…concentration of main Russian forces against Eastern Prussia and Warsaw direction is causing serious concerns that fighting on this front could lead to lasting fierce combats” (The Russian Military History Magazine, February 1992, P.22)
Out of two games, the first one was decisive. “The analysis of the first game was done on the highest political leadership level of the Soviet Union.” (The Red Star Newspaper, December 27, 1990). The highest political leadership level of the Soviet Union was Stalin. He carefully observed the course of the first game and got was got convinced that the Red Army could get stack in the Eastern Prussia. Therefore just after completion of the first game Stalin made his choice: a main assault to Germany should be inflicted not from the north (Eastern Prussia) but from the south, from the territories of Ukraine and Moldavia.
On January 8th-11th, 1941, the second strategic game took place. The Grouping of the Soviet Union was inflicting a “counter-attack” through the territories of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania. In the management of playing groups some insignificant changes took place. Some generals were moved from the group of Zhukov to Pavlov and vise versa. But now, Zhukov commanded the Soviet Grouping and inflicted “counter-attack” while Pavlov played for German, Hungarian & Romanian forces trying to repel the Soviet offensive.
The logic behind these military games was the following: in the space between Baltic Sea and Black Sea there is an area of Polesye. Polesye is the largest area of marshes/swamps in Europe and possibly in the world. Polesye is not suitable area for massive movement of the troops and combats. Polesye is separating the western theater of military operations for two strategic directions. The main principle of strategy is concentration. Aspiration to be strong everywhere is leading to scattering of forces and total weakness. If we would try to be equally strong to the north of Polesye and to the south of Polesye we could fragment our forces. This is not advisable. That’s why we should concentrate the main forces in the one strategic direction and inflict the decisive blow. On another strategic direction, we have to inflict auxiliary strike. But what direction should be considered as decisive and which one should be considered as a secondary? Both alternatives had its advantages and disadvantages. A blow to the north of Polesye is a direct assault to Berlin. However, in front of the Red Army would be the Eastern Prussia with its strong hold fortifications and main forces of the Wehrmacht. A blow to the south of Polesye is a deviation and outflanking strike. However, this is a blow to an oil heart of Germany, which was not protected. That’s why it was decided to conduct two military games, compare results and make a final choice.
The soviet strategist was preparing a crushing blow to Germany. On the first game the main blow to Europe was inflicted to the north of Polesye from the territory of Byelorussia and Baltic States. On the second game the main blow to Europe was inflicted to the south of Polesye from the territories of Ukraine and Moldova.
As a result of conducted strategic games, Stalin made his choice after completion of the first game: to carry out an assault to Germany from the area to the south of Polesye from the territories of Ukraine and Moldova. In two days after completion of the second strategic game, the commander of the Kiev Special Military District, General Zhukov was appointed as a Commander of the Soviet General Staff. His main objective was to prepare the main blow from Ukraine and the secondary blows from the territories of Western, North-Western military districts.
By the way, Zhukov & the Soviet General Staff didn't have any contingency defensive plans in June 1941 and had to improvise.
I recommend you two more books about Soviet military strategy & planning in 1939-1941
1. Stalin's Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939-1941
Albert L. Weeks
2. Stalin’s missed chance: Soviet Union and the fight for Europe, 1939-1941, Meltyukhov M., Moscow 2000.
I have also attached links where you can find a military maps of both options (:"Northern" and "Southern") studied & planned by Russian Generals in 1940-41. These maps were taken from the Meltyukhov's book.
http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/s05.gif
http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/s06.gif
http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/s07.gif
Best Regards from Russia,