Junkers Ju-290 to Manchuria 1944

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Cheap Jeep
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Re: Junkers Ju-290 to Manchuria 1944

Post by Cheap Jeep » 05 Mar 2009 20:23

JG,

When did the Japanese give their word that they would attack the Soviets at some point after December 1941? Whose word would have been broken if Japan had attacked the USSR? [url=http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/s1.asp]Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact April 13, 1941


As part of the Tripartite Agreement, if any member was attacked by an outside force, the other members would automatically come to that Axis elements assistance. _As a practical matter_ if the Germans declare war on the Americans, the Japanese should have done the same to the Russians. Because at that point, having themselves staged an unannounced surprise attack on Pearl Harbor 'only in defense' as an element of strategic diplomacy goes right out the window. Sink or Swim, you're in it together.

This is where 'a gentleman's agreement' effectively becomes rubber-to-road pragmatic.

Manchuria to Tankograd is an awfully long distance. BTW, can you quantify the Soviet forces pulled from the Far East to Moscow?


Not for a one way mission. And nuking Tankograd with 5-6 Ju-290s in overload condition is by no means a 'bad idea'.

As for the OOB outside Moscow, I know as late as October 19-22nd they had only about 90,000 men trying to speedbump the Wehrmacht outside Vyazma (sp.) and yet were able to bring up 3 rifle and 2 tank divisions at the flick of a wrist.

By December 5th, these numbers have suddenly spiked to 1.1 million; enough to stage a localized counteroffensive with 2:1 advantagement in the outskirts of Moscow and Guderian is thanking his lucky stars that he pulled his men up short or it would have been a rout for sure with only 1/10th strength in many of his lead units (2,000 man regiment with 200 man company numbers etc.).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Moscow
http://niehorster.orbat.com/012_ussr/41 ... beria.html

You're ignoring just how dependent Japan was on imports of even very basic things such as rice and coal.


No. I'm saying that if the need is high enough (atomic weapons are single investment-path war winners as _no other single technological edge ever has been before or since_) you go to where you can concentrate on their development. Korea or Japan. Just like the Russians went to the heart of their own outback, used slave labor that made the death camps seem quaint and put together the world's largest tank manufacturing complex in under a year and a half.

FWIW, I don't know about rice but the Japanese had sufficient coal, they lacked the miners and so used Allied POWs for the task. But since neither rice nor coal is in and of itself essential to an atomic weapon, the question becomes how much you can use engineering shortcuts to leverage the manpower which we were -forced by our own scientists- to waste 3 years and 20 billion dollars figuring out the theoreticals for...

The rest of your post makes for intriguing reading, but your points would come across stronger if you could provide any kind of evidence to support your ideas.


The evidence is explicit in the History. WHY would Hitler attack in the West if experiences in Aachen and elsewhere as well as certain knowledge of what had been done to the Russians (and what they were revisiting upon Germanic peoples, 10 fold, in reoccupied areas) showed the disposition of the Western Allies to be kinder conquerors?

WHY would Patton seek to 'cut off the line of retreat' of ANYONE when the obvious direction to flee is not -towards- Southern Europe (then occupied by both Russian and American forces) but NORTH, to Norway, with little or no interference?

Hitler is presented as a madman as justification for every bad decision ever made. Holding ground at all costs (deceived by his own top people into thinking he was closer to atomics than was the case). Committing to daylight attacks to get the Allies to respond in (massed force = great nuclear target) kind.

But flip it. And say that he wasn't. Why did he do what he did?

I believe that there is more to be said here than meets the eye and as soon as you start to question what is obvious (Vengeance Weapons are useless without proper targeting, unless they carry weapons whose devastation is itself a magnification of the psychology of terror warfare, tenfold), as being a deliberate rather than randomly maniacal act you are left with the basics of what _cannot be ignored_.

The German high command expected to have Nuclear (or Nuclear Like) Capabilities, _Real Soon_.

As for a specific reference, let's try this one:

http://www.thewebfairy.com/missilegate/rfz/swaz/

Laugh all you want to at the author's mystic-Nazi motives or his foo-flyer in Antarctica revelations but do Google keyword searches on the chapters covering elements of the atomic story.

Specifically Hartek and Diebner, the number and types of German (sluice, centrifuge, calutron, NOT Allied unique developments but _German ones_) refinement processes for Uranium; the Buna plant that made no rubber; the disappearance of such a large quantity of the prewar Uranium stockpiles from other nations; Leslie Groves and the _American_ Uranium shortage, 'what was really on U-234' and Oppenheimer's comments on gun-design weapons.

The emphasis today should then be turned to finding deep-wreck (beyond 1,500ft) of German supply subs in a search for unaltered (as U-864 almost certainly has been) evidence of large transfers of weapons grade precursor Uranium (metallicized would be even bettter).

If the Germans are moving radioisotopes around in 1,000 ton or greater quantities then again, it can only be for _one reason_. They know what atomics can do and they know how to make them. Perhaps have even detonated one.

Finally, and _most specifically_ the eavesdrop reports on the conversations of the scientists discussing a 'photochemical refinement process' should be explained as well as how they came up with the 'magic number' for the Uranium density factors in getting an RCR capable electron orbit separation radii sufficient to bombard into a fissionable weapon yield.

Here's something to get you started:

>
Finally, Harteck again must have stunned his British captors with a remark made near the end of the transcript for August 6, 1945:

HARTECK: The multiplication factor with "235" is 2.8, and when one collides with the other how long is the path until it happens? 4 centimeters, Rx is the radius. Then you have to multiply that by the mean free path and divide it by the square root of the multiplication factor. That should be 3.2. Rx is about 14 centimeters, the weight is 200 kilograms; then it explodes.36

Even Bernstein cannot ignore this, and his comment indicates the there is a "possible something" lurking behind Harteck's figures:

This apparently off-hand calculation of the critical mass by Harteck which does lead to a sensible answer, unlike Heisenberg's shows some evidence that he had done this problem before. It is difficult to believe that he would have known, for example, that the critical radius involved the inverse square root of the multiplication factor if he had not thought about it. How Harteck got the number 2.8 for the multiplication factor is unclear.

During the war the Los Alamos people, who certainly knew a lot more than he did, used 2.2. Only after the war was the number increase to 2.52 as the measurements became better. Perhaps it was Harteck who supplied the German Army Ordnance report of January 1942 with its numbers in the scientists' attempts to interest the Army in continuing support of bomb research.37
>

http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/socio ... pter09.htm

If that ONE STATEMENT can be proven from independent sources with access to the published Farm Hall documents, it essentially debunks the most critical portion of the Allied Myth: Namely that Heisenberg as the nutty professor, represented the general ignorance of the German scientific community as to the most fundamental element of building a bomb. Namely, how much uranium you need to refine for in achieving a critical mass. Not 10 tons. Not 1 ton.

500lbs.

"The Germans couldn't even get the cascade figures right." Thus becomes "The Germans GOT the cascade figures right, better than we did. Being anal retentive Germans who always dot their i's and cross their t's, where did they do the backing research that proves the theory?"

There would be a paper trail. Both of scientific/engineering reports themselves and of the monetary backing for equipment and facilities necessary to support a weaponization vs. pile related effort.

FOIA -those- documents, undoubtedly from U.S. not German secure depositories, and the whole house of cards starts to collapse on the presumption that 'mother never pregnant' means the Germans didn't seriously try to conceive.

The sad part, for me, is that science is never static. There is never any -one element- of 'only a German could do it' wunderkinism. And if there is anything at all to how this can be done, how the Germans came up with their own nuclear solutions, there is nothing to keep a Pakistani or Iranian or North Korean from having already remade the discovery.

Which in turn means that we could in fact be dealing with basketball-sized micronukes today. At a geo-strategic level (i.e. effecting 'globalist' agendas) where we, the JQ Average public don't even know that the game has changed. And our society is a hostage to nuclear weapons technology utterly different from that which predominated in the Cold War.

Even as a 'dirty bomb' doesn't mean a sack of medical refuse with a wad of C4 and a chemical pencil.

IMO, we are doing some incredibly insane things, irreversible and utterly against our own (Western) interests in the push to 'normalize relations' with a hostile religion and the totalitarian socialist capitalism which is using it as a stalking horse via North Korea and Pakistan.

If there is technology like this which is driving diplomatic considerations against our better judgment, we _need to know_, publically, so that we can make some choices about the level of risk we will accept vs. the amount of threat that is actually out there with the capability-X.

We can't do that while operating under a 1940s delusion of what is possible with nuclear arms and other technologies.

Even if the exact technical details must remain hidden, if there was an active German nuclear program that 'came close', it should be revealed.


CJ

Jon G.
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Re: Junkers Ju-290 to Manchuria 1944

Post by Jon G. » 06 Mar 2009 09:58

Cheap Jeep wrote:
When did the Japanese give their word that they would attack the Soviets at some point after December 1941? Whose word would have been broken if Japan had attacked the USSR? [url=http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/s1.asp]Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact April 13, 1941


As part of the Tripartite Agreement, if any member was attacked by an outside force, the other members would automatically come to that Axis elements assistance. _As a practical matter_ if the Germans declare war on the Americans, the Japanese should have done the same to the Russians. Because at that point, having themselves staged an unannounced surprise attack on Pearl Harbor 'only in defense' as an element of strategic diplomacy goes right out the window. Sink or Swim, you're in it together...


The flip side of that is that the German attack on the Soviet Union surprised the Japanese as much as it surprised everybody else. For that matter, Italian and German strategies were very poorly coordinated as well with very little if any information shared about whom either country intended to attack next.

For this scenario, which still suffers from a glaring absence of evidence, you're assuming a basic German-Japanese willingness to share advanced technology while even the US, whose strategy with the other Western Allies was far more coordinated, kept the Manhattan Project secret from its own allies.

...
Manchuria to Tankograd is an awfully long distance. BTW, can you quantify the Soviet forces pulled from the Far East to Moscow?


Not for a one way mission. And nuking Tankograd with 5-6 Ju-290s in overload condition is by no means a 'bad idea'.


Perhaps not, but that presupposes that you have nuclear ordnance in the first place - apart from the caveats about how ill-coordinated Axis strategy was, above.

As for the OOB outside Moscow, I know as late as October 19-22nd they had only about 90,000 men trying to speedbump the Wehrmacht outside Vyazma (sp.) and yet were able to bring up 3 rifle and 2 tank divisions at the flick of a wrist.

By December 5th, these numbers have suddenly spiked to 1.1 million; enough to stage a localized counteroffensive with 2:1 advantagement in the outskirts of Moscow and Guderian is thanking his lucky stars that he pulled his men up short or it would have been a rout for sure with only 1/10th strength in many of his lead units (2,000 man regiment with 200 man company numbers etc.)...


I'm no expert on the Eastern Front, but AFAIK, the Soviets were able to scrape larger forces together for their winter offensive because all the divisions they began raising when the Germans invaded were becoming active by December. Not because Far Eastern forces were slimmed down.

...
You're ignoring just how dependent Japan was on imports of even very basic things such as rice and coal.


No. I'm saying that if the need is high enough (atomic weapons are single investment-path war winners as _no other single technological edge ever has been before or since_) you go to where you can concentrate on their development. Korea or Japan.


Yes, but you will need immense industrial potential to even begin such an undertaking. Japan's industrial potential was less than a third of Germany's and only slightly larger than Italy's

I posted some numbers here from viewtopic.php?p=838629#p838629 which I in turn took from Harrison's The Economics of WWII

Just like the Russians went to the heart of their own outback, used slave labor that made the death camps seem quaint and put together the world's largest tank manufacturing complex in under a year and a half.


Not quite the heart of the outback - IIRC Tankograd was built conveniently close to the largest coal deposits then known east of the Urals. Not sure how large a role forced labour played in the establishment of the Chelyabinsk complex - but Gulag prisoners definitely played a large part in the Soviet nuclear project, perhaps because the whole thing was supervised by Beria.

FWIW, I don't know about rice but the Japanese had sufficient coal, they lacked the miners and so used Allied POWs for the task.


They didn't quite have enough coal, although the shortage was nowhere as serious as their oil deficit. I posted some numbers here viewtopic.php?p=1223934#p1223934

But since neither rice nor coal is in and of itself essential to an atomic weapon, the question becomes how much you can use engineering shortcuts to leverage the manpower which we were -forced by our own scientists- to waste 3 years and 20 billion dollars figuring out the theoreticals for...


Right, but shortages of rice, coal, oil and other essentials are good measurements for the limits of Japanese industrial potential on the eve of war.

The rest of your post makes for intriguing reading, but your points would come across stronger if you could provide any kind of evidence to support your ideas.


The evidence is explicit in the History...


I'm still intrigued, but as far as I can see you haven't provided any evidence to show us that the Germans were even close to building a working nuclear device, or, specifically, how the Japanese might have been involved in such a project.

...There would be a paper trail. Both of scientific/engineering reports themselves and of the monetary backing for equipment and facilities necessary to support a weaponization vs. pile related effort.

FOIA -those- documents, undoubtedly from U.S. not German secure depositories, and the whole house of cards starts to collapse on the presumption that 'mother never pregnant' means the Germans didn't seriously try to conceive...


...but in the absence of said paper trail, we can't really conclude that the Germans (or the Japanese for that matter) had the capability to build nuclear devices, can we?

Sid Guttridge
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Re: Junkers Ju-290 to Manchuria 1944

Post by Sid Guttridge » 06 Mar 2009 12:36

Hi Guys,

As a matter of interest, did the Germans ever contend to the Japanese that the USSR had attacked them first? If true, this should have triggered automatic Japanese entry into the war against the USSR under the Tripartite Pact. Yet we all know that this did not happen.

What reason did the Japanese give for staying out? That as Germany had attacked the USSR first, the Tripartite Pact was not applicable?

Cheers,

Sid.

Cheap Jeep
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Re: Junkers Ju-290 to Manchuria 1944

Post by Cheap Jeep » 06 Mar 2009 21:51

Jon G.,

The flip side of that is that the German attack on the Soviet Union surprised the Japanese as much as it surprised everybody else. For that matter, Italian and German strategies were very poorly coordinated as well with very little if any information shared about whom either country intended to attack next.


I would say that it was the Germans who were taken aback myself, as well they should have been, given Hitler led with his honor and not his brain in declaring war 4 days after Dec.7. The Russians knew, up to two weeks ahead of time when their 'ambassador' laid it out with his Japanese contacts and -they told him- that neutrality was their path in a manner that made it blatant that it was -not- the German one. Then a German contact told the Russian embassy in Switzerland the _exact date_ of the invasion. And from then on out it was just a matter of listening to the COMINT. The Russian's knew what was coming. The Germans were the ones who were SB&T'd. Yet for all this, they did not stop giving the Japanese technologic assistance in everything from engines to optics to cannon and sweptwing jet design. _Why?_

For this scenario, which still suffers from a glaring absence of evidence, you're assuming a basic German-Japanese willingness to share advanced technology while even the US, whose strategy with the other Western Allies was far more coordinated, kept the Manhattan Project secret from its own allies.


I'm assuming nothing. It was clearly present in the exchanges that are publically acknowledged. Again, the question is _why_. Why send tons of mercury. Why send as much as 1,500 tons of (missing from European stockpiles) 'uranium oxide'? If Germany is losing the war that badly and the Japanese sole connection to 'Aryanhood' is an ancient myth and they have been such lousy Allies, WHY BOTHER?

Part of the answer may lie here-

http://www.ety.com/HRP/rev/warcrimetrials.htm

Given we enslaved roughly 7 million Germans, half of them civilians and probably butchered close to a million more, after the war, for up to 10 years, just for wearing a uniform. This being the consequence to OUR 'dirty hun!' brainwashing. Even an occupied Germany may be able to buy leniency, either directly by weight of their erstwhile Ally's long-arm or by offering _the same technology_ to the Americans.

Given only that they have proof that it works.

But the first thing you have to do (and part of why I include the above LINK) is debunk everything you have conveniently heard about Hitler and start asking yourself: What if it's ALL a lie? Why would they do these things? In Germany. And elsewhere. Why would a non-mad Hitler send tanks West to smack the Allies in the teeth? Why the sudden interest in cutting hydroelectric power so late in the war? Why invent V-weapons that are useless as terror devices because they just don't make a big enough bang to compensate for CEP errors?

For a rational person to have done these things can only mean one thing: he thought he had the means to force a concession if not a conclusion of hostilities upon the world. And there was only a single category of wonder weapon that would provide that.

Having said all of the above, the British Mission to the MP began from 1941. They were at the very heart of the program and indeed, Fuchs, one of the biggest leaks of the war and the man who handed over Trinity's blueprint was a Brit scientist.

http://www.amazon.com/British-Scientist ... 0312061676

>
13. “Statements Relating to the Atomic Bomb,” British Information Services,
Rev. Mod. Phys. 17 4, 472–490 1945. This paper gives statements
issued in August 1945 by Winston Churchill and the British
“Directorate of Tube Alloys.” While the emphasis is on British efforts
within the MP, this paper also presents an excellent survey of nuclear
research along with a description of the Frisch-Peierls memoranda and
the work of Sir George Thomson’s MAUD committee. E
14. Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-1945, M. M. Gowing St. Martin’s
Press, London, 1964. Study of the British contributions to the Manhattan
Project. Includes the Frisch-Peierls memoranda of 1940 see
also Ref. 48 and the MAUD reports of 1941. E
15. British Scientists and the Manhattan Project: The Los Alamos
Years, F. M. Szasz St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1992. Examines the
stories of two dozen British scientists who contributed to the development
of the atomic bombs. E
>

http://www2.ups.edu/physics/faculty/rex ... Letter.pdf

Perhaps not, but that presupposes that you have nuclear ordnance in the first place - apart from the caveats about how ill-coordinated Axis strategy was, above.


No. It only presupposes that you have the aircraft to reach the places you need to make the strike /when/ you have nukes. Which is why the Ju-290 which -is known to have made these trips- suddenly became the Ju-390. It is also why there were two Ju-390s and yet only the transport version is acknowledged. Because the bomber had been redesigned with a heavier grossweight as a '390A' production aircraft.

The difference between the two? A 290 can make a polar 1-way route run to deliver critical materials after compromises of the Kriegsmarine Enigma made the U-Boat routings impossible to sustain. It can also bring -back- nuclear materials. But only a 390 can complete a -radius- as much as rangepoint and come home to do it again. Something critical for the London then NYC missions in particular. Those could not be throwaways.

I'm no expert on the Eastern Front, but AFAIK, the Soviets were able to scrape larger forces together for their winter offensive because all the divisions they began raising when the Germans invaded were becoming active by December. Not because Far Eastern forces were slimmed down.


Once the Russians knew that the Japanese were not coming (and they had just pasted the Japanese really badly so it was not as if they were being 'too trusting') they brought 'the other half' of their population West. And thus fulfilled the worst of the German vision of the 'Eastern Slav' without understanding that these were -Asians- whose numbers they could not defeat in penny packets.

The reality being that somewhere between 500,000 and 600,000 Russian forces were captured in the Bryansk pocket alone. And the Russians, whose rule over the East has always been one of terror, not numbers, could not support that kind of loss. They had 250,000 /women and children/ digging trenches outside the Kremlin Jon. This is not an army that has numbers of men to spare, west of the Urals.

Yes, but you will need immense industrial potential to even begin such an undertaking. Japan's industrial potential was less than a third of Germany's and only slightly larger than Italy's


No. What you need are strong backs to erect buildings near running water and electrical sources, building a dam to have both if need be. The Japanese word for 'strong back' is Korean. What you can't sustain is a construction effort that is being bombed to oblivion in your own country and sphere of occupation. As soon as the Allies demonstrated a willingness to engage in relay bombing to get at deep Polish and Czech targets, that became a real issue for the Germans. The important element you have to understand here is that water+electricity is an undeniable _target signature_.

I posted some numbers here from viewtopic.php?p=838629#p838629 which I in turn took from Harrison's The Economics of WWII


The Japanese strength lay in their laboratories. That is where their own cyclotrons were and those were used to determine the thermal neutron saturation paths were to 'breaking' radioisotopes into the most energetic of chain reaction breakdown. It is most likely -not- where their gas diffusion centrifuge or sluice systems were. Those being in Korea where the Germans would bring Uranium and/or Mercury and/or 'Bondur' (the coating required to protect the centrifuges from corrosion) and return with U-235 which in turn (may) have been fed to a primitive breeder reactor facility run by Diebner.

If so, and assuming '500 kilograms was enough for two bombs' aboard the U-234 is true. Then the reason Diebner's final run of his own pile experiment may not be considered 'mentionable' by Heisenberg was because what was on the U-234 was neither Uranium Oxide (yellow cake, pre weapons grade material) nor U235.

It was Element 94.

Which the Germans had destroyed their own breeder system to create enough of to make a viable weapon for the Japanese.

http://www.grunt.com/scuttlebutt/corps- ... icbomb.asp

Again, I am not precluding the idea that these were NOT in fact atomic yield devices but something used to spike an ordinary liquid chemical explosive into maximum thermal efficiency. If that were true, we may be looking for blast zones that never existed. But a half kilometer wide detonation arc would still be tactically useful and whether delivered by Kaiten, Okha or Sieran, the results off an invasion beachhead or Ulithi or San Diego would have been far more horrific than any mere Kamikaze, if only because suspension of the need to penetrate to impact would have resulted in many more 'successful' detonations.

http://www.japanprobe.com/?p=2100
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ ... 804a2.html


Not quite the heart of the outback - IIRC Tankograd was built conveniently close to the largest coal deposits then known east of the Urals. Not sure how large a role forced labour played in the establishment of the Chelyabinsk complex - but Gulag prisoners definitely played a large part in the Soviet nuclear project, perhaps because the whole thing was supervised by Beria.


Back Of Beyond. BFE. Here Be Dragons. You clearly have not been to Siberia to know that ALL labor there is 'forced'...

The Germans captured enough prisoners to have a reasonable idea that Tankograd existed. They were themselves /east/ of there, in Manchuria or Korea. While late 1944/45 would represent a period when only Capital Attacks and frontal weapons employment would be useful; the fact of the Ju-290's transpolar routes existence in and of itself proves the method of both an Amerika Attack. And the potential of _reconnaissance_ leading to direct attack upon the Chelyabinsk facilities, once Germany had unified it's fronts.

Right, but shortages of rice, coal, oil and other essentials are good measurements for the limits of Japanese industrial potential on the eve of war.


Perhaps. If you are trying to be a Detroit. Or Chelyabinsk. Or any of the other high-manpower intensive, heavy metal, war industries.

There were five men on the Japanese atomic project. Yet still they managed to create sufficient hot-gas diffusion to create U-235 from U-238. _WE_ did not manage this until late in 1944 when Oak Ridge finally stood up.

To which I will add another consideration. Everyone gives Yamamoto a pet-American hug for those classic words: "I can run wild for six months … after that, I have no expectation of success." Because he fulfills our expectation of the guy who could actually bloody our nose and the guy who knows we're gonna pound him for it.

Yet again, _nobody asks the question_: Why, if he is speaking this to various Japanese Cabinet members as late as 1940 and as early as 1939, don't they listen to him as their designated military expert? Are we back to a perception that ALL Axis leadership is subjet to the same madness or at least extreme dissociative behavior from the actual context of reality? Even if they don't believe their own Grand Admiral, can these people not look at a map and see what the U.S. vs. Japan geographical dissimilarities are? Can they not pick up an almanac and study population differentials? Is 'Hitlerism' a catchable psychosis? If so then why this-

>
Japanese scientists recognized the potential of using atomic energy to develop a powerful new bomb even before the war.

While the navy commissioned the Arakatsu laboratory to undertake research, the Imperial Japanese Army also ordered a laboratory headed by Yoshio Nishina at Riken, a national research institute for physical and chemical sciences, to develop an atomic bomb.

The Arakatsu laboratory tried to enrich uranium using a centrifuge but was not successful before the war ended. However, both programs failed.
>

http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ ... 804a2.html

Of course they 'failed' they were not the industrial center attempts to succeed, they were theoretical science labs!

>
Scientists Suggest Project

The scientists themselves initiated atomic bomb research in
September 1940. Army sponsorship was arranged, and "fairly
large-scale research" began at the Riken "from December, 1940."
The years 1940 and 1941 were a period of intense military
interest in the possibilities of atomic weapons. In 1941, Prime
Minister and War Minister Hideki Tojo's order for investigation
of the possibilities for a fission weapon were passed on to the
Riken.
>

http://www.fortfreedom.org/w08.htm

IMO, the Japanese, like Hitler, had a far wider vision as totalitarianists of 'what was going on behind closed doors' in their government than Yamamoto did. And we are still not at the bottom of their vision of a 'justifiable war' because we are still looking at them from the wrong end of the telescope. As losers because they were instigators. Rather than as instigators _because they thought they could win_.

When did Nishina to study with Niels Bohr? Why did he also chum up with Einstein? That is the point to start looking for motives.

Could it actually be that, since apparently -everyone- knew the basics of Atomic Energy as Atomic Warfare (contrary to every Discovery Channel type mass-media docudrama); the notion of the development and availability of atomic weapons was not as 'sudden' an intrawar need as it was supposedly seen to be?

How far back into the 30's does this 'awareness' and the disinformation effort surrounding it extend?

I'm still intrigued, but as far as I can see you haven't provided any evidence to show us that the Germans were even close to building a working nuclear device, or, specifically, how the Japanese might have been involved in such a project.


The Japanese were involved as a secure industrial partner.

http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/socio ... pter07.htm

The Japanese needed materials and process assistance. But they had the labor and the backwoods hydroelectrics which the Germans were constantly subject to losing to Allied Air Attack from the point in, mid-late 1941, where the Atomic option became a 'papered possibility'.

http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/socio ... pter08.htm

The German:Japanese telegraph cables were never cut, throughout the war. As tanks were rolling through the streets of Berlin in 1945, the Japanese were sending condolences.

Why?

HOW did we know exactly where to send our people into Germany if there was no contact or monitoring capability inherent to our lookin on their telecomms and nuclear industry? If we had decrypts for Germany (Ultra) and we had decrypts for Japan (Purple and JN-25 for the subs) _and there was nothing there_ we had no reason to go charging into Czechoslovakia. Or to bomb two civilian targets in gross violation of the Geneva and Hague accords. In fact, we had no reason to spend 20-30 billion dollars in on the MED.

There comes a point where negative evidence itself becomes indicative.

...but in the absence of said paper trail, we can't really conclude that the Germans (or the Japanese for that matter) had the capability to build nuclear devices, can we?


We now have definitive proof of a German concept drawing for an A-Weapon which would have worked, out of the Russian archives.

We now have proof of David Irving's 'pineapple sized' atomic weapon quote from no less than Heisenberg himself. Out of the Russian Archives.

U-234s cargo manifest says 'U-235' NOT Uranium Oxide. Karl Ernst Pfaff, junior officer on the U-234 says he SAW Oppenheimer present as a 'tall, thin, guy with a fedora' when the Americans brought him in to 'deboobytrap' the boxes containing the material.

http://greyfalcon.us/the%20U.htm

Leslie Groves was saying as late as February 1945 that there was _not enough material for a bomb before 1946_. Then suddenly, six months later, there were at least two and possibly as many as four U.S. bombs in the theater, ready to be dropped. And the very first weapon employed, without prior test, was the gun design. By Oppenheimer's own words, this was 'of German provenance'.

Which should mean it was crap because the Germans didn't know half of nothing about how to make atomics work. Or did they?


CJ

Cheap Jeep
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Re: Junkers Ju-290 to Manchuria 1944

Post by Cheap Jeep » 07 Mar 2009 00:15

A few more bits and pieces...

Breeder Reactors In The Woods. Radioactive Bomb Craters on Rugen and Thuringia Walde...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y3KmIgAk ... re=related
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2TmIlFH105I&NR=1


CJ

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Re: Junkers Ju-290 to Manchuria 1944

Post by Zebedee » 07 Apr 2009 16:45

Sid Guttridge wrote:Hi Guys,

As a matter of interest, did the Germans ever contend to the Japanese that the USSR had attacked them first? If true, this should have triggered automatic Japanese entry into the war against the USSR under the Tripartite Pact. Yet we all know that this did not happen.

What reason did the Japanese give for staying out? That as Germany had attacked the USSR first, the Tripartite Pact was not applicable?

Cheers,

Sid.


Hi Sid,

the Japanese had signed a neutrality pact with the SU on 13th April 1941. However, there is some evidence that the Japanese were still keeping their options open with regards to war with the SU:

the Liaison Conference between the Imperial General Headquarters and the Government deliberated on the "Outline of the Empire's National Policy to Cope with the Changing World Situation" from 28 June and, on 2 July, the Imperial Conference adopted the following vital national policy.
Principle:

1. Regardless of whatever changes may occur in the world situation, Japan will adhere to the established policy of creating a Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere and thereby contribute to the establishment of world peace.

2. As before, Japan will strive for the settlement of the China Incident, advance toward the Southern Area in order to lay the foundation for her self-support and self-defense, and, depending upon the situation, settle the northern issues.

...

Outline:

3. Although the spirit of the Tripartite Alliance should be the basis for dealing with the German-Soviet war, Japan will act independently for the time being but will secretly conduct military preparations against the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, diplomatic negotiations will, of course, be conducted with utmost care. If the German-Soviet war turns in favor of Japan, she will resort to force to settle the northern problem and secure the stability of the northern frontier.

[This is then analysed a little later on]

3. Clause 3, "Although the spirit of the Tripartite Alliance should be the basis for dealing with the German Soviet war, Japan will act independently for the time being... If the German-Soviet war turns in favor of Japan, she will resort to force to settle the northern problem and secure the stability of the northern frontier," came to mean no more than "Take advantage of an opportunity when it presents itself," after the northern area settlement theory advocated by certain quarters in the Army was suppressed. It might be said that this attitude was caused by German propaganda which gave the impression that the Soviet Union was about to collapse due to the successes of the German offensive. At that time, at a cabinet meeting, Army Minister Tojo estimated the future development of the German-Soviet war as follows:

a. The Soviet Army will retreat step by step to final collapse. (Most probable)

b. It will retreat for a considerable distance and engage the German Army in decisive battle systematically. (This is just what Germany wants.)

c. It will retreat step by step and continue its resistance. (This is what Germany does not want.)

Thus, a "wait and see" policy prevailed to a considerable degree.



source: p.30-32, Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War, Part III (Monograph 147), The Japanese Monographs

Essentially, the Japanese position seems to have been that the Tripartite Pact was clearly not in operation and therefore that the neutrality pact was in force. This reflected the final victory for those who were pressing for an attack to the southern resource area over those in the army who still hankered after a war against the SU while also allowing leeway for an attack should the Soviet Union collapse as quickly as Germany was claiming it would.

Hope that is of some use,

Zeb

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Re: Junkers Ju-290 to Manchuria 1944

Post by Cheap Jeep » 08 Apr 2009 06:35

Zebedee,

Hitler was a fool to declare war on the USA without a guarantee of Japanese 'coequivalency' upon Russia and yet the Soviet military attache` (who was also chief spook at the time) in Japan got confirmation -before the troop shift- that the IJA would not be making any attacks into Soviet territory.

On it's face, this makes sense, for the Japanese. Because you've got: Oil, Tin, Manganese, Rubber, Bauxite all down in Malaysia and thereabouts.

But for the Germans it does not. And if it was a single casepoint 'do or be rebuffed' condition, then Japan should have become a paper ally, isolated from all further contact and technical assistance. History shows she was not.

What I think you are doing with your evidence here is reading the obvious, backwards.

Japan had -nothing- that would stand against Russian KV-1 and T-34. Her best latewar tanks were barely a match for the T-26.

So what I think you are seeing is not simply the German egotistic forecast (Scenario A was in fact the option chosen because Stalin didn't want to lose Moscow and -could not- lose the rail lines that allowed mass transfer of the local industry, eastwards, so he had to make it a razed earth slugging match, by inches) but what they _needed and expected_ Japan to do to create such a turmoil in the East that Stalin was paralyzed with indecision as to traveling into a new threat area and leaving the West-of-Urals region to be overrun. Or staying where he was and hoping to force a decision in favor of a negotiated withdrawal type settlement.

i.e. The German 'hoped for' occurence is the one which HAPPENS if the Japanese are not such cowards as to show their backs to the Russians -from the outset-.

At which point, you are back to my original question: WHY.

Once bitten, twice shy, why does Germany still supply advanced armament tech and port services to Japanese and indeed German submarine couriers?

IMO, the answer is obvious: Vae Victis rewrites of history aside; the Germans or at least those most likely to be 'in the know' (Diebner, Hartek, Otto Hahn and Von Arden) knew of a certainty what the effort to make a bomb required, perhaps better than we did. And the massive shipments of Mercury and Uranium 'Oxide' (1,500 tons of European stocks, _still unaccounted for_) and the efforts to learn how to force U-Boats to the surface and the panic when the Germans went to a new form of Enigma. All these things point to a (correct) Allied interpretation as to why Germany didn't blow off her erstwhile 'ally' altogether: the need for a secure industrial base for atomic weapons research overrode every other consideration. Fairly late in the war.

Indeed, I wouldn't be at all surprised if Heisenberg's trip to see Bohrs wasn't some kind of vetting for Nishina and THAT is the 'real Copenhagen secret' of the time.

Note, that in _Overheard_ the transcripts for the CSDIC show little or no reference for any but Heisenberg's POV and mention is also specifically given to scientists /then in the Russian occupied zone/ whose direct testimony is not avaialable at all (yet who would, less than 4 years later, help in creating Russia's first test detonation) at Farm Hall.

Due to the embarrassing nature of one little blurb by Hartek in particular, these transcripts have since been buried _again_ under national secrecy acts (which in Britain are very severe) but the one thing which is now known is that Heisenberg and his little 'atomic engine' clique DID NOT HAVE the detailed data on how to make an Atom Bomb. Diebner and -his- team did.

By choice.

In fact they had better numbers for the uranium density formula than the Americans did. Something which the transcripts record Hartek scoffing at Heisenberg's ignorance in full view of all his toadies.

Why is this important? Because Heisenberg, as chief high muckety at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute was part of the 'peer pressure' group which prevented the notification of the German War Department that there was a way and 'here's the concept development for it'. So whether for noble or selfish (control over limited resources) purposes, Heisenberg HAS REASON to denigrate the 'true Nazi' as Diebner while not quite exiling him completely from the working group with his "Oh he could be useful for logistics organization..." comments. Because his was the mainstream effort which cost Germany the war and in 1945, that was volatile information indeed.

The thing is, I doubt seriously if the Atomic Scientists, in their hubris, were any less monitored in 1941 when the patent application was making it's rounds at the Institute than they were in 1945 in England. They just assumed it was their little secret.

And this is in turn the reason that, when _specifically asked about it_ by no less than his pet doberman Skorzeny, Hitler said: "When Todt told me in 1941 what this weapon could do, I chose to avoid it as the means by which man would destroy himself in every battle."

Are these the words of a man who butchered millions of Jews? Yup. Are they also the words of a man who once said: "For myself I could never lie, but for Germany, no limits!". Yup.

But these are _not_ the words of a man looking to save for himself a chunk of dignity in a post war world where he knows he will be demonized as no other man in history. These are not even the words of a man terrified (by his WWI experiences) of the prospects of yet another new kind of WMD. I think these are the ruminations of a man who _specifically knows_, not simply about atomic weapons. Which are relatively low yield. But about the potential of hydrogen weapons whose FiFuFi staging does indeed pose enormous scaling problems for a subcontinental plain as small as Europe. Plutonium Fusion weapons in turn having another enormous edge: with the plasticized heavy hydrogen isotopes* providing a relatively easy 'cheat' for added thermal neutron emission, _you don't need a massive quantity of refined radioisotope trigger material_. Especially E94.

http://www.unmuseum.org/nbomb.htm

What I think it comes down to is that the Germans had the basic weapon but couldn't weaponize it. And Hitler, looking for an excuse not to start a war of annihilation in an already shattered Europe, with time running out on all fronts, came up with the idea that he could hostage the U.S. by letting _the Japanese_ bear the brunt of a series of atomic attacks in the Western Hemisphere.

Truk, Ulithi, Guam, Panama. Even Pearl and San Francisco.

Whether these were to have happened in the period when Hitler still had Europe in his clenched fist. Or as a function of a '5 minutes past midnight' endgame by which a forced withdrawal could be negotiated on his country's behalf after capitulation, _there_ is the reason for Japan being limped along as an 'ally' while forcing her own singular mindset in dealing with the U.S. as the means to split the attention paid to his own nation.

We have already seen most of the Allied Myth debunked. The notion that the Germans had no conception of the need for only /partial/ RCR cascading is disproven by Hartek's '2.62' quote from the CSDIC transcripts. The idea that the Germans didn't have a working knowledge of the mechanics of the design is shown to be false by the patent drawing. After the 'no heavy water' argument of so many years reliance, we have the discovery of plutonium imbedded in lumps of graphite in and outside the meltdown event of the test reactor outside Berlin. We have Oppenheimer's remarks about the provenance of the most compact and useful of the early atomic weapons designs and indeed, the weapon which was dropped first.

We have, unfortunately, lost the option to polygraph most if not all of the Ohrdruf witnesses and the Italian reporter.

But we still have the German War Department files which were captured in both Silesia and in Berlin. The U.S. will never release somethign as potentially embarrassing as the notion that we used atomic weapons on Japanese civilians after the Germans refused to do so on the battlefield. But the Russians (who got the Berlin files) would. Given the slightest chance of embarrassing The West.

And matters like the Ukraine provide exactly that option to a nation desperate to justify some kind of 'pan Slavic loyalty' to a people urgent to breakaway into the welcoming arms of NATO.

The truth will out. Someday. And it will make a complete farce of the post-WWII 'permanent wartime economy' as a method to secure the myth of Allied Nuclear Dominance. Most likely because the Germans had or were on the verge of having a cheap method of initiating nuclear weapons with fractional amounts of the trigger materials we have made such a big deal of as 'the only way' today.


Jeep


*Hartek specifically mentions, at Farm Hall, work by IG Farben on Ammonia Tower recirculative technology as a means to produce heavy water at rapid rates beyond that possible with the Norsk Hydro separation assemblies.

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Re: Junkers Ju-290 to Manchuria 1944

Post by Zebedee » 08 Apr 2009 12:46

Hi Cheap Jeep,

sadly the evidence is not being read backwards, but you are applying hindsight to Germany's war plans. The Soviet Union was meant to collapse by autumn 1941 negating any need for Japan to enter the war there, and so Japan seems to have been encouraged to look southwards as not only did that meet the aims of Japan's own strong 'southern resource area' lobby but it also would divert US aid away from the European continent which in itself would be a boon for Germany. edit: By the time Hitler declared war on the USA all he was doing was clarifying what the German high command had believed since lend-lease, that it was only a matter of time before the USA entered the war directly, and by declaring war it freed up the U-boat arm to directly attack US merchant shipping.

While the stories of cheap nuclear bombs etc are fun, I can't find any merit in an argument based on hearsay, lacunae and supposition.

While Britain's Secrecy laws are rather tedious at times, they aren't quite as draconian as you seem to imply (and need them to be for your story to have a conspiracy angle).

Hitler's comments to Skorzeny (if true - Hitler dying before the bomb's first use even in a test which makes his appreciation of its power somewhat interesting and farsighted - this being the man who believed that V-missiles would end the war makes me doubt it...) do seem odd. Until you then place them besides the official Hitler line on why he 'let' the BEF escape. There are no mistakes in Nazi Germany it would seem - just farsighted power plays for noble aims :)

In any case, all the best as I just wished to give Sid a decent source taken from interviews after the war with Japanese cabinet members,

Zeb

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Re: Junkers Ju-290 to Manchuria 1944

Post by Cheap Jeep » 09 Apr 2009 17:17

Zebedee,

>>
Sadly the evidence is not being read backwards, but you are applying hindsight to Germany's war plans.
>>

Sadly, only the victor will ever know the difference between what is 'written as truth or written after truth no longer matters' of certain events. That is the definition of Vae Victis. Hitler may well have been a maniacal fool. But he was not surrounded by them on the OKW and with regard to V-Weapons in particular, atomic warheads would have made all the difference between stupidity and genius, for a lot of things.

>>
While the stories of cheap nuclear bombs etc are fun, I can't find any merit in an argument based on hearsay, lacunae and supposition.
>>

As a function of missing evidence, we now have proof that even the experts do not deny because it is in the public domain. "Germans didn't know the first thing about how much Uranium was required! Heisenberg was thinking 10,000lbs and nobody could refine that much, that fast!" Except that Heisenberg gave a 1941 speech whose minutes were 'never discovered' in which even he describes a 'Pineapple sized weapon'. A speech which has now been produced from Russian Archives and can no longer be scoffed at.

Just as Hartek's quote on the orbit separation radii can no longer be ignored as the most elemental dependent-math upon which more realistic (you need 10-20kg of plutonium for a basic bomb) material estimates for RCR can be based. This is a 2+2=4 scenario. There are not ways beyond it.

As such, if anything, I would say that it is your own 'lacunaeic' ignorance which is the driving factor here.

>>
While Britain's Secrecy laws are rather tedious at times, they aren't quite as draconian as you seem to imply (and need them to be for your story to have a conspiracy angle).
>>

Again, on public record. The Brits wanted Irving arrested and had his (at the publisher) manuscript 'lost' for several months and upon it's return it was missing several pages. It was not Irving's idiocy over the Death Camps that is at question here. He really ran into problems when he got hold of the Farm Hall transcripts because those are the basis of the entire LIE that is the myth of Allied supremacy.

The irony being here that, if you had Googled up the title I gave you you would find that Irving himself, on his website, does not believe that there was an atomic bomb. But he knows quite well about being hounded by British Law.

And it's all based on such a disturbing quote as to make even the ascerbic (bored out of his mind) Allied translator worriedly write: "May have something here..." to his supervisor after MONTHS of getting nothing but worried rhetoric against the notion of their participating in Hitler's madness.

>>
Hitler's comments to Skorzeny (if true - Hitler dying before the bomb's first use even in a test which makes his appreciation of its power somewhat interesting and farsighted - this being the man who believed that V-missiles would end the war makes me doubt it...) do seem odd. Until you then place them besides the official Hitler line on why he 'let' the BEF escape. There are no mistakes in Nazi Germany it would seem - just farsighted power plays for noble aims :)
>>

>
At the end of the war Skorzeny, who had been promoted to SS-Standartenführer on April 20, 1945, was taken into American captivity near Salzburg. In 1947 he was indicted in Dachau for operations with soldiers in enemy uniforms, but acquitted. Until July 1948, he waited in the camp at Darmstadt for his so-called de-nazification hearing, which was, however, postponed time and time again in order to keep him in prison for as long as possible. Therefore, he chose to liberate himself. He stayed in Germany and France for two more years and went to Spain in 1951, were he worked successfully as an engineer. He also assisted with the formation of the Egyptian intelligence service under the name Moukhabarat. An incurable lung disease brought him to Heidelberg in 1975 for medical treatment. There, Hans-Ulrich Rudel and Waldemar Schütz were his last comrades, visiting him before his return to Spain eight days before his death. Otto Skorenzy told them on this occasion about his visit in the Führerhauptquartuer in the autumn of 1944, when the Führer was ill and received him at his bed. The Führer told him that day that Germany had not built the atom bomb, because he did not want to take the responsibility for mankind being destroyed by such a "Teufelswerk". On July 5, 1975, Otto Skorzeny died in Madrid. His urn was interred in Vienna.
>

http://www.stormfront.org/forum/showthread.php?t=138696

I don't agree with the forum or it's purpose. Only quoting a source. There is another on Youtube.

>>
In any case, all the best as I just wished to give Sid a decent source taken from interviews after the war with Japanese cabinet members,
>>

I don't believe that half the true politics of the East:West Axis are known. I have exceptional doubts as to the intent inherent to our leaving the telegraph lines uncut for the entire war for instance.

But what bothers me is not the easy way in which 'Atomic Bomb Stories' are disregarded as the delusions of the simpleminded or the Neo Nazified. But rather because they all assume there is no pertinent evidence as counterpoint.

There is. There always has been.

Too Much Mass. No. 2.62 and 'pineapple sized' proves they knew exactly how much mass was needed.

Too Little Material. No. The Nazis had stockpiles from all over Europe. Principally because _everyone knew what the atom could do_. There was no 'sudden shock' as Einstein said "Mein Gotte, I never thought of that!" because Szilard had patented papers covering the potential of a weapon as far back as _1934_. BEFORE the first piles went critical.

No Evidence Of Connection. Yes. The Nazi and IJN submarine relays and their absolutely /abysmal/ track records for what should have been a milk run mission. And the absence of those 1,500 tons of Uranium _never accounted for_.
Leslie Groves. Early 1945. "We will not have enough material for even a single bomb until 1946 and the more you split it between Hanford and Oak Ridge the worse the situation will get!" No. By 1945 there were at least three and maybe four such weapons in the Pacific. One of which was said to have been dropped but did not fuze. Where did that additional material come from if not Germany and Patton's mission to raid the Pilsen site. A raid made possible by the efforts of 'Alsos' which is Latin for...Grove.

The Germans didn't know about using Graphite to moderate reaction. No. They knew all about graphite, they simply couldn't refine it pure enough to work. And yet eventually, they did even that (the test bed reactor which _went into meltdown_ trying to force Plutonium production, something the Allies said had not happened at all).

The Germans didn't have enough Heavy Water. No. The entire Norsk Hydro effort was a red herring whose importance was figured out by the Nazis as soon as the Allies started paying so much attention to it. On the bottom of Lake Tinnjso lies a ferry with rail cars containing 'tons' of heavy water. All unguarded in 1944 when the Norwegian Resistance murdered fellow citizens to put the transfer effort out of operation. This after three different prior sabotage attempts (Swallow, Grouse, Gunnerside) had failed to demolis the Rujoken plant and indeed _by 1942_ an upgrade to improve output by _ten times_ had been successfully implemented. Yet in 2005, an ROV recovered some of the barrels from 1,000ft down and found they matched the manifests: of a mere 15 tons of the material less than 2 were of sufficient concentration to act as a nuclear moderator. Why the extended stalking horse mission? Because the Nazis wanted us to think otherwise. We now know that IG Farben was doing work on an alternate method to harvest the necessary material from Ammonia, directly. Because Hartek admitted to it at Farm Hall.

'Nobody Saw Nuthin'. Again NO. We have early 1945 interrogation records of an He-111 pilot giving exact details of the detonation sequence of an atomic weapon over Rugen. We had (until a few years ago) EYE WITNESS ACCOUNTS who were neither covert nor unwilling to talk about what they saw on the Thuringia Walde in March 1945. People who are on record (Youtube) as having suffered what could be termed symptoms of mild radiation poisoning. We have reports from a Soviet agent _direct to Stalin_ of an atomic detonation. Were any of these people given polygraphs during their long postwar lives? WHY NOT?

They didn't invest the money or manpower... How do we know? The largest BUNA or artificial rubber plant in the entirety of the reich. It was only a little ways from Auschwitz. And the man who was being tried for use of death camp slave labor _got off_ on the simple technicality of: "But we never made any!" We can't account for more than half the Concentration Camp losses ANYWHERE in the Reich. WHY NOT? Even the Jewish organizations now admit that places like Dachau were not Death Camps and in fact there were no such in Germany proper. Where did that labor go? What was it used for? How do we know that the Germans didn't have the production capabilities for a separate atomic program from that run out of the KWI?

They were too single minded and disregarded the effort too early or started too late. This when the Germans are so often criticized for having -too many- programs ongoing at once in areas like aerospace. Ridiculous. They had a backup or alternative for everything. Scientists spent the whole war fiddling in R&D to avoid the Oste Front. And clearly the left hand didn't know what the right was doing or Heisenberg wouldn't have been caught out so easily in his assumptions. Nor have tried to suppress the patent application which went round the KWI in 1941.

It's all out there. Google it using the subject words I've given you. And realize that I don't care whether it's proven ultimately true or not. Because this-

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9lwvImJ ... re=related

Is the alternative. In which the U.S. gets smeared, continuously, for having done the unnecessary as much as unthinkable. And nobody realizes that all the little lies that are being 'neither confirm nor denied' propogated as to what _really happened_ in WWII are what is making it hard to settle this matter.

Impossible to move on with the notion that atomic weapons are a genie that will never go back in the bottle. And may be frighteningly easy to summon forth for all countries. If a beaten Germany could do it in six months in WWII.

Explain the little lies and whether there is a Big One hiding underneath them or not, I will be happy. Fail to explain why it was necessary to have such a staggering list of them to begin with and you will never convince anyone.


Jeep


P.S. Has anybody got an English translation source for Karlsch Rainer's _Hitler's Bombe_? I would like to read it in full rather than by snippets but nothing shows up on Amazon. Thanks.

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Re: Junkers Ju-290 to Manchuria 1944

Post by Zebedee » 09 Apr 2009 18:09

Hi Cheap Jeep,

I got through the jibe on my 'ignorance' ok, but stopped reading when you got into David Irving conspiracy theories. Sadly the evidence for your theory needs to be provided by you, and you are providing hearsay, supposition and innuendo. Which I guess are types of evidence for some people but not sufficient for myself. H.H. Noorden of the NSDAP/AO website would not be a good choice for a serious source to evaluate Skorzeny by the way.

All the best,

Zeb

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Re: Junkers Ju-290 to Manchuria 1944

Post by Cheap Jeep » 10 Apr 2009 04:16

Zebedee wrote:Hi Cheap Jeep,

I got through the jibe on my 'ignorance' ok, but stopped reading when you got into David Irving conspiracy theories. Sadly the evidence for your theory needs to be provided by you, and you are providing hearsay, supposition and innuendo. Which I guess are types of evidence for some people but not sufficient for myself. H.H. Noorden of the NSDAP/AO website would not be a good choice for a serious source to evaluate Skorzeny by the way.

All the best,

Zeb


Zebedee,

I did not first use the term 'lacunae' as a cover for absent awareness of the proof that is out there. Again, there is a partial record for the CSDIC transcripts online. I provided you with the paper title and as far as I know there is no Official British Government Proof that the words contained therein are false. Regardless of the author.

You may scoff at Irving but you may not dismiss what he has written until you have the counter proof.

The use of the 'missing manuscript' defense is thus untenable.

The Germans best atomic _engineers_ were radiochemists long before they were physicists as Otto Han's findings of Madame Curie's fractionalization of Lanthanum proves. It was he and his team who found that what was occuring in tests with Barium and Radium was literal splitting of individual atoms whose fissile products became isotopes of other materials 'halfway down the chart' of atomic mass.

What he did not understand (at the time) and which I now suspect is key to making highly enriched uranium or plutonium isotopes without 'cooking it kosher' like the physicists did in the U.S., was simply that _chemical bonds_ in the process of providing a useful carrier substance to filter and extract the individual compounds had in fact altered the _atomic_ energy state to a degree that you were guaranteed a fissile event.

i.e. They looked for something they created as it's own proof.

If it was done in the 1930s, I believe that this could be quantificatedly replicated, even today, did we simply use modern technology to count the ionization trails and MEV outputs of Han's technique and that specifically, it is the _material handling_ rules which prevent this experimental primitivism. Not the availability of very high end quantum spectographs to see the outcome.

At some point in the war, the Germans discovered the real meaning behind this '3-5h' substrate mechanization as a chemical solutioned fallout means to understanding how low energy (neutron emitter) material could be brought to a highly energetic state, artificially.

And that discovery, along with advanced shaped charge (dual compression technique with a heavy water moderator evacuated from a neutron source inbetween like radium or tritium as the base material, probably plutonium, -became critical) is how they got away with making what we would consider subcritical material quantities into useful weaponized yields in the range .25 to 1.5KT. If they used their nascent (rocket) chemical capabilities to create a deuterium compound for boosting, those yields could have been far higher.

Not enough to win the war. But enough to make a difference in how it was lost. And for how long.

I believe that the Allies knew all about this because of our decrypt and _wired_ comms intercept capability as well as the sieve like security with which the outer (cover) 'atomic engine' program maintained contacts with multiple scientists outside the Reich. Once we had a power pyramid established using something as simple as published prewar papers, it was simple to isolate and contact key personalities within the **inner program** through these contacts and specifically, I think we effectively bought off Kammler or one of his subordinates equally high up in the military construction end of the weapon program to prevent or delay the weaponization of full yield weapons.

And that in turn is why _the one man_ who would know exactly what was going on and who should have been among the first in the dock at Nuremburg for crimes against the Jews was effectively never hunted down.

The problem is that, contrary to your scepticism, none of the research I have done and the basic understandings I have come to on the chemical/fissile transition process is hidden or 'lacunaeic'. And so it is all equally vulnerable to rediscovery by anyone with sufficiently advanced degrees in physics or radiochemistry and a knowledge of the historical techniques available to the period German researchers.

This approach has not died with the passing of the German physics and chemists of the time. It _could not_ be taken to the grave with them because it is evident in the papers which they published before the war and indeed, in the basic premises upon which the discovery of fission itself was made.

That is why the Brits, Germans and Americans continue to be so impoverished of answers that come nearer to the truth of what was going on. Why they lie constantly but not consistently as to the nature of atomic /mechanization/ as much as theory.

Because the basics are all RIGHT THERE. In the open literature. And they have been, for the better part of 70 years.


Jeep

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Re: Junkers Ju-290 to Manchuria 1944

Post by Zebedee » 10 Apr 2009 18:56

Hi Jeep,

I appreciate the time you spend posting.

The source for Skorzeny's story is his autobiography by the way (p.161-162) in my copy. He goes on to describe how Hitler than described how atomic energy would result in a four hundred kilometre area which would be incapable of sustaining any kind of life (plant or matter) for hundreds of years. Personally, I take Skorzeny's memoirs with a kilo of salt, but each to his own :)

Perhaps it's best if we agree to disagree as I can only see speculation heaped upon speculation in this theory. As we have little to no idea about what occured in Konan (other than it did not require the presence of Japan's leading physicists who remained safely on the Home Islands), then no doubt speculation will continue until someone takes radiation readings in North Korea or further Soviet archives are opened about what they discovered there which evaded the attention of researchers looking into expenditures listed by Japanese corporations in that area. As for any theory which relies so heavily on such an unsatisfactory 'witness' as Witowski, well, additional evidence of a most persuading type is needed. Additionally, the evidence of Ju-390 flights is still most unsatisfactory - not least whether it was capable of carrying sufficient fuel to make the journey while also carrying any cargo of significant weight.

All the best,

Zebedee

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Re: Junkers Ju-290 to Manchuria 1944

Post by Sid Guttridge » 11 Apr 2009 11:57

Hi Zebedee,

Many thanks,

Sid.

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Re: Junkers Ju-290 to Manchuria 1944

Post by Marcus » 25 May 2010 20:11

I received this in reply:

Die Glocke
Dr. A. H. Krieg CMFGE

Introduction

In all the annals of WWII science history none is as secret as “The Bell” whose history is closely entwined with that of Nicolas Tessla. (1) Tessla is without question the greatest genius of world history after Leonardo da Vinci and like da Vinci his secret inventions have been hidden away by government. When Tessla died a full RR freight car of his notes and unapplied for patents and observations were confiscated the largest percentage of these dealt with work that was then continued by the SS in the Bell project. The American government has sequestered all this in secret achieves ever since. Tessla had well over 300 patents 278 issued by the US patent office. He gave us AC current; three phase induction motors, and over a hundred electrical inventions now in use. Hundrets on secret technologies like rotary magnetic fields, particle beam weapons, death rays, scalar physics (2) and anti gravity aircraft have been stored away in secret archives of the OSS (3) later called the CIA. The Bell was the Nazi continuation of research that Tessla had been involved in for decades.
NOTE: Tessla did not believe that Einstein’s mostly plagiarized, theory of relativity was correct, he considerd his theory’s to be incompatible with the theory of relativity. Bearing in mind that Tessla was a man of action that in most instances proved his statements and produced over 100 times the amount of scientific physics and over 250 patents relating thereto than Einstein, we should consider his position most seriously, as did the Nazis.
What exactly the results of the Bell experiments produced is only known by a select few people. There is however a short list of assumed science that may be applicable to the experiments and those are:
• Aircraft with propulsion systems that are non-chemical or not based on fossil fuels, but rather on levitation. As well as vortex powered and electrically driven.
• Energy weapons that could project some forms of energy over great distances.
• Time dimensional movement in space brought on by electrical and magnetic fields including radiation.
• Space travel at speeds in excess of the speed of light by factors of over 100x.
• Expansion of the flying saucers technology that had already been tested and flown in 1934, but powered by anti-gravitational propulsion rather than vortex dynamics.
• Transmutation of chemical elements. (Side effect of experiments)
In a lecture given by Tessla in 1938 titled The “Dynamic theory of gravity” he listed the above points as applicable results to his theory. He further stated that these would become apparent when he released that information to the world upon completion of his secret research. It was never released, he died before the information could be released, the government has it. Astrophysicist commonly knows about space-time distortions and their effect on time is an accepted scientific theory.
The Bell was a huge experiment in Torsion Scalar & Aether (4) Field Physics. The fields created by the “Glocke” bent time. (The space-time continuum) The project was begun in 1937 and continued on in Germany until 1945. They bent the direction of space around the generator. (Die Glocke) When space is bent time is also bent. Known results of these experiments were disastrous upon technicians, plants and all living organisms within the Bell’s sphere of influence. To contain the experiments above ground they built a large concrete “Bird Cage” as was later used in helicopter flight experiments. The concrete birdcage still stands today in Poland. The project was headed up by SS-Obergruppenführer (5) Emil Mazuw who was a personal friend of Hitler as well as Himmler. Experiments began in 1937 in Silesia (6) centered at the SS controlled castle of Wewelsburg ending in 1944 and where then continued in Argentina by the Nazis and eventually by the American government as an alternate space program paralleling that of NASA. The Nazis transported the entire research some of it’s prominent scientists it’s SS commander and the Bell in a six engine Junkers JU 390 (7) from Silesia to Norway and from there to Argentine where Peron was enamored with the Nazis. The JU 390 was one of the first aircraft capable of air-to-air refueling a process developed by the Luftwaffe in the 1940’s. An understanding of the importance of this project to the Nazis is the fact that over 60 technicians and scientists were liquidated by the SS upon termination of it to prevent the research from falling into Soviet or American hands. The Nazis considered this experiment far more important than nuclear physics. They had already tested a small nuclear device by appearance and history a neutron device in the Baltic on March 4, 1945 at Ohrdruf. The Manhattan Project was bailed out in its inability to produce a nuclear weapon by the surrender of U-234 and it’s cargo of fissile uranium and nuclear device components including timers and detonators as aided by Martin Bormann. The U-boat surrendered on May 16, 1945 at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Portsmouth NH. Cargo and particulars has been listed as top secret. . Various code names for the project may shed some light onto its planned purpose. First name was Tor that translates to door or gate, second name was Chronos that in Greek translates to time. So Time Gate would appear to have been the original purpose. The region where the research was carried out Silesia was code named Der Riese, translating to The Giant that may have something to do with the size of the project that spanned miles and numerous bases, castles and some of which was located in closed coal mines.
A separate cell designated Forschung Entwicklung Patenete (8) (FEP) within the Waffen SS commanded this project the head of FEP was a naval officer Admiral Rheim. Virtually nothing is known about either Rheim or Mazuw. The fact that a high-ranking naval officer was involved at the top of the command structure and that Mazuw was also a previous naval officer, also tells us that some considerable heavy fabrication, either of containment or flight was necessitated. Additionally Waffen SS-Brigadeführer Heinrich Gärtner of the of the SS armaments R& D office in Berlin was also in the command loop. Let’s consider that the Nazis were anything but stupid in technology they were years ahead of the rest of the world so when they place some of the top ranking naval and heavy weapons officers in charge of a project it must obviously have demonstrated considerable promise.
A fact relevant to this paper on the Bell is the personnel that worked on it from about 1939 to 1944. This list includes some of the most prominent heavy weight scientists of the 20th century.
Admiral Rhein Kriegsmarine assigned to the Bell project; virtually no information on this man is available from American or European sources. His position was so secret that even his military record has been purged. Organizational structure FEP, under the command of Mazuw.
SS-Obergruppenführer Emil Mazuw, born September 21 1900, death, reported but unverified. Similar to that of SS Kommandant Ost Heinrich Müller a lot of BS and very little proven facts. Recippiant of The Honorary Saber by Himmler and promoted to the highest rank of the SS by Hitler on Hitler’s birthday. Also the skull and crossbones ring by Göring signed by Himmler. Ran the Bell project from 1939 to 1944. By trade a metalworker and naval officer. Organizational structure SS high command Martin Bormann, Heinrich Himmler. Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring.
Professor Dr. Walter Gerlach, born 1889, died 1979, physicist. Inventor of Spin Quarzification in a magnetic field U. of Tübingen from 1908 onward. Involved with the famous Max Planck Institute as well as the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft. All of his research papers as well as his diary are still classified.
Dr. Kurt Debus Born Nov 19, 1908 Died Oct 10, 1983 University of Darmstadt, design and rocket engineer employed at Peenemünde as designer on V-2 Rockets but then transferred to the Bell project. Member of the “Paperclip”(9) transfer of German scientists after WWII. Worked for NASA until his death.
DR. Elizabeth Adler Particulars unavailable but was an extorrdinary mathematician. Pulled into the Bell project to help with mathematics.
DR. Hermann Julius Oberth, born 25 June 1894, died 28 December 1989, physicist and mechanical engineer. Considered one of the three fathers of modern rocketry and astronautics. Taken into the Bell project from Peenemünde. Member of Project ‘Paperclip” worked for NASA until his death.
Prof Peter Herbert Jensen 1913-1955 University of Mainz. Nuclear physicist transferred in 1942 from the nuclear energy project (Uranverrein) to the Bell project. Formerly with the Max Planck Institute for Chemistry where he was director of the high-voltage section which he directed.
DR. Kurt Debus, born 1908, retired from NASA in 1974, mechanical and electrical engineer University of Darmstadt doctorate. Specialized in high energy and high voltage electrics. Later rocket and aeronautical engineering. Worked on Saturn as well as Apollo multistage rocket design. Was transferred to the Bell project from Peenemünde in 1943.
Viktor Schauberger, Austrian Born Jun 30 1885, died Sept 25 1940. Inventor and naturalist. Father of implosion technology and Vortex fluid Dynamics. Developed “Repulsin “A” in the Bell project a flinging saucer developed many patents ideas ran along those of Tessla. His turbines are among the most efficient ever devised. (Viril Mitglied)
Dr. Wilfried Otto Schurmann Electrical engineer Inventor of the Schumann effect. High energy physics, high voltage electrics, participant in the 1934 flying saucers of the Nazis. Modell RFZ (Raketenflugzeug) Thule/Viril Type. Worked with Dr. Popper (Austrian) also an electrical engineer.
The list of personnel involved in the Bell project is extensive and I must again emphasize that these were no lightweights. Even the technicians were of the highest possible caliber and had been recruited from all other defense and military projects in the Axis. The SS recruited people out of the nuclear programs, Peenemünde and the rocket programs, and scores of universities and institutes. The largest percentage of surviving scientists involved in “Die Glocke” later went to work for NASA having been brought to the United States in operation “Paperclip”.
A brief explanation of the Bell. It is obvious that when examined in the light of the aforementioned information that this physics experiment, which lasted some years consisted of two separate and distinctly different projects both of which shared the same sources of power, and some ancillary ones as well. Firstly coming out of Tessa’s work there were experiments in high voltage effects upon gravity in a probable attempt to develop some sort of anti-gravity craft and space time continuum distortions to attain time travel. Secondly was the Tessla death ray. Ancillary experiments dealt with energy weapons and travel beyond the speed of light. These experiments would be in compliance to Tessa’s research in his later years of which very little is known.
Available descriptions are incomplete from a scientific view but some known information relating to exterior and some interior as well as other descriptions are as follows. The bell was shaped like a huge acorn the larger bottom of which was inscribed by many runes. It was made of ceramic similar to high voltage line insulators. (Pear shaped) The bell was just about one meter in diameter and about two and one half meters long. The center diameter was approximately one meter. The inside consisted of a central hollow core about witch two large cylinders rotated at very high speed in opposite directions. The rotating cylinders were made of a silvery alloy rotating on the common axis. The core shaft was about 20 cm in diameter with the lower end firmly attached to a pedestal upon which the bell sat. The shaft was made of a hardened tool steel alloy, of unknown type. Before each test a vacuum container made of ceramic was placed within the shaft that was partially hollow. This vacuum container was only 30 mm in diameter and about 1 to 1.5 m long. It was filled with a metallic substance that had a violet-golden appearance with constancy similar to Jell-O. This substance was coded with the name IRR SERUM- 252, (10) which consisted in part of: thorium-oxide, beryllium, oxide, (beryllia) and mercury. It was radioactive. Mercury was also inside the spinning cylinders inside the bell. The mercury was cooled by liquid oxygen and liquid nitrogen during operation, which has a centigrade temperature of –118.6 for Oxygen and –273.0 for Nitrogen. I believe this to be in error, unless the temperature rise within the bell was so huge that it required that sort of cooling to keep the mercury from boiling. The drums, i.e. rotational cylinders would be unlikely to spin in a solution of mercury that has a freezing point of –38.83 Deg. Centigrade. Power consumption was huge and varied from DC to ultra low to ultra high hertz ratings. The possibility exists that the mercury was inside the drums and formed a layer on the inside of the drums as they began to spin. The Liquids of oxygen and nitrogen could probably have been used to cool transformers. The Bell discharged huge amounts of electrical energy and magnetic fields at various low and high frequencies.
Available information relating to carried out tests is likewise incomplete but some of the known facts are: Two types of tests were carried out. The most common tests were underground in a chamber that would be similar to an underground swimming pool. The second in the “birdcage” above ground, which may be assumed to have only been, used in the flight versions. A water pool of about 20 cm depth was located across the entire floor below the birdcage. We know from reported information that underground chambers were destroyed after three tests because the structural integrity of the walls was compromised. The Bell glowed violet when activated by external electric current, and after the cylinders began to spin. Rubber mats (destroyed after each test) were used over the ceramic tile that covered the walls and water was pooled on the floor. These would be radiation barriers. Personnel were always kept from 150 to 200 meters (450 to 600 ft) from the operating experiments, that were recorded by remote filming and even at that distance workers wore rubber suits and helmets with red colored lenses on the face helmet portion. The effect of experiments reached a distance of over 200 m from the Bell and had dire impact on all living things within its range. Single as well as poly-phase electrics were effected, light bulbs exploded, magnetic fields broke watches, workers experienced a metallic taste in their mouths, problems with their central nervous systems, headraces, pins & needles in extremities, sleep loss, and equilibrium problems. During May to June of 1944 when full-scale tests began five of the seven lead scientists were killed due to exposure. Effects were both short as well as long term and surrounding substances suffered for a long term. When started up the Bell produced a loud humming like in a beehive thus the name given it by laborers (Der Bienenstock). In the first tests plants exposed became gray possibly due to the corruption of chlorophyll, and their eventual decomposition into grease like substance. Living organism’s blood solidified.
Reports from villages in the surrounding Silesian region interviewed after the war stated that they had seen numerous barrel shaped objects with strange luminescence fling around and rising and falling vertically in the region of the experiments.
The rotational vortex caused by the spinning drums might well have something to do with the magnetic properties of the Bell. Two counter rotating drums as used in the Bell would also have a gyroscopic effect that may neutralize some gravitational forces. Mercury due to its heavy weight would help accelerate the vortex action within the drums. This is but speculation. Latter 20th century and 21st century research relating to similar topics would indicate that Plasmas created by electric currents are known to cause vortices also known as plasmoids in which the lines of magnetic field force is almost completely closed. When achieved this creates a situation by which the vortex becomes isolated from the surrounding environment creating a localized spatial time distortion. (11) Heim speculated about changes of the structure of materials exposed to artificial and high generated gravitational fields. Work at the University of Warsaw Institute of Plasma Physics and laser Micro-fusion has built a device they call a plasma trap that is horizontal rather than vertical but looks very similar to the Bell

(1) 10 July 1856-7 Jan 1943 Serb of US citizenship. On his death only 150,000 documents of his writings and journals were released all the rest (90%) was clarified as top secret to this day.
(2) Scalar Physics (as in scale) is defined by a single number or point on any scale. Claimed as a magnitude but without direction, as a volume of mass. It is distinguished from vector.
(3) Office of Strategic Services which was disbanded by Pres. Truman due to having been overrun by communists.
(4) Aether Physics is sub atomic sized physics. (A History of the Aether and Electricity by Sir Edmund Whittaker 1951) & (A history of the theories of the Aether & Electricity, from the age of Descartes to the close of the 19th century.
(5) Obergruppenführer is a rank equivalent to three-star general. Mazuw was made an Obergruppenführer in Hitler’s birthday April 20 1942. He must have been very well connected.
(6) Silesia is now part of Poland on the Check republic border but was part of Germany for all history prior to WWI.
(7) The transport project was titled Laternenträger (literal translation light carrier, or a code for Bell carrier)
(8) Research, Development, Patents
(9) Project Paperclip was the transfer at the close of WWII of Nazi scientists, physicist, engineers and rocket aeronautical engineers from Germany to America.
(10) Einsteinium #99 on the periodic table of elements has a atomic number of 252.080
(11) Heim Theory (Prof. Burkhard Heim Göttingen University) Physicist Feb 9,1925 to Jan. 14 2001.

Part 2

Besides flight, and in consideration of who was in charge of the Bell project and the frequent references to a Wunderwaffe, (miracle weapon) it seems likely that there was a second consideration to this research. It is also likely as in most research that secondary developments would result in ancillary inventions not previously contemplated by its researchers. One path known to have been followed was scalar weapons.

jankerburg
Member
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Joined: 05 Jun 2010 17:54

Re: Junkers Ju-290 to Manchuria 1944

Post by jankerburg » 05 Jun 2010 19:01

Perhaps part of the answer lies here in China. I'm off to interview a number of people who claim to be direct eyewitnesses of the german flights

Return to “Luftwaffe air units and Luftwaffe in general”