Shiden (George) vs F6F, P-51

[Takao]

A careful study of actual air to air kill-losses for the F4U Corsair against the A6M (in Osprey's A6M vs F4U), limiting the study to actual air combat, not ground kills, found that when a specific tally from both sides could be made for a specific action, for the entire first year of the Corsair's introduction, the F4U against the A6M kill ratio averaged 1:1... Overall the F4U was stated as 11:1, but that likely included ground kills and certainly all bombers/non-fighters.

Well, the F4U's 11:1 kill ratio was strictly air-to-air kills, but did include both fighters and bombers.

Limiting kills to air-to-air kills vs Japanese fighters only, the ratio drops to 9:1 in favor of the Corsair.

Land-based F4Us
During 1943, the F4U shot down 526 Japanese fighters for 94 losses...Roughly 5.6:1 favoring the F4U.

In 1944, 477 Japanese fighters were shot down for 49 Corsair losses. Roughly 9.7:1 favoring the Corsair.

In 1945, 244 Japanese fighters were shot down for 12 Corsair losses. Roughly 20.3:1 favoring the Corsair.

Carrier-based F4Us
In 1945, 419 Japanese fighters were shot down for 34 Corsair losses. Roughly 12.3:1 favoring the Corsair.

https://www.alternatewars.com/WW2/NACS_ ... -20-21.htm

It goes to show the Japanese fighters were not that easy when they were actually in the sky...

No sir. It goes to show that Japanese fighters were not that easy when they had trained and skilled pilots at the stick.

Similarly, it could be said to show that, as American pilots became more accustomed and familiar with the Corsair and it's performance, they became more deadly.

The biggest failure of the Zero had nothing to do with its flammability, but more with its radios, and especially its slow-firing cannon, which gained muzzle velocity but got an even slower rate of fire in later models.

The Zero had many faults.. it's light construction limited it's Never-Exceed speed in a dive, thus limiting it's ability to escape.
It's controls became very stiff at higher speeds limiting it's ability to maneuver at high speeds, practically limiting it to low and mid speed engagements for a successful outcome.

The Oscar was similarly hampered by a slow rate from its excellent 900 rpm 0.5 copies, slowed to 500 rpm by the propeller because of the Browning design.

This was a problem with all Browning-based designs - had to do with the way the synchronization affected the Browning's action, which is why the Americans vary rarely placed such weapons to fire through the propeller arc. The Grrmans, instead, used an all electric system(doing away with the firing pin) and saw much higher synchronization rates of fire.

Even with 4 X 20 mm Type 99s on the N1K1 and N1K2, whether early or later high velocity cannons (early 550, late 480 rpm), Japanese pilots endlessly complained about their "put-put-put" rate of fire ruining kills, even with four cannons firing outside the propeller... The Japanese Army's up-sized 20 mm Brownings were excellent however, IF mounted on the wings (a big IF): 900 rpm with 20 mm at 750 m/s! But only the Ki-84 and Ki-44 had these guns mounted outside the propeller. If in the prop, things would be back down to 500 rpm...

To quote Jimmy Thach...

“I would prefer to have the .50 caliber gun to any other weapon I know of; I have, of course, never fought with a cannon, but I still feel that for a fighter four .50 caliber guns are enough. The pilot who will miss with four .50 caliber guns won’t be able to hit with eight. Increased firepower is not a substitute for marksmanship.”

A pilot missing with 500 rpm guns only means many more misses with 900 rpm guns.

Further, if you read "Genda's Blade", you will find that the more experienced Japanese pilots appreciated the power of the 20mm cannon. Although, there were some that felt a battery of .50s was more appropriate for a fighter.

The slow rate of fire I think had a very deleterious effect when combined with tough US aircrafts: The effect was exponential because it took a combination of hits to really have an effect. Every extra 50 rpm made a huge difference... Hellcats would often be out-maneuvered by N1K1s and N1K2s, and yet despite this, US pilots would report poor effects of the Japanese armament despite an advantageous position... That is just shocking...

Again, a lack of Japanese aerial gunnery training. A pilot's gunnery accuracy means more than the number or size of the rounds he is firing.

In the Air Force boardgame I redesigned into "Advanced Air Force", https://boardgamegeek.com/filepage/9710 ... -air-force , I rate the Japanese Type-99-2 20 mm cannon as no better than equivalent to a single .50 caliber M2! Note that the Oscar boosted its 13 mm guns with highly effective explosive rounds (derived from an Italian design), to the point I wonder if, despite a propeller slowing it down to a similar 500 rpm, it was not more effective than the Navy's wing-mounted 20 mm!

Opinions are opinions...Every one has them, or else we would not be here.

I insist on this because people endlessly talk of unreliability on late war Japanese types (much overstated, except maybe for the N1K1 telescopic gear,

Could you be more specific? The Japanese in-line engines tended to be unreliable, even more so on those aircraft sent to far-flung Pacific islands, where supply and maintence were greatly affected by a lack of parts & tools. Or later in the war, when parts shortages were affecting aircraft reliability.

There are many facets to Japanese aircraft reliability...You seem to have confused design deficiency(telescopic gear) with operational reliability.

and even then most of these were destroyed on the ground, as happens when you have 1% of US fuel output, Germany having 2%), poor fuels (untrue, they kept 92 octane for fighters, and boosted that with a unique constant flow MW-50, which boosted their power with remarkable efficiency).

Japan tried to keep 92 octane AVGAS for it's fighters, and succeeded through much of 1943. At which point it began to slip. By 1945, AVGAS as low as 80 octane was being used for Japanese fighters.

But having damaged US fighters make it home meant those pilots would come back with more experience... That was the real failure of Japanese fighters, and much of it was down to the Navy's Type 99, and synchronizing Browning copies to fire through the prop. In actual air to air combat, that firepower's low rate of fire issue far outweighed most of what is always said about Japanese fighter effectiveness. The rate of fire has an exponential effect, and should never, ever have been compromised in the way they did.

Again, it was the inability of replacement pilots to score hits, because they lacked the requisite gunnery and piloting skills.

[Stravinsky444]

A careful study of actual air to air kill-losses for the F4U Corsair against the A6M (in Osprey's A6M vs F4U), limiting the study to actual air combat, not ground kills, found that when a specific tally from both sides could be made for a specific action, for the entire first year of the Corsair's introduction, the F4U against the A6M kill ratio averaged 1:1... Overall the F4U was stated as 11:1, but that likely included ground kills and certainly all bombers/non-fighters.

Well, the F4U's 11:1 kill ratio was strictly air-to-air kills, but did include both fighters and bombers.

Limiting kills to air-to-air kills vs Japanese fighters only, the ratio drops to 9:1 in favor of the Corsair.

Land-based F4Us
During 1943, the F4U shot down 526 Japanese fighters for 94 losses...Roughly 5.6:1 favoring the F4U.

In 1944, 477 Japanese fighters were shot down for 49 Corsair losses. Roughly 9.7:1 favoring the Corsair.

In 1945, 244 Japanese fighters were shot down for 12 Corsair losses. Roughly 20.3:1 favoring the Corsair.

Carrier-based F4Us
In 1945, 419 Japanese fighters were shot down for 34 Corsair losses. Roughly 12.3:1 favoring the Corsair.

https://www.alternatewars.com/WW2/NACS_ ... -20-21.htm

It goes to show the Japanese fighters were not that easy when they were actually in the sky...

No sir. It goes to show that Japanese fighters were not that easy when they had trained and skilled pilots at the stick.

Similarly, it could be said to show that, as American pilots became more accustomed and familiar with the Corsair and it's performance, they became more deadly.

The biggest failure of the Zero had nothing to do with its flammability, but more with its radios, and especially its slow-firing cannon, which gained muzzle velocity but got an even slower rate of fire in later models.

The Zero had many faults.. it's light construction limited it's Never-Exceed speed in a dive, thus limiting it's ability to escape.
It's controls became very stiff at higher speeds limiting it's ability to maneuver at high speeds, practically limiting it to low and mid speed engagements for a successful outcome.

The Oscar was similarly hampered by a slow rate from its excellent 900 rpm 0.5 copies, slowed to 500 rpm by the propeller because of the Browning design.

This was a problem with all Browning-based designs - had to do with the way the synchronization affected the Browning's action, which is why the Americans vary rarely placed such weapons to fire through the propeller arc. The Grrmans, instead, used an all electric system(doing away with the firing pin) and saw much higher synchronization rates of fire.

Even with 4 X 20 mm Type 99s on the N1K1 and N1K2, whether early or later high velocity cannons (early 550, late 480 rpm), Japanese pilots endlessly complained about their "put-put-put" rate of fire ruining kills, even with four cannons firing outside the propeller... The Japanese Army's up-sized 20 mm Brownings were excellent however, IF mounted on the wings (a big IF): 900 rpm with 20 mm at 750 m/s! But only the Ki-84 and Ki-44 had these guns mounted outside the propeller. If in the prop, things would be back down to 500 rpm...

To quote Jimmy Thach...

“I would prefer to have the .50 caliber gun to any other weapon I know of; I have, of course, never fought with a cannon, but I still feel that for a fighter four .50 caliber guns are enough. The pilot who will miss with four .50 caliber guns won’t be able to hit with eight. Increased firepower is not a substitute for marksmanship.”

A pilot missing with 500 rpm guns only means many more misses with 900 rpm guns.

Further, if you read "Genda's Blade", you will find that the more experienced Japanese pilots appreciated the power of the 20mm cannon. Although, there were some that felt a battery of .50s was more appropriate for a fighter.

The slow rate of fire I think had a very deleterious effect when combined with tough US aircrafts: The effect was exponential because it took a combination of hits to really have an effect. Every extra 50 rpm made a huge difference... Hellcats would often be out-maneuvered by N1K1s and N1K2s, and yet despite this, US pilots would report poor effects of the Japanese armament despite an advantageous position... That is just shocking...

Again, a lack of Japanese aerial gunnery training. A pilot's gunnery accuracy means more than the number or size of the rounds he is firing.

In the Air Force boardgame I redesigned into "Advanced Air Force", https://boardgamegeek.com/filepage/9710 ... -air-force , I rate the Japanese Type-99-2 20 mm cannon as no better than equivalent to a single .50 caliber M2! Note that the Oscar boosted its 13 mm guns with highly effective explosive rounds (derived from an Italian design), to the point I wonder if, despite a propeller slowing it down to a similar 500 rpm, it was not more effective than the Navy's wing-mounted 20 mm!

Opinions are opinions...Every one has them, or else we would not be here.

I insist on this because people endlessly talk of unreliability on late war Japanese types (much overstated, except maybe for the N1K1 telescopic gear,

Could you be more specific? The Japanese in-line engines tended to be unreliable, even more so on those aircraft sent to far-flung Pacific islands, where supply and maintence were greatly affected by a lack of parts & tools. Or later in the war, when parts shortages were affecting aircraft reliability.

There are many facets to Japanese aircraft reliability...You seem to have confused design deficiency(telescopic gear) with operational reliability.

and even then most of these were destroyed on the ground, as happens when you have 1% of US fuel output, Germany having 2%), poor fuels (untrue, they kept 92 octane for fighters, and boosted that with a unique constant flow MW-50, which boosted their power with remarkable efficiency).

Japan tried to keep 92 octane AVGAS for it's fighters, and succeeded through much of 1943. At which point it began to slip. By 1945, AVGAS as low as 80 octane was being used for Japanese fighters.

But having damaged US fighters make it home meant those pilots would come back with more experience... That was the real failure of Japanese fighters, and much of it was down to the Navy's Type 99, and synchronizing Browning copies to fire through the prop. In actual air to air combat, that firepower's low rate of fire issue far outweighed most of what is always said about Japanese fighter effectiveness. The rate of fire has an exponential effect, and should never, ever have been compromised in the way they did.

Again, it was the inability of replacement pilots to score hits, because they lacked the requisite gunnery and piloting skills.

You are overstating the importance of pilot experience (as is usual with all blanket statements that don't really add nuance to any knowledge): Very few pilots had the gunnery skills required to use hit and run effectively, which is why speed mattered far less than low speed turning. This difference increased as most Allied pilots in 1944 finally learned to drop the hit and run dogma (the IJN never did, which led one US Navy pilot to observe: "Zero pilots have generally poor tactics: If they would just chop their throttle and turn with us, they could just sit on our tail.". The last to drop the hit and run dogma were the Me-109G pilots, who clung rigidly to avoiding turns (and turned at full power when they did, which means badly) all the way through the Summer of '44, where they were massacred (in turning combat, what else?) by P-51s and P-47s throughout the entire first half of 1944, only to suddenly turn much more and much better in the Fall of '44... They finally got it... Russian Front experience on opponents with one-way radios (hit and run was far less effective on a target that was aware of you) had entrenched all the wrong lessons into senior 109 pilots, and 136 kill aces would get killed on their very first Western Front mission, specifically because they tried to avoid turning despite the advice of 5 kill pilots to not use hit and run (or any vertical tactics) in the West...

A German study showed the average hit rate was around 1/%. If you had great "gunnery skills" it was 5%...

Hartmann could make hit and run work by stalking stragglers, diving, and then firing at point-blank range to cause fatal damage in the short window available, so much so he was shot down 15 times (or thereabouts) by debris from his own target... Hit and run was indeed his daily bread (by his own account, he avoided serious furballs as best as he could), but it was far from a panacea, even for him...

Clostermann, with 18 kills, said he could not hit anything beyond 15 degrees of deflection, but that he got better later in the War. He was amazed by Germans who could go 45 degrees...

By the end of the War all the Americans were doing was turn fighting, which required little deflection (this being the whole point of the thing, in fact). Often while knowing enough to cut the throttle as they went around in multiple consecutive 360s (against their theory-based training that said to add power in turns, which was terrible advice: As 9 kill P-47 ace Virgil K. Meroney said of new pilots: "The worst part was getting their training out of their heads"). They had seen success using turns with the P-47D Razorback, which was probably the most obsessive turn fighter of the entire War (if not the best turning), and by the end turning is literally all they were doing on all types. It really takes an utterly ridiculous cherry picker like Robert L. Shaw to fail to see this, so that he can placate jet propulsion tactics on prop traction types...

If the Corsair did no better than 1:1 for one year, I doubt it went to 9:1 later on.

As to the 80 avgas, at least 90 or 92 octane was specifically reserved for the Ki-84. I thought it did 680 km/h but more research indicated that it was probably no higher than 660. It used full time MW-50 which was quite unique: In effect it had no WEP, and could only do ferry flights at 470 km/h without MW-50...

That performance did not change front line commanders from preferring the Ki-43, and cancelling Ki-84 deliveries, because the Ki-84 did not quite turn well enough to break diving attacks (even if it did turn very well to the left: 17 seconds vs 20 to the right):

-From Osprey "Ki-43 'Oscar' aces of World War 2": P.50: "(Sgt Toshimi Ikezawa, Ki-43 ace) I heard Major Eto had refused delivery of the Ki-84.--- A Hayate pilot would simply drop the nose, and be off in a flash... They could not avoid an attack if it came from above however, because of the Ki-84's poor rate of turn. [To which I add: !!]
This meant the Hayates would routinely head for home while we (Ki-43s) were left to dogfight with the Spitfires. 50th Sentai pilots became notorious for firing a few cannon bursts at the enemy and then fleeing the scene... I think we owe our survival to the Ki-43, as the Ki-84 would have left you in a mighty tight spot if you were attacked from above by P-51s. ---Skilled (Spitfire Mk VIII) enemy pilots such as flight leaders would pull out of their dives when they realized they could not catch us [unaware]. New pilots would dive straight down on us, leaving them vulnerable in a turning fight."

Amazingly enough, apparently having the altitude advantage did not really help you against the Ki-43...


As to pilot experience being a big factor, yes, as long as you did not get into the habit of thinking turning was not important (a concept I hope is beginning to break through):


-“Defenders of the Reich” JG 1 p. 247: Ofhr. Hubert Heckmann (5 kills): “I became wingman to the new Kommandeur, Hptm. Karl-Heinz Weber. His only experience was from the Eastern Front, and from time to time he used the words “pull up during air combat”. I assumed that he would make use of this method in the West, and I warned him about doing so. But he cast all my well-meant recommendations to the wind on our first mission. (7th June) Flying at 1000 m, about 30 P-51s showed up some 500 m above us. After passing us they made a downward turn. Four of them came toward us. Weber didn’t turn in, but pulled up steep into the sky, dragging a Methanol cloud behind him. I yelled “turn in!” but he did not listen. I tried a slight turn in attempt to distract them from Weber. But my self-sacrifice was in vain: They separated into pairs. I fought my two opponents for more than 30 minutes. They went away after losing much of their speed. That evening we were informed Hptm. Weber (136 kills) was dead. ”

There goes a lot of (misleading) pilot experience...

As you can see, even dedicated historians over decades could not even decipher that hit and run was -in large part but not in whole- the preserve of a few aces that mostly avoided combat and racked up scores on lone stragglers. Admittedly, they often had high deflection gunnery skills to make it work. For most of the other pilots, the band-aid of the K-14 gunsight was attempted (when someone finally realized how oversold a tactic high deflection hit and run was)... Hit and run vertical tactics were a legitimate part of a pilot's arsenal, but only as a secondary tactic compared to having a steadier low-angle target trapped in a turning fight (reversing the turn, once engaged, was usually fatal, a frequent mistake made by hit-and-run indoctrinated German pilots, and another example of a widely known front-line "secret" historians have completely ignored). The death of Macguire was a perfect example of how many of the highest scoring aces operated: Away from the rabble, at their convenience...

Not that this really matters to a Ki-43, since turn fighting was best done at reduced throttle, but I would really like to see documentation that anyone actually went into combat with 80 octane fuel. I had never heard of this before.

[ShindenKai]

In the Air Force boardgame I redesigned into "Advanced Air Force", https://boardgamegeek.com/filepage/9710 ... -air-force , I rate the Japanese Type-99-2 20 mm cannon as no better than equivalent to a single .50 caliber M2! Note that the Oscar boosted its 13 mm guns with highly effective explosive rounds (derived from an Italian design), to the point I wonder if, despite a propeller slowing it down to a similar 500 rpm, it was not more effective than the Navy's wing-mounted 20 mm!

Terrible decision on your part, U.S. Testing determined that a 20mm cannon had a destructive power equal to THREE .50cal machine guns, and if that 20mm cannon was firing the German "Mine shells" (thinner walls, more explosive filler) it was equal to FIVE, yes that's correct FIVE .50cal machine guns! Also, IIRC, that same testing determined that as few as only FIVE standard 20mm shell hits were needed to bring down most Allied fighters. Also, the Oscar NEVER had 13mm MG's, EVER. Interestingly enough the experienced Oscar pilots preferred to have an armament of 1x 7.7mm MG & 12.7mm MG, they did not like GREATLY reduced ROF of the synchro'd 12.7mm MG. To top it off their 12.7mm was a reduced power .50cal and had less effective range AND hitting power than the US AN M2's & M3's because of it, though the explosive 12.7mm shells did bring up their effectiveness slightly.

https://www.warbirdforum.com/rdunn43.htm

https://www.warbirdforum.com/jaafmgs.htm

[ShindenKai]

This difference increased as most Allied pilots in 1944 finally learned to drop the hit and run dogma (the IJN never did, which led one US Navy pilot to observe: "Zero pilots have generally poor tactics: If they would just chop their throttle and turn with us, they could just sit on our tail.". The last to drop the hit and run dogma were the Me-109G pilots, who clung rigidly to avoiding turns (and turned at full power when they did, which means badly) all the way through the Summer of '44, where they were massacred (in turning combat, what else?) by P-51s and P-47s throughout the entire first half of 1944, only to suddenly turn much more and much better in the Fall of '44... They finally got it... Russian Front experience on opponents with one-way radios (hit and run was far less effective on a target that was aware of you) had entrenched all the wrong lessons into senior 109 pilots, and 136 kill aces would get killed on their very first Western Front mission, specifically because they tried to avoid turning despite the advice of 5 kill pilots to not use hit and run (or any vertical tactics) in the West...

A German study showed the average hit rate was around 1/%. If you had great "gunnery skills" it was 5%...


They had seen success using turns with the P-47D Razorback, which was probably the most obsessive turn fighter of the entire War (if not the best turning), and by the end turning is literally all they were doing on all types. It really takes an utterly ridiculous cherry picker like Robert L. Shaw to fail to see this, so that he can placate jet propulsion tactics on prop traction types...

If the Corsair did no better than 1:1 for one year, I doubt it went to 9:1 later on.

As to the 80 avgas, at least 90 or 92 octane was specifically reserved for the Ki-84. I thought it did 680 km/h but more research indicated that it was probably no higher than 660. It used full time MW-50 which was quite unique: In effect it had no WEP, and could only do ferry flights at 470 km/h without MW-50...

That performance did not change front line commanders from preferring the Ki-43, and cancelling Ki-84 deliveries, because the Ki-84 did not quite turn well enough to break diving attacks (even if it did turn very well to the left: 17 seconds vs 20 to the right):

-From Osprey "Ki-43 'Oscar' aces of World War 2": P.50: "(Sgt Toshimi Ikezawa, Ki-43 ace) I heard Major Eto had refused delivery of the Ki-84.--- A Hayate pilot would simply drop the nose, and be off in a flash... They could not avoid an attack if it came from above however, because of the Ki-84's poor rate of turn. [To which I add: !!]
This meant the Hayates would routinely head for home while we (Ki-43s) were left to dogfight with the Spitfires. 50th Sentai pilots became notorious for firing a few cannon bursts at the enemy and then fleeing the scene... I think we owe our survival to the Ki-43, as the Ki-84 would have left you in a mighty tight spot if you were attacked from above by P-51s. ---Skilled (Spitfire Mk VIII) enemy pilots such as flight leaders would pull out of their dives when they realized they could not catch us [unaware]. New pilots would dive straight down on us, leaving them vulnerable in a turning fight."

Amazingly enough, apparently having the altitude advantage did not really help you against the Ki-43...


As to pilot experience being a big factor, yes, as long as you did not get into the habit of thinking turning was not important (a concept I hope is beginning to break through):


-“Defenders of the Reich” JG 1 p. 247: Ofhr. Hubert Heckmann (5 kills): “I became wingman to the new Kommandeur, Hptm. Karl-Heinz Weber. His only experience was from the Eastern Front, and from time to time he used the words “pull up during air combat”. I assumed that he would make use of this method in the West, and I warned him about doing so. But he cast all my well-meant recommendations to the wind on our first mission. (7th June) Flying at 1000 m, about 30 P-51s showed up some 500 m above us. After passing us they made a downward turn. Four of them came toward us. Weber didn’t turn in, but pulled up steep into the sky, dragging a Methanol cloud behind him. I yelled “turn in!” but he did not listen. I tried a slight turn in attempt to distract them from Weber. But my self-sacrifice was in vain: They separated into pairs. I fought my two opponents for more than 30 minutes. They went away after losing much of their speed. That evening we were informed Hptm. Weber (136 kills) was dead. ”

There goes a lot of (misleading) pilot experience...

As you can see, even dedicated historians over decades could not even decipher that hit and run was -in large part but not in whole- the preserve of a few aces that mostly avoided combat and racked up scores on lone stragglers. Admittedly, they often had high deflection gunnery skills to make it work. For most of the other pilots, the band-aid of the K-14 gunsight was attempted (when someone finally realized how oversold a tactic high deflection hit and run was)... Hit and run vertical tactics were a legitimate part of a pilot's arsenal, but only as a secondary tactic compared to having a steadier low-angle target trapped in a turning fight (reversing the turn, once engaged, was usually fatal, a frequent mistake made by hit-and-run indoctrinated German pilots, and another example of a widely known front-line "secret" historians have completely ignored). The death of Macguire was a perfect example of how many of the highest scoring aces operated: Away from the rabble, at their convenience...

Not that this really matters to a Ki-43, since turn fighting was best done at reduced throttle, but I would really like to see documentation that anyone actually went into combat with 80 octane fuel. I had never heard of this before.

This is some laughable stuff here, P-47 as the best turning fighter of the war??!? Are you serious?! It would be IMPOSSIBLE for even an experienced Jug pilot to even touch an experienced Oscar or Zero pilot in a turn fight. This is well known. The wing loading and weight of the Jug absolutely cancel that option out and Jug pilots knew this as well. ALL experienced Zero & Oscar pilots KNEW that their ONLY chance was to suck Allied pilots into decreasing altitude turn-fights to gain an advantage. The Zero pilots trying to do "boom & zoom" tactics were those without the experience and ability to wring the performance (and advantage) out of their planes when they had the opportunity to do so (and didn't know it). Where are you getting the idea that IJN followed a "boom & zoom" dogma??? Some "secret" source?? LOL! ALL of the Japanese Aces have talked at LENGTH about the Allies being able to AVOID prolonged combat with them (and remain relatively safe) by sticking to "boom & zoom" tactics OR diving away. In-fact they could tell an Allied pilot was INEXPERIENCED when he chose to TRY and dogfight with them.

In what reality is better gunsight a "band-aid"?? It helps an inexperienced shoot-down and/or damage an enemy aircraft a LOT easier. Thats exactly how pilots get the chance to become "experienced" they live to fight another day. I would bet ALL the Axis pilots would've LOVED to have a K-14 gunsight or equivalent. IIRC, the German study you mentioned was actually accounting for ALL gunnery accuracy including those of soldiers and vehicle mounted guns, AKA doesn't count for aerial gunnery. ALL Aces had better than average gunnery, that's EXACTLY how you become an ACE. Saburo Sakai famously mentions shooting down an unaware P-39 with only FOUR 20mm shells and he knew this because the mechanics checked and verified (incidentally that matches up almost exactly with U.S. testing, GO FIGURE) Hans-Joachim Marseille was also known for his supreme aerial gunnery and the list goes on & on.

The biggest disadvantage the Zero pilots had was that the 20mm's were slaved to fire with the 7.7mm's (and the VERY limited amount of 20mm shells carried), they don't have the same muzzle velocities, they don't have same effective ranges and they don't have the same ballistic coefficients. The pilot has to aim either for the 7.7mm's OR for the 20mm's, PERIOD.
That means he has to the lead the target differently for each pair of guns. The inexperienced pilots clearly didn't know this and usually didn't survive long enough to learn otherwise. To be clear, its also a failure on the part of Mitsubishi (and Nakajima because they built more Zeros than Mitsubishi did!) to not know better and thus set-up the gun system incorrectly.

Where/when were IJA units refusing Ki-84's?? Your statement is the first I've EVER heard this.

I've always loved it when ANY Allied aircraft would try to dogfight me while I'm flying a Zero in a combat flight sim. It never worked out for them -Not even for the F6F, U.S. testing showed that even the slightly less maneuverable A6M5 would further tighten the noose on the F6F every third turn, until it was curtains for the Hellcat.

As a side note, I've tried all the popular WW2 aircraft in combat sims- they all have their own strengths & weaknesses and if flown to their strengths are all quite survivable. I love aircraft with the "thru-the-prop-hub" cannons (much easier to aim because they're in the exact centerline of the aircraft), like the P-39, Me-109, some Yak's & Lagg's and if the sim allows it (the good ones always do) I always set-up the cannons to fire independently of the mg's. It works wonders for ammo conservation.

The key to success in aerial combat is to ALWAYS fly/fight ONLY to your aircraft's strengths and never break that rule, EVER. It's the very reason Thomas McGuire died, he got cocky, didn't jettison his drop-tanks and TRIED to turn-fight with a veteran Oscar pilot at approx 300ft of altitude and lost. (He even taught against doing that)

Put the board game down and pick-up a decent combat flight sim.

Ki-61, Japan's answer to the P-38 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7MCsTRK8n6Y

Ki-84 Japan's Best? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gRQvnCfEbNA

[Stravinsky444]

This difference increased as most Allied pilots in 1944 finally learned to drop the hit and run dogma (the IJN never did, which led one US Navy pilot to observe: "Zero pilots have generally poor tactics: If they would just chop their throttle and turn with us, they could just sit on our tail.". The last to drop the hit and run dogma were the Me-109G pilots, who clung rigidly to avoiding turns (and turned at full power when they did, which means badly) all the way through the Summer of '44, where they were massacred (in turning combat, what else?) by P-51s and P-47s throughout the entire first half of 1944, only to suddenly turn much more and much better in the Fall of '44... They finally got it... Russian Front experience on opponents with one-way radios (hit and run was far less effective on a target that was aware of you) had entrenched all the wrong lessons into senior 109 pilots, and 136 kill aces would get killed on their very first Western Front mission, specifically because they tried to avoid turning despite the advice of 5 kill pilots to not use hit and run (or any vertical tactics) in the West...

A German study showed the average hit rate was around 1/%. If you had great "gunnery skills" it was 5%...


They had seen success using turns with the P-47D Razorback, which was probably the most obsessive turn fighter of the entire War (if not the best turning), and by the end turning is literally all they were doing on all types. It really takes an utterly ridiculous cherry picker like Robert L. Shaw to fail to see this, so that he can placate jet propulsion tactics on prop traction types...

If the Corsair did no better than 1:1 for one year, I doubt it went to 9:1 later on.

As to the 80 avgas, at least 90 or 92 octane was specifically reserved for the Ki-84. I thought it did 680 km/h but more research indicated that it was probably no higher than 660. It used full time MW-50 which was quite unique: In effect it had no WEP, and could only do ferry flights at 470 km/h without MW-50...

That performance did not change front line commanders from preferring the Ki-43, and cancelling Ki-84 deliveries, because the Ki-84 did not quite turn well enough to break diving attacks (even if it did turn very well to the left: 17 seconds vs 20 to the right):

-From Osprey "Ki-43 'Oscar' aces of World War 2": P.50: "(Sgt Toshimi Ikezawa, Ki-43 ace) I heard Major Eto had refused delivery of the Ki-84.--- A Hayate pilot would simply drop the nose, and be off in a flash... They could not avoid an attack if it came from above however, because of the Ki-84's poor rate of turn. [To which I add: !!]
This meant the Hayates would routinely head for home while we (Ki-43s) were left to dogfight with the Spitfires. 50th Sentai pilots became notorious for firing a few cannon bursts at the enemy and then fleeing the scene... I think we owe our survival to the Ki-43, as the Ki-84 would have left you in a mighty tight spot if you were attacked from above by P-51s. ---Skilled (Spitfire Mk VIII) enemy pilots such as flight leaders would pull out of their dives when they realized they could not catch us [unaware]. New pilots would dive straight down on us, leaving them vulnerable in a turning fight."

Amazingly enough, apparently having the altitude advantage did not really help you against the Ki-43...


As to pilot experience being a big factor, yes, as long as you did not get into the habit of thinking turning was not important (a concept I hope is beginning to break through):


-“Defenders of the Reich” JG 1 p. 247: Ofhr. Hubert Heckmann (5 kills): “I became wingman to the new Kommandeur, Hptm. Karl-Heinz Weber. His only experience was from the Eastern Front, and from time to time he used the words “pull up during air combat”. I assumed that he would make use of this method in the West, and I warned him about doing so. But he cast all my well-meant recommendations to the wind on our first mission. (7th June) Flying at 1000 m, about 30 P-51s showed up some 500 m above us. After passing us they made a downward turn. Four of them came toward us. Weber didn’t turn in, but pulled up steep into the sky, dragging a Methanol cloud behind him. I yelled “turn in!” but he did not listen. I tried a slight turn in attempt to distract them from Weber. But my self-sacrifice was in vain: They separated into pairs. I fought my two opponents for more than 30 minutes. They went away after losing much of their speed. That evening we were informed Hptm. Weber (136 kills) was dead. ”

There goes a lot of (misleading) pilot experience...

As you can see, even dedicated historians over decades could not even decipher that hit and run was -in large part but not in whole- the preserve of a few aces that mostly avoided combat and racked up scores on lone stragglers. Admittedly, they often had high deflection gunnery skills to make it work. For most of the other pilots, the band-aid of the K-14 gunsight was attempted (when someone finally realized how oversold a tactic high deflection hit and run was)... Hit and run vertical tactics were a legitimate part of a pilot's arsenal, but only as a secondary tactic compared to having a steadier low-angle target trapped in a turning fight (reversing the turn, once engaged, was usually fatal, a frequent mistake made by hit-and-run indoctrinated German pilots, and another example of a widely known front-line "secret" historians have completely ignored). The death of Macguire was a perfect example of how many of the highest scoring aces operated: Away from the rabble, at their convenience...

Not that this really matters to a Ki-43, since turn fighting was best done at reduced throttle, but I would really like to see documentation that anyone actually went into combat with 80 octane fuel. I had never heard of this before.

This is some laughable stuff here, P-47 as the best turning fighter of the war??!? Are you serious?! It would be IMPOSSIBLE for even an experienced Jug pilot to even touch an experienced Oscar or Zero pilot in a turn fight. This is well known. The wing loading and weight of the Jug absolutely cancel that option out and Jug pilots knew this as well. ALL experienced Zero & Oscar pilots KNEW that their ONLY chance was to suck Allied pilots into decreasing altitude turn-fights to gain an advantage. The Zero pilots trying to do "boom & zoom" tactics were those without the experience and ability to wring the performance (and advantage) out of their planes when they had the opportunity to do so (and didn't know it). Where are you getting the idea that IJN followed a "boom & zoom" dogma??? Some "secret" source??

Just from original intelligence archives, from an interview with historian Justin Pyke, who made that surprising discovery while digging into declassified original archives, probably available for decades, and missed by generations of boomer historians, more keen on interviewing a few celebrity pilots:

https://youtu.be/ApOfbxpL4Dg?si=ge9-CMK-medfklWQ


-Drachinifeld, YT, "Zero or Hero?" (Interview with Justin Pyke, UCalgary MA in Military and Intelligence History, @CBI_PTO_History) 59:07 "Intelligence reports assumed that these tactics (hit and run) indicated the Zero lacked maneuverability." 59:22 "Judging from their apparently long fuselage, these planes do not have a small turning circle, and are not very maneuverable." 59:33 "The Chinese report in question noted the reluctance of the Japanese Navy pilots to dogfight." 1:00:05 "Chinese pilots report that the Japanese will not engage in a turning duel." 1:01:42 USN pilot comment (1942): "In my opinion, they [Zero pilots] had generally poor fighter tactics: Zeroes could not be shaken by us if they would chop their throttles and sit on our tails."

Anecdotal but typical example:

“On October 21, 1943, the Group launched eight aircraft along with four Mustangs from the 530th on a big Japanese supply dump at Kamaing in Burma. The 530th squadron’s P-51As met numerous Mitsubishi Zeros when they accompanied B-24s and B-25s on bombing missions. On the way down, I came up behind Lt. Geoffrey Neal, who was chasing a Zero [Mitsubishi A6M] down to the deck! I latched on to their formation and watched as he drove the enemy fighter right into the ground. The pilot of the Zero had tried everything to get rid of Lt. Neal except to circle fight. At this point, Lt. Arasmith had two confirmed kills, but the fight wasn’t over…“-311th Fighter Group Unit history.

Quote (you): "This is some laughable stuff here, P-47 as the best turning fighter of the war??!? Are you serious?!"

This is what you are referring to:

"They had seen success using turns with the P-47D Razorback, which was probably the most obsessive turn fighter of the entire War (if not the best turning)"

I realize the wording might be confusing if you ignore the parenthesis making a separate statement, and so assume (wrongly) that it is a continuation of the main statement. By the grammar, you made the wrong interpretation, but it is an understandable one: I should have put NOT in italics, full caps or in bold, to clarify the statement.

I meant it was the most obsessive turn fighter in the context of fighting a turn-averse Luftwaffe (especially when fighting those pilots who were mounted on 109s, and even more so if those came from the Eastern Front), but I did not say that it was THE BEST at turns... I clearly meant the opposite.

I'll also note that the Razorback is clearly specified in that sentence of mine, and the Razorback turned significantly better than the later Bubbletops, particularly to the LEFT.

So based on a turn-averse opponent doctrine, and adding that this particular P-47D variant had a preference for left turns, it does appear its extreme lack of climbing qualities made the early Razorback the most obsessive turn fighter of the War, and I'll maintain that statement, because I have read over 900 8th Air Force P-47 Encounter Reports, twice, and the early Razorback P-47 does virtually nothing else in the 8th Air Force, until the clumsier Bubbletops begin to arrive in April or May, which is exactly the time they were quickly shifted to a ground attack role (I feel that this might not be entirely coincidental, but there is no way of knowing for sure).

I'll give it a pass that you interpreted what I wrote in the most absurd way possible, when an alternative interpretation was more grammatically correct, but it does say more about your slant of mind than about my clarity. Anyone who reads my posts with a fair mind can see I spent more time researching these issues than you.

[T. A. Gardner]

It sounds like they're conflating roll rates and turning ability in that. The P-47 had a very high rate of roll, while its wing loading was somewhat high limiting its actual turning ability. When you toss in power available at some altitude, you get a third variable in the mix. How tight you can turn depends on how much speed and or altitude you are willing to trade to do it.

[youtube]https://youtu.be/Ir5J9X3txz4[/youtube]

[ShindenKai]

Just from original intelligence archives, from an interview with historian Justin Pyke, who made that surprising discovery while digging into declassified original archives, probably available for decades, and missed by generations of boomer historians, more keen on interviewing a few celebrity pilots:

https://youtu.be/ApOfbxpL4Dg?si=ge9-CMK-medfklWQ


-Drachinifeld, YT, "Zero or Hero?" (Interview with Justin Pyke, UCalgary MA in Military and Intelligence History, @CBI_PTO_History) 59:07 "Intelligence reports assumed that these tactics (hit and run) indicated the Zero lacked maneuverability." 59:22 "Judging from their apparently long fuselage, these planes do not have a small turning circle, and are not very maneuverable." 59:33 "The Chinese report in question noted the reluctance of the Japanese Navy pilots to dogfight." 1:00:05 "Chinese pilots report that the Japanese will not engage in a turning duel." 1:01:42 USN pilot comment (1942): "In my opinion, they [Zero pilots] had generally poor fighter tactics: Zeroes could not be shaken by us if they would chop their throttles and sit on our tails."

Anecdotal but typical example:

“On October 21, 1943, the Group launched eight aircraft along with four Mustangs from the 530th on a big Japanese supply dump at Kamaing in Burma. The 530th squadron’s P-51As met numerous Mitsubishi Zeros when they accompanied B-24s and B-25s on bombing missions. On the way down, I came up behind Lt. Geoffrey Neal, who was chasing a Zero [Mitsubishi A6M] down to the deck! I latched on to their formation and watched as he drove the enemy fighter right into the ground. The pilot of the Zero had tried everything to get rid of Lt. Neal except to circle fight. At this point, Lt. Arasmith had two confirmed kills, but the fight wasn’t over…“-311th Fighter Group Unit history.

Quote (you): "This is some laughable stuff here, P-47 as the best turning fighter of the war??!? Are you serious?!"

This is what you are referring to:

"They had seen success using turns with the P-47D Razorback, which was probably the most obsessive turn fighter of the entire War (if not the best turning)"

I realize the wording might be confusing if you ignore the parenthesis making a separate statement, and so assume (wrongly) that it is a continuation of the main statement. By the grammar, you made the wrong interpretation, but it is an understandable one: I should have put NOT in italics, full caps or in bold, to clarify the statement.

I meant it was the most obsessive turn fighter in the context of fighting a turn-averse Luftwaffe (especially when fighting those pilots who were mounted on 109s, and even more so if those came from the Eastern Front), but I did not say that it was THE BEST at turns... I clearly meant the opposite.

I'll also note that the Razorback is clearly specified in that sentence of mine, and the Razorback turned significantly better than the later Bubbletops, particularly to the LEFT.

So based on a turn-averse opponent doctrine, and adding that this particular P-47D variant had a preference for left turns, it does appear its extreme lack of climbing qualities made the early Razorback the most obsessive turn fighter of the War, and I'll maintain that statement, because I have read over 900 8th Air Force P-47 Encounter Reports, twice, and the early Razorback P-47 does virtually nothing else in the 8th Air Force, until the clumsier Bubbletops begin to arrive in April or May, which is exactly the time they were quickly shifted to a ground attack role (I feel that this might not be entirely coincidental, but there is no way of knowing for sure).

I'll give it a pass that you interpreted what I wrote in the most absurd way possible, when an alternative interpretation was more grammatically correct, but it does say more about your slant of mind than about my clarity. Anyone who reads my posts with a fair mind can see I spent more time researching these issues than you.

The Zeros vs Chinese aircraft at that time of the war had a performance advantage over Chinese fighters that allowed the Zero/Ki-43 to Boom & Zoom, which is always the easier way to go when you have the performance (and altitude advantage) that allows you to do so. The experienced Zero pilots KNEW that with their Zero they had a colossal speed/energy advantage over their adversaries (generally speaking monoplanes are nearly always faster) and yes, the Chinese (Russian) biplanes were more maneuverable than the Zero (most biplanes are far more agile than monoplanes). So, the Zero pilots used their energy advantage like anyone with 2 brain cells would. The situation flipped later in the war when the USA had the energy fighters.

The Zero being chased into the ground was obviously being flown by an inexperienced pilot that exceeded it's dive speed and the controls locked up/got real stiff- the actions of a rank amateur. Any experienced Zero pilot would've stayed within its maneuver speed and used his agility. That example is the epitome of anecdotal.

Did you know that P-47 pilots HAD to be able exert a stick force of 65lbs+ (aka CRAZY HEAVY FOR A FIGHTER)?? You will NOT be yanking & banking a fighter that NEEDS that kind of stick force to maneuver for any real amount of time. It was a FAT pig.

Did you know that ALL single engine prop aircraft (w/o contra props) turn better one way than the other? It's P-factor and torque.