Intruder Operations Over England

[frcoplan]

mars just check the effect of ground on radar on ww2 night fighters and you'll see you don't have to fly exactly at tree top height. Not to mention that radas at thta time were not like todays so even if ypou have night fighter in air you first must find the opposite night fighters,a mong hundreds of other planes in the air etc. Of course they can also find you...

comparing luftwaffe raids with hundreds of heavy bombers in a very small airspace trying to land all illuminated etc. is not exactly the same, but as erich said, we can argue till we are blue in face, but it shall not change anything, we can not know for sure what could have been, becouse it never happened, so....

i think hundreds of bombers low on fuel, with tired crews, many of them low on speed , some with with landing gear down, possibly on landing approach are sitting ducks for any kind of fighters, and also finding them glowing in the dark like christmass tree is not very hard, and you don't need radar for this...

but we shall never know who is actually rigt here so i leave this debate, but i would still like to hear about the action Eirch mentioned.

frcoplan

[Huck]

Interesting discussion, though a little bit edgy at times.
I have a question for mars: you say that Luftwaffe had a higher loss rate during the night blitz than Bomber Command (during the war), do you have anything to support this statement?

[mars]

Interesting discussion, though a little bit edgy at times.
I have a question for mars: you say that Luftwaffe had a higher loss rate during the night blitz than Bomber Command (during the war), do you have anything to support this statement?

"NO PLACE FOR CHIVALRY: RAF Night Fighters Defend the East of England Against the German Air Force in Two World Wars" by Alastair Goodrum
" The Night Blitz" by John Philip Ray
"1941: The Turning Point: The Blitz to the Non-stop Offensive" by John Foreman

For example, in Jan 1944, Luftwaffe committed around 500 bombers to night raids against England, in 2 months, more than 300 bombers were lost. in the most successfull Luftwaffe night intrusion mission, Operation Gisela (night of March 3/4), Luftwaffe launched an night intrusion with 150 night fighters, and caught the British almost completely in surprise, Germans shot down about 24 British aircrafts, and damaged another around 20 (half of them were written off), but 24 German night fighters were lost in this operation, that was not a favorable exchange rate.

[mars]

First B-17's were followed back in April of 44 during dusk hours (a very long mission), and were slaughtered by KG 51 Me 410A's.

Hello Erich, can you please give some details about this action?

One other thing i was wondering about, if i understand correctly, returning bombers were often very low on fuel and it was rather crowdy during landings, so is it possible that if intruders attacked several airports at once, crashed bombers/destroyed on ground would decrease capacity of airport or shut it down, so increased number of bombers would also be lost/damaged due to lack of fuel/in air and ground crashes/chaos on overloaded remaining airports etc., although those numbers would not officialy be credited to intruders, but would still be consequence of their action? Just a though i wonder what people more knowledgable on this subject think of this?

frcoplan

Well, I would not called it a "slaughter", those American Heavies were attacked by Me-410 of II/KG 51 on the night of Apr 22, 1944, 9 B-24s and 1 Albermarle were shot down, 3 B-24s were damanged, and 2 more were lost in a collision, since there were 270 B-24s returned from the mission, the loss, though heavy, hardly could be considered a "slaughtered", 2 Me-410 failed to return from this mission.

[Erich]

Mars, your stats on the April 44 mission are incorrect as well as Operation Gisela which I will cover and two other intruder raids of 1945 in my book " Im Schatten des Mundes liegen ".

Aufname aus !

[mars]

Mars, your stats on the April 44 mission are incorrect as well as Operation Gisela which I will cover and two other intruder raids of 1945 in my book " Im Schatten des Mundes liegen ".

Aufname aus !

Erich, my source is Simon W. Parry's "Intruders over Britain" in which he listed every single Allied and Germany aircraft losses in those 2 operations, of course he could make mistakes, I would be interested in reading your book, wish your book would be translanted in English.

[Huck]

Interesting discussion, though a little bit edgy at times.
I have a question for mars: you say that Luftwaffe had a higher loss rate during the night blitz than Bomber Command (during the war), do you have anything to support this statement?

"NO PLACE FOR CHIVALRY: RAF Night Fighters Defend the East of England Against the German Air Force in Two World Wars" by Alastair Goodrum
" The Night Blitz" by John Philip Ray
"1941: The Turning Point: The Blitz to the Non-stop Offensive" by John Foreman

For example, in Jan 1945, Luftwaffe committed around 500 bombers to night raids against England, in 2 months, more than 300 bombers were lost. in the most successfull Luftwaffe night intrusion mission, Operation Gisela (night of March 3/4), Luftwaffe launched an night intrusion with 150 night fighters, and caught the British almost completely in surprise, Germans shot down about 24 British aircrafts, and damaged another around 20 (half of them were written off), but 24 German night fighters were lost in this operation, that was not a favorable exchange rate.

mars, your statement was that Luftwaffe suffered higher loss rates during night blitz than BC during its bombing campaign. Gisele was a nightfighter operation, not a bombing operation. Let's stick to bombing. Do you have anything to prove that Luftwaffe bombers suffered higher loss rates than BC?

[mars]

Huck, all of the three references I gave :
"NO PLACE FOR CHIVALRY: RAF Night Fighters Defend the East of England Against the German Air Force in Two World Wars" by Alastair Goodrum
" The Night Blitz" by John Philip Ray
"1941: The Turning Point: The Blitz to the Non-stop Offensive" by John Foreman

were entirly related to "Night Blitz", not Luftwaffe night intrusion, same as I stated, between Jan 1944 to March 1944, Luftwaffe commited a force of 500 bomber to raid England at night, they lost 300 bombers in that time period, and their loss rates were as high as 7%, on the other hand, the hightest RAF bomber comand lost rate was 6.5% in Jun 1944, and averagely were between 4% and 5%

[Huck]

Huck, all of the three references I gave :
"NO PLACE FOR CHIVALRY: RAF Night Fighters Defend the East of England Against the German Air Force in Two World Wars" by Alastair Goodrum
" The Night Blitz" by John Philip Ray
"1941: The Turning Point: The Blitz to the Non-stop Offensive" by John Foreman

were entirly related to "Night Blitz", not Luftwaffe night intrusion, same as I stated, between Jan 1944 to March 1944, Luftwaffe commited a force of 500 bomber to raid England at night, they lost 300 bombers in that time period, and their loss rates were as high as 7%, on the other hand, the hightest RAF bomber comand lost rate was 6.5% in Jun 1944, and averagely were between 4% and 5%

That's hardly the case. What you are looking at is a typical apples and oranges comparison. The British losses counted only the losses in combat mission over the enemy territory, while the German ones are the losses to ALL causes. By the end of the battle of Berlin, BC losses increased to 10% losses (significantly higher than of Luftwaffe over London in the same period) and operations over Germany had to be stopped (they continued at very low pace until May when they stopped completely until the end of 1944, by that time German nightfighters were hardly operating). Radar technology developments and wide deployment, lack of effective escorts and heavy interceptor armament, made night bombing too costly by 1944. There was no airforce at that point able to afford 10% loss rates for more than a couple of months.

[mars]

Huck, we are talking about montly loss rate, not loss rate for an operation, so that the highest loss rate suffered by RAF bomber command were 6.5% in Jun 1944, or otherwise you could tell me your source ? you can find my source at http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/ and I do not agree we are comparing "orange to apple", because those RAF bomber lost over Western Europe also those lost by accident, you only count those bombers failed to return from a mission, you had no way to know how many of them were lost in combat and how many of them were lost in accident, of course RAF lost far more bombers than Luftwaffe did, but that simply because Luftwaffe did not have the ability to field the same amount numbers of bombers as RAF had

[Huck]

Huck, we are talking about montly loss rate, not loss rate for an operation, so that the highest loss rate suffered by RAF bomber command were 6.5% in Jun 1944, or otherwise you could tell me your source ? you can find my source at http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/

You are comparing loss rates experienced by Luftwaffe in Steinbock raids, which were mostly directed against London, the most heavily defended Allied objective, with BC's montly loss rates? Why would anyone do that?? You should either compare Luftwaffe's bomber units and BC units montly loss rates, or compare the loss rates in Steinbock vs Battle of Berlin. In the latter BC loss rate towards the end of the campaign was almost twice the Luftwaffe loss rate. The source for Luftwaffe losses during Steinbock raids is "The Defence of the United Kingdom" by Basil Collier.

and I do not agree we are comparing "orange to apple", because those RAF bomber lost over Western Europe also those lost by accident, you only count those bombers failed to return from a mission, you had no way to know how many of them were lost in combat and how many of them were lost in accident,

They knew quite well whether aircrafts were lost in accidents or due to enemy action. The point is that the numbers given for BC loss rates include only the losses in operations, whereas the 329 aircraft lost by Luftwaffe during Steinbock are due to all causes, including non-combat mission related. Hence the artificially high loss rate that is usually quoted: 329 aircraft lost / 4251 combat sorties = 7.7% loss rate overall.

of course RAF lost far more bombers than Luftwaffe did, but that simply because Luftwaffe did not have the ability to field the same amount numbers of bombers as RAF had

That's a poor excuse. Luftwaffe averaged in 1944 more than 1400 sorties daily (all combat types). Sure Luftwaffe had much fewer planes than the Allies, but flew them much more. In fact Luftwaffe flew in 1944 about as much as USAAF in theatres against Germany (which constituted the large majority of sorties flown by USAAF). BC bombers averaged 400 sorties daily at their peak (mid 1944) and about half of that during the war.

[LWD]

One must be careful when forcasting what would happen if a relativly small force that enjoyed considereable success is scaled up. Consider for example the Pearl Harbor raid. The few US fighters that got airborne enjoyed considerable success but if say 10 or 20 times as many managed to get airborn it is doubtful that they would have shot down 10 or 20 times as many Japanese planes. The Japanese like the British pretty much thought they had the sky to themselves and were thus very vulnerable. If there was significant opposition expecially over time that would not be the case.

[mars]

Huck, what is your source about the loss of 329 bombers included non-combat losses ? and do you know the Luftwaffe loss rate in the "night blitz" between 1940-41 ?
and I found this comments "In fact Luftwaffe flew in 1944 about as much as USAAF in theatres against Germany (which constituted the large majority of sorties flown by USAAF). BC bombers averaged 400 sorties daily at their peak (mid 1944) and about half of that during the war." very intersting, although I am little confused what you are talking about ? do you mean the total number of sorties flew by Luftwaffe bombers are the same as USAAF bomber forces ? if this is what you mean,should Gen Dolittle got court-marshaled for this ? or was that samething to a tactic support sorties (woops, you have considered USAF tactic support sorties already, am I right ?) and the stragic bomber sorties ?

[Huck]

One must be careful when forcasting what would happen if a relativly small force that enjoyed considereable success is scaled up. Consider for example the Pearl Harbor raid. The few US fighters that got airborne enjoyed considerable success but if say 10 or 20 times as many managed to get airborn it is doubtful that they would have shot down 10 or 20 times as many Japanese planes. The Japanese like the British pretty much thought they had the sky to themselves and were thus very vulnerable. If there was significant opposition expecially over time that would not be the case.

We discussed this before. The size of an airforce is not given by the number of aircraft available, but by the number of sorties achievable. In this respect Luftwaffe remained comparable with any of the Allied airforces until mid 1944, though of course Luftwaffe could not compete with all of the them at the same time. People are aware of the massive USAAF operations, but know less about VVS for instance. In support combat operation in mid 1944, VVS flew more than 3000 ground attack sorties daily!

[Huck]

Huck, what is your source about the loss of 329 bombers included non-combat losses ?

The same source I gave above quotes the following monthly losses breakdown for the units involved in Steinbock raids:

January 57
February 72
March 75
April 75
May 50

These numbers were taken from individual Gruppen monthly records. These records DO NOT LIST non-combat losses, this is an Allied practice. On the other hand Luftwaffe units losses are divided between "due to enemy" and "not due to enemy", regardless of whether it happened during combat missions or not. This is in stark contrast with the way Allies kept the losses records.

and do you know the Luftwaffe loss rate in the "night blitz" between 1940-41 ?

I have no precise numbers, but it is known that loss rates were small. Monthly losses averaged to about 60 airplanes from October '40 to May '41 (in May about 120 planes were lost because they Luftwaffe flew at least twice as much than usual to mask the preparations for Barbarossa). While these monthly losses are quite similar with those during Steinbock raids, the loss rates are definitely not, because during the "night blitz" in '40-'41 Luftwaffe's bombers flew each month as much as it did during the entire Steinbock campaign in '44. An average loss rate of 1% during the night blitz is probably a good guess.

and I found this comments "In fact Luftwaffe flew in 1944 about as much as USAAF in theatres against Germany (which constituted the large majority of sorties flown by USAAF). BC bombers averaged 400 sorties daily at their peak (mid 1944) and about half of that during the war." very intersting, although I am little confused what you are talking about ? do you mean the total number of sorties flew by Luftwaffe bombers are the same as USAAF bomber forces ? if this is what you mean,should Gen Dolittle got court-marshaled for this ? or was that samething to a tactic support sorties (woops, you have considered USAF tactic support sorties already, am I right ?) and the stragic bomber sorties ?

In 1944 Luftwaffe flew a total of 524,487 combat sorties despite the severe fuel shortages. In 1944 USAAF flew 1,012,101 sorties in theaters against Germany (in 1943 USAAF flew considerably less: 233,523 sorties in ETO+MTO and 365,940 sorties in total). Considering that from September '44 Luftwaffe hardly flew, this shows that the Luftwaffe monthly sorties average was very good until mid 1944, perfectly comparable with that of USAAF (and most likely better than of any airforce before 1944). These numbers include sorties of all combat types (fighters, attack, bombers, etc), they also include USAAF tactical sorties.