Intruder Operations Over England

[mars]

In 1944 Luftwaffe flew a total of 524,487 combat sorties despite the severe fuel shortages. In 1944 USAAF flew 1,012,101 sorties in theaters against Germany (in 1943 USAAF flew considerably less: 233,523 sorties in ETO+MTO and 365,940 sorties in total). Considering that from September '44 Luftwaffe hardly flew, this shows that the Luftwaffe monthly sorties average was very good until mid 1944, perfectly comparable with that of USAAF (and most likely better than of any airforce before 1944). These numbers include sorties of all combat types (fighters, attack, bombers, etc), they also include USAAF tactical sorties.

Huck, was the 524,487 combat sorties flew by Luftwaffe also included those flew in East Front, which did not flew against Western Allies ? if so, should you also need to included USAAF's combat sorties in Pacific ? and again, I do not think a sorties flew by a US heavy bomber deep into Germany terriotory was eaqul to a Luftwaffe bomber sortie against allied armor spearhead, you could launched a medium bomber 2 or 3 at least sometimes more sorties a day to against a short range ground target, but you could not do the have a heavy bombers like B-17s, B-24s or Lancasters do multiple sorties in a day, that was a difference, same as the difference between a battleship and a destroyer.

[Huck]

In 1944 Luftwaffe flew a total of 524,487 combat sorties despite the severe fuel shortages. In 1944 USAAF flew 1,012,101 sorties in theaters against Germany (in 1943 USAAF flew considerably less: 233,523 sorties in ETO+MTO and 365,940 sorties in total). Considering that from September '44 Luftwaffe hardly flew, this shows that the Luftwaffe monthly sorties average was very good until mid 1944, perfectly comparable with that of USAAF (and most likely better than of any airforce before 1944). These numbers include sorties of all combat types (fighters, attack, bombers, etc), they also include USAAF tactical sorties.

Huck, was the 524,487 combat sorties flew by Luftwaffe also included those flew in East Front, which did not flew against Western Allies ?

Yes, this figure includes the sorties on Eastern Front.

if so, should you also need to included USAAF's combat sorties in Pacific ?

Sorties in Pacific were not that many, it adds about 20% to the previously quoted figure.
Please note that I never maintained that Luftwaffe could compete with all there major Allied airforces at the same time. It is true that Luftwaffe sorties were split between Western and Eastern Front whereas USAAF concentrated mostly on (Western) Europe, but overall Luftwaffe daily sorties averaged at similar numbers with any of the Allied airforces until mid 1944.

and again, I do not think a sorties flew by a US heavy bomber deep into Germany terriotory was eaqul to a Luftwaffe bomber sortie against allied armor spearhead,

USAAF made plenty of tactical sorties in 1944, as Luftwaffe bomber units did mostly level bombing. Remember, on Eastern Front the main bomber type was He-111, which was basically capable only of level bombing missions. Except for the beginning of Barbarossa, when Ju-88 and He-111 where about equal in numbers on Eastern Front, later on Ju-88 was a rara avis on Eastern Front (when VVS met Ju-88 then it was probably Romanian or Finnish). Luftwaffe did sustained level bombing on Eastern Front, Soviet cities in range of Luftwaffe offered the same sore view of destruction after the war, just like the German cities. Sorties against armor was the role of attack aviation not of bombers.

you could launched a medium bomber 2 or 3 at least sometimes more sorties a day to against a short range ground target, but you could not do the have a heavy bombers like B-17s, B-24s or Lancasters do multiple sorties in a day, that was a difference.

Absolutely, this was the advantage of German medium bombers and of front line aviation in general, they could do multiple sorties per day, whereas Allied heavy bombers could not do more than 2 sorties per week. And Luftwaffe often used significantly higher power HE mixtures for their bombs to compensate for the somewhat smaller payload of the medium bombers (this was the case for instance during Steinbock raids).

[Huck]

A few conclusions to the above discussion:

* Luftwaffe did not suffer higher losses over Britain at night than BC bombers, quite the opposite is true.

* Luftwaffe was a rather small airforce (compared to USAAF or VVS), but it had the activity and achievements of a large airforce.

* Night bombing was advantageous at the beginning of the war because of the low loss rates, but by the end of the war countermeasures were so well developed that night bombing was not feasible any more (against the three main players in the electronics field: US, Britain and Germany). BC was forced by mid 1944 to limit itself to operation outside Germany, where both nighfighters and flak had poor coverage. USAAF itself contemplated night bombing but decided to stick to day operations. Of course, by the end of the war BC returned to Germany, since already most nightfighter units were inoperative or in process of disbanding.

On the other hand I do not believe that night intruder operations were the key of winning the war at night earlier. Why would nightfighters follow bombers to be confronted with airfield AAA (where one could find the nastiest light AAA) instead of shooting over their own territory where they could benefit of thier own radar guidance and where there was a real possibility that even moderate damage inflicted to the bomber could be sufficient to make it impossible for the bomber to return to base? Using captured IFF over the Allied airfield was an advantage not going to last long, Western Allies proved capable enough in the electronic countermeasures war. What really mattered in the war at night was complete radar guided nightfighter and radar guided flak coverage. When this was available the night offensive had to stop.

[mars]

Yes, this figure includes the sorties on Eastern Front.

so we could not compare that way

Absolutely, this was the advantage of German medium bombers and of front line aviation in general, they could do multiple sorties per day, whereas Allied heavy bombers could not do more than 2 sorties per week. And Luftwaffe often used significantly higher power HE mixtures for their bombs to compensate for the somewhat smaller payload of the medium bombers (this was the case for instance during Steinbock raids).

And that was comparing apple to orange, the Achievement of Luftwaffe at the West Front after 1944 were virtually nill, a US stragic sorties could achieve far more than a Luftwaffe tactical sorties, and besides, US and British tacical mission achieved far better results than Luftwaffe, there come the call from German soldiers "where is the Luftwaffe ?"

Luftwaffe was a rather small airforce (compared to USAAF or VVS), but it had the activity and achievements of a large airforce

Huck, I respectfully but completely disagree, the achievement of Luftwaffe in WWII was no match to USAAF, the best airforce this world ever had, not even close.

What really mattered in the war at night was complete radar guided nightfighter and radar guided flak coverage. When this was available the night offensive had to stop.

the night bombing of RAF bomber command over Germany continued until the very end of wa

[LWD]

One must be careful when forcasting what would happen if a relativly small force that enjoyed considereable success is scaled up. Consider for example the Pearl Harbor raid. The few US fighters that got airborne enjoyed considerable success but if say 10 or 20 times as many managed to get airborn it is doubtful that they would have shot down 10 or 20 times as many Japanese planes. The Japanese like the British pretty much thought they had the sky to themselves and were thus very vulnerable. If there was significant opposition expecially over time that would not be the case.

We discussed this before. The size of an airforce is not given by the number of aircraft available, but by the number of sorties achievable. In this respect Luftwaffe remained comparable with any of the Allied airforces until mid 1944, though of course Luftwaffe could not compete with all of the them at the same time. People are aware of the massive USAAF operations, but know less about VVS for instance. In support combat operation in mid 1944, VVS flew more than 3000 ground attack sorties daily!

??? Your response has almost nothing to do with what I wrote. The essence of my message was that because a few planes (or people or vehicles) have a very high kill rate vs a much larger force it does not mean that if there were a lot more of them the results would scale linearly.

In regards to your reply your measure of size may be the important one in comparing airforces in some situations but certainly not in all situations. It doesn't take into acount lengths of sorties, available targets, ordanace dropped etc. As a general measure of airforce size it is probably inferior to just counting aircraft. It will also favor an airforce that is concnetrating on tactical missions as well as those in a "target rich environment". As such it seams tailor made to make the LW look good.

[Huck]

Yes, this figure includes the sorties on Eastern Front.

so we could not compare that way

Yes we can compare the total montly sorties for each of the major airforces. Luftwaffe was very much competitive until mid 1944.

Absolutely, this was the advantage of German medium bombers and of front line aviation in general, they could do multiple sorties per day, whereas Allied heavy bombers could not do more than 2 sorties per week. And Luftwaffe often used significantly higher power HE mixtures for their bombs to compensate for the somewhat smaller payload of the medium bombers (this was the case for instance during Steinbock raids).

And that was comparing apple to orange, the Achievement of Luftwaffe at the West Front after 1944 were virtually nill, a US stragic sorties could achieve far more than a Luftwaffe tactical sorties,

Oh, not this again. Allied strategic bombing was a total waste, industrial production increased in Germany a few times at the height of strategic campaign. At least the British did not have illusions about it. Harris had no trouble admitting that the civilian population is the actual target of night campaign.

and besides, US and British tacical mission achieved far better results than Luftwaffe, there come the call from German soldiers "where is the Luftwaffe ?"

This is because Luftwaffe was simply missing from the Western Front. Luftwaffe could not cover both fronts at the same time and Soviets were considered a much bigger threat. However, comparing the tactical achievements of USAAF or RAF with that of VVS or Luftwaffe is ludicrous. Western Allies never had a capable tactical airforce. By the end of war they still did not have a capable armored ground attack plane, they had to rely on vulnerable fighter bombers and inaccurate level bombers for these missions. Besides, Allied planes could not operate in frontline conditions, long flight distances always hampered the Allied ground support operations.

Luftwaffe was a rather small airforce (compared to USAAF or VVS), but it had the activity and achievements of a large airforce

Huck, I respectfully but completely disagree, the achievement of Luftwaffe in WWII was no match to USAAF, the best airforce this world ever had, not even close.

Really? What were the achievements of USAAF? Because strategic campaign was nothing else than a multibillion blunder.

What really mattered in the war at night was complete radar guided nightfighter and radar guided flak coverage. When this was available the night offensive had to stop.

the night bombing of RAF bomber command over Germany continued until the very end of wa

This is not true. During spring (and June) of 1944 about 3-4 major raids and about the same number of minor ones were done against targets in Germany, but only against targets not farther than 50 miles from the border or coast. During the summer, fall and winter these raids dropped to just a couple per month. It wasn't until December 1944 when BC returned to Germany. So basically BC could only scratch Germany's borders at that point, nothing more.

[LWD]

...
Please note that I never maintained that Luftwaffe could compete with all there major Allied airforces at the same time. It is true that Luftwaffe sorties were split between Western and Eastern Front whereas USAAF concentrated mostly on (Western) Europe, but overall Luftwaffe daily sorties averaged at similar numbers with any of the Allied airforces until mid 1944.

That they averaged similar numbers of sorties was probably more a matter of the mess they found themselves in and a target rich environment particularly in the East.

Other measures you might consider would be ordance expended, or miles flown (that would make the US look good) or engine hours. All useful for somepurposes and misleading for others.

Ultimatly the LW shoed itself incapable of sustained offensive operations against the RAF where the latter was not the case. It was also shown that the LW was essentially incapable of any significant offensive operations vs the USAF or of halting offensive operations by the USAF.

....Absolutely, this was the advantage of German medium bombers and of front line aviation in general, they could do multiple sorties per day, whereas Allied heavy bombers could not do more than 2 sorties per week. And Luftwaffe often used significantly higher power HE mixtures for their bombs to compensate for the somewhat smaller payload of the medium bombers (this was the case for instance during Steinbock raids).

Were heavy bombers incapable of it or did the USAF and RAF just choose not to do so because they didn't have to and/or because of the much longer missions they were flying dissalowed it? IE it wasn't that the airforces couldn't do it was a function of the mission set and need.

[mars]

Huck: do you really, I mean really, believe Luftwaffe was a "very high kill rate" airforce in 1944 ? No, most of Luftwaffe airfcrews were badly trained cannon folder, the average quality of USAAF and British aircrews were far better than Luftwaffe in 1944, of course I feel bad that Americans and British were not gentlemen enough to cut down the size of their airforce to make a "fair game"

This is because Luftwaffe was simply missing from the Western Front. Luftwaffe could not cover both fronts at the same time and Soviets were considered a much bigger threat. However, comparing the tactical achievements of USAAF or RAF with that of VVS or Luftwaffe is ludicrous. Western Allies never had a capable tactical airforce. By the end of war they still did not have a capable armored ground attack plane, they had to rely on vulnerable fighter bombers and inaccurate level bombers for these missions. Besides, Allied planes could not operate in frontline conditions, long flight distances always hampered the Allied ground support operations.

Huck, I do not agree, VVS did not have the same capablity comparint to USAAF, again, not even close. I do not consider it would be even worth discussing this point

Allied strategic bombing was a total waste, industrial production increased in Germany a few times at the height of strategic campaign. At least the British did not have illusions about it. Harris had no trouble admitting that the civilian population is the actual target of night campaign.

what could I say ? Huck ?

This is not true. During spring (and June) of 1944 about 3-4 major raids and about the same number of minor ones were done against targets in Germany, but only against targets not farther than 50 miles from the border or coast. During the summer, fall and winter these raids dropped to just a couple per month. It wasn't until December 1944 when BC returned to Germany. So basically BC could only scratch Germany's borders at that point, nothing more.

again, Huck http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/diary.html, what are you talking about ? and could you please take a few minutes to think the reasons of the priority in RAF bomb command target list.

[Huck]

One must be careful when forcasting what would happen if a relativly small force that enjoyed considereable success is scaled up. Consider for example the Pearl Harbor raid. The few US fighters that got airborne enjoyed considerable success but if say 10 or 20 times as many managed to get airborn it is doubtful that they would have shot down 10 or 20 times as many Japanese planes. The Japanese like the British pretty much thought they had the sky to themselves and were thus very vulnerable. If there was significant opposition expecially over time that would not be the case.

We discussed this before. The size of an airforce is not given by the number of aircraft available, but by the number of sorties achievable. In this respect Luftwaffe remained comparable with any of the Allied airforces until mid 1944, though of course Luftwaffe could not compete with all of the them at the same time. People are aware of the massive USAAF operations, but know less about VVS for instance. In support combat operation in mid 1944, VVS flew more than 3000 ground attack sorties daily!

??? Your response has almost nothing to do with what I wrote. The essence of my message was that because a few planes (or people or vehicles) have a very high kill rate vs a much larger force

Achieving favourable kill rates while badly outnumbered showed the human and material quality of the Luftwaffe.

it does not mean that if there were a lot more of them the results would scale linearly.

I never said such a thing.

In regards to your reply your measure of size may be the important one in comparing airforces in some situations but certainly not in all situations. It doesn't take into acount lengths of sorties, available targets, ordanace dropped etc. As a general measure of airforce size it is probably inferior to just counting aircraft. It will also favor an airforce that is concnetrating on tactical missions as well as those in a "target rich environment". As such it seams tailor made to make the LW look good.

Sortie count is always a better measure for the size and strength of an airforce. What good are more planes if in total they can't fly as much? Look at the Iran-Irak war. On paper Iran looked much better, having the latest American and British equipment, compared with the Iraqis' French and Soviet (mostly old) planes. But Iraqis flew 10 times as many sorties, enjoing complete air superiority during the conflict.

Of course Luftwaffe flew much shorter sorties, and therefore more of them, this is the advantage of a frontline airforce. USAAF and RAF never fielded in numbers planes that could take the punishment of frontline service, they had to contend with operations from distant airfields.

[mars]

Huck, Luftwaffe did not achieve any "favorable" kill rate after 1944, especially in 1944, that was a nearly "one-side" thing, of course Luftwaffe still had some excellent pilots till the end of war, but most of German flyer that time was simply cannon folder. Besides how could you be sure that USAAF pilots would not perform even better if they were "heavliy outnumbered" ? "if you dare, disband three fourth of your airforce, then we fight equally", sadly, those bad Americans dare not.

[Huck]

Huck: do you really, I mean really, believe Luftwaffe was a "very high kill rate" airforce in 1944 ? No, most of Luftwaffe airfcrews were badly trained cannon folder, the average quality of USAAF and British aircrews were far better than Luftwaffe in 1944, of course I feel bad that Americans and British were not gentlemen enough to cut down the size of their airforce to make a "fair game"

Were Luftwaffe crews badly trained cannon fodder? You have been probably mislead by the number of training hours spent by the pilots in schools, which was indeed decreasing as the war went on. But this was because it was required for the novice pilots to spend additional time in frontline training units. This was a very useful practice. It was observed that if novice pilots survived the first 10-20 combat missions they were sufficiently trained to manage a 2000HP beast and be aware of what's going on outside the cockpit at the same time.

The combat missions they flew in these units were completely secondary, but gave the chance to the young pilots to meet the enemy while being assisted by instructors. No other airforce had such a program. This was one of the reasons why while German pilots had no limits to their service, they still had reasonable survival ratios. And about Allied pilots quality I'm sure you read only superlatives, but in reality Allied pilots rarily went past the experience of a novice in Luftwaffe. Read Heinz Bär comments about the quality of the Allied pilots he met during the invasion of Normandy.

This is because Luftwaffe was simply missing from the Western Front. Luftwaffe could not cover both fronts at the same time and Soviets were considered a much bigger threat. However, comparing the tactical achievements of USAAF or RAF with that of VVS or Luftwaffe is ludicrous. Western Allies never had a capable tactical airforce. By the end of war they still did not have a capable armored ground attack plane, they had to rely on vulnerable fighter bombers and inaccurate level bombers for these missions. Besides, Allied planes could not operate in frontline conditions, long flight distances always hampered the Allied ground support operations.

Huck, I do not agree, VVS did not have the same capablity comparint to USAAF, again, not even close. I do not consider it would be even worth discussing this point.

I don't particularly care whether you consider this worth discussing or not. VVS had more airplanes in service than USAAF by the end of war. True, VVS had no heavy bombers (except a few Pe-8), but USAAF had no armored planes either.

Allied strategic bombing was a total waste, industrial production increased in Germany a few times at the height of strategic campaign. At least the British did not have illusions about it. Harris had no trouble admitting that the civilian population is the actual target of night campaign.

what could I say ? Huck ?

I don't know. You might as well say nothing.

This is not true. During spring (and June) of 1944 about 3-4 major raids and about the same number of minor ones were done against targets in Germany, but only against targets not farther than 50 miles from the border or coast. During the summer, fall and winter these raids dropped to just a couple per month. It wasn't until December 1944 when BC returned to Germany. So basically BC could only scratch Germany's borders at that point, nothing more.

again, Huck http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/diary.html, what are you talking about ? and could you please take a few minutes to think the reasons of the priority in RAF bomb command target list.

What about it? This list only confirms what I said above.

[LWD]

...Oh, not this again. Allied strategic bombing was a total waste, industrial production increased in Germany a few times at the height of strategic campaign.

You can't be serious. The strategic bomber campaign was far from a "total waste". It did suffer from vassilating targeting priorities but it allowed the west to have consdierable impact on the war even before their troops were on the continent. While German production did rise up through 44 GErmany also ended up devoting a lot of that produciton to air defence. One also suspects that the production would be even higher with out the campaign. Then there is the gutting of the LW fighter arm during the course of this campaign.

...
This is because Luftwaffe was simply missing from the Western Front. Luftwaffe could not cover both fronts at the same time and Soviets were considered a much bigger threat. However, comparing the tactical achievements of USAAF or RAF with that of VVS or Luftwaffe is ludicrous. Western Allies never had a capable tactical airforce. By the end of war they still did not have a capable armored ground attack plane, they had to rely on vulnerable fighter bombers and inaccurate level bombers for these missions. Besides, Allied planes could not operate in frontline conditions, long flight distances always hampered the Allied ground support operations.

And the German's had an armored ground attack plane? The allied airforces that destroyed the logistics net through most of Western Europe weren't effective? At least some allied planes (P40's, P-47s, P-38s, and F4Us just to mention some of the US planes) were quite cabable of operating in front line conditions. In most cases they didn't have to and during some phases the German army was falling back to fast to make it reasonable but just becausse they didn't doesn't mean they couldn't.

...Really? What were the achievements of USAAF? Because strategic campaign was nothing else than a multibillion blunder.

You can't be serious asking questions like that.

[LWD]

....
??? Your response has almost nothing to do with what I wrote. The essence of my message was that because a few planes (or people or vehicles) have a very high kill rate vs a much larger force

Achieving favourable kill rates while badly outnumbered showed the human and material quality of the Luftwaffe.

Which had nothing to do with my quote above it. It also isn't necessarily true. As I pointed out earlier the USAF pilots that got airborne at Pearl had very favorable kill rates when they were very badly outnumbered. I would be very reluctant to claim that the planes or the pilots were as superior as that would indicate to the JNAF.,

it does not mean that if there were a lot more of them the results would scale linearly.

I never said such a thing.

No but many of the post prior to mine were suggesting that scaling up the night intruder operations would have also scaled up their success porportunately. The whole point of my post was that that might not have happened.

...Sortie count is always a better measure for the size and strength of an airforce. What good are more planes if in total they can't fly as much? ...

No. It's not. Let's take an extreme example. Say a the US launches a fighter with 4 phoenix missiles and a third world country launches say 4 Mig-17's. The US fighter drops all 4 Migs (1 missile each). By your rational the third world country had a stronger airforce. As far as capability to launch sorities rather than sorties launched goes looking at something like engine hours or flight miles might actually give you a better measure of that capability if conditions were similar. The LW sortie rate is driven way up by thier presence close to the battle field in the east and the target rich environment there. The US had no need to use it's airforce that way and might not have in any case. Flying multiple sorties a day over extended periods can't be good for ones efficiency.

[LWD]

...Yes we can compare the total montly sorties for each of the major airforces. Luftwaffe was very much competitive until mid 1944....

If they were competative then why were they almost nonexistant in the West as far as offensive operations are concerned?

[Huck]

...Oh, not this again. Allied strategic bombing was a total waste, industrial production increased in Germany a few times at the height of strategic campaign.

You can't be serious. The strategic bomber campaign was far from a "total waste". It did suffer from vassilating targeting priorities but it allowed the west to have consdierable impact on the war even before their troops were on the continent.

Transforming USAAF into a real tactical airforce, could have made possible the invasion an year earlier, and maybe shorten the war with one year. But USAAF had its own agenda, its leadership was not happy with USAAF being an "army air force". They wanted to be a separate service like the navy, hence lobbying for this strategic bombing armada. American planners should have been smart enough to grant independence to their air force and strengthen its tactical capabilities at the same time. Unfortunately it did not happen.

While German production did rise up through 44 GErmany also ended up devoting a lot of that produciton to air defence. One also suspects that the production would be even higher with out the campaign. Then there is the gutting of the LW fighter arm during the course of this campaign.

Devoting production to air defence did not influence the other areas. For instance, at the end of the war Luftwaffe was facing overproduction. From the beginning of the war the available fuel quantities limited the number of planes in service. When the fuel shortage hit in mid 1944, even fewer planes could be kept flying. But at the same time aircraft production nearly doubled (fighter production almost tripled) from the year before, so most of 1944-1945 production was never actually accepted for service. Armament production was sufficient, the problem was the fuel shortages that kept the German armies from fighting effectively.

...
This is because Luftwaffe was simply missing from the Western Front. Luftwaffe could not cover both fronts at the same time and Soviets were considered a much bigger threat. However, comparing the tactical achievements of USAAF or RAF with that of VVS or Luftwaffe is ludicrous. Western Allies never had a capable tactical airforce. By the end of war they still did not have a capable armored ground attack plane, they had to rely on vulnerable fighter bombers and inaccurate level bombers for these missions. Besides, Allied planes could not operate in frontline conditions, long flight distances always hampered the Allied ground support operations.

And the German's had an armored ground attack plane?

Yes, they had two planes. Ju-87D had 600kg of armor just like the standard Il-2. Hs-129 almost doubled that amount to 1100kg. This meant that 1/4 of Hs-129 weight was steel (more than 1/2 if we consider the engines and the rest of the airframe), quite amazing for a plane. Also Luftwaffe bombers often carried (depending on the mission) armored cowlings, covering the lower half or the entire engine. This was an unique practice. Fw-190 variants for ground attack had extensive armor too, almost 500kg. Even an interceptor like Fw-190D carried a complete armored cowling (beside the regular spots protected by armor), making it the only fighter to have such a feature (regular Fw-190A had only an armored ring over the oil tank and cooling, in front of the engine). Armor was a very important safety feature of the German planes.

The allied airforces that destroyed the logistics net through most of Western Europe weren't effective? At least some allied planes (P40's, P-47s, P-38s, and F4Us just to mention some of the US planes) were quite cabable of operating in front line conditions.

From these planes only P-40 was capable of such a thing. None of the late war USAAF planes was capable of it, including P-47, P-38 or P-51. P-47 had very low clearance for prop and belly, P-51 had the vulnerable radiator intake very close to the ground and P-38 was a hangar queen in regular usage, frontline service was out of discussion. I doubt F4U really had the capability, though other planes Navy/Marines planes, like Hellcat were probably adequate if used this way. Now, we all have seen wartime footage with these planes flying from dirt runaways. But the conditions there were incomparably better than on Eastern Front, where planes took off but there was no runaway to speak of. Constant moving with the ground troops from one place to another, close to the frontline, was very tough on both men and machines.