I seems to be a case of 'lost in translation'. Groelher gives the LW losses in the West, between 10 May and 30 June 1940 as 1401 write-offs. Presumably this includes destroyed and those written off as scrap at base. It certainly includes both enemy related and other types of losses, as Groehler does not specify these. Total wastage (ie. including damaged aircraft) was 2073 aircraft.Wargames wrote:It certainly leads to the question of how it happened though because what did knock down 367 ME's?
Now back to the 367 MEs. I guess this comes from putting the fighters and destroyers into a single 'fighter' group. See below.
Groehrel gives the losses (presumeably to all causes):
Nähaufklärer, 190 wastage, of which 124 were destroyed (In May: 151/96).
Fernaufklärer, 134 wastage, of which 87 were destroyed (In May: 98/67).
Fighter (ie. 109) as 376 wastage, of which 250 were destroyed (In May: 209/136).
Destroyers had 171 wastage, of which 121 were destroyed or written off (In May: 118/79).
Bombers, 691 wastage, of which 477 were destroyed (In May: 512/350).
Dive Bombers, 164 wastage, of which 123 were destroyed (In May: 106/75).
Schlact, 19 wastage, of which 5 were destroyed (In May: 8/2).
Transport, 214 wastage, of which 140 were destroyed (In May: 188/122).
See, 43 wastage, of which 37 were destroyed (In May: 26/25).
Liason, 65 wastage, of which 33 were destroyed (In May: 54/26).
Misc. types, 6 wastage, of which 4 were destroyed (none In May).
As to the 75 Hurricanes lost in air combat, I have some doubts as a very significant portition of the RAF losses were over Dunkerque, and that certainly did not involve planes bombed on the ground or left behind during retreat.
Source for 'no reserve'?Simon K wrote: Recovery on the ground by the allies,even for a couple of weeks,would eliminate Germany tactical air superiority.
This is a strategic issue which points to a fatal weakness of the whole blitzkreig strategy. There was NO RESERVE.
Simple fact is that by the end of June 1940, the Luftwaffe`s mastery of the air was complete over the Continent. There was little in the hands of the Allies that could change that. The French Air Force ceased to exists, and the RAF would soon be on the verge of disappearance, had it continued its daylight operations. After the Battle of France, as of June 29, which does include a good deal of standstill and rebuild after Dunkerque, after RAF operations died down over the continent, the RAF could muster 814 fighters, including Squadron reserves, of which 587 was ready for operation; the Luftwaffe, after all that two months of combat over France, still possessed 1107 single engined fighters, of which 856 was ready for operations. 95% established strenght and 77% servicibility hardly suggest lack of reserves, especially if this figure is to be understood after two months of heavy fighting. This does not include the Zestörer units.
People at Fighter Command's HQ had very valid reasons to be worried. The two months of respite in June and July had great importance, as it allowed for them to rebuild forces.