Luftwaffe losses France, 1940

[phylo_roadking]

Yes, they're on my wishlist - sadly behind several thousand pounds' of motorcycle parts and a mig welder

[Jon G.]

Right, it turns out I was looking in the wrong Hooton :roll: From p. 325 of Eagle in Flames, here are production figures for German aircraft only. I've included the 1941 figures for comparative purposes.

1940/1941
Single engined fighters 1,870/2,852
Twin engined fighters 1,840/1,880
Twin engined bombers 2,744/2,816
Four engined bombers 38/58
Stuka/Schlacht 611/476
Transports 763/969
Trainers 1,328/889
Others (incl. gliders) 1,632/1,836

[phylo_roadking]

1940/1941
Single engined fighters 1,870/2,852

Looks like John Ray's 2268 for 1940 was actually on the generous side then!

[Simon K]

Was RDF in use with the BAFF at all?
Ive got a reference to captured Radar equipment examined at Dunkirk. Any thoughts?

[phylo_roadking]

I've seen at least one anecdotal account of experimental radar sets in France - but SEVERLY anecdotal (BBC peopole's History) and certainly never deployed as any part of an integrated system if they even existed.

What's the reference, Simon? No chance it could be referring to the CH station at Dunkirk...on the Thames Estuary???

[Wargames]

The claim that the vast majority of Hurricanes were lost due to non-combat related reasons is difficult to believe. Why would be so many Hurricanes left behind, if they were airworthy? And if they were not, it surely had something to do with combat, as its difficult to believe that the RAF was unable maintain its aircraft to a reasonable level (70-80% servicibilty).

Your serviceability levels appear accurate. However, that level actually accounts for a large number of British Hurricane loses. If you have 1,000 fighters in France and have to withdraw them, and 75% are sericeable, then you'll leave 250 behind to be counted as loses. Add those lost on the ground to German enemy aircraft and you might have over 300 aircraft losses on the ground.

In North Africa, where aircraft serviceability was only 50%, every time one side or the other advanced, whoever retreated left behind half his airforce. Ground losses in this theater were simply astounding.

[phylo_roadking]

If you have 1,000 fighters in France and have to withdraw them, and 75% are sericeable, then you'll leave 250 behind to be counted as loses. Add those lost on the ground to German enemy aircraft and you might have over 300 aircraft losses on the ground.

Events, particularly in squadrons that had been moved up after 10th May to support the BEF move up to Wavre in the Dyle Line, overtook the RAF that a significant number of aircraft had to be abandoned and suitably destroyed on the ground; these included aircraft out of service on forward airfields for regular maintenance, for the repair of minor battle damage, aircraft awaiting engine parts from England etc. that SHOULD otherwise have made it back to England. When you remember that the German panzer drive to the Channel cut ACROSS the Allies' expected front, the SPEED of the collapse and subsequent retreat can't be exaggerated. On many occasions airfields went from being well behind the line ideally, to being overrun in a couple of HOURS. Couple this to the amount of time the RAF was actually spending in the air after May 10th - the sortie rate went through the roof - and the phenomenal amount of regular servicing both DAILY and at regular timetabled intervals period performance aircraft needed, and the German advance couldn't help but catch out a sizeable percentage of the RAF on the ground and U/S for a variety of reasons...and the speed of the German advance was simply faster than RAF groundcrew could work

Also it had been a command policy of Dowding's to minimise the number of Spitfires deployed onto the Continent as much as possible (see John Ray) so OF COURSE the figures of aircraft lost will reflect the greater percentage of Hurricanes deployed in France.

[Michael Emrys]

Also it had been a command policy of Dowding's to minimise the number of Spitfires deployed onto the Continent as much as possible (see John Ray)...

Does he suggest that any were sent to the Continent? Somehow I had gotten the notion that they were all based in the UK and only flew to locations that could be reached from there, Dunkirk being one such.

Michael

[phylo_roadking]

Michael - they MUST have been...for apart from Ray's book - and I'm scanning thru the appropriate chapter again now - IIRC the first RAF fighter casualty of the war, over the Franco-German border...was flying in a Mk1A Spitfire! It was uncovered about three years ago in a Time Team programme.

[phylo_roadking]

Ray is more concerned with Dowding's hoarding of his fighter force vs. Air Ministry demands to support the French, so he doesn't provide a breakdown. Four squadrons of "fighters" were sent in September 1939 to support/defend the Field Force, with a further element sometime before the 10th of May 1940 - for there were six in France on the morning of the 10th. This Air Element was officially withdrawn - those that could fly - to the UK on the 21st, and afterwards operated from home fields.

BUT - SOMETIME between the 10th and the 16th, more were sent as Dowding came under very strong political pressure - THESE seem definitely to have been Hurricanes....for on the 14th Dowding wrote in correspondence tthat "the Hurricane tap is now turned full on." He managed at an Air Staffmeeting on the 15th to get the flow staunched a little...but the day after, in a letter to the Air Ministry, said

5. I would remind the Air Council that the last estimate which they made as to the force necessary to defend this country was fifty-two squadrons, and my strength has now been reduced to the equivalent of thirty-six squadrons.

So - on the 10th there were SIX in France....more were sent....and on the 16th he is in effect complaining that a total of SIXTEEN fighter squadrons were in France...then TEN must have been sent in a panic in the intervening six days...and THIS TEN is what comprised "the Hurricane tap" in full flow, as he called it

The RAF Component of the BEF was recalled on the 21st, and for the rest of the Battle for France operated from England. By the 3rd of June almost 2700 RAF fighter sorties had been flown in french airspace from whatever location. In the three weeks following the 10th - as I said up the thread - 432 Spitfires AND Hurricanes had been lost.

[phylo_roadking]

There's a P.S. to this...

"Six squadrons" is of course by the numbers very small; a nominal strength of 72 aircraft. But it wasn't the RAF's ONLY fighter strength on the Continent Ray is only talking about single-engined fighters - Spitfires and Hurricanes...

Dowding ALSO "hoarded" his good monoplane fighters in England by sending a couple of the "Blenheim fighter" squadrons the Air Ministry had saddled him with over to France Not nightfighting Blenheims - Blenheims configured as DAY fighters! IIRC Dowding had been strongarmed into accepting six squadrons of them - but of course didn't want them - he KNEW they were going to be hopeless! Sending them over to France as part of the Fighter Component "wasted" them, yet fulfilled Fighter Command's contribution to the Fighter Component and as time went on...circumstances meant they were re-equiped with monoplanes - later, back in England! Three squadrons of these liabilities remained in Eleven Group on the outbreak of the "official" BoB - but Dowding NEVER permitted them to be tasked as dayfighters for the duration.

[Michael Emrys]

He [Dowding]...in a letter to the Air Ministry, said

5. I would remind the Air Council that the last estimate which they made as to the force necessary to defend this country was fifty-two squadrons, and my strength has now been reduced to the equivalent of thirty-six squadrons.

So - on the 10th there were SIX in France....more were sent....and on the 16th he is in effect complaining that a total of SIXTEEN fighter squadrons were in France...then TEN must have been sent in a panic in the intervening six days...

Now let's think about this for a minute. Not saying you are wrong, because I truly don't know the specific facts of this case are, but, "I would remind the Air Council that the last estimate which they made as to the force necessary to defend this country was fifty-two squadrons..." does not necessarily mean that those fifty-two squadrons were ever in hand, just that that was the goal to be aimed for. So the sixteen squadrons he is short might have been sent to France. Or might not. See what I am driving at? What we need here is more comprehensive information.

Michael

[phylo_roadking]

Yes. But I've now checked further back - Ray mentions specifically that on the morning of the 10th May there were 6 squadrons in France...and 45 in the UK. Making 51. Now you have to look at John James The Paladins about the history of the devlopment and expansion of the RAF during the Interwar years leading up to 1939...and I would assume the 52nd was still in formation or conversion. Even if we take the fifty-ONE as meaning fully-operational...Ray seems to work on this basis - whereas Dowding was working on the fifty-TWO to round up his figures for debate with the Air Ministry??? - we still have EITHER NINE or ten therefore being despatched between the 10th and the 16th when Dowding wrote that.

Even at a minimum therefore - Fighter Command sent another nine squadrons - another nominal 108 fighter aircraft - to France on the start of the campign in the West, to supplement the 72 there.

Note my italics - twelve aircraft per suadron is the official "rostered" strength od an RAF fighter squadron, the number it was expected to muster for combat if at full strength. The actual complement was ideally 16 aircraft and pilots - the others were intended as replacements and reserves for combat losses or as aircraft were pulled for maintenance. That's why occasionally - where the sample is small enough like the TWO land-based squadrons sent to Norway earlier in the year - the LOSS totals are sometimes BIGGER than the "nominal" strength.

(I've NOW found that article about Blenheim Mk.*F "fighters" - it's "Bolt-on Blenheims" in Flypast, Feb, 2007 issue. Unfortunately I recollected wrongly - there were no Blenheim fighters stationed IN France - but Blenheim fighters operated OVER France while patrolling the Channel, and did operate at long range over Belgium and Holland. They earlier WERE sent to NORWAY ...or rather Dowding was SUPPOSED to The Air Ministry ordered Dowding to send 23 and 604 Sqns. to Norway along with 263's Gladiators - but knowing they'd be cr@p he'd sneakily withdrawn them for fitting with selfsealing tanks and armour...SLOWLY... and 46 Sqn's Hurricanes were sent instead. In the end...events resulted in the complete loss of all the Norway aircraft, Gladiators AND Hurricanes - either destroyed in combat, on land...or when the "Glorious" was sunk AFTER 46 Sqn managed to put down it's LAND fighters on its deck sans arrestor hooks etc. It was technically a good call on Dowding's part - two full squadrons of aircraft were lost to his command, instead of THREE)

[RichTO90]

It seems reasonable given the other figures I have seen. It would be perhaps
The claim that the vast majority of Hurricanes were lost due to non-combat related reasons is difficult to believe. Why would be so many Hurricanes left behind, if they were airworthy? And if they were not, it surely had something to do with combat, as its difficult to believe that the RAF was unable maintain its aircraft to a reasonable level (70-80% servicibilty).

Its also somewhat unclear to what period these figures refer to: do they include June as well?

Hi Barbi, it's been a while.

Fighters lost "on operations" were reported (AIR 22/261) as follows:

10 May - 24 June
AASF - 43 Hurricanes
Air Compnent - 200 Hurricanes
Fighter Command - 64 Spitfires, 127 Hurricanes, 11 Bleinheims, 13 Defiants
Bomber Command - 2 Spitfire (PDU)

However, the kicker is that up to the report for the week of 18-24 June, the Air Compnent losses had been given as 47 - all incurred from 10-20 May. So it looks like an additional 153 were written off at the end of the campaign, probably accumulated damaged aircraft that could not be evacuated (I have the damaged reports as well, but its getting late...).

So the operational "lost" was 217, but you could argue the additional 153 were also "operational" - except that they did not record how many of those were to enemy action and how many to accidents and so forth (they only did it for total aircraft, nit by type ). But its rather moot, by any measure, 370 Hurricane airframes were out of inventory by 24 June.

BTW, losses during "Dunkirk Week" (28 May-3 June) were:

AASF - 8 Hurricanes
Air Component - 0 Hurricanes
Figher Command - 38 Spitfies, 39 Hurricanes, 8 Defiants

Ooops, nearly missed it, NWEF also lost 11 Gladiators and 7 Hurricanes, all by 1 June. So 377 Hurricanes gone by 24 June.

Rich

P.S.

The breakdown of cause of loss as of 24 June, out of 936 losses (all RAF, including NWEF, Middle East, Coastal Command, Fighter Command, Bomber Command, Air Component, and AASF) was:
692 - "In Action"
164 - "On Ground"
25 - "Result of Action"
55 - "Not by Action"

[Michael Emrys]

He [Dowding]...in a letter to the Air Ministry, said

5. I would remind the Air Council that the last estimate which they made as to the force necessary to defend this country was fifty-two squadrons...

A historic sidebar to the present discussion: The figure of 52 squadrons may in fact date back to the year 1923. At that time there was some anxiety in the UK over the size and power of the French air force. Relations between the two countries were apparently somewhat cool then and the possibility of hostilities may have made some in power nervous.

Out of that shock was born the decision, in 1923, to create a Home Defence Air Force of 52 squadrons...

—John Terraine, The Right of the Line

That figure may have been put up by the Air Staff, Terraine does not say. Nor does he say by what means that figure was arrived at. Probably by adding up the French totals and making an estimate of what it would take to defend against that...but that's just my own guess. Given how much people were in the dark about the effectiveness of air power at that time, that was probably as good an estimate as any.

Michael