Hop wrote:You might want to check the drop in British fighter production towards the late automn/winter of 1940, when the LW begun to hit the aircraft factories - at night. Looking at the Spitfire II production figures, it didn`t recovered from those strikes until about February 1941.
British fighter production didn't suffer significant declines until December 1940. It peaked at 496 in July before falling back slightly, but August, September, October and November were all above the June figure. Production fell from 496 in July to 476 in August, and to 467 in September, before rising to 469 in October, and falling to 458 in November.
The figure first fell significantly in December, down from 458 fighters to 413. It then fell heavily to 313 in Jan 1941, before rising again to a new record of 535 in Feb.
In other words you just underlined what I said above with your figures.
Ie.
496 in July
476 in August -20
467 in September
469 in October
458 in November
413 in December
313 in Jan 1941
535 in Feb 1941
It seems to me the British aircraft industry was targeted, and was hit hard.
In particularly Spitfires production suffered since on 26 September a mere 59 Heinkels from KG 55 razed the main Supermarine factory at Woolstoon; then the new one at Itchen. Both had to be abandoned and production dispersed.
In mid November they flattened out Coventry`s aircraft industry, quite literally, 21 factories were razed in one raid. Naturally it`s effects didn`t set in immidately - fighter aircraft are a result of a lenghty process, the ones that were finished in late November were probably entered production a month ago.
It came with a major loss of production, monthly production at Supermarine fell drastically :
126 in August
100 in September
61 in October
73 in November
42 in December
67 in Jan 1941
Castle Bromwhich came online slowly at the same time and made up for some of the losses, but even then overall the production fell to about just half of what would have been if there were no attacks.
What precision bombing happened in late 1940?
Ah, the good old strawmen arguements again...
Well, Supermarine was based in Southampton. From The Night Blitz by John Ray, detailing attacks on Southampton:
*SNIP*
Where's the precision bombing?
Same strawmen arguement...
Two thirds of the city centre burnt out, damage to factories and docks "little destruction", "not great", "comparatively light damage", "little damage". For civilians "dislocation of everday life", working classes trekking out of the city.
Sounds like area bombing to me.
Of course it does
to you, but is it a surprise?
Back on subject. To me it sounds like the Luftwaffe was trying to hitting specific targets, and most of the time they hit them.
23rd November, 120 bombers, target was docks, docks, several ships were hit.
A week later, 147 bombers, target was docks, docks were hit.
Next evening, 130 bombers, target was docks, docks were hit, along with factories.
19 January, 62 aircraft, target was docks, docks were hit, along with factories and railway shops.
In each case civillian casulties were relatively low. None of this - specific targets, moderate collateral damage, relative low number of aircraft aiming at specific points designated by Pathfinders - sells to me as an 'area raid'.
But,nobody here
expect you suggested the strikes were surgically clean, but they were rather effective within the technical limits of the times nonetheless against well specified, legit targets.
But the nature of the targets were rather clear. I would also suggest people reading this thread to take a look at Southhampton`s layout. Use Google Earth for example. Basically the city center is in the middle of an 'Y', formed by the sea and the bay, between the dock areas surrounding it.
No wonder the center got so many astray bombs, especially as the lower part of the 'Y' is the bay itself leading out to the sea - an ideal attack/navigational path for bombers, that would fly from the South towards North, with the sea breeze blowing any incendinaries towards to down.
As for fewer bombers, the figures I was able to find about Bomber Command strenght show that there weren`t too many bombers available. It would appear the avarage force of bombers BC could send for mission daily did not reach 1000 bombers until late 1944. In contrast, in mid-1943 they could send about 600 heavies into action, and in mid-1942, a fraction of that. The first 1000 bomber raids were only possible by scraping the bottom of the barrel, utilising even Coastal Command and trainers.. The LW medium bomber force was considerably larger (more numerous) than that in 1940.
You are comparing aircraft available for the Luftwaffe against sorties dispatched for the RAF, and they are two very different things.
No I don`t compare sorties to available aircraft, I am using rough figures of the avarage number of available British bombers at a given period of the war.
But then of course, if you have better figures, share them.