The Luftwaffe in the Battle for Britain

[JonS]

In other words you just underlined what I said above with your figures.

Ie.
496 in July
476 in August -20
467 in September
469 in October
458 in November
413 in December
313 in Jan 1941
535 in Feb 1941

It seems to me the British aircraft industry was targeted, and was hit hard.

Not all months are created equal.

Assuming the factories only worked Monday-Friday, the following is the daily average production:
Jul - 21.6
Aug - 21.6
Sep - 22.2
Oct - 20.4
Nov - 21.8
Dec - 18.8
Jan - 13.6
Feb - 26.8

Assuming further that the factories were closed on Christmas Day and New Year's Day, the following is the daily average production:
Jul - 21.6
Aug - 21.6
Sep - 22.2
Oct - 20.4
Nov - 21.8
Dec - 19.7
Jan - 14.2
Feb - 26.8

Note how this changes the picture for July-thru-November. July and August were a plateau, September was a bit better, October saw a slight dip, November was better again - and better than the July/August plateau, then December saw another dip of about the same magnitude as the dip between September and October. Compare that to Hop's summary: "British fighter production didn't suffer significant declines until December 1940. It peaked in July before falling back slightly. Production fell from July to August, and fell again in September, before rising in October, and falling in November." (I've lightly editted this passage of Hop's to remove the numbers)

The daily average for Jul-Nov is 21.5. Assuming that that production could have been continued into Dec and Jan, then the cost to the British of the lower production in those months was 200 Spitfires (of which only 40 were lost in December). Not to be sneezed at, to be sure, but really it was something less than two weeks production. The bounce back in Feb alone made up for over half the lost production.

(If we assume that Dec was typical, the average from Jul-Dec becomes 21.2, and the lost production in Jan amounts to 153 Spitfires, or just over 7 avg day's production, and over 70% of the lost production is recovered in the Feb bounce.)

Hit hard? Maybe ... but once again the Germans had missed the point that an aerial campaign is essentially a campaign of attrition. Hitting factories once - no matter how hard - is basically a waste of time unless it is aligned with some other concurrent, related activity.

Furthermore, as I said, not all months are created equal. As shown in - for example - Tooze, significant production drops are to be expected in Winter anyway, and Dec and Jan are of course the coldest, wettest, darkest months of the year in England, and they are coupled with significant non-work distractions (Christmas, New Years).

Did the GAF raids on the Spitfire factories have an effect: Of course they did.
Was it significant: Not really.
Did it make a jot of difference: No.
Were the factories - and more importantly production - "hit hard": I wouldn't say they were.

[Kurfürst]

Well, that`s your opinion, the fact is that British Spitfire production fell by 58%, in practical terms probably more when you take into account that the increase in montly output that they expected and planned with. This loss in invisible on

Of course if we continue with your reasoning, the Allied strategic bombing had no effect all, after all, German production kept rising (the truth is of course it would have been even higher, if the planned production figures would have been met, but lot of the planned production was lost, the fact masked by the fact that overall production still kept rising - as opposed to British production, which was dropping in 1940.)

Thing is though that Hop claims that British fighter production didn't suffer significant declines until December 1940 - in reality it (at least Spitfires) dropped by 58%. Thing is that you try to reason why the loss of production worth of 300 fighters is not very significant, and its an opinion hard to agree with. Thing is that you argue that the fact that the RAF had about
400 Spitfires less by early 1941 (assuming they could keep up the montly 500 produced, as in July) is waste of time; in practice it meant that the Luftwaffe had to shoot down 400 Spitfire less (ie. appx. the total amount they shot down during the BoB), and the loss of these aircraft production meant that the Hurricane had solider on a lot longer due to the lack of available Spitfires.

Endless arguements can be put up against the facts, I have no doubt.

[JonS]

Thing is that you argue that the fact that the RAF had about 400 Spitfires less by early 1941

No.

I "argue" that a month with 23 working days is not the same as a month with 20 working days.

I "argue" that they did in fact sustain the July production levels right through to December.

I "argue" that the lower production in January (and possibly in December) had an opportunity cost for the British of about 150 Spitfires, some of which would have been due to the GAF, and some of it due to the traditional winter dip in production.

[Kurfürst]

OK, then keep arguing the facts that there were hundreds of fighters less were built than it was planned during the months we are speaking of, assuming that unlike you, Beaverbook was not aware during the planning phase of these peacetime conditions, conditions that I highly doubt would apply to wartime Britain in 1940.

I have some difficulties imagining aircraft factories shutting down for the weekend, Unions complaining about 8 hour plus shifts in a country that has the Wehrmacht on the other side of the Channel, the Luftwaffe in the air, that mobilized even the 60 year olds and issued them spear bayonets and 'armored cars' improvized from coaches to fight the Panzers when they land, that collected frying pans due to the lack of aluminium for aircraft etc. You on the other hand believe that is how it was. Factories operated only 20 days in one month and 23 in the other. It was all due to the winter dip.

But, as you like to argue it, I am waiting for your evidence for your claims and the details.

[JonS]

I "argue" that the lower production in January (and possibly in December) had an opportunity cost for the British of about 150 Spitfires, some of which would have been due to the GAF, and some of it due to the traditional winter dip in production.

It was all due to the winter dip.

Do you really think that is an acceptable form of debate?

I have some difficulties imagining aircraft factories shutting down for the weekend, Unions complaining about 8 hour plus shifts in a country that has the Wehrmacht on the other side of the Channel, ...

http://uk.encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_ ... itain.html
http://tiny.cc/D8uSQ

July has 31 days, August has 31, September has 30, October has 31, November has 30, December 31, January 31, February 28 (in 1941). Really. Go look it up. I'm not making this stuff up as I go along - not all months are the same. While you're doing that, take a peek at when the weeks fell.

Yes, Britain mobilised. Heavily. But ramping mobilisation up takes time, and they didn't really start till June 1940.

You lack of imagination is neither my fault nor problem.

[Juha]

Kurfûrst
if somebody used the German production figures for single engine fighters:

June 1940 164
July 220
August 173
September 218
Oct 200

Jan 41 appr. 80
Feb 41 appr. 140

to prove that "It seems the German aircraft industry was targeted, and was hit hard", I guess that You would not accept the allegation. Supermarine works at Woolston were hit rather hard on 26 Sept 40 by KG 55, IIRC, but its effect to Spitfire production was surprisingly short-lived as were later on many times the effects of the attacks on German a/c factories.

Juha

[Kurfürst]

Except that we of course know that the British industry was indeed hit hard in 1940 - Woolston was hit, Hurricane works were hit, Coventry, the centre of aircraft production was hit towards the end of the year, British heavy bomber plants were hit etc.

We all know for fact that these were hit in LW attacks, and we have the British production figures to see how hard they were hit.

Of course one may want argue that German aircraft industry was hit hard, too. But then we know it is a fiction, and this didn`t take place, and we know that the Germans were running out the 109E production in early 1941 and introducing the 109F on its place.

If you have trouble accepting the fact that British aircraft industry was hit hard during the Battle, that is not my problem.

BTW whats your source for SE figther production in 1940?

[Kurfürst]

Wood and Dempster, The Narrow Margin, Appendix 6 : Monthly output of Fighter aircraft, June/October'.

June :
Planned : 1164
Actual : 1163
Actual compared to Planned : -1

July :
Planned : 1061
Actual : 1110
Actual compared to Planned : +49

August :
Planned : 1143
Actual : 1087
Actual compared to Planned : -56

September :
Planned : 1195
Actual : 908
Actual compared to Planned : -287

October :
Planned : 1218
Actual : 917
Actual compared to Planned : -301

596 less fighters produced than planned it seems. Quite clear, isn`t it.

[Juha]

Kurfürst
what I know, even before the war both British and German aircraft industries fell behind production plans, at least time to time. So one cannot gauce effects of bombing from production plans without extensive knowledge on production questions.

BTW Fieseler's factory was hit rather badly in late July 40, which was to cause production stop in Sept. Fieseler went to Berlin to see Milch etc to discuss how to handle the problem. Fieseler was one of Bf 109 manufacturers, so that might have some effect on Bf 109E production or maybe not, I have not knowledge on the type(s) whose production was affected. Also time to time factories which produced parts for LW were hit. And of course some a/c factories which to my knowledge had no connection to Bf 109 production, Weser at least twice in 2nd half of 1940 for ex.

Sources to 1940 production, R.J Overy's The Air War 1939-1945 (1987) and Edward H. Sims' The Fighter Pilot (1970)

[Michael Emrys]

ISTR that the real bottleneck for the RAF in the autumn of 1940 was not planes, but pilots. The Empire Training Scheme had not truly kicked in yet as it would later on, and new pilots in the UK were being rushed through flight school and OCUs. To try to provide sufficient pilots for the planes already available, the RAF was converting bomber pilots and other aircrew to fighters.

Michael

[phylo_roadking]

Coventry, the centre of aircraft production

There were a number of aero engine plants in the area, but none took major damage. It's a BIG exaggeration to call Coventry "the centre of aircraft production". IIRC the only factories destroyed in the Coventry Blitz was the old Triumph motorcycle works - thus robbing the Army of a second-rate Triumph despatch model - and a plant making armoured cars.

[Kurfürst]

Coventry had 17 aero-engine and other factories, which were the targets of the Luftwaffe attack according to the LW`s operational orders for that night.

See Zielunterlagen Coventry, BA-MA RL 2 II/863-867.

Its goals are laid down as to disable this 'centre of aircraft and aeroplane spare parts production' and IC intelligence found that 'the goals of this attack were met'. The British War cabinet council on 15 November shared the German intel`s POV, noting that this was so far the most severe attack on a centre of war production. See PRO CAB 65/10.

Longmate, Air Raid : '.. the Germans were remarkaby successfull in hitting their intended targets and hardly a single famous name in the local industry escaped'.

Lord Beaverbook must have exaggrevated when he said that 'the roots of the Air Force are planted in Coventry. If Coventry`s output is destroyed, the tree will languish.'

I would like to see your sources proving that none of the factories of aero industry has been hit. Appearantly this thread had taken a course towards emotianal based denial of well established, referenced facts.

[Kurfürst]

ISTR that the real bottleneck for the RAF in the autumn of 1940 was not planes, but pilots. The Empire Training Scheme had not truly kicked in yet as it would later on, and new pilots in the UK were being rushed through flight school and OCUs. To try to provide sufficient pilots for the planes already available, the RAF was converting bomber pilots and other aircrew to fighters.

Michael

Does anyone have statistical figures of the pilot training programmes of both sides in this period...? Number of hours flown, pilots released to units per months, things like that?

[Andreas]

Just a word of warning. Wilful misrepresentation of other member's opinions, personal remarks, and discussions about the morality of area bombing are all not acceptable in this thread.

I am keeping an eye on it, and I am ready to start deleting such items on sight, and without further warnings.

Thanks.

Andreas

[Kurfürst]

Kurfûrst
...the German production figures for single engine fighters:

June 1940 164
July 220
August 173
September 218
Oct 200

... Sources to 1940 production, R.J Overy's The Air War 1939-1945 (1987) and Edward H. Sims' The Fighter Pilot (1970)

Juha

The reason I ask because it seemed odd to me. Ie. your (Overy`s) list shows 811 s-engine fighters produced in Germany in July - October. My list of German factory deliveries in the same period show 718 Bf 109Es delivered, which include 75 Bf 109E-3a (export version - its pretty interesting BTW that Messerschmitt was building fighters for export in the midst of the so-called Battle..).

I wonder what the reason for disparence could be.. different fighter types included with Overy`s figures, say like Heinkel types or..? Does Overy lists a reference to the figures?