The Luftwaffe in the Battle for Britain
Re: The Luftwaffe in the Battle for Britain
Could it be that "monthly production" and "factory deliveries" are not quite the same thing? (I'm not trying to be snide here it's a question that I don't know the answer to but could possibly account for at least some of the discrepencies.)
Re: The Luftwaffe in the Battle for Britain
I think that maybe possible, if there is another step in the delivery chain, e.g. acceptance flights by the RAF. In commercial aviation today, a plane can be produced at a certain point, and rolled out onto the tarmac in full finish but delivery is subject to the customer accepting it.
All the best
Andreas
All the best
Andreas
Re: The Luftwaffe in the Battle for Britain
Overy's table only says single-engine fighters, Overy and Sims give same production numbers for June-Sept but Overy doesn't give production for Oct but acceptances as 144. Overy's note is for 3 tables, most probably source for his production figures is A. S. Milward's The German Economy at War (1965). Sims claims that his production figures are from official German Quartermaster reports. Overy's figure of the whole 1940 production is 1870 which is IIRC a good match to other figures I have seen as the Bf 109 production in 1940.
What are the monthly delivery figures for July-Oct, may I ask?
BTW That Germany exported 109E-3as in late 1940 shows primary Germany’s acute lack of foreign currency and the lack of trust in RM by Jugos or by Swiss even in the 2nd half of 1940.
What are the monthly delivery figures for July-Oct, may I ask?
BTW That Germany exported 109E-3as in late 1940 shows primary Germany’s acute lack of foreign currency and the lack of trust in RM by Jugos or by Swiss even in the 2nd half of 1940.
- HansMarseille
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Re: The Luftwaffe in the Battle for Britain
From what analysts had concurred in recent years is that the BoB was about a draw. Anyone can agree with that or not.
I have yet to have anyone agree that if the offensive intent was reversed, ie., the RAF attacking the Luftwaffe in France, that the outcome would be any different. The RAF would fare no better as the aggressors.
I have yet to have anyone agree that if the offensive intent was reversed, ie., the RAF attacking the Luftwaffe in France, that the outcome would be any different. The RAF would fare no better as the aggressors.
"I've fully integrated all the motions of air combat with difficult maneuvers. In combat I make all the motions unconsciously. This lets me concentrate fully on the attack, and fly my plane as though I had wings."- Hans Marseille
Re: The Luftwaffe in the Battle for Britain
While losses were more or less a draw if you are attacking and you don't win that counts as a win for the defence.HansMarseille wrote:From what analysts had concurred in recent years is that the BoB was about a draw. Anyone can agree with that or not....
Re: The Luftwaffe in the Battle for Britain
That's probably because history rather refutes your contention.HansMarseille wrote:I have yet to have anyone agree that if the offensive intent was reversed, ie., the RAF attacking the Luftwaffe in France, that the outcome would be any different. The RAF would fare no better as the aggressors.
Re: The Luftwaffe in the Battle for Britain
Salutations All
1, Tactics defeated the Germans, they defeated themselves, switching from destroying the airfields and radar stations they by fate switched to attacking London, giving the RAF valuable respite.
2, The Luftwaffe not having a strategic wing, like going after factories, such as aircraft production and maintenance facilities.
3, Generalreichmarshal Herman Göring, enough said.
Regards
Roddoss72
1, Tactics defeated the Germans, they defeated themselves, switching from destroying the airfields and radar stations they by fate switched to attacking London, giving the RAF valuable respite.
2, The Luftwaffe not having a strategic wing, like going after factories, such as aircraft production and maintenance facilities.
3, Generalreichmarshal Herman Göring, enough said.
Regards
Roddoss72
Re: The Luftwaffe in the Battle for Britain
I'm reminded of a post-civil-war historian interviewing Gen. Pickett. The interviewer questioned what caused the loss at Gettysburg: was it Stuart not being in the right place, the early failure to seize the flanks, inadequate artillery preparation before Pickett's charge, Longstreet's defeatism, and on and on about Confederate deficiencies.
Pickett scratched his head, reflected, and said "I think the Yankees had something to do with it."
Pickett scratched his head, reflected, and said "I think the Yankees had something to do with it."
- a white rabbit
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Re: The Luftwaffe in the Battle for Britain
..highly likely, the supply ministry had figures to achieve, as did the factories, but are all those aircraft parked outside, all nice and spanking new actually combat-ready, or will some need tinkering with ? even after a proving (it goes up and comes down in one piece) flight..LWD wrote:Could it be that "monthly production" and "factory deliveries" are not quite the same thing? (I'm not trying to be snide here it's a question that I don't know the answer to but could possibly account for at least some of the discrepencies.)
..a good example, from another war are the 50 Hurricanes delivered to Malaya in 42, sounds like a lot and should change the air-war, but they are all a ground-attack desert-modified version that need major unconversion work to be made combat-ready as high-level interceptors in a jungle enviroment. There was not enough time to do this work so they were shot down like the sitting ducks they were..
- Michael Emrys
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Re: The Luftwaffe in the Battle for Britain
I'm not sure that made as much difference as it has been made out to be. Unless the Germans began systematically destroying all the sector stations, which were controlling the RAF defenses, all they would be doing by attacking airfields is blowing holes in grass landing grounds, which were easily repaired, or blowing up a few hangars, which would be inconvenient for the Brits but not really critical. Attacking radar stations could be more serious, but the only planes that could consistently hit them with enough accuracy were the Stukas, and they had a hard time surviving long enough to do the job.Roddoss72 wrote:Salutations All
1, Tactics defeated the Germans, they defeated themselves, switching from destroying the airfields and radar stations they by fate switched to attacking London, giving the RAF valuable respite.
Even if the Luftwaffe had succeeded in forcing the RAF to vacate the 11 Group airfields, they still would not have succeeded in their main task of obtaining air superiority over Southern England, which was required for Seelöwe to go forward. The RAF would simply have retreated to airfields outside the range of Luftwaffe flights from the Continent, but would have still intervened in the ground battle once German troops had landed.
Barring a severe blunder on the part of the RAF, it was always going to a no-win situation for the Luftwaffe.
Michael
Incoming fire has the right of way.
Re: The Luftwaffe in the Battle for Britain
According to some historians like Walter Boyne the Luftwaffe was nevertheless in a position to wear the RAF down by attrition before the attacks were switched from the airfields. His material might be for mass-market consumption but I've found most if not all his general assertions to have excellent voracity with further research.
But it must be stressed the reasons are a matter of opinion and controversy, with data and speculation to support even conflicting points of view.
As far as I know it was Erp.Gr210 (Me-110C-4B and Me-109E-4B) plus attacks by Do-17's which had the greatest success at radar (and coastal AAA) installations. The Ju-87 losses were unsustainable and the only marked successes they had was an early attack on one station (Isle of Wight?) and operations against merchant shipping in the Channel. They joined in on attacks against southern airfields but had a very high attrition.
As far as the OP and comparing the Me-109E to the Spit Mark I/II they were regarded by reputable pilots on both sides to be quite equal in aerial combat, although with very different characteristics. Göring's strictly enforced policy of close bomber escort however crippled Me-109 performance as they had to try to get up to combat speed only after being attacked. This is the main point all Luftwaffe fighter pilots consistently noted. Plus, the problem would only be much worse for the Me-110 squadrons operating out of Norway against northern England, as that's an aircraft which needs distinct advantages if it is to engage contemporary single engine fighters (it was designed to destroy them with heavy armament whilst they were still trying to climb to interception altitude or were taking off, for this reason I personally put British radar near the top of the list for its overall advantages during the BoB because the tactic worked great on the continent where radar was not being used for early warning response and Me-110's were not being met at fighter combat altitude very often at all).
But it must be stressed the reasons are a matter of opinion and controversy, with data and speculation to support even conflicting points of view.
As far as I know it was Erp.Gr210 (Me-110C-4B and Me-109E-4B) plus attacks by Do-17's which had the greatest success at radar (and coastal AAA) installations. The Ju-87 losses were unsustainable and the only marked successes they had was an early attack on one station (Isle of Wight?) and operations against merchant shipping in the Channel. They joined in on attacks against southern airfields but had a very high attrition.
As far as the OP and comparing the Me-109E to the Spit Mark I/II they were regarded by reputable pilots on both sides to be quite equal in aerial combat, although with very different characteristics. Göring's strictly enforced policy of close bomber escort however crippled Me-109 performance as they had to try to get up to combat speed only after being attacked. This is the main point all Luftwaffe fighter pilots consistently noted. Plus, the problem would only be much worse for the Me-110 squadrons operating out of Norway against northern England, as that's an aircraft which needs distinct advantages if it is to engage contemporary single engine fighters (it was designed to destroy them with heavy armament whilst they were still trying to climb to interception altitude or were taking off, for this reason I personally put British radar near the top of the list for its overall advantages during the BoB because the tactic worked great on the continent where radar was not being used for early warning response and Me-110's were not being met at fighter combat altitude very often at all).
Jason
Re: The Luftwaffe in the Battle for Britain
Salutations All
While i get why the RAF won the BoB mainly due to the fact that the British did indeed built more fighters and trained more pilots than the German's but during the BoB what part did RAF Bomber Command/Coastal Command contribute to the BoB were pilots from those commands transferred to fighter command to shore up shortfalls.
Also one thing has bugged me for years over the reason of the German failure in the BoB for what ever reason and that is would if the situation was reversed and we have the RAF and it's political and military commands were based in France & Low Countries and Norway tried to defeat the Luftwaffe and it's political and command were based in England.
I would argue that the Luftwaffe based in Britain would have won the day because the RAF would not only have to train pilots for it's fighters/figher-bombers/dive-bombers and bombers it would have to crew the 1,000+ bomber crews as well.
Also that the RAF using the same tactics as the Luftwaffe would have been defeated, apart from targeting the RAF airfields (and soon abandonned) and London Blitzing they (RAF) never really went after stategic targets of armaments manufacture (especially aircraft facilities), destruction of infrastructure.
The RAF in the long run would still lose the BoB if the situation was reversed.
Regards
Roddoss72
While i get why the RAF won the BoB mainly due to the fact that the British did indeed built more fighters and trained more pilots than the German's but during the BoB what part did RAF Bomber Command/Coastal Command contribute to the BoB were pilots from those commands transferred to fighter command to shore up shortfalls.
Also one thing has bugged me for years over the reason of the German failure in the BoB for what ever reason and that is would if the situation was reversed and we have the RAF and it's political and military commands were based in France & Low Countries and Norway tried to defeat the Luftwaffe and it's political and command were based in England.
I would argue that the Luftwaffe based in Britain would have won the day because the RAF would not only have to train pilots for it's fighters/figher-bombers/dive-bombers and bombers it would have to crew the 1,000+ bomber crews as well.
Also that the RAF using the same tactics as the Luftwaffe would have been defeated, apart from targeting the RAF airfields (and soon abandonned) and London Blitzing they (RAF) never really went after stategic targets of armaments manufacture (especially aircraft facilities), destruction of infrastructure.
The RAF in the long run would still lose the BoB if the situation was reversed.
Regards
Roddoss72
Re: The Luftwaffe in the Battle for Britain
I don't think you even have to go that far. If the RAF had gone on the offensive vs the Luftwaffe in the late summer and fall of 1940 they would have lost. Giving up the home field advantage and having to keep both the bomber and fighter elements up to strength would have been too much for them. They realized this however and didn't fight a battle they couldn't win where as the LW did not. The intelligence assessments undoubtedly contributed to this. The British thought the LW was stronger and had more production capability than it had while the Germans thought that the RAF was weaker and had a lower replacement capability than it did. Thus the LW made a mistake the RAF avoided.
- Michael Emrys
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Re: The Luftwaffe in the Battle for Britain
Somewhat, yes. I can't give you exact numbers, I'm afraid, but both bomber and transport pilots were transferred to Fighter Command during the emergency. Since it was not held to be desirable to deplete Bomber Command too far, this was a temporary and limited measure. Plus, not all bomber pilots would make good fighter pilots.Roddoss72 wrote:...during the BoB what part did RAF Bomber Command/Coastal Command contribute to the BoB were pilots from those commands transferred to fighter command to shore up shortfalls.
Michael
Incoming fire has the right of way.
Re: The Luftwaffe in the Battle for Britain
Salutations LWDLWD wrote:I don't think you even have to go that far. If the RAF had gone on the offensive vs the Luftwaffe in the late summer and fall of 1940 they would have lost. Giving up the home field advantage and having to keep both the bomber and fighter elements up to strength would have been too much for them. They realized this however and didn't fight a battle they couldn't win where as the LW did not. The intelligence assessments undoubtedly contributed to this. The British thought the LW was stronger and had more production capability than it had while the Germans thought that the RAF was weaker and had a lower replacement capability than it did. Thus the LW made a mistake the RAF avoided.
Execlent observation, meaning that had the RAF used the same tactics of the Luftwaffe they would lose.
Tactics decided the outcome, the primary role of the Luftwaffe should have been one direction and that was the destruction of the RAF and early warning stations, but a quirk of fate stepped in and the rest as they say is history.
On that quirk of fate but after the retaliation by the RAF to bomb Berlin after an attack on London, Fuhrer Adolf Hitler should have swallowed his pride and the RAF continued to target the RAF and not switched to attacking civilian targets, giving the RAF much need respite.
Regrads
Roddoss72