Germany's lack of a 4 engined bomber

[phylo_roadking]

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 1&start=15

But training against enemies FAR closer to home Communism may have been the ultimate enemy, but this isn't a true WI; if the Ju-89 had been available at the start of the war the outcome of the Blitz and the more deliberately-planned 1941 campaign would have been very different. Remember, the British minimised these by countermeasures - the fake "lightshow" towns and airfields positioned in open farmland under the diverted bombing beams etc. These were FAR more important at stopping casualties and damage from bombing than the RAF's first generation of nightfighters in late 1940 into 1941. Imagine then if the dropped bombloads that DID fall on target were from the SAME number of aircraft getting through the nightfighters onto targets....but with maybe three or four times the bombload - !!!

[LWD]

Why "very different"? Wasn't night bombing in WWII especially early WWII almost an exercise in futility as far as damaging another countries war making capability? Then there's the fact that if the other guy starts doing better you concentrate more on countering him.

[phylo_roadking]

Actually - no. The British messed up as the 1941 Butt Report showed, their policy of penny-pocket supposedly "precision" raids by squadron-sized sorties turned out to be almost useless. The Germans on the other hand scored the VERY noticeable success of Coventry, and significantly damaged the Armstrong-Vickers/Coventry Ordnance Works and various others around the city, which was one of the main hubs of the British war industry...but we didn't hear ANY of that during the war, and very little has crept into the public consciousness since IIRC, British tank production dropped by 40% for the next 8 months, and armoured car production by almost 70%! Before this, the Battle of the Channel Convoys immediaitely proceeding Adlertag and the "official" start of the BoB had actually severely reduced the output if various industries in Southern England that depended on the delivery of coal etc. by sea rather than by land via the railways. The Channel convoys were never entirely stopped, of course, but the total cargo tonnage carried shrank greatly during 1940 and the early spring of 1941. The three raids on Belfast in 1941 destroyed a large shipment of M3 tanks being converted to Lee spec by Harland &Wolff, and a considerable number of Stirlings were destroyed VERY near completion at Shorts'.

As far as the government and the RAF were concerned, Arthur Harris' concentration BACK on the Douet-style "The bomber will always get through" belief and his unshakeable faith in the ability of strategic bombing to end the war had almost been "proved" by Coventry and others! The RAF 's campaign up until mid-1941 had been a failure...but the same cannot be said of the LW's In fact, quite the reverse - despite ALL the countermeasures, it was their significant successes that convinced the government that the rejigged targeting parameters for Bomber Command and Harris' driving personality could carry it off.

[Michael Emrys]

Before this, the Battle of the Channel Convoys immediaitely proceeding Adlertag and the "official" start of the BoB had actually severely reduced the output if various industries in Southern England that depended on the delivery of coal etc. by sea rather than by land via the railways. The Channel convoys were never entirely stopped, of course, but the total cargo tonnage carried shrank greatly during 1940 and the early spring of 1941.

Are you claiming that the convoys were attacked at night? And if not, why introduce them here?

Michael

[phylo_roadking]

No I'm commenting more generally on

as far as damaging another countries war making capability?

I'm saying that the Germans proved that it WAS possible to damage aother county's war making capability - the RAF didn't, up to late 1941...despite planning the progressive development of its day AND night bomber force from 1933-34 onwards, bombing German targets on almost every possible night once they abandoned the pointless Phoney War leaflet raids, and claiming vast amounts of damage, from the late spring of 1940 until late autumn 1941. It later turned out - courtesy of the analysis of the Butt and Lindemann report - that this simply wasn't the case. LWD's comments only apply to the RAF for that period. The LW was able to score some significant sucesses of Britain's warmaking capability, by day and by night...just NOT the victory-creating damage they intended. AND they managed to do so despite the British' very comprehensive countermeasures - developing (slowly) proper nightfighters, finding out how to disable or divert the various and successive bombing beams, and giving the LW fake targets to bomb. AND courtesy of ULTRA having the full ppans of the 1941 bombing location including targets etc.

BUT in comparison, the failure of the RAF stands out a mile....ONCE they actually found out about it So

Wasn't night bombing in WWII especially early WWII almost an exercise in futility as far as damaging another countries war making capability?

...applies to the RAF, but not as accurately to the Luftwaffe.

The same happened by day; the many daylight unescorted day bomber raids the RAF attempted in 1940 and 1941 on Axis targets proved that the bomber did NOT always get through - and actually resulted on many occasions of the RAf's expensively-built HP Hampdens and Hereford, and expensively-purchased Hudsons, squadrons being decimated. IIRC the loss rate per raid was very often up at 70-80%, far worse than even the LW experienced for unescorted raids at the start of the BoB. It wasn't until better LL day bombers arrived with the RAF with better defensive armament than the aircraft designed in the late 1930s, AND fighters were available for daytime escort over the nearer targets in mainland Europe, that the RAF could attempt daylight raids on French ports etc. again.

My point is this; IF the LW had had a four-engined bomber carrying a decent bombload for the nightime Blitz raids of late autumn 1940, and the spring of 1941 - then those raids that DID get through all of the British countermeasures could and would have done damage an order of magnitude greater than they already historically did. You don't actually HAVE t0 get more raids through than historically, or even more aircraft...JUST factor in that those that did carried a MUCH greater bombload. The third Belfast raid for one would have been a firestorm, it was JUST on the point of self-sustaining. And Liverpool and other Midlands' targets took repeated raids; if these had desposited say double the tonnage of bombs then so much more damage would have occured.

As I said - this is not a true WI, we don't need to factor in wonder weapons, or the British being struck down with Spanish Flu and being unable to fly, or not learning how to divert the X-Gerat or Knickenbein beams. We're JUST discussing what difference a four-engined german strategic bomber would have done. So we JUST need to count the planes that DID get through historically and effectively bomb on target, and magnify the bombload...

[Jon G.]

...As I said - this is not a true WI... We're JUST discussing what difference a four-engined german strategic bomber would have done. So we JUST need to count the planes that DID get through historically and effectively bomb on target, and magnify the bombload...

Actually, the original poster suggests discussion on why Germany never had a four engined long distance bomber. Extrapolations on how, why & to which effect such a heavy bomber might have been used are potentially interesting, but they fall outside the purview of this thread.

[phylo_roadking]

Is it an extrapolation to simply put a suitable strategic bomber in place of an unsuitable tactical bomber with a limited bombload? We KNOW the reasons why the Germans decided to develop the tactical bomber, not the strategic. They DID build four- and more-engined aircraft...across the various types they built them in large total number. At one time the Germans were in advance of Great Britain in designing modern monoplane bombers - compare the Ju-86 of 1935-37 with the RAF's contemporary...the Handley-Page Harrow and the Heyford. The Harrow gave away something like forty to fifty mph to the Junkers. But they stopped developing along that path for a combination of everything mentioned - the cost of creating a large tactical force as opposed to a smaller strategic force, coupled with the intended use of the tactical bomber capacity inside Europe on targets immediately to the rear of the enemy's front line. Stopping development where they did, before the war, was part of a conscious decision to do something else.

During the war a whole variety of other influences forced the Germans into the decisions they did. The decision constraints of limited resources and - until early 1944 - damage-shrunken manufacturing capacity - meant that they had to balance demands that were pulling them in every which way - progessively improving existing fighter types and bringing on the new jet technology, was just one aspect. Another was as the war drew into its last 18 months targets in the UK became literally further away as the LW's operating range had to stretch from inside the Third Reich's shrinking borders - the airlaunched V1 attacks mounted from the vicinity of Antwerp were mong the last "massed" attacks on the UK. But one thing that has not been mentioned here is that the ONE thing the Germans were getting progessively shorter of was aero engines and the alloys needed to make them...AND the fast-growing availability problem of high-test aviation spirit. The decision to built engine installations consisting of two medium-power piston engines powering a single prop, and designing them into what the Allies would describe as a "medium" bomber is ONE way to solve both the problem of the range AND the availability of very high-power aero engines and the fuel suitable for them. And given the pressures on other material resources for the production of air defence fighters for German airspace, the Air Ministry was only looking at building small batches of other types anyway. They were never going to be able to consider building a strategic bomber FORCE.

[Kurfürst]

Actually, the original poster suggests discussion on why Germany never had a four engined long distance bomber. Extrapolations on how, why & to which effect such a heavy bomber might have been used are potentially interesting, but they fall outside the purview of this thread.

As to the original question, the Germans heavy four engined bomber was the He 177. It was built in considerable numbers (1000+) and saw action in considerable numbers (force peaking out at around 250 by summer 1944). It was a technologically very advanced bomber with impressive capabilities, perhaps just too advanced for it took considerable time to work out its teething troubles.

Fatefully for the German heavy bomber force, by the time the He 177 was getting into production and action in numbers - in the end of 1943 - its introduction coincided and run parallel with the Allied strategic offensive against German fuel industry. Lack of fuel and the need for fighters for home defense killed the program at its start.

I dont think, however, that a heavy bomber would have particularly advantagous to Germans, had it been available earlier. For one, the Luftwaffe did not face the problems the Western Allies did, ie. having to deliver payload to considerable distance, accross half of occupied Europe into the heart of German industrial centres. With no heavy bomber in service could they reach the US, or the USSR plants behind the Ural, England was just accross the Channel and well within range, as were marshalling yards and communication hubs on the Eastern front. At that point it was rather the same wheter it is two medium bombers delivering the same load as one heavy, at the same cost of resources.

[Jon G.]

Is it an extrapolation to simply put a suitable strategic bomber in place of an unsuitable tactical bomber with a limited bombload?

When comparing a project which was cancelled in 1937 with a 1940/1941 situation as you do, you're definitely projecting - although it should not be difficult to predict what might happen to a fleet of German four-engined bombers with insufficient airspeed, insufficient service ceiling and excessive range compared to the aircraft which were historically employed in the BoB.

You're also staring yourself blind on a fruitless comparison with RAF capabilities and strategies of the time. Comparing what the Germans might have accomplished with a fleet of four-engined bombers with what the RAF did accomplish with its strategic bomber fleet does not answer the original question - which was simply why Germany never had a four engined long distance bomber. Which, BTW, isn't strictly true, since the Germans had the He-177, which was ridden with engine trouble for much of its active life.

Why was Wever's aircraft called the Urals Bomber? Why did his original requirement call for a range of 1,250 miles? Half that range would have sufficed for operations against Britain

And why, incidentally, was the next projected German multi-engined aircraft, which presumably could have included some BoB benefit of hindsight, the Me-264 dubbed the America bomber?

[phylo_roadking]

Kurfurst - I agree inasmuch as the lack of a heavy four-engined bomber didn't hamper the Germans in ANY campaign except their impromptu strategic bombing campaign after they began to switch to nightbombing on the UK in late 1940, and their planned offensive of 1941. Later at the very end of 1941 into 1942, while within practical range, their tactical bombers were fine for dozens of unopposed night raids on Moscow, for instance. But up until the point the massed raid strategic offensive of the first half of 1941 on the UK ended with the transfer of the great majority of the aircraft used to Barbarossa, IF they had made the decision earlier not to abandon strategic bomber development they could have done a lot with such a weapon. With several years' worth of pre-war production the issue wouldn't be quite that of choosing between one of one or two of another....because the capacity would be built or building and paid for. It WOULD have forced another decision on the Germans - not to use the money on the stunted part-of-a-Z Plan that manifested itself in their pocket battleships that THEN manifested themselves on the bottom of various parts of the Atlantic.

Given that they were developing long-range bombers....AND trying to compete with the most powerful navy in the world....the decision to stop one and continue the other was TWO major oversights, not one in favour of the other.

[Kurfürst]

Phylo, the thing I don`t get is the common notion about the Luftwaffe`s 'tactical' bombers. There was absolutely nothing tactical about the He 111, Do 17 which formed the mainstay of the Luftwaffe bomber force at the start of the war. They had pretty much the same capabilities if not more (considering their better bombsights, night equipment and more potent bombs) as say, the RAF`s Wellingtons, not to mention the fact that at the start of the war Bomber Command was far more tactical in a sense if you look at the comperatively high ratio of light bombers (Blenheims) in the force.

Not even in their opertions, I can`t recall too many cases when they were used for tactical support of the army. Through the war, the Luftwaffe`s medium performed attack on the operational level, much like B-26s or even B-17s did when they attacked marshalling yards, supply depots, rail stations, bridges and road junctions. In fact the only type that was strictly tactical was the famed Ju 87 Stuka, but they weren`t anywhere near as numerous as the mainstay He 111s.

Nor was the He 177 in any sense a medium - it was a sizeable beast with 7+ ton bombload and a maximum takeoff weight of appx. 30 tons, capable of carrying ~9 tons of fuel. The engines - coupled DB 605As essentially with 1550 PS output - weren`t lacking in power either, the reason for coupling them was related to - rather silly - dive bombing requirements and to minimize frontal area. See also Avro Manchester. Unfortunately the DB 605 itself had technical difficulties for until about late 1943, delaying the He 177 to the point when Allied Strategic bombing reached its climax and forced the Luftwaffe into defensive.

[Jon G.]

...

When comparing a project which was cancelled in 1937 with a 1940/1941 situation as you do, you're definitely projecting

No. That's where you're wrong. Take a look at the aircraft for example that formed the RAF's day and nightbomber forces up to 1941...

I don't know why you persist in your comparison with RAF bomber types and strategies. As I wrote several times now, what the RAF was and was not doing does not answer the basic question why the Germans didn't field a four-engined bomber force.

[Kurfürst]

First of all look at the RAF's bombers; the RAF made a distinction between "day" and "night" bombers right the way through the 1930s and the issuing of specifications. The Wellington and Whitley were the "designated" night bombers, and the very numerous Blenheim was a day/tactical bomber. The real advantage of the British nightbombers at the start of the war was their long range - as they were designed to reach targets in Western Germany - and in the case of the Wellington its ability to withstand damage, compared with the hsorter ranges and lives of German twin-engine "equivalents".

I think you need to check your facts again..

I only have wiki as a source for the Wellington`s range, which gives it as 2900 km, under unknown conditions for the Mk IC. On the other hand, I have primary source for the He 111 H-4/H-5 from February 1940, and these show a range of 2800 km. IOW, the range was practically similar.

As for ruggedness etc., the Wellington used a geodeic construction which was unique to the aircraft, and provided good structural strenght. On the other hand, it was largely fabric and wood covered IIRC, and burned rather easily, the fuel tanks were non-self sealing, armoring was completely missing at the start of the war. Over the German Bay this ability to withstand damage did not show.

In comparison the mainstay He 111 carried very extensive armor plating for the crew weighting about a quarter of a ton, the fuel tanks were self sealing, and it was all metal in construction. Bomb sighths, night navigation aids were also very advanced for the time (which begs for the question - if the He 111 was meant for 'tactical' bombing, why was it blessed with long range, heavy loads, and navigation aids for night bombing...?) It was also far more numerous within the force compared with the Wellingtion, and Churchill even describes it as a heavy bomber (certainly it could be considered such, at the time) in 1940.

The notion about the LW's "tactical" bombers is how the LW intedned and did use them - as you say attacking marshalling yards, supply depots, rail stations, bridges and road junctions - but as *I* said, they intended to do so more immediately behind the enemy's front line or further to the rear to prevent the supporting of troops at the front.

I guess we only use different terms to describe the same thing. What you describe as 'tactical' level bombing is really operational level bombing, ie. between the tactical and strategical level.

THIS was the job in the RAF of aircraft like the Blenheim, it was the direct equivalent of the JU88, certainly in performance, the first years of the war.

The Blenheim
Equivalent of the Ju 88
...in performance...?

Certainly they had similiar concept, and similiar task, but otherwise..

The LW didn't plan to carry a bombing campaign right into the infrastucture of an enemy, as the Germans hoped NOT to have to fight any protracted campaigns, the sort that necessitated planning bombing targets against an enemy's industrial production and delivery two and three years into the future.

You know, it just a really strange 'coincidence' then that they ordered, delivered aircraft with range, payload and navigational equipment that made them capable of exactly that - and that they were without any doubt the best prepeared for such campaign at the start of the war compared to all others.

The RAF always planned to carry out this sort of a bombing campaign, and by night, AND based in England not on the continent and certainly not from fields right up against the German border.. which in effect as what the Germans did when the attacked from bases in the Pas de Calais

This is very poor reasoning - as seen in the first paragraph, British and German mediums had very similiar range, which shows what kind of .which in effect as what the Germans did when the attacked from bases in the Pas de Calais.

The fact that the Germans were, in 1940, standing on the shores of the Channel of taking advantage of that advantegous position for their bombers (and it would have been very stupid not to) has nothing to do with their pre-war doctrines.

But they ALSO intended a bombing offensive by day by the so-called medium-heavies like the Hampden, and shortrange tactical bombing by Blenheims....with the Army Cooperation/battlefield tactical bombing of the Fairey Battle - pardon while I puke. The Germans only PLANNED two of those levels, and incidently had the capacity available that made them believe they could carry out a night campaign with their limited aircraft.

Uhhm.... you mean between July 1940 - May 1941.. ? Pardon me, but that period looks like to me a lot more than just belief and incidental capability. They didn`t just pull out long ranged medium bombers with advanced noctural bomb aids and considerable bombload carrying capability from under their hat when they needed them. These bombers proved quite capable of hurting the enemy industrial potential at the time.

As for the He177 - that was a sad aberration that took SO long to mature that any results it gained were FAR outwieghed by the mechanical losses and the missed opportunities.

True in the sense that they might have got results sooner with a less advanced and complex design.

That aerodynamically-"clean" frontage required the use of surface radiators - but these were impracrftical so the much-more limited-area nanacelle-mouted circular items were fitted instead - causing drag, thus demanding extra fuel for the specified range and thus increasing the weight and thus stress on the engines.

That is pretty much true for most aircraft developed in 1930, surface radiators were tried on many designs (Spitfire, He 112 being two well known examples), and were eventually rejected for ordinary radiators. Now of course all radiators add extra drag, but the Junkers-style circular radiator layout was pretty good from that point of view, since it didn`t add to much, being placed in front of the engine, not adding extra frontal area - hence why it was used on the Ju 88, FW 190D etc with good results.

Inside the engine oversized oil scavenge pumps caused the engine oil to aerate and foam at altitude...leading to siezures and fires in already-overheated engines.

It was an unfortunate thing with the early DB 605, rather than the He 177 itself, and the engine troubles also plagued the Bf 109 and Bf 110 that shared the same engines. In any case, the troubles were solved by the automn of 1943, after about year the engine was introduced into service. Afterwards, it proved to be a reliable powerplant and the He 177 operated reliably in service.

As to the other problems you`ve mentioned, the earliest 177 prototypes certainly exhibited them, but thats pretty much a natural way of evolving, fixing and ironing out of the construction bugs.

[phylo_roadking]

I have primary source for the He 111 H-4/H-5 from February 1940, and these show a range of 2800 km...the range was practically similar

...by fitting extra fuel tanks in place of the wing bomb cells. That range is for the extra-tankage H-5/H-6, what was the range of the first service marks? After all you've given the range for the Wellington Ic, maybe you want to hunt around for the other service marks, particularly the high-altitude marks the V and VI specifically designated for attacking German targets, with its range of 3661 km? The Ic and others were the day bomber variant to spec B.9/32, the night bombers with the increased range were to B.23/39.

That's a range difference of only 31% in favour of the Wellington when used as a long-range bomber.

As for the He111s "heavy loads", what was the internal bombload of the H series? 2000Kg? As compared with the Wellington V/VI's...6804Kg - over three times as much?

As for "as seen in the first paragraph, British and German mediums had very similiar range" I've already shown that the Wellingtons used through all of 1940 and 1941 for strategic bombing had a third again more range than the He111 "heavy", and while the Avro Whitley had a roughly comparable range of 2700Km, it did so with a bombload of 3175Kg, more than half again as much as the He111.

I do agree though that the daybomber Wellington I was vulnerable, which is why the RAF stopped using them as such in December 1939. As for your "the fuel tanks were non-self sealing, armoring was completely missing at the start of the war", this ONLY applied to the Wellington I, the very first service mark - crew armour, selfsealing tanks, armoured tanks etc. arrived with the Ic...when did crew armour arrive for the He111? The P-4? How many service marks into its LW frontline deployment (if not actual combat history) was that? The LW was certainly STILL upgrading it as late as the H-11...

The Blenheim
Equivalent of the Ju 88
...in performance...?

Certainly they had similiar concept, and similiar task, but otherwise...

Yes. As fast as each side's own fastest monoplane fighters when brought into service

Uhhm.... you mean between July 1940 - May 1941.. ? Pardon me, but that period looks like to me a lot more than just belief and incidental capability. They didn`t just pull out long ranged medium bombers with advanced noctural bomb aids and considerable bombload carrying capability from under their hat when they needed them. These bombers proved quite capable of hurting the enemy industrial potential at the time.

My point is - which you incidently confirm - is that the LW had a tactical/"operational level" (whichever you want to refer to it by) that was as effective by night as by day. The Germans proceeded to use it in a STRATEGIC role ...and as I did say several times but you missed so pardon my emphasis... did so with FAR more effect than the British did with their expensively constructed and doctrine-driven designated STRATEGIC bombers Bomber Command got it VERY wrong, but that is not the same as the LW setting out to do a job and getting it entirely right. The LW's bombers were not a designated and intended STRATEGIC-level bomber, but happened to work that way. The British were saved in 1941 by their very effective countermeasures - look at the example of Coventry when these failed.

As for the rest of your post about the He177 - the switch to the DB 610 in the longer nacelle was only a partial cure, the 177 still suffered fire problems from the transfer gearbox. To call it "reliable" is to ignore the mechanical failure evidence from the Steinbock raids - EVEN the modified, "reliable" A-5s. The He177 only suffered 10% combat losses, yes - BUT the mechanical failure rate and return-to-base rate was unacceptably high, running to something like 60% on one raid. And look at the mechanical failure rate on the air-launched V1 assaults from Antwerp post-D-Day.

[Kurfürst]

I have primary source for the He 111 H-4/H-5 from February 1940, and these show a range of 2800 km...the range was practically similar

...by fitting extra fuel tanks in place of the wing bomb cells.

I must ask myself what parallel universe`s Heinkel 111 are you talking about.
Wing bomb cells - in the He 111...?

That range is for the extra-tankage H-5/H-6, what was the range of the first service marks?

Well for the early H-1/H-2 the maximum range is given as 2770 km with 3450 liter fuel.

After all you've given the range for the Wellington Ic, maybe you want to hunt around for the other service marks, particularly the high-altitude marks the V and VI specifically designated for attacking German targets, with its range of 3661 km? The Ic and others were the day bomber variant to spec B.9/32, the night bombers with the increased range were to B.23/39.

Wikipedia gives the following information about the 'service variants' Mk V and VI.

Experimental and conversion variants

Type 407 and Type 421 Wellington Mk V
Three were built, designed for pressurised, high-altitude operations using turbocharged Hercules VIII engines.

Type 432 Wellington Mk VI
One high-altitude prototype only.

Type 449 Wellington Mk VIG
Two production aircraft only.

Comments....? It seems you made some variants up.

As for the He111s "heavy loads", what was the internal bombload of the H series? 2000Kg? As compared with the Wellington V/VI's...6804Kg - over three times as much?

Again, I have to wonder which parallel universe`s Wellington are you talking about... 6804 kg, where that figure from, is it including inflation rates of the past 70 years or what?

All Wellington variants were limited to a bombload of ca. 4000 lbs, ie. 1814 kg, with a bit of generousity, it was comparable to the early Heinkel`s.

As for "as seen in the first paragraph, British and German mediums had very similiar range" I've already shown that the Wellingtons used through all of 1940 and 1941 for strategic bombing had a third again more range than the He111 "heavy",

Experimental Wellingtons...

and while the Avro Whitley had a roughly comparable range of 2700Km, it did so with a bombload of 3175Kg, more than half again as much as the He111.

Avro Whitley didn`t exist, you are thinking of the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley. I believe only a handful were around of them and were seen as obsolate types at the beginning of the war - other than its considerable bombload, it had little to offer (and in this respect it as soon outdone by Heinkel 111s : the H-4 was capable of lifting 2800 kg, the H-5 3600 kg)

I do agree though that the daybomber Wellington I was vulnerable, which is why the RAF stopped using them as such in December 1939. As for your "the fuel tanks were non-self sealing, armoring was completely missing at the start of the war", this ONLY applied to the Wellington I, the very first service mark - crew armour, selfsealing tanks, armoured tanks etc. arrived with the Ic...when did crew armour arrive for the He111? The P-4? How many service marks into its LW frontline deployment (if not actual combat history) was that? The LW was certainly STILL upgrading it as late as the H-11...

Main point is that while the mainstay LW`s frontline bombers featured an extensive armor protection, the RAF bombers did not, at the start of the war, and you were arguing for the toughness of a canvas covered (thus highly flammable) bomber without self sealing tanks or armor protection.

Again, the whole arguement originated that you`ve claimed the RAF had a strategic doctrine and bomber force suitable for it at/before the start of the war, and the LW didn`t. I pointed out the notion is simply false.

The LW actually possessed more and more suitable, long ranged medium bombers than the RAF`s BC at the start of the war. This kind of emphasis on long range bombers capable of waging strategic bombing, and considerable pre-war development for noctural bombing devices surely wasn`t only incidental.

The Blenheim
Equivalent of the Ju 88
...in performance...?

Certainly they had similiar concept, and similiar task, but otherwise...

Yes. As fast as each side's own fastest monoplane fighters when brought into service

Also one of them is capable carrying 5+ times the bombload than the other.

*SNIP*

The LW's bombers were not a designated and intended STRATEGIC-level bomber, but happened to work that way.

Then please explain why their mainstay He 111 had, at the start of the war

- long range
- navigational equipment that would typically suit strategic bombers hitting targets in the night deep behind the enemy Hinterland
- considerable bombload, armor protection and respectable defense guns (for the period)

Too many coincidences I`d say. None of these would be required by a purely tacticaloperational level doctrine. Truth is, the Luftwaffe was rather flexible through the war in employing its bombers.

As for the rest of your post about the He177 - the switch to the DB 610 in the longer nacelle was only a partial cure, the 177 still suffered fire problems from the transfer gearbox. To call it "reliable" is to ignore the mechanical failure evidence from the Steinbock raids - EVEN the modified, "reliable" A-5s. The He177 only suffered 10% combat losses, yes - BUT the mechanical failure rate and return-to-base rate was unacceptably high, running to something like 60% on one raid. And look at the mechanical failure rate on the air-launched V1 assaults from Antwerp post-D-Day.

This opion of yours is in direct contrast with British intterogations of captured He 177 crew in early 1944, who express great confidence in the big Heinkel`s reliability.