Germany's lack of a 4 engined bomber

[phylo_roadking]

Type 407 and Type 421 Wellington Mk V
Three were built, designed for pressurised, high-altitude operations using turbocharged Hercules VIII engines.

Type 432 Wellington Mk VI
One high-altitude prototype only.

Type 449 Wellington Mk VIG
Two production aircraft only.

Comments....? It seems you made some variants up

Careful what you say.

VICKERS WELLINGTON (High-altitude bomber variants) - The Vickers Wellington 1C airframe provided basis for adaptation as a high-altitude bomber, conforming to Specification B.23/39. Requirement was for a three-man crew, ability to bomb from 35,000 ft (10,668 m) or above, and to have an endurance of more than nine hours. Pressurisation was to begin at 15,000 ft (4,572 m), the altitude specified for cruise to and from the target.
Vickers Wellington V: Two prototypes (R3298, R3299) by conversion of Mk 1C airframes, ordered in May 1939, as Vickers Type 407 with high-altitude Bristol Hercules VIII engines. Rear turret retained but pressure cell extended into nose, replacing forward turret, and accommodated rear gunner during high-altitude portion of flight. First prototype flown September 1940 with 1,400 hp Hercules Ills (as Type 421); second prototype had 1,650 hp Hercules VIIIs and smaller 'blister' dome for pilot's head in place of longer canopy on first prototype. Production batch of 30 Mk Vs ordered to Specification 17/40, in compliance with Operational Requirement OR. 94, to have Hercules VIII (Type 426) or Hercules 38 (Type 448) engines. One only (W5796) completed as Mk V; 20 as Mk VI (see below) and nine cancelled.
Vickers Wellington VI: Similar to Mk V, with 1,280 hp Rolls-Royce Merlin 60 engines.

First of production-batch Mk Vs (W5795, Vickers Type 431), completed as prototype Mk VI and flown in late 1941, followed by 19 more from Mk V contract and 44 from new production contract (for 100; others cancelled) placed in 1941. Standard FN20A turret retained, but gunner in pressure cell at all times, using periscopic sight in underside of fuselage. Basic type (28 aircraft) as Vickers Wellington VIA (Vickers Type 442), but final 35 were Vickers Wellington VIG (Type 449) without rear turret, and with Oboe blind-bombing aid. Two Vickers Wellington VIG used operationally by No 109(SD) Sqn, and others to train crews in use of Oboe. Max speed, 300 mph (483 kmlh). Service ceiling, 38,500 ft (11,735 m). Range, 2,275 mis (3,661 km) with 15,000-lb (6,804-kg) bombs. Empty weight, 20,280 Ib (9,200 kg). Gross weight, 30,450 Ib (13,812 kg). Span, 86 ft 2 in (26.26 m). Length, 61 ft 9 in (18.82 m). Wing area, 840 sqft (78.04 m2).

127 in total. Not many, as the Stirling/Halifax/Lancaster heavies were coming online in numbers, but it's certainly a hell of a lot more more than six. I don't make things up.

Regarding

Again, I have to wonder which parallel universe`s Wellington are you talking about... 6804 kg, where that figure from, is it including inflation rates of the past 70 years or what?

...see above.

Avro Whitley didn`t exist, you are thinking of the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley. I believe only a handful were around of them and were seen as obsolate types at the beginning of the war - other than its considerable bombload, it had little to offer (and in this respect it as soon outdone by Heinkel 111s : the H-4 was capable of lifting 2800 kg, the H-5 3600 kg)

You're quite right, I meant the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley - but as for

I believe only a handful were around of them and were seen as obsolate types at the beginning of the war

ARMSTRONG WHITWORTH AW.38 WHITLEY - The Armstrong Whitworth Whitley was designed under the direc-tion of J Lloyd to the requirements of Specification B.3/34 for a five-seat 'heavy bomber' replacement for the Heyford and Hendon, to carry a 2,500-lb (1,135-kg) bomb load over 1,250 mis (2,010 km) at 225 mph (362 km/h) at 15,000 ft (4,575 m). First of two prototypes (K4586) with 795 hp Tiger IX engines flown at Whitley, Coventry, aerodrome on March 17, 1936. Second prototype (K.4587) with Tiger XIs flown February 11, 1937.

Armstrong Whitworth Whitley I: First contract for 80 Armstrong Whitworth Whitley Mk Is placed 'off the drawing board' in June 1935. First example flown December 23, 1936; deliveries to No 10 Sqn, RAF, on March 9, later to Nos 51 and 78 Sqns. Tiger IX engines; armament of single 0.303-in (7.7-mm) Lewis gun each in front (AW. or Nash and Thompson) and rear (AW.) manual turrets. Production termi-nated at 34th aircraft.

Armstrong Whitworth Whitley II: Final 46 aircraft on initial contract completed with 920 hp Tiger VIIIs with two-speed superchargers, to Specification B.21/35. Deliveries mid-1938, to Nos 7, 51, 58 and 97 Sqns. One Armstrong Whitworth Whitley II (K7243) test-bed for AS Deerhound 21-cyl air-cooled radial engine, flown Jan 1939-March 1940.

Armstrong Whitworth Whitley III: Second production batch of 80, to Specification B.20/36, similar to Armstrong Whitworth Whitley Mk II but with powered Nash and Thompson single-gun nose turret and retractable ventral 'dustbin' turret with two O.303-in (7.7-mm) Brownings. Bomb-bay and racks modified for larger bombs. Deliveries second half of 1938 to replace Mk Is and Us and also to Nos 77, 97, 102 and 166 Sqns. Early marks of Armstrong Whitworth Whitley from Nos 51 and 58 Sqns flew first RAF Nickel (leaflet) raid over Germany on night of September 3/4, 1939.

Armstrong Whitworth Whitley IV: Final 40 aircraft on second production contract (additional to 80 Mk Ills) fitted with Merlin in-line engines and extra fuel tanks. Prototype (converted Mk I K7208) first flown at Hucknall on February 11, 1938; first production Armstrong Whitworth Whitley IV flown on April 5, 1939 with Merlin IVs; final seven aircraft had 1,070 hp Merlin Xs and designated Armstrong Whitworth Whitley IVA.

Armstrong Whitworth Whitley V: Contracts placed in 1938 for 312, in 1939 for 150 and in 1940 for 1,150 Armstrong Whitworth Whitleys, of which 1,466 completed as Armstrong Whitworth Whitley Mk V and 146 as Armstrong Whitworth Whitley Mk VII (see below). As Mk IV with Nash and Thompson powered tail turret mounting four 0.303-in (7.7-mm) Browning guns; 15-in (38.1-cm) rear fuselage extension to improve rear gunner's field of fire; modified fin shape; wing leading-edge rubber de-icers and fuel capacity increased to 837 Imp gal (3,805 1). First production Mk V flown August 8, 1939, and initial deliveries to No 77 Sqn in September. Many Armstrong Whitworth Whitley Vs (and some earlier marks) used as glider tugs, with towing gear in place of rear turret or fitted beneath rear fuselage, and as para-troop transports; also used to drop agents into occupied territory. Fifteen Armstrong Whitworth Whitley Mk Vs transferred (with civil registrations) to BOAC for Gibraltar-Malta supply flights, 1942/43.

Armstrong Whitworth Whitley VII: Total of 146 Armstrong Whitworth Whitley Mk VII built on final production contract, plus some Mk V conversions, to serve with Coastal Command squadrons on maritime reconnaissance duties, carrying ASV Mk II radar (with four dorsal radar masts plus lat-eral and underwing aerials), sixth crew member and extra fuel in bomb bay and fuselage to a total of 1,100 Imp gal (5,000 1) for a range of 2,300 mis (3,700 km). Initial CC squadrons were Nos 502 (GR) and 612 (GR), using standard Armstrong Whitworth Whitley Vs from 1940 and 1941 respectively, with Armstrong Whitworth Whitley VIIs introduced 1942.

THAT Whitley? Notice the emboldened section. 1,500 both ordered AND produced AFTER the start of the war does argue against "a handful" and "were seen as obsolete"...

Again, the whole arguement originated that you`ve claimed the RAF had a strategic doctrine and bomber force suitable for it at/before the start of the war, and the LW didn`t. I pointed out the notion is simply false.

The LW actually possessed more and more suitable, long ranged medium bombers than the RAF`s BC at the start of the war. This kind of emphasis on long range bombers capable of waging strategic bombing, and considerable pre-war development for noctural bombing devices surely wasn`t only incidental.

The Luftwaffe didn't have any strategic bombing doctrine. That isn't false. The RAF did, but unfortunately had aircraft for it that while suitable for the carrying-out of that doctrine were as of 1939-41 just about marginal for it at that time but had bigger and better in design and testing while those fought on. Of course the Luftwaffe possessed more and more suitable medium bombers - I DO believe I said that - and they DID use them to wage two strategic bombing campaigns.

But "pre-war development of noctural bombing devices" does NOT argue that anyone in the RLM or LW was specifically planning STRATEGIC bombing pre-war - it argues that the LW fully intended to carry out round-the-clock tactical/operational level bombing with their tactical bombers as opposed to being stupid enough as to develop a parallel but separate day/night capability like the RAF had. It's exactly what I said above in my example of the B-17 - the ability to fly to Hawaii, Alaska and Panama brought Germany within easy reach from England...but it doesn't indicate the US was planning to bomb Germany from England in 1934, does it? By YOUR logic it would.

This opion of yours is in direct contrast with British intterogations of captured He 177 crew in early 1944, who express great confidence in the big Heinkel`s reliability.

The mechanical failure rates in 1944 are NOT opinion, they are recorded fact. Have you checked them out?


(all British tech. specs. and material taken from here - http://www.jaapteeuwen.com/ww2aircraft/index.htm)

[phylo_roadking]

Let me give you an example and save you the trouble.

On 3rd February,1944, 2. and 3./KG100 set off for London. 14 aircraft taxied out, 13 took off, EIGHT returned with overheated or burning engines within half an hour, ONLY FOUR reached London, and only three came back.

One failed on the apron, eight were forced to turn round. That's NINE out of FOURTEEN. That's 64%.

And that's the modified reliable 1944 models....

in direct contrast with British intterogations of captured He 177 crew in early 1944, who express great confidence in the big Heinkel`s reliability

OF COURSE they were happy - they'd survived it!!!

[Jon G.]

I split a number of off-topic posts to this new party of two topic:

British responses to German air rearmament
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=135768

[Hop]

Actually - no. The British messed up as the 1941 Butt Report showed, their policy of penny-pocket supposedly "precision" raids by squadron-sized sorties turned out to be almost useless. The Germans on the other hand scored the VERY noticeable success of Coventry, and significantly damaged the Armstrong-Vickers/Coventry Ordnance Works and various others around the city, which was one of the main hubs of the British war industry...but we didn't hear ANY of that during the war, and very little has crept into the public consciousness since IIRC, British tank production dropped by 40% for the next 8 months, and armoured car production by almost 70%!

From British War Production by Postan:

Tank production per quarter:
1940
qtr1 - 218
qtr2 - 340
qtr3 - 392
qtr4 - 449
1941
qtr1 - 653
qtr2 - 943
qtr3 - 1,368
qtr4 - 1,877

No drop at all, in fact a tale of accelerating expansion. There was a drop in November, to 113 tanks from the 144 produced in October, but by December production had increased to 170, by Jan 1941 it was 201, by the end of the Blitz in May production had reached 332 tanks a month, treble what it was a year earlier.

I don't have the figures for armoured cars, and there may well have been a drop, but that's likely due to a downgrading of production priority. Light tanks were phased out too, in favour of heavier versions.

If you look at other categories there were some reductions in November, but a huge increase as the year went on.

25 lb field guns, for example, increased in production every month from July 1940 (42) to May 1941 (408), before slipping back to 310 in June 1941 (and then climbing again).

Postan gives an overall index of output of military equipment, based on the average for September - December 1939 = 100:

1940
May 206
Jun 256
Jul 253
Aug 245
Sep 217
Oct 245
Nov 242
Dec 239
1941
Jan 244
Feb 266
Mar 303
Apr 284
May 319
Jun 319
Jul 327
Aug 347
Sep 387
Oct 404
Nov 429
Dec 431

As you can see, there was a rise overall. The first quarter of 1941 saw higher production than any previous quarter, the second quarter of 1941 saw a further rise to a new peak.

As far as the government and the RAF were concerned, Arthur Harris' concentration BACK on the Douet-style "The bomber will always get through" belief and his unshakeable faith in the ability of strategic bombing to end the war had almost been "proved" by Coventry and others! The RAF 's campaign up until mid-1941 had been a failure...but the same cannot be said of the LW's In fact, quite the reverse - despite ALL the countermeasures, it was their significant successes that convinced the government that the rejigged targeting parameters for Bomber Command and Harris' driving personality could carry it off.

Certainly the Luftwaffe helped inspire the British planners, but note that they counted on using much larger forces. The Luftwaffe disrupted Britain somewhat, and locally could cause production losses, but never managed to reduce British production overall.

[phylo_roadking]

Hop, you're quite right, and I've been digging too as it had been YEARS since I did anything on Coventry, and I'm glad I put the IIRC on as I didn't "RC" LOL that 32% in November 1940 was the drop I was thinking of, for Nuffields in and around Luton relied on Coventry-based subsidiaries for a LOT of engine parts so their production lines siezed up for a couple of months. But production figures overall actually ramped up quickly because the Valentine line was speeding up in Elwisk on the Tyne. If you look at the actual types produced and the factory locations, there were a LOT of new production lines coming in in late 1940, away from the old Birmingham/Luton/Tyneside (and Woolwich) centres. Castle Bromwich for example was ramping up nicely for production of the Spitfire, compensating for the raid that damaged Supermarine's "home" factory in Southhampton. A lot of new weapons and production contracts issued in 1939 and very early 1940 were coming on stream by early 1940.

But even that hiccup created by Coventry was far more than Bomber Command ever managed before 1942. The attack on Sylt of March 19th 1940 provides clear and good evidence about the ineffectiveness of Bomber Command. Thirty Whitleys and twenty Hampdens set out to attack a seaplane base on the island, on a night with a full moon. The aircraft attacked the target from heights as low as 1000ft with moderate enemy resistance, and over 80% of the crews reported identifying and bombing the target; photo recce later showed that there had been NO damage to the target.

[Alaric]

Why Germany never had a 4 engined long distance bomber has always puzzled me. Surely Hitler saw the great effect of allied bombers? Has anyone ever read anything to adequately explain this major inadequacy of the German Luftwaffe?

The primary reason, in my view, is the death (assasination in my opinion) of General Walther Wever, the only man, apparently, in the Luftwaffe or the entire Wehrmacht establishment that had any vision and critical thinking when it came to air power and it's proper usage (which is why, I believe, he was murdered), even though in the First World War he was an infantry officer and was on Ludendorff's staff. He became Chief of the RLM (Reich Air Ministry) on 1 September 1933 and later Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe. He held that post until his death on June 3, 1936. Wever saw the need for a strategic bomber, as previously mentioned, a "Ural bomber", from the very beginning. Had Wever lived, there would have been a mixed-mission, completely independent air force which including tactical, close support aircraft (Ju-87 as the biggest example), medium bombers (Ju-88 and Do-17, I don't think a man like him would have continued to produce the He-111 knowing the type of good results in Spain that lulled his unworthy successors into a false sense of security in that plane were against inferior fighters, and that superior types would be encountered in a new Euro war which would decimate the He-111), and strategic bombers (Ju-89 and Do-19 at first, gradually upping the ante with the He-177, although the idiocy of the forcing two engines into one nacelle, and adding dive brakes, would never have happened on his watch). I also don't believe that inferior designs like the Bf-109 and Bf-110 would have been selected over superior designs like the He-100 and FW-187, which of course changes the entire BoB outcome as well as the eastern front.

Here is something that I think describes this perfectly:

"Even before Adolf Hitler sealed the fate of Germany by going to war(sic), Wever understood that the next armed conflict would be a tactical as well as a strategic one. Adhering to his vision, Wever steered the German air industry into developing what he saw as its most precious asset in the next war: a four-engined heavy bomber. The bomber Wever envisioned would have been able to carry a payload of some 3,300 pounds to a distance of at least 1,240 miles. In developing the concept for such an aircraft, Wever had only one enemy in mind: Soviet Russia. He understood what many of his peers and eventual successors failed to see. In order to take the war into the Russian industry, buried deep behind the Ural Mountains, Germany needed an aircraft able to subject those industries to a heavy bombardment that could disrupt the flow of aircraft, tanks, truck, artillery pieces and other tools of war; into the frontlines - the destruction of the enemy's means of war production. He clearly saw that in order to defeat the air force of a country such as Russia, where the sheer amount of aircraft available to them could had overwhelmed Germany's fighter force, they would need to destroy the industry that made those aircraft, instead of shooting them out of the skies. Here was the British Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Frederick Sykes's strategic vision at its most basic. The objectives of the new German air force would not only be concentrated on the support of its ground and naval forces, although Wever was a passionate believer in a mixed-mission and completely independent Luftwaffe, but it would take the tools of war to the enemy's nerve centers, the troop staging areas, rear bases, their industries and in the end, their population as a whole. This concept of total air war was first promulgated by Sykes in December 1918.

For all of his vision, strategies and directions, Wever's views were in the minority in the German air force. The most senior Luftwaffe commanders saw little need for the development of a strategic heavy force, although they changed their minds when the British and American heavy bombers began to pound their beloved country. Following Wever's lead, Germany's air industry began to conceive plans for the design and production of a fleet of heavy bombers. Two proud German companies, Junkers and Dornier put forward design sketches for a heavy level bomber in late 1934. On January 3rd, 1935, Junker's chairman, Dr. Heinrich Koppenberg; reported to Colonel Wilhelm Wimmer, head of the Luftwaffe Technical Department and fierce backer of Wever; that a preliminary design for the new bomber, designated Ju 89, had been completed. Dornier followed a couple of months later. On a clear morning in October 28th, 1936, the much anticipated Do 19 made its maiden flight. The Ju 89 followed two months later. But by this time, fate had intervened. On June 3rd, 1936, Wever was in Dresden addressing a gathering of Luftwaffe cadets when he received the news of the passing of a World War I German hero. He decided to leave the city immediately in order to attend the funeral. Wever took off on his He 70 airplane. As the plane started to climb, one wing tipped on the ground propelling the aircraft into a mad tailspin that ended with a fiery crash. Wever and his flight engineer died immediately. With his prematurely passing, his dream, that of a well balanced tactical and strategic Luftwaffe; also died. Without Wever's vision and relentless drive to pursue, Germany fell behind its main adversaries in the development of a heavy bomber platform.

Wever's successors were more "yes"-type officers. More eager to please the Luftwaffe's Chief Commander Hermann Göring than in establishing a balanced force. From June 1936 onwards, the main effort of the Luftwaffe's aircraft development programs was concentrated on the design and production of aircraft capable of providing the German army with a close air support arm. Nearly all of the heavy bomber development resources were diverted to the development of dive bombers. Even the much anticipated and needed He 177 was not ordered into full-scale production until the four-engined plane was refitted to operate as a dive bombing platform. It's safe to say that with the death of General Wever, the dream of developing a multi-faceted air force, an air force capable of providing Germany with the same kind of capability as the Royal Air Force and the US Army Air Forces possessed, died also. There were many aspects of discrepancy between the Allies combat air philosophy and that of Germany's air arm, but what separates them most profoundly was the strategic aspect of their respective philosophies. The Allies truly believed in the importance of strategic bombing to their overall war effort, while the Germans were more focused on the tactical aspect. Had Wever lived, maybe the Luftwaffe's philosophy and the product of this philosophy would have been more balanced."

http://www.aeroflight.co.uk/military/ural_bomber.htm

[kriegsmarine221]

the luftwaffe had a couple types of heavy bombers availible but just didnt use them for strategic bombing. they had the ju-290 and the fw-200 condor but they were used for transport and anti shipping

[Ironmachine]

The Fw-200 was not well suited for the strategic bomber role. In fact it was particularly ill-suited for something that implied carrying big loads and going strong enemy air defenses.

[Simon Gunson]

And why, incidentally, was the next projected German multi-engined aircraft, which presumably could have included some BoB benefit of hindsight, the Me-264 dubbed the America bomber?

In actual fact Milch anticipated using the Me-264 to shadow convoys and direct He-177 aircraft to attack said convoys.

This was also the same RLM requirement which resulted in the EF-100 study of 1942 and which became the Ju-390. The Ju-390 was extremely slow. A Ju-390 V3 bomber version was intended to attack New York with a pair of ramjet powered Me-328 hung under each wing, but eventually RLM declared it's wings too weak to support these Me-328s.



The photo depicts a 1942 wind tunnel test of the Ju-90 as an Amerika Bomber. The aircraft in question bore the same rounded tail fins peculiar to the Ju-90 V5 through V8 which then disappeared on the Ju-290. The Ju-390 as the EF100 was similarly wind tunnel tested as a carrier for the Me-328.

The Ju-390 with an economic cruise speed of just 232 knots was bitterly criticised as being too slow to survive over the target as a bomber. The Ju-290 A-8 bomber required removal of a centre fuel tank degrading it's long range performance. Three A-8 were completed from a planned 11 aircraft (werke nr. J900211-J900221) These three were intended for sale to Japan which required a strategic bomber to attack USA.



The Ju-290E was projected to be a serious bomber with a large ventral bomb bay in a pod beneath the fuselage.

The He-177 was a disaster in my opinion and an example of pig headed stubbornness in trying to make a silk purse from a sow's ear. Had Hienkel simply been allowed to develop the smarter alternative of the He-277 Germany could have had a strategic bomber much earlier. The same could be said of the Ju-89 Ural Bomber.

The FW200 Kondor had too many structural issues with wing failures to enable it to be a bomber. The Fuhrerflieger Atlantik eventually prohibited the FW200 from attacking convoys with air defence, but specifically permitted the Ju-290 to attack convoys with air defence.

For the same reasons the FW200 could not have substituted for a Ural Bomber.

[phylo_roadking]

And why, incidentally, was the next projected German multi-engined aircraft, which presumably could have included some BoB benefit of hindsight, the Me-264 dubbed the America bomber?

...perhaps because when Allied intelligence analysts got to hear of it, it would be worth a few quaking boots and a few hundred fighter aircraft NOT sent to Europe - even if it never flew???

[Tim Smith]

The US built more fighters than they knew what to do with. So keeping a few hundred back means nothing to the course of the war.

[phylo_roadking]

Numbers-wise - true. Though if Hitler could say to Mannerheim he underestimated the Russians' capacity to make war - how much did he underestimate the Americans too?

But panic-wise...? Look at the parable of the He113, and how many locations IT was supposedly identified in by ALLIED pilots...

[Simon Gunson]

Jon_G wrote to Phylo

I don't know why you persist in your comparison with RAF bomber types and strategies. As I wrote several times now, what the RAF was and was not doing does not answer the basic question why the Germans didn't field a four-engined bomber force.

The point being that the British did not waste years in development trying to make Avro Lancasters into dive bombers.

Thanks to Udet the logical He-277 was bypassed for the He-177 and it's near impossible engine configuration.

[Tim Smith]

But panic-wise...? Look at the parable of the He113, and how many locations IT was supposedly identified in by ALLIED pilots...

Look, some Allied fighter pilots were 'Luftwaffe fans' like people on this board, and they liked to 'collect' different kinds of German aircraft by shooting them down. I've read of one pilot who said he wanted to shoot down at least one of every kind of German aircraft, to 'round out his collection'.

So it's tempting to 'collect' a He 113 by misidentifying a Bf 109.

Remember many Allied pilots were not much older than schoolboys, and schoolboys like collecting things. Boys will be boys....

"Hey chaps, guess what, I got a He 113 today!"
"I say, Jonny, that's absolutely wizard! You lucky so-and-so. Where did you see it? I really want one of those!"

[phylo_roadking]

Look, some Allied fighter pilots were 'Luftwaffe fans' like people on this board, and they liked to 'collect' different kinds of German aircraft by shooting them down

Actually - I wasn't taking about fighter pilots! I was thinking more of the times Allied bomber crews reported He113s among the swarms of German aircraft attacking them during events like the Schweinfurt Massacre.

If a three-line silhouette is included in aircraft recognition material - aircraft will be identified as it. The same thing happened with Me110s being identified as the "Jaguar" variant over Kent during the BoB by OAPS in the Royal Observer Corps. It "existed" in their OFFICIAL material so it "got seen"