Neuhammer Stuka disaster

Discussions on all (non-biographical) aspects of the Luftwaffe air units and general discussions on the Luftwaffe.
Mark V
Member
Posts: 3925
Joined: 22 May 2002, 10:41
Location: Suomi Finland

Re: Neuhammer Stuka disaster

#16

Post by Mark V » 25 Apr 2009, 18:30

bil wrote:If no bombs were released,the auto mechanism would not function,correct? Thanks. ---bil
I don't know, but it would be natural that there was loop in system that allowed triggering the pull-out mechanism even if bombs were not carried...

The release button has two separate functions:

- sent an impulse to bomb-racks to release
- starting the pull-out (maybe with slight delay to clear out bombs first)

Why the Germans would had designed it in way that would had prevented any realistic training without carrying practice bombs ? That makes no sence.

Also wasn't the problem the ground fog ? which made pilots to err in altitude they were ? - if not activated by pilot the pull-out mechanism stays idle..


Regards

Othon
Member
Posts: 43
Joined: 24 Apr 2009, 22:42

Re: Neuhammer Stuka disaster

#17

Post by Othon » 25 Apr 2009, 22:58

AIFAK in Ju-87B variant bombs were released automatically when plane reached preselected drop altitude. At this moment pull-out mechanism began to level-off Stuka. This was changed in Ju-87D-5 version equipped with Stuvi bombsight.


User avatar
bf109 emil
Member
Posts: 3627
Joined: 25 Mar 2008, 22:20
Location: Youngstown Alberta Canada

Re: Neuhammer Stuka disaster

#18

Post by bf109 emil » 26 Apr 2009, 09:39

At the last moment Sigel recognized the danger, warned the rest immediately on the radio, and just got away himself with a ground close shave.
For the rest it was too late...13 Stukas with 26 young pilots and observers crashed into the ground, no survivors.
The Immelmann Gruppe recognized the fog in time and broke off.
This has to be a huge training mistake as trained pilots even diving through clouds or fog watch their altimeters which are vital to there survival, also for Sigel to warn the rest at the same moment he noticed the danger IMHO being a trained pilot his instincts would have taken over, he'd have pulled out, and trying to speak or heed a warning over a radio while one is subjected to a 5 or 6G force while close to blackening out makes me think his warning couldn't have come until he himself had already pulled out and was able to speak or use his microphone...no way he gave a warning while pulling 6G's and had the ability to talk

Othon
Member
Posts: 43
Joined: 24 Apr 2009, 22:42

Re: Neuhammer Stuka disaster

#19

Post by Othon » 26 Apr 2009, 13:56

Well, Stuka did not have radar altimeter of course...that explains everything.

User avatar
Ironmachine
Member
Posts: 5821
Joined: 07 Jul 2005, 11:50
Location: Spain

Re: Neuhammer Stuka disaster

#20

Post by Ironmachine » 26 Apr 2009, 16:55

I'm afraid that I don't understand your point.
If you imply that the Stuka did not have altimeter, then you are plainly wrong. If you are trying to say that the altimeter, not being a radar altimeter, was not accurate enough and that was the cause of the Neuhammer disaster, then your opinion is quite questionable, as the many many dive bombing missions carried out by Stukas with success can easily prove.

Othon
Member
Posts: 43
Joined: 24 Apr 2009, 22:42

Re: Neuhammer Stuka disaster

#21

Post by Othon » 26 Apr 2009, 17:49

Does baromertic altimeter show AGL or ASL value?

User avatar
bf109 emil
Member
Posts: 3627
Joined: 25 Mar 2008, 22:20
Location: Youngstown Alberta Canada

Re: Neuhammer Stuka disaster

#22

Post by bf109 emil » 27 Apr 2009, 09:41

Othon wrote'
Ju-87B variant bombs were released automatically when plane reached preselected drop altitude. At this moment pull-out mechanism began to level-off Stuka.
the only way this could be preselected and allow to function is with an altimeter
standard Ju87 Dive techniques emphasize the pilot watching the contact altimeter as standard Luftwaffe technique...something which could have avoided the Neuhammer mishaps, ground fog or not, the contact altimeter would still have functioned and the young pilots if trained would have actuated the auto-pullout mechanism whether seeing ground, for, clouds, snow what have you
.It was this ability to make such a controlled vertical dive the enabled the Stuka to deliver heavy bombs with greater precision then any other aircraft of the war.As he dived the pilot kept an eye on the contact altimeter.It had an indicator which lit up when it was time to initiate the automatic pull-out.This brought the Stuka back to level flight at 6g (six times the force of gravity) descending another 1,475 ft (450 m) in the process.The control column had a safety device limiting it to 5 degrees of movement from neutral , stopping the pilot from pulling too much g during a pull-out
from sourcehttp://homepage.eircom.net/~nightingale/stuka.html

Dili
Member
Posts: 2201
Joined: 24 Jun 2007, 23:54
Location: Lusitania

Re: Neuhammer Stuka disaster

#23

Post by Dili » 06 May 2009, 22:30

Maybe this is a tangent but what is "contact altimeter" and how it works? At sea a traditional altimeter as no problem since the "land" it is a 0 meters but on real land we have mountains, depressions etc.

User avatar
Ironmachine
Member
Posts: 5821
Joined: 07 Jul 2005, 11:50
Location: Spain

Re: Neuhammer Stuka disaster

#24

Post by Ironmachine » 21 Jun 2009, 10:53

I have just found this. It is a bit melodramatic at times, but clarifies the causes of the accident.
Following is a hastily typed transcript -- any typos are my own -- from
Herbert Molloy Mason Jr's THE RISE OF THE LUFTWAFFE 1918-1940 (Dial Books,
1973), specifically pages 261 to 263 --

No Luftwaffe units were worked harder during Europe's final weeks of peace
than were the cherished groups of Ju.87 Stukas, which were being
remorselessly groomed for the leading role in the war Hitler was
determined to launch against Poland. One of the more experienced Stuka
outfits, Group I of the 76th Sturzkampfgeschwader, commanded by Captain
Walter Sigel, was sent up from its usual base in Austria to Cottbus, sixty
miles southeast of Berlin, as part of the Luftwaffe's general deployment
of its strike forces toward the east. It was Sigel's pride that his was
one of the early units to be so deployed, especially since I/St.G.76 had
been handpicked for a showpiece demonstration to be held for the benefit
of the senior Luftwaffe commanders, including Generals Hugo Sperrle, Bruno
Loerzer, and Wolfram von Richthofen. Sigel's outfit was equipped with the
lastest Ju.87B's, mounting new Jumo 211D engines rated at 1,200
horsepower, nearly twice as powerful as those used in Spain. Sigel hoped
to stun the onlooking air commodores with a mass formation diving attack
of the entire group, twenty-seven aircraft in all. He succeeded, but in a
way nobody could have dreamed of.
The demonstration was scheduled for the morning of August 15 [1939].
The hour chosen, six [a.m.], was undoubtedly selected for the dramatic
postsunrise effect it would offer. Just prior to the scheduled takeoff
time, a weather reconnaissance plane landed at Cottbus with a report on
conditions over the strike area, a wooded section of Silesia near
Neuhammer-am-Queis, thirty minutes' flight time away. Conditions were far
from ideal. The weather pilot told Captain Sigel that it was clear above
6000 feet, but below he would find seven-tenths cloud cover all the way
down to 2500 feet. Below that, however, visibility was good. This meant
that Sigel would have to trust finding a hole in the clouds over the
strike area, lead his group down through the murk, and and break into the
clear with about five seconds left to line up on the target, release
bombs, and pull out. As group commander, Sigel had three choices: to
request postponement of the strike until the weather was clear all the way
down, to ask that the exercise be scrubbed, or to carry on as planned.
Since Sigel was a German officer, and since a galaxy of fearsome Luftwaffe
generals were gathering to personally witness I/St.G.76's star turn, only
the last option was thinkable. Shortly after 5:30am, Sigel led his group
off the field at Cottbus.
Once Sigel left the ground, he was in constant radio communication with
the twenty-six other Stukas forming up in squadron strength behind him,
but there was no radio link between his airborne group and the strike area
at Neuhammer. Thus he could not know of the disaster in the making.
Between the time the weather plane had surveyed the area and returned to
Cottbus and the time Sigel's group neared the strike zone, early morning
ground fog formed into an opaque white blanket covering almost the entire
area, rising in places to merge with the fringes of cloud. No more
dangerous weather conditions for a dive-bombing attack could have been
created.
Sigel, with his Stukas arrayed behind him, approached Neuhammer at an
altitude of 12,000 feet, estimating his position by dead reckoning and
upon checkpoints which were in the clear on the flight out from Cottbus.
Above, a pale blue windowpane sky; below, a sea of rolling clouds tinged
with red. The generals were waiting. Sigel rolled the Stuka on its back
and shoved the stick forward. The altimeter needle began unwinding in a
futile race to keep up with the altitude that was being eaten away at the
rate of 375 feet per second. Sigel's bomber plunged into the dirty gray
wet muck at a dive angle of seventy degrees doing nearly 300 miles per
hour. Closed in by the white world about him, his eyes straining to see
past the mist being churned by the prop, Sigel felt time drag. By now,
the entire group, echeloned out on his wings, were hurtling through the
clouds with him. Where was the clear air promised by the weather pilot?
Any instant now...
Then the horrified Sigel saw not two thousand feet of clear space, but a
limitless canopy of trees rushing toward him. Already tensed to the
breaking point, his reactions were instantaneous. He screamed a warning
to the others and slammed the stick back. Through the blur of a grayout,
Sigel saw that he missed death by a matter of feet; the Stuka was zipping
through a firebreak below the treetops. His warning came too late for
the two dive-bombers riding his tail. They plunged into the earth, sirens
wailing, and exploded -- as did all nine Stukas of the second wave. The
high squadron's Ju.87's convulsively came out of their dives, but two of
them stalled out and smashed into the trees to join the eleven others.
Fragments of metal and flesh were scattered across a wide area, and fires
started in the summer-dry secondary undergrowth. Plumes of smoke, pyres
for the twenty-six airmen who had died before breakfast, rose lazily into
the air, blending with the fog that began to dissipate not long
afterwards.
The tragedy at Neuhammer, worst of its kind in the recorded history of
aviation, was kept secret for a long time afterward. OKL was notified
immediately, of course, as was the Fuhrer. One account has it that when
Hitler was given the news, he "stared speechlessly out of the window for
ten minutes." The reaction is believable; Hitler was a mystic, a believer
in astrology, and the wiping out of thirteen of his vaunted Stukas at one
stroke was surely an omen. His war against Poland, in which the Luftwaffe
was counted on to play a decisive role, was scheduled to begin sixteen
days later.
http://www.ibiblio.org/wwii-buffalo/msg01421.html

User avatar
bf109 emil
Member
Posts: 3627
Joined: 25 Mar 2008, 22:20
Location: Youngstown Alberta Canada

Re: Neuhammer Stuka disaster

#25

Post by bf109 emil » 22 Jun 2009, 09:44

good dig Ironmachine...thanks

67SATisfaction
Member
Posts: 12
Joined: 25 Jun 2009, 20:48
Location: USA & Norway

Re: Neuhammer Stuka disaster

#26

Post by 67SATisfaction » 30 Jun 2009, 04:26

Hello, I am a new member and pleased to have found this discussion.

I agree with ‘bf109emil’s responses on this thread.

There seems to be little doubt the pilot(s) made a major operational error at the August 15th Neuhammer demonstration. It appears they did not establish the minimum recovery altitude and were not referring to their altimeters in their terminal dives. The surprise for this highly trained (arrogant?) squadron is, this error was contrary to operational procedures.

My family owns the Ju-87 Stuka Dive Recovery Unit (DRU, which is our own unofficial monicker for the instrument/device or alternatively called "junk/sewing machine" :D :lol:) of which ‘Furyman’ posted photos.

Referring to the markings visible in the first photo: The implication of "nicht fur Horizontalflug" ought to be clear. I believe “760km/h” is the max airspeed to which the instrument is calibrated to be accurate. I believe “250” is the moment arm the unit’s mass imposes around the aircraft’s CG for weight & balance purposes.

The Stuka's DRU is an electro-mechanical device that contains an internal altimeter, a device to measure G-load, various potentiometers, rheostats, plus power & signal wiring. Input is mechanical. All signal output is electrical. The unit has a few inputs which I have not fully explored yet. But I know one is the setting for barometric pressure on the internal altimeter, and another is setting for pull-out altitude. The electrical output signal of the unit controls servosoperating the Stuka’s control surfaces to bring about or maintain the recovery from a dive within safe limits. I haven’t confirmed whether the unit was truly automatic in that it INITIATES the recovery INDEPENDENT of pilot action. Or if bomb release or a pilot’s toggling of a switch was necessary to activate the unit’s dive recovery assist functions. Perhaps the DRU could be set to be triggered by any of these 3 or more options?

The DRU’s purpose is to prevent the aircrew and aircraft from destruction caused by impact with terrain or excessive G-force. It achieved this by affecting pull-out by movement of the controls while assisting to limit the G’s placed on the airframe.

Thus, it is very likely a DRU could be operated without bomb-release. But recovery from a dive WITHOUT dropping the bombload would have different flight dynamics - and require a higher minimum recovery altitude. This would need to be anticipated by a Stuka pilot and gunner and might be the reason different sources quote different minimum operational altitudes. [Sources vary between 900m and 450m AGL]. Or these may be the difference between operational realities and a theoretical minimum.

Sources also vary in their descriptions of how DRU’s were set up and operated during a mission. However the DRU undoubtedly needs to be fed two critical pieces of information: barometric pressure allowing the internal altimeter to be accurate, and the minimum “pull-up” altitude from which the aircraft needs to recover to avoid impacting terrain. According to one source it was Luftwaffe procedure to establish the minimum altitude before a mission. One source stated the altitude information was input into the unit in flight by the rear gunner, minutes before the dive commenced. This would offer mission flexibility, so an alternate target could be selected by the pilot with the gunner verifying the ground elevation on his charts and set the new minimum altitude in the DRU accordingly.

All my assumptions and statements are open for discussion.

Best,
- Art

User avatar
bf109 emil
Member
Posts: 3627
Joined: 25 Mar 2008, 22:20
Location: Youngstown Alberta Canada

Re: Neuhammer Stuka disaster

#27

Post by bf109 emil » 01 Jul 2009, 08:00

67SATisfaction thank you for the excellent description and operation of the DRU which was shown earlier...knowing how this device works along with the use of it, helps to clarify how the Stuka, more so then most WW2 dive bombers helped to both dive accurately and safely

67SATisfaction
Member
Posts: 12
Joined: 25 Jun 2009, 20:48
Location: USA & Norway

Re: Neuhammer Stuka disaster

#28

Post by 67SATisfaction » 01 Jul 2009, 20:11

Most welcome. Happy to offer what we know about the Stuka's automatic dive recovery device. With the many and varied sources of information, there is truly something new to learn every day and hopefully shed light on the past.

It is very motivating to discover forums and people like you folks - it's what makes history really come alive.

67SATisfaction
Member
Posts: 12
Joined: 25 Jun 2009, 20:48
Location: USA & Norway

Re: Neuhammer Stuka disaster

#29

Post by 67SATisfaction » 28 Mar 2011, 05:02

It's been a long time since this thread originated, but we've verified some additional technical aspects of the German dive bombing recovery systems thanks to recent correspondence with a restoration group in Germany dedicated to Luftwaffe aircraft. There are some inaccuracies in the information I wrote about the Stuka system.

The dive recovery unit we have that 'Furyman' posted photos of is NOT from a Ju-87 Stuka. It has been positively identified as a dive recovery computer from a Ju-88.

This has little or no direct bearing on the subject of the Neuhammer Disaster. I just wanted to correct the information we previously posted about the system.

The Stuka had a relatively simple dive recovery "system" on board. It was an alarm feature on the aircraft's altimeter (the so-called "kontakthøhenmesser"). An audible alarm would sound upon the Ju-87 having descended to a pre-set altitude. This altitude is manually set. It is still correct that operational policy was to establish the minimum safe pull-out altitude of a given target prior to the mission. The "pull-out" maneuver itself required pilot action to initiate and maintain. There was a mechanical limiter on the rearward travel of the control yoke such that the airframe would not be stressed beyond its capabilities during a pull-out. This stick limiter could be overridden by the pilot applying muscle force of something like 30kg. We were told by our German contacts the Ju-87 Stuka didn't have the size or payload capacity for a more complex system to be effective. It would have been too heavy. There were no automated system or servos that would perform the pull-out maneuver(s) for the Ju-87 pilot.

The Ju-88 had the size and capacity for the more automated dive recovery system. The Ju-88 was obviously used for many many other missions besides dive bombing. For this reason, the automated dive recovery/computing system was apparently not employed or even installed very often.

Thank you,
- Art

User avatar
tigre
Member
Posts: 10550
Joined: 20 Mar 2005, 12:48
Location: Argentina

Re: Neuhammer Stuka disaster

#30

Post by tigre » 06 Aug 2011, 16:06

Hello to all :D; something more on this subject..................

In that tragedy perished among others 26 young pilots:

Oberleutnant Eppen (Adjutant); Oberleutnant Müller (T.O.); Oberleutnant Goldmann (Staffelkapitän of the 2./ St G 76).

While survived (among others):

Hauptmann Walter Sigel; Oberleutnant Peltz (Staffelkapitän of the 1./ St G 76) and Leutnant Hans Stepp (leader of the first kette of the 1. Staffel).

Source: Der Adler 21 – Noviembre de 1939.
"Angriff-höhe 4000". Cajus Bekker.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
Attachments
image002.gif
image002.gif (57.7 KiB) Viewed 2786 times
image004.gif
image004.gif (62 KiB) Viewed 2786 times

Post Reply

Return to “Luftwaffe air units and Luftwaffe in general”