Yes indeed, by mid October they had enough to do a maximum effort - one day - of 300 sorties, including the specialty units. So all 46-odd Staffeln theoretically equipped could on their best day generate a sortie rate just over half the nominal Staffel strength.phylo_roadking wrote:Which is what they were going to have.
How exactly does that help with a 16-24 September or 1-3 October launch window for Sealion? In that period the Staffeln were re-equipping and trying to figure out the new tactics and techniques. On 7 September, 4./JG 26, the first unit to transition, made its first operational sortie...and also lost its first aircraft over England. 9./JG 54 recived its first three on 20 September then flew 17 missions until 12 October when they turned them over to 8. Staffel, which became the permanent Jabostaffel. On 2 October, the newly equipped Jabostaffel of III./JG 53 executed its first Jabo mission...and lost four aircraft, including the Staffel Kapitan. The Jabostaffel of I./JG 51 launched its first mission on 7 October with eight aircraft lost two over England and had two crash after just making the French coast.
As I expected, you were just playing silly buggers word games again.I was referring to the centre-line shackles or "ventral ETC centre-line stores pylon".
Try addressing some actual issues for once instead.
Yes, obviously I have no interest in the subject...aside from noticing the Germans apparently so well understood the sector boundaries and Fighter Command operations that they immediately exploited that oh so critical "Sector-wide corridor to London"...right?Obviously you're not interested in noticing....but for those that are, what you notice is a two-Sector-wide corridor to London. Four, if you include the earlier in the week operations against Kenley and Tangmere.
EDIT: I just noticed. From the first Jabo mission on 7 September to the end of the month, a grand total of 19 missions were executed with a total of 428 sorties....and for the purposes expressed in Direct No. 16, what more do they have to do to achieve local air superiority over the invasion area than prevent Fighter Command operating effectively in the four most southerly Sectors of Eleven Group?
The Jabostaffeln did not help WRT achieving local air superiority if they took away the capability of the Jagdwaffen to engage the British fighter defenses EXCEPT by attacking the ground installations, which the Germans had ALREADY assessed wasn't effective. The end result was that beyond the coastal crust, they required as much escort support as the bombers had...and in any case, they only became a factor after the Sealion invasion window had closed.