Luftwaffe vs RAF

[RichTO90]

Which is what they were going to have.

Yes indeed, by mid October they had enough to do a maximum effort - one day - of 300 sorties, including the specialty units. So all 46-odd Staffeln theoretically equipped could on their best day generate a sortie rate just over half the nominal Staffel strength.

How exactly does that help with a 16-24 September or 1-3 October launch window for Sealion? In that period the Staffeln were re-equipping and trying to figure out the new tactics and techniques. On 7 September, 4./JG 26, the first unit to transition, made its first operational sortie...and also lost its first aircraft over England. 9./JG 54 recived its first three on 20 September then flew 17 missions until 12 October when they turned them over to 8. Staffel, which became the permanent Jabostaffel. On 2 October, the newly equipped Jabostaffel of III./JG 53 executed its first Jabo mission...and lost four aircraft, including the Staffel Kapitan. The Jabostaffel of I./JG 51 launched its first mission on 7 October with eight aircraft lost two over England and had two crash after just making the French coast.

I was referring to the centre-line shackles or "ventral ETC centre-line stores pylon".

As I expected, you were just playing silly buggers word games again.

Try addressing some actual issues for once instead.

Obviously you're not interested in noticing....but for those that are, what you notice is a two-Sector-wide corridor to London. Four, if you include the earlier in the week operations against Kenley and Tangmere.

Yes, obviously I have no interest in the subject...aside from noticing the Germans apparently so well understood the sector boundaries and Fighter Command operations that they immediately exploited that oh so critical "Sector-wide corridor to London"...right?

...and for the purposes expressed in Direct No. 16, what more do they have to do to achieve local air superiority over the invasion area than prevent Fighter Command operating effectively in the four most southerly Sectors of Eleven Group?

EDIT: I just noticed. From the first Jabo mission on 7 September to the end of the month, a grand total of 19 missions were executed with a total of 428 sorties.

The Jabostaffeln did not help WRT achieving local air superiority if they took away the capability of the Jagdwaffen to engage the British fighter defenses EXCEPT by attacking the ground installations, which the Germans had ALREADY assessed wasn't effective. The end result was that beyond the coastal crust, they required as much escort support as the bombers had...and in any case, they only became a factor after the Sealion invasion window had closed.

[phylo_roadking]

I was referring to the centre-line shackles or "ventral ETC centre-line stores pylon".

As I expected, you were just playing silly buggers word games again.
Try addressing some actual issues for once instead.

No, it was you that was doing that with the aforementioned strawman about "bomb racks".

Yes, obviously I have no interest in the subject...aside from noticing the Germans apparently so well understood the sector boundaries and Fighter Command operations that they immediately exploited that oh so critical "Sector-wide corridor to London"...right?

No, if you look back to what I was discussing with Sid, you note I actually put the change in Luftwaffe tactics into September; that was just the last-week-of-August example of the intensity of operations and how successful they were at closing down airfields and Sector stations...albeit temporarily...compared to the start of the campaign earl;ier in the month.

They continued with the level of attacks on Sectors stations etc. into the first week of in September...then headed to London en masse by day on the 7th of the month...the 5th and 6th having seen a high intensity of sorties against airfields even though the change in targets had already been decided.

For Sid, and to quote Patrick Bishop - as of the 6th...

Fighter Command was approaching a crisis. During the previous two weeks it had seen 295 of its fighters destroyed and 171 seriously damaged. Even with the improvements in production, the aero factories were struggling to keep up with the rate of attrition. Workers were tiring and productivity was slowing. During August, just over 300 pilots had been lost and only 260 had arrived to replace them, many inadequately prepared by the shortened training time now in operation. Six of the seven Sector stations were now bombed almost to the point of collapse. Five of its advanced fields were seriously damaged....

...Park later wrote that the damage to 11 Group's airfields was now (the 7th - my note) so bad that it "...greatly reduced the defensive power of our fighter squadrons. The destruction of numerous telephone lines...using emergency Sector ops rooms...and an almost complete disorganization of the defence system made the control of our fighter squadrons extremely difficult...had the enemy continued his heavy attacks against Biggin Hill and the adjacent sectors...the fighter defences of London would have been in a perilous state."

But unbeknownst to Park et al, the Luftwaffe had already decided to change its tactics radically and head to "Loge" instead, its codename for London.

[RichTO90]

No, it was you that was doing that with the aforementioned strawman about "bomb racks".

Yes indeed it is quite a strawman you created. Phylo, we were discussing your problematic statement regarding the deployment of Jabo's. I pointed out that your claim of half the Jagdgruppen being equipped with them "but" (I assume you meant "by") October was nonsense. You then created a strawman about "bomb racks" to divert attention from the simple fact that you've been talking through your hat.

Furthermore, this...

was able to carry ordnance for the lowlevel, fast-pass raids on airfields that proved so successful when piloted (sic) by Erprobungskommando210.

Is also utter tosh. The Jagdfliger hated those missions as they hated all the Jabo missions. The only ones really good at it, because they trained specifically for it, were Erprobungsgruppe (well the Bf 109 Staffel, the Bf 110 Staffeln were hosed by the end of September) and the two Lehrgruppen. The rest had no clue where the bombs were going and tried marvelous things like going round twice at airfields...with predictable results. The end result was that by October, when most of the Jabo had been deployed - one-third of the Staffeln, not half remember - the decision was made to use them in raids against London...not airfields, which were seen as too costly a target. And by the turn of the year they converted to Bf 109F for the spring campaign in the east. The separate Jabo Staffel concept wasn't returned to again until 1942, until the same problems crept up, which led to the formation of the new Schlachtgruppe and the concentration of the ex-Jabo Staffeln in them.

No, if you look back to what I was discussing with Sid, you note I actually put the change in Luftwaffe tactics into September; that was just the last-week-of-August example of the intensity of operations and how successful they were at closing down airfields and Sector stations...albeit temporarily...compared to the start of the campaign earl;ier in the month.

They continued with the level of attacks on Sectors stations etc. into the first week of in September...then headed to London en masse by day on the 7th of the month...the 5th and 6th having seen a high intensity of sorties against airfields even though the change in targets had already been decided.

Yes...and why did they head for London? Because they were as clueless about the effect of the raids as they were about the "two sector corridor" opening up, and etc.

[phylo_roadking]

Yes indeed it is quite a strawman you created. Phylo, we were discussing your problematic statement regarding the deployment of Jabo's. I pointed out that your claim of half the Jagdgruppen being equipped with them "but" (I assume you meant "by") October was nonsense. You then created a strawman about "bomb racks" to divert attention from the simple fact that you've been talking through your hat.

Really? *I* created the strawman regarding bomb racks? Let's see...

So a comment from Len Deighton became half of the Bf 109 equipped with bomb racks?

Okay, I'll bite, how were they "able to carry ordnance for the lowlevel, fast-pass raids on airfields that proved so successful when piloted (sic) by Erprobungskommando210" without bomb racks as fitted on the 1/B, 4/B, 4/BN, and 7?

I did try and drag you away from it,

And who mentioned bomb racks?

...but you continued with it. Unfortunately, the forum rules prevent me form calling this statement "You then created a strawman about "bomb racks"" for what it is.


And here's ANOTHER one in the making...

was able to carry ordnance for the lowlevel, fast-pass raids on airfields that proved so successful when piloted (sic) by Erprobungskommando210.

Is also utter tosh. The Jagdfliger hated those missions as they hated all the Jabo missions....etc

I didn't mention a word about them liking them or hating them. ALL that that statement says is that that mission profile was successful when piloted by Erprobungskommando 210. It does not in any way say any about whether or not the rest of the Luftwaffe as any good at them or liked them.

Yes...and why did they head for London? Because they were as clueless about the effect of the raids as they were about the "two sector corridor" opening up, and etc.

And? Do these statements say ANYTHING...

No, if you look back to what I was discussing with Sid, you note I actually put the change in Luftwaffe tactics into September; that was just the last-week-of-August example of the intensity of operations and how successful they were at closing down airfields and Sector stations...albeit temporarily...compared to the start of the campaign earlier in the month.

They continued with the level of attacks on Sectors stations etc. into the first week of in September...then headed to London en masse by day on the 7th of the month...the 5th and 6th having seen a high intensity of sorties against airfields even though the change in targets had already been decided.

..about why the Luftwaffe headed to London? No.

[RichTO90]

Really? *I* created the strawman regarding bomb racks? Let's see...

Nonsense, phylo. You argued that "half" the Jagdwaffe were equipped as Jabos "but October". I asked you where you sourced that from, which turned out to be some vague - on your part - recollections of something that someone once said. Now you're playing your usual game of regrouping and throwing out strawmen in a frantic attempt to show you were right in the first place.

...but you continued with it. Unfortunately, the forum rules prevent me form calling this statement "You then created a strawman about "bomb racks"" for what it is.

You then questioned my use of "bomb racks" with your usual artless question that transmits zero data except to raise the strawman of whether or not the use of "bomb rack" was the correct terminology.However, the issue is what you said about the number of German fighters that could drop bombs. Period. Everything else you are now spinning out to obfuscate that simple fact is your strawman, not mine.

And here's ANOTHER one in the making...

was able to carry ordnance for the lowlevel, fast-pass raids on airfields that proved so successful when piloted (sic) by Erprobungskommando 210.

Is also utter tosh. The Jagdfliger hated those missions as they hated all the Jabo missions....etc

I didn't mention a word about them liking them or hating them. ALL that that statement says is that that mission profile was successful when piloted by Erprobungskommando 210. It does not in any way say any about whether or not the rest of the Luftwaffe as any good at them or liked them.

So are you now saying that in addition to the nonsense about "half" the Jagdflieger being equipped as Jabos "but October" your inference that doing so was a potentially battle-winning strategy is also nonsense because, as you have now correctly admitted, only Erprobungsgruppe 210 and the two Lehrgruppen were the only units that had solid training in that "mission profile"?

And? Do these statements say ANYTHING...

That you've been talking through your hat?

..about why the Luftwaffe headed to London? No.

That's a different subject, but you should be asking why they sent Jabos to London.

[phylo_roadking]

Nonsense, phylo. You argued that "half" the Jagdwaffe were equipped as Jabos "but October". I asked you where you sourced that from, which turned out to be some vague - on your part - recollections of something that someone once said. Now you're playing your usual game of regrouping and throwing out strawmen in a frantic attempt to show you were right in the first place.

I did not, in any way, refer to "bomb racks". You did that....then accused ME of setting up a straw man. And you continue to do it...

You then questioned my use of "bomb racks" with your usual artless question that transmits zero data except to raise the strawman of whether or not the use of "bomb rack" was the correct terminology

What I said was - and you even quoted it again - was

...able to carry ordnance for the lowlevel, fast-pass raids on airfields that proved so successful when piloted (sic) by Erprobungskommando210.

I was referring to the centreline pylon for the Bf 109 and nothing else. I was surprised when YOU started talking about bomb racks....as I would have assumed YOU knew better.

So are you now saying that in addition to the nonsense about "half" the Jagdflieger being equipped as Jabos "but October" your inference that doing so was a potentially battle-winning strategy is also nonsense because, as you have now correctly admitted, only Erprobungsgruppe 210 and the two Lehrgruppen were the only units that had solid training in that "mission profile"?

What I said was "...the lowlevel, fast-pass raids on airfields that proved so successful when piloted (sic) by Erprobungskommando210."

I passed absolutely no comment about liking/hating it, or being good at it. Except for Erprobungsgruppe 210.

[RichTO90]

I did not, in any way, refer to "bomb racks". You did that....then accused ME of setting up a straw man. And you continue to do it...

Nor did I ever say you did. I used the term. You questioned it. Unfortunately that does not change the simple fact that you lazily claimed, without checking, that half the Jagdwaffe "but October" were capable of dropping bombs. That is incorrect. Please try to focus on the issue instead of your strawman.

I was referring to the centreline pylon for the Bf 109 and nothing else. I was surprised when YOU started talking about bomb racks....as I would have assumed YOU knew better.

Oh, my use of a generic term acceptable to most everyone as a synonym for "device by which an aircraft can carry bombs" was what got you in a tizzy? You might notice that before you went off on your strawman tangent I noted that I already thought that was what you were on about.

WHICH REMAINS SINGULARLY UNRELATED TO THE ERROR YOU WERE CALLED OUT ON.

Which is the number of German fighter aircraft you claimed were available to carry bombs on their whatchamacallit bomb thingie.

What I said was "...the lowlevel, fast-pass raids on airfields that proved so successful when piloted (sic) by Erprobungskommando210."

I passed absolutely no comment about liking/hating it, or being good at it. Except for Erprobungsgruppe 210.

So are you now saying that you were unaware that the two Lehrgruppen deployed in August-September were also capable of conducting those successful attacks? Or are you now saying that when you inferred it was a potential battle-winning tactic by the Germans, you were spouting nonsense equal to your claim about "half" the Jagdwaffe being capable "but October"?

There, I phrased my question to you differently so you could have another whack at actually making a stab at attempting to answer it, instead of diverting attention to another strawman about something I never said you said, but was rather my commentary upon why I thought your whole idea was inane nonsense.

Until you can be so bothered, get stuffed.

Cheers!

[Urmel]

Lest we forget

2/ at the same time, the Luftwaffe began converting its Bf109s en masse to use the tactics worked out in Late August; but October, half the Bf109s in Western France and the Low Countries was able to carry ordnance for the lowlevel, fast-pass raids on airfields that proved so successful when piloted (sic) by Erprobungskommando210.

Let's make it simple.

1) Did half of the 109s have the capacity to carry bombs by October? Yes or no?
2) If the answer is 'yes', what's the source?

[Kurfürst]

"In July – September the number of Luftwaffe pilots available fell by 136, but the number of operational pilots had shrunk by 171 by September."

To be precise, Übersicht über Soll, Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft, Verluste und Reserven der fliegenden Verbänden, RL 2 III/700, states that as of 28 June there were 1,309 single-engine fighter pilots assigned against an establishment of 1,398, and of those 1,089 were ready for operations and 82 were on light duty. As of 27 September the number assigned had increased to 1,452 against an establishment of 1,450, but those ready had fallen to 994 with 334 on light duty.

So there were actually 143 more available, but 95 fewer ready for operations.

The numbers are for Tagjagd only, ie. day fighters.

In other words, the number of pilots increased, but the number of experienced pilots decreased. AFAIK the "on light duty" is not an accurate translation, as the "Einstatzbereit" or Ready of Action meant pilots with 5 sorties or more experience.

Also there is some statistical pittfall in the numbers, since in the meantime between end of June and end of September some JGs (and their pilots) were either disbanded/merged etc, and some were transferred from Tagjagd to the just emerging Nachtjagd units. Moreso, not the entirety of the Tagjagd was employed for England operations.

[RichTO90]

The numbers are for Tagjagd only, ie. day fighters.

Sure. I don't believe there were any single-engine Nachtjagd at this time.

In other words, the number of pilots increased, but the number of experienced pilots decreased. AFAIK the "on light duty" is not an accurate translation, as the "Einstatzbereit" or Ready of Action meant pilots with 5 sorties or more experience.

Really? I have never seen it expressed that way before. Einstatzbereit means "ready for action". I have not heard the qualifier before. However, I am also unclear as to what got translated as "light duty" in the original. Do you have some references on that?

Also there is some statistical pittfall in the numbers, since in the meantime between end of June and end of September some JGs (and their pilots) were either disbanded/merged etc, and some were transferred from Tagjagd to the just emerging Nachtjagd units. Moreso, not the entirety of the Tagjagd was employed for England operations.

Um, no, since those are for the fliegenden Verbänden as a whole.

[Urmel]

In the reports I have seen for North Africa 1941, it is reported as:

1) Number of crews
2) Einsatzbereit

E.g.
1) 17
2) 7

[RichTO90]

In the reports I have seen for North Africa 1941, it is reported as:

1) Number of crews
2) Einsatzbereit

E.g.
1) 17
2) 7

Yeah, I've always wondered exactly what the phrase translated as "light duty" says in Übersicht über Soll, Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft, Verluste und Reserven der fliegenden Verbänden, since I have only seen the translated lists. Soll, Istbestand, and Einsatzbereit are pretty simple, but "light duty"? Nicht Einsatzbereit?

[doogal]

Did not the Luftwaffe engage in a pre - 1940 study which looked at the operational possibilities of attacking and attempting to gain air superiority over only the South Coast of England??? concluding that it would bear poor results.

[Urmel]

In the reports I have seen for North Africa 1941, it is reported as:

1) Number of crews
2) Einsatzbereit

E.g.
1) 17
2) 7

Yeah, I've always wondered exactly what the phrase translated as "light duty" says in Übersicht über Soll, Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft, Verluste und Reserven der fliegenden Verbänden, since I have only seen the translated lists. Soll, Istbestand, and Einsatzbereit are pretty simple, but "light duty"? Nicht Einsatzbereit?

Sorry, I have to correct myself. Just looked at the files again (goes to show to not post from memory), and of course I made a mistake.

So it would be:

1) Number of crews
2) Einsatzbereit
3) Bedingt Einsatzbereit

E.g.
1) 17
2) 7
3) 0

Attached a screenshot showing how that looked like in ULTRA translation.

Untitled.jpg

[Juha Tompuri]

The numbers are for Tagjagd only, ie. day fighters.

Sure. I don't believe there were any single-engine Nachtjagd at this time.

http://www.ww2.dk/air/njagd/njg1.htm

Regards, Juha