Luftwaffe lost

[JonS]

This fuel shortage was caused by Romanians who were unable/unwilling to keep the supply at the same level, and then by the Soviets who in August 1944 overrun Romania.

Well, that and the fact that the GAF was utterly unable to defend it's own production sources. Because it was too busy being shot out of the sky

[Huck]

LOL I'd guessed you'd try that approach

The massive expansion you refer to would explain why total numbers of fighter a/c available in the GAF remained the essentially same throughout 1944 :roll: Combining the graph below with the % Authorised Strength graph above we can derive the following table:

. . . . . . . # Actual . . . % Auth . . . # Auth
Jan 44. . 1561 . . . . . . 72 . . . . . . . 2168
Mar 44 . .1747 . . . . . . 73 . . . . . . . 2393
May 44 . .1650 . . . . . .60 . . . . . . .. 2750
Jul 44 . . .1523 . . . . . . 55 . . . . . . . 2769
Sep 44 . . 1610 . . . . . . 45 . . . . . . . 3578

Do not put words in my mouth. I never said there was big increase in fighters strength. What I said was that there was massive expansion of the fighter pilot training program during the spring of 1944 (3 times increase).

So, you tell me ... If the GAF weren't flying due to a lack of fuel (and therefore weren't being shot down in droves), why weren't they able to easily acheive their new authorised strength of ~3,600 in September? I mean, it should have only required less than three weeks production to 'catch up'. But they didn't, or couldn't. Heck, they barely even grew from the year-start position. Why?

The answer is obvious. In the summer of 1943, at the peak of its fuel consumption, Luftwaffe was able to fuel only one in two planes available. By the end of summer of 1944 they were able to fuel only 1 in 20 planes. So give me the rationale why they should have tried to achieve the authorized strenght in Sept 1944 when only a fraction of the planes had fuel anyway.

You should know by now that in 1944 despite of a production of almost 40,000 aircraft Luftwaffe accepted less than 15,000 aircraft. They could easily replace losses if needed, in fact Luftwaffe was larger in 1945 than in 1944 or 1943. But it flew 10 times less. Why? because it did not have planes or pilots?

Leaving your 10% inflation of the number of airframes produced aside,

This is both a pointless and wrong commentary, obviously the numbers were approximations, however much more precise than the one given by your 10% reduction. Production in 1944 was 39,807 airplanes (according to Overy), approximating this figure by 40,000 is perfectly acceptable. Don't try this hard to embarrass yourself.

you manage to bring up an interesting point: "it did not have ... pilots". Well, d'uh. Where had the pilots gone, I wonder? Shot out of the sky, perhaps?

What pilots? what are you talking about?

[Huck]

This fuel shortage was caused by Romanians who were unable/unwilling to keep the supply at the same level, and then by the Soviets who in August 1944 overrun Romania.

Well, that and the fact that the GAF was utterly unable to defend it's own production sources. Because it was too busy being shot out of the sky

Again, crude oil supply from Romania was not affected by the American bombardment because it was buffered by stocks. Only the oil extraction was affected. Crude oil supply from Romania decreased prior the American bombardments that started in late spring of 1944 and were flown intermittently through the summer of that year. And if you mention losses, USAAF suffered much higher loss rate during the missions against Ploesti compared to the average loss rates over Germany.

[JonS]

So give me the rationale why they should have tried to achieve the authorized strenght in Sept 1944 when only a fraction of the planes had fuel anyway.

Well, perhaps because the auth strength had been increased? Or is this just another example of the GAF working furiously to defeat itself? On the one hand 'someone' is upping the auth strength, while on the other 'someone else' is refusing to release apparently available a/c to the units that need them? Yup. Sound organisation skills there. If they weren't going to even try to acheive auth str, why bother raising it? Why bother producing the a/c in the first place?

Give me a reason why they wouldn't release available a/c to units requiring them? And some proof would be nice. Your speculation is all very rivetting, but not very helpful.

Not that it really matters though - the important point is that the GAF single-engine fighter strength was essentially stagnant from Jan 42 through to the end of the war. Despite mighty efforts in some areas to increase it.

Leaving your 10% inflation of the number of airframes produced aside,

This is both a pointless and wrong commentary, obviously the numbers were approximations, however much more precise than the one given by your 10% reduction. Production in 1944 was 39,807 airplanes (according to Overy), approximating this figure by 40,000 is perfectly acceptable.

Well, I did say "leaving it aside", but since you want to make a big deal out of it :roll:

Murray, on p.253, gives 36,000 a/c produced by Germany in 1944 (and notes that this is only 8,000 more than the Japanese), and as a source for this he gives ... wait, what's this? Richard Overy, The Air War, 1939-1945 (London, 1980), p .123. Isn't that the same source you are using? How odd.

Anyway, 36,000 or 40,000. The difference isn't that important. Which is why I suggested leaving it aside.

you manage to bring up an interesting point: "it did not have ... pilots". Well, d'uh. Where had the pilots gone, I wonder? Shot out of the sky, perhaps?

What pilots?

Well, yes. That's the rather the point. An effective airforce requires a/c + trained pilots + fuel + sound organisation.

* The GAF may have had a/c, though they were managing to lose them hand over fist too.
* The GAF was rapidly running out of useful pilots, because they were being killed faster than they could be trained (you know, that whole shot out of the sky thing)
* By the second half of 1944 the GAF was running out of fuel even faster than it was running out of pilots, in part because it was unable to defend it's own logistical base (and why couldn't it? Well, that whole being shot out of the sky thing earlier in the year wasn't helping much)
* Sound organisation. Heh. (see for example: lack of trained pilots, which goes back much earlier than any fuel shortage)

Regards
JonS

[thor-jg51]

not nearly as busy getting shot out of the sky as whoever they faced, and that would

be considered a tatical victory, if it were an allied group, in here anyway.

t

This fuel shortage was caused by Romanians who were unable/unwilling to keep the supply at the same level, and then by the Soviets who in August 1944 overrun Romania.

Well, that and the fact that the GAF was utterly unable to defend it's own production sources. Because it was too busy being shot out of the sky

[Acolyte]

I think the main problem with the Luftwaffe was that it was basically intended to be an air force that has no strategic aims but is tasked with giving tactical support to the Wehrmacht's land forces during Blitzkrieg attacks, HOWEVER it was not used as such, in fact it was regularly misused during the war: given tasks that were either beyond its capabilities (to gain air supremacy over Southern England in 1940, supply the 6th Army at Stalingrad etc.) or not suited for their equipment (i.e. using their aircraft in roles they weren't designed for). Göring had way too much political influence in the German armed forces (especially if emphasis is put on his rather limited skills as the Luftwaffe's commander), and the Luftwaffe becoming a separate branch within the Wehrmacht was an obvious result of that.

I'm one of those people who think the air force should have a very limited role as separate branch of the armed forces. It should be equipped with long-range strategic bombers, high-altitude interceptors and recon planes - all other types of military aircraft should be organised into the air arm of the land forces and used for tactical support of land operations, under the command of the land forces (navies obviously need to have their own air force).

The Luftwaffe would have done better IMO if it was mainly used as the air arm of the Heer, under the command of Heer officers (not Göring) who were aware of its limitations and would've used it as it was meant to be used. The Kriegsmarine should have had its own air arm as well (consisting of recon planes, torpedo bombers etc.) and the Luftwaffe as a separate branch (under the command of a sensible guy like Kesselring or what have you) should have been responsible for the air defence of Germany and strategically important targets in the occupied territories (oil refineries etc.) But then again, I'm not an expert...

[ChristopherPerrien]

I think the main problem with the Luftwaffe was that it was basically intended to be an air force that has no strategic aims but is tasked with giving tactical support to the Wehrmacht's land forces during Blitzkrieg attacks, HOWEVER it was not used as such, in fact it was regularly misused during the war: given tasks that were either beyond its capabilities (to gain air supremacy over Southern England in 1940, supply the 6th Army at Stalingrad etc.) or not suited for their equipment (i.e. using their aircraft in roles they weren't designed for). Göring had way too much political influence in the German armed forces (especially if emphasis is put on his rather limited skills as the Luftwaffe's commander), and the Luftwaffe becoming a separate branch within the Wehrmacht was an obvious result of that.

I'm one of those people who think the air force should have a very limited role as separate branch of the armed forces. It should be equipped with long-range strategic bombers, high-altitude interceptors and recon planes - all other types of military aircraft should be organised into the air arm of the land forces and used for tactical support of land operations, under the command of the land forces (navies obviously need to have their own air force).

The Luftwaffe would have done better IMO if it was mainly used as the air arm of the Heer, under the command of Heer officers (not Göring) who were aware of its limitations and would've used it as it was meant to be used. The Kriegsmarine should have had its own air arm as well (consisting of recon planes, torpedo bombers etc.) and the Luftwaffe as a separate branch (under the command of a sensible guy like Kesselring or what have you) should have been responsible for the air defence of Germany and strategically important targets in the occupied territories (oil refineries etc.) But then again, I'm not an expert...

It matters not if the Germans had 10 He-177's operational or 1000 by even 1942. Did the first 1000 Allied heavy bombers make a dent in Germany's war-fighting potential? Exactly what could have an "in finitum" number of He-177's done for Germany?
Could they have,
Won air superiority over England?
Scared the "plucky English to surrendering?
Exceeded in destroying more the material support of the USA to either or both Britian or the USSR?

How long would that have taken?

There is no example of Heavy bombers being decisive to beating a country, much less a particular model.