phylo_roadking wrote:And there we have the really
big problem in a nutshell -
time. For example - the Mosquito vs. the Me410. The 410 had to grow out of the "failed" 210, and thus arrived in service in 1943....whereas the Mosquito predated it by two years at every stage. And despite being a "later" aircraft - it was
still a relative failure. Germany simply never picked up all those lost years of model-on-model, mark-on-mark development experience - and it was
still by the middle of the war, their "high point", causing German designers to throw up turkeys,
even with the resources of "Totalische Krieg" to throw at them 
The Nazis could have thrown everything at the problem in the middle of the 1930s - but they had over a decade of missed experience designing military aircraft to make up, and they never
quite managed it - even with the way the war telescoped development times
If they'd
started the war with a strategic bomber force of aircraft of the capacity of the He177 -
they'd have to have been aircraft designed in 1935-36 - and as I've told Roddoss before elsewhere, the bombers that Germany WAS designing in 1935-36 were truly poor
You can't simply magic that vital missed decade out of existence.
And i have always have told you that the Death of General Walther Wever had a dramatic history altering course for the Luftwaffe, but you seem to think it had no effect.
I should point out that as far as i can gather that the Do-19 and Ju-89 weren't cancelled by General Walther Wever but were cancelled by General Albert Kesselring.
Interesting points in history.
He-177
3rd June 1936 RLM issues specifications for a Heavy Strategic Bomber.
2nd June 1937 RLM issues Heinkel with an order to build a mock-up of its design
? November 1937 Heinkel completes its mock-up
5th November 1937 RLM designates the aircraft the official designation of RLM Type Number 8-177.
5th November 1937 RLM interference orders Heinkel that the design be changed to accomidate dive bombing capabilities.
From this point on we know of the difficulties of what Heinkel was facing with the specifications of having to incorporate this specification into the design, Heinkel never could iron out all of the faults that this direct interference caused. Further point, when Heinkel suggested that the DB-606 engines be replaced, the RLM rejected this out of hand, even Damlier Benz considerd that it was a poor choice for the He-177, but agian the RLM demanded that the DB-606 be used.
From 1939 to 1943 Heinkel struggled with the He-177 it was in effect a lemon, as one problem was fixed another occured because of that remedy, the main problem was that of the continuance of the Wing/Engine make up.
Heinkel had secretly decided that it would redesign the He-177 as an in-house project, the design would replace the DB-606 engines and replace them with four seperate DB-603 engines, and modified the aircraft accordingly to the engine design changes, plus drop the dive bombing capability.
In May 1943 Adolf Hitler place a demand on the RLM to the effect that Germany must have a strategic bomber to attack London and other major cities in Britian. Heinkel had an advocate that the RLM could not reject this time around, so work proceded, the new aircraft bourne was the He-277, the only real difference was the addition of a twin fin construct to overcome handling problems and it achieved that, but it was too late and less than 14 months later He-277 was cancelled as fighter production became a priority.
The main problem was that Germany could and did make an excellent strategic heavy bomber, but that was in February 1944. Had the RLM under General Albert Kesselring not continued to cause permanent interference in the development of the He-177 as it should have, even refusing Heinkel and
Daimler Benz to alter the design was criminal, his and with Reichmarschall Herman
n G
öring hand in interference they deprived the Luftwaffe with an excellent aircraft.
The Luftwaffe could have had an effective weapon and by 1942 begun their own thousand bomber raids on London or any other target, but that is for another section of the forum.
By the end of the war, for instance, the RAF Heavy Bomber force comprised 3,500 aircraft It was SO large that they had run out of useful targets for it, the FNSF's 1,500 Mosquitos were far more effective!
