Why the Waffen-SS

[Cult Icon]

and neither were the SS mechanized units, which were comparable to their Heer counterparts and were in no way better (and your quotes about Balck's book don't say anything else).

Balck has an interesting way of evaluating formations, there is also a paper where he writes about his ideal of the division which matches his interview.

Overall, I don't know if that the "quality" was better, it may have been worse than the best army panzer divisions.

In reading the operations of 43-45 (including counterattacks in the East), haven't you noticed that the significantly larger size of 1-3.SS,G.D. divisions gave them more staying power than neighboring formations that were involved in the same operation? The most obvious being 2 x extra infantry battalions and generally higher armor strength. Also, their frequent assignment for the main effort of the operations that they took part in.

The recently published book on the Konrad operations, "Sword and the Shield" is clear about this.

[CNE503]

I totally understand your point but I disagree: "elite" can't be only an organizational matter. Otherwise, the example that I've already given of the 319. Infanterie-Division which counted roughly 40000 soldiers in 1944 (because it was defending the only part of Great Britain in German hands, the anglo-normand isles) is a good example of an elite division. After all, it could defend a much broader front than a SS mechanized unit.

You have countless accounts, even in the last weeks of the war, of Heer/Luftwaffe units performing lethal counterstrikes. Without Waffen-SS mechanized units. For instance, 1. Panzer-Division in Debrecen in October 1944. 2. Panzer-Division which is the only one to reach the Meuse river in December 1944. 5. Panzer-Division defending Königsberg early 1945. Or one of the two "Hermann Göring" divisions in Bautzen late April 1945.
There is a hypertrophy of Waffen-SS combat records that darkens regular units combat records. It's exactly the same process than with the vaunted so-called "Afrikakorps" (which was actually only a part of the German expeditionary corps in Africa, Panzergruppe then Panzerarmee "Afrika").
So we agree on the fact that Waffen-SS mechanized divisions were usually better equipped and had their full complement of soldiers more than their Heer counterparts. And that as every single mechanized units able to proceed to mobile warfare they were intensively used in lethal counterattacks or stiff resistance everywhere they could. Does they deserve such a thing as "elite" status? I don't think so, and I repeat that I don't think that any of the German generals gave it to them (though, maybe in postwar writtings... But propaganda was working well at this time).

CNE503

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi jkeenan,

You write, "There where was nothing wrong with the Waffen-SS divisions that were stood up at the beginning of the war."

Strictly speaking, not only were there no Waffen-SS divisions at the beginning of the war, there was no Waffen-SS either!

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Cult Icon,

When I asked, "You will have to clarify with a bit of evidence."

You replied,

"Well, you'll have to spend more time reading operational and unit histories...."

I would suggest that it is up to ourselves to support our propositions with evidence, not others. If we cannot do so, they fall by default.

You say Balck uses the word "elite" 13 times in his book. Of whom?

The Balck interview to which you gave us a link doesn't seem to mention the Leibstandarte, the Waffen-SS or the word "elite". Why did you refer us to it?

It is also interesting that Balck is equating the quality of Hitler's personal bodyguard division full of volunteers, which was presumably selected to be the absolute best of the W-SS, with a standard Army panzer division full of conscripts. Reading between the lines, this of itself might tell us something!

Cheers,

Sid

[Michael Kenny]

3.FJD, according to Zaloga,was considered to have twice the combat power of a regular infantry division by the Germans despite being not amazingly well equipped (only 1 artillery battalion, inventory below authorized).

Consult Zetterling to see why the Division's casualties up to Sept 4 1944 were greater than its nominal manpower.

[CNE503]

Michael, why that?
I'm genuinely interested in the answer!

Regards,

CNE503

[Cult Icon]

The small, pre-war SS saw themselves as an "elite" and marketed themselves as such. The SS Officer schools were meant to raise an 'elite' and their cadets absorbed these attitudes. Their definition of elite is different from yours and mines it seems.

The old academic book from 1966, "the Waffen SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War, 1939-45" by Stein is perhaps one of the most cited books- my history professor even recommended it. It is still useful but definitely outdated, with the author constantly using the word "elite" and writing his subjective opinions but without access to a lot of important publications contemporary and later.

[Cult Icon]

on pg. 135 of the mentioned book, a letter from III PzK (1941) commander von Mackensen to Himmler writes of the SSLAH as a "genuine elite formation" and "aura that surrounds the Fuhrer's guard". von mackensen also includes a lot of superlatives.

[Dwight Pruitt]

"Dear Reichsfűhrer,
Your officers lack proper training, your troops take too many casualties and prove to be a drain on manpower and equipment for the army"
s. v.Mackensen

How do you think that would have worked out for the author?

[Michael Kenny]

3.FJD, according to Zaloga,was considered to have twice the combat power of a regular infantry division by the Germans despite being not amazingly well equipped (only 1 artillery battalion, inventory below authorized).

Attachment edited to stress point being made

[Cult Icon]

what's the point of derailing the thread with a clip from Zetterling's Normandy.

[Cult Icon]

How do you think that would have worked out for the author?

Maybe you can tell me

[Michael Kenny]

what's the point of derailing the thread with a clip from Zetterling's Normandy.

It has a direct bearing on this quote:

https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic ... 1#p2144401

3.FJD, according to Zaloga,was considered to have twice the combat power of a regular infantry division by the Germans despite being not amazingly well equipped (only 1 artillery battalion, inventory below authorized).

I suggest you take your own advice and 'spend more time reading operational and unit histories....'


https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic ... 9#p2144399

Sorry, I don't work for you or the slightly flawed editorial stance of this thread.

I take a different view when challenged.
I have no problems with simple request for conformation of anything I post.
I am always able to reference any of my posts

[Cult Icon]

I totally understand your point but I disagree: "elite" can't be only an organizational matter.

You have countless accounts, even in the last weeks of the war, of Heer/Luftwaffe units performing lethal counterstrikes. Without Waffen-SS mechanized units.this time).

Naturally the 1-3. SS, G.D. divisions were not everywhere.

The H.G. division was originally considered an 'elite' as well and later a Panzerkorps H.G. was organized with various formations as an economy saving measure.

I believe there was a Axishistory post on Totenkopf casualties- perhaps the highest in WW2. G.D. had around 50,000 according to Spaeter. 5.SS had about half of this according to their history, and the same for 23.Pz. In general, a pattern can be detected where the 4 big divisions simply ran through more material and personnel & were assigned main efforts in their operations.

Jentz' Panzertruppen I/II has data on the deliveries.

[CNE503]

There was no such thing in the German army as elite. Neither in Waffen-SS nor with "Grossdeutschland" or "Hermann Göring" units.

CNE503